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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers the impacts of legislation introduced by the British 
government in 1984 to restructure the administration of non-advanced further education 
(NAFE) in England and Wales. The White Paper Training for Jobs proposed to transfer 
a substantial proportion of responsibility for the delivery of NAFE away from local 
education authorities (LEAs) to the Manpower Services Commission (MSC), involving 
the transfer of a proportion of LEAs' block grant to the MSC's annual budget for the 
purposes of NAFE delivery.
The thesis examines the impacts of the White Paper by recourse to three themes. 
First, the revision of the policy innovation as a consequence of resistance by local 
authorities and their national associations to the policy as framed, and the subsequent 
renegotiation of its terms. Second, the bureaucratic impacts of the policy change, 
principally the restructuring of local working relationships which it necessitated. Third, 
a consideration of its impacts upon local NAFE planning procedures, the target of the 
policy shift Central to the thesis are the relative bureaucratic characterisitcs of, and the 
operational relationship between, the MSC and LEAs, and the effect of these upon the 
development and delivery of NAFE policy.
These themes are set in the context of an historical overview of vocational 
education and training in England and Wales, and a theoretical perspective which 
considers Training for Jobs as an illustrative example of decision-making and policy 
implementation in practice. It presents evidence for the argument that these processes 
should be perceived as a continuum in which actors at all levels play a part in the policy 
process, rejecting more simplistic ’top-down’ approaches to the issue.
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FOREWORD
The subject of this thesis is a field beset by numerous acronyms and jargon terms, 
confusing to the non-specialist reader. To counteract the first of these problems a 
glossary of acronyms has been included at the end of the thesis. The second can be 
tackled by here clarifying some of the terminology employed.
Throughout this thesis, non-advanced further education is signified by the acronym 
'NAFE1. This is for purposes of consistency, despite the fact that the field has 
subsequently been re-termed 'work-related FE’. The same applies to the continued use 
of 'Manpower Services Commission' or MSC, which changed its name to the 
'Training Commission' in June 1988, and again in September of the same year to the 
Training Agency'. The choice of terms in both the above instances is based on that 
most widely accepted during the period of empirical study.
Other terms requiring explanation are 'joint planning', the 'NAFE Agreement' and 
the 'NAFE Initiative'. Joint-planning is used to refer to the process engaged in by local 
education authorities and the MSC under the terms of a policy articulated in the 1985 
NAFE Agreement, an arrangement made between the MSC and the national local 
authority associations. This Agreement constituted a revision to the White Paper 
Training for Jobs, and the' NAFE Initiative' is a collective reference to the policy 
change enacted by the both.
An explanation of two final terms will further ease the reading of this thesis: the 
term NAFE 'Plan' is used to refer jointly to both the Development Plan and Annual 
Programme produced as a consequence of the NAFE Agreement; the term 'planning 
round' is a reference to the year for which local officers were developing proposals. 
Hence 'the 1988-9 planning round' is a reference to work actually being conducted 






This thesis addresses government legislation announced in the 1984 White Paper 
Training for Jobsi. Its effect was to involve for the first time a quasi-autonomous 
government agency, the Manpower Services Commission (MSC), in the planning and 
administration of non-advanced further education (NAFE); a function hitherto 
controlled entirely (in the public sector at least) by local education authorities (LEAs). 
The thesis is a study of how the policy came to be made, what happened to it en route 
to its implementation, and what, in practice, were its outcomes.
Public policy on vocational education and training (VET) was an issue brought 
significantly to the fore in Britain in the 1980s. Debates over the continuing 
recalcitrance of British employers to provide adequate training for their own workforce 
have focussed attention upon chronic skill shortages and the supposed need to meet 
radical industrial restructuring with a more highly skilled and adaptable labour force.
Concurrent with these debates have been continuing disputes over the role of the 
public sector in VET. Arguments about the proper contribution of government, central 
and local, have focussed on the shape of the administrative structure. Colouring these 
arguments have been political divisions over the relative values of collectively-planned 
and market-led approaches to VET delivery, and more fundamentally over the purposes 
of education, whether primarily aimed at employers or individuals. A key element in 
any analysis of British public sector VET delivery is the division of responsibility for 
administration and policy between (in England) the Department of Education and 
Science (DES) and the Department of Employment (DE). This division has created long­
standing tensions within the state bureaucracy, tensions which became increasingly 
significant in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the government institutions in question 
sought to overcome chronic VET deficiencies intensified by economic recession.
In examining NAFE, this thesis focusses on the area of public sector VET where 
these tensions have become most manifest, the field in which training and education 
come together at single points of delivery: local authority colleges. These institutions 
have a dual role in providing specific training courses for individuals and employers on
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one hand, and more general academic and non-vocational tuition on the other. This 
places them in the vanguard of any policy interventions which realign the institutional 
relationships governing NAFE.
The White Paper Training for Jobs announced a transfer of resources away from 
the central grant given to local authorities for the delivery of NAFE and into the MSC 
budget This was to the extent that the Commission would be responsible for about one 
quarter of all public spending in the field. The Commission was a young and expanding 
institution rooted in the public training bureaucracy, and coordinated at central 
government level by the DE. The allocation to such a body of NAFE responsibilities 
previously the sole preserve of the education sector marked a decisive shift in central 
strategies addressed to the administration of VET. It marked a new propensity to 
resolve the state's internal bureaucratic tensions in favour of the employment and 
training sector.
This thesis examines the impacts of the legislation by recourse to: an analysis of its 
driving motivations; an interpretative identification of its intended consequences; and an 
examination of its actual impacts in local areas as witnessed in the period 1984-89. In 
doing so it takes as its focus the local mechanisms through which NAFE was 
administered. It is thus a study of prodesses operating in the NAFE bureaucracy, rather 
than a study of NAFE outcomes in terms of courses delivered.
The Conservative government's move in announcing the new proposals is seen 
primarily as an attempt to increase central influence over NAFE provision by 
restructuring the administrative bureaucracy using means other than direct legislative 
intervention in local government responsibilities. In practice, the intended policy 
outcome failed to materialise. The central aim of the thesis is to examine why, and what 
happened instead.
The introduction and implementation of the policy is analysed by recourse to three 
central themes:
(i) Motivations behind the Training for Jobs announcement - the reasons behind
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the government’s particular choice of strategy, and what it hoped to achieve 
thereby.
(ii) The process through which the strategy became realigned in a period of 
dispute and negotiation which followed the publication of the White Paper, a 
consequence of which was the removal of key elements of the original policy 
and the addition of new ones.
(iii) The pursuit in practice of these realigned goals, and their effects upon the 
bureaucratic structures to which the White Paper was addressed. It is these 
developments which illustrate the ultimate effects consequent
upon the introduction of the original policy.
These themes are analysed by means of appraisal against an historical and 
theoretical context developed in the early chapters, and by means of empirical 
information-gathering in the affected areas, which is presented in the latter chapters of 
the thesis.
Chapter 2 provides an historical overview of the development of both the NAFE 
and employment/training sectors. It considers the growth of FE after the 1944 
Education Act which established its modem legal framework, and the broader 
educational trends which shaped its course in the ensuing period. It examines the 
institutional framework of LEA colleges, and identifies explicitly the parameters of 
NAFE as opposed to other post-school provision, in order to clarify the policy area 
under discussion. The chapter goes on to examine historical changes in the training 
sector, beginning by analysing key post-war developments which shaped provision, 
and then considering the specific role of the emergent MSC within training. The final 
section of the chapter outlines recent changes in the NAFE sphere in both education and 
training. Whilst it covers areas beyond the thesis' remit, this discussion is important for 
the purposes of setting its material in the context of contemporary developments.
Chapter 3 builds on the context established in the previous discussion, and raises a 
series of theoretical perspectives which form the foundation of the thesis' argument. A
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number of key are areas introduced at this stage. First, policy linkages - the manner in 
which policy areas are governed by institutions bound to each other by resource and 
administrative dependencies and separated from other institutions by the absence of 
such dependencies, the connections forming definable policy networks. Second, 
theoretical perspectives on bureaucracies, the manner in which different institutions 
exhibit contrasting characteristics which shape both their administrative and strategic 
behaviour and their relationships with other bodies. Third, an analysis of the 
relationship between central and local governments, with particular emphasis on the 
circumstances in England and Wales. After each of these analyses is presented a 
discussion of their significance to NAFE. Thus considered are: the nature of the policy 
networks involved in the 1984 legislation; the bureaucratic characteristics of the key 
institutions in each network, in particular the MSC, the DES and LEAs; and the effects 
of conflict between central and local government on policy in England and Wales in the 
run up to 1984.
The above discussions lay a foundation for the remainder of Chapter 3. Firstly, 
this presents a critical analysis of the rise of the MSC. This is followed by a section 
which considers theoretical aspects of the nature of policy formulation, decision­
making and implementation, setting out an argument for a continuum view of this 
process in preference to more simplistic 'top-down' models. These two sections 
together, added to the previous discussions, are synthesised in the last section of the 
chapter in a critical analysis of the introduction of 1984 White Paper. This considers the 
motivation behind government strategy, the means by which it was to be effected, and 
the intended outcomes of its intervention in NAFE.
Chapter 4 examines the detail of the White Paper's provisions, their implications 
for the NAFE sector, and assesses their underlying meaning in terms of the theoretical 
positions developed earlier. It then, through the presentation of new data gathered in 
interviews, goes on to examine in detail the response of the MSC and LEAs (and more 
particularly their national representative bodies) to the proposed legislation. The most 
significant aspect of this is indicated to have been the negotiation of an Agreement 
between the MSC and the local authority associations, which brought to an end sixteen 
months of dispute prompted by the White Paper. This Agreement is found to have
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substantially deflected the original intentions of Training for Jobs, and shifted the 
central issue of the policy innovation to that of planning from one of administrative 
control. The realigned priorities became the ultimate definition of the Training for Jobs 
policy as it became 'concretised' at the implementation stage. In analysing the impacts 
of the White paper, much of the thesis' original empirical contribution focuses upon the 
administrative structures and planning procedures which resulted from the provisions 
outlined in the Agreement
Chapter 5 introduces the methodology employed in the major survey work of the 
thesis. After first discussing the factors which impinge on choosing a research method, 
the use of an iterative approach combining both intensive and extensive research 
techniques is considered the most appropriate. The particular methodological 
instruments chosen within this framework are then identified, along with an indication 
of the success with which they were deployed in practice.
The main part of the thesis' empirical survey data is presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The first of these focuses upon the impacts of the White Paper and the subsequent 
Agreement upon the NAFE bureaucracy. This broad objective means in detail an 
analysis of the institutional responses of both the MSC and LEAs to the new 
conditions, and the effects of this in creating a larger policy network for NAFE, which 
combined the elements of the pre-existing employment/training and NAFE policy 
networks. An essential aspect in studying this development is the emergent relationship 
between the MSC and LEAs at local level during the 1984-89 period. This is 
considered in detail, with discussion of, first, the mechanisms of interaction which 
were developed through a combination of central policy and local interpretation. 
Second, the quality of these relationships, and in particular how this altered through the 
period of study. Third, the matter of MSC sanctions provided for in the Agreement, a 
highly significant factor in the development of relations. And fourth, particular problem 
areas which were experienced by both parties in forging a joint working relationship 
and developing new planning procedures - which problems proved the most difficult, 
and the extent to which they were successfully overcome.
The discussion moves in Chapter 7 to the planning procedures which emerged in
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response to the NAFE Agreement, and which represent the grounded impacts of 
Training for Jobs. Again, the empirical analysis is not a consideration of NAFE 
outputs, rather of the administrative processes which shape outputs. In pursuing this it 
examines a number of areas in which such processes were particularly significant The 
first section deals broadly with LEAs' NAFE planning experiences, focussing upon the 
construction and quality of the Development Plans which were a key element of the 
revised policy. It also considers the degree to which these Plans were a product of local 
interpretation of the national policy, thus linking to a key theme raised in Chapter 3.
Other sections of the chapter examine arrangements for joint MSC-LEA monitoring 
in NAFE, how these developed over time and dealt with the issues of cooperation and 
trust central to the newly emerging bureaucratic relationship. The funding of NAFE 
administration and the additional resources given to specific projects are likewise 
examined, as are the key areas of labour market information (the MSC's major 
responsibility under the Agreement) and liaison with other bodies. The final sections 
deal with curricular impacts and evaluation. The educational impacts of Training for 
Jobs, as modified through the filter of the Agreement, can only be properly measured 
by considering their effects on the NAFE courses actually delivered in LEA colleges. 
Whilst the thesis is, as noted, primarily concerned with processes over outputs, a 
proper analysis of the White Paper's influences cannot be conducted without some 
investigation of curriculum change, and the role of the 1984 policy in effecting that 
change. The final section on evaluation develops the analysis of the policy's overall 
impacts, by exploring the perceptions of those most involved in its implementation 
about the changes which had taken place. It seeks: to identify change; to assess the 
relative influence of the MSC’s role in bringing this about; to evaluate the level of LEA 
support for the Training for Jobs/NAFE Agreement policy several years after the 
planning exercise began; and to explore preferred future options, which may both 
reveal the level of satisfaction with the status quo at the time of the survey, and provide 
pointers to the future of NAFE administration.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by a synthesis of the main findings and offers an 
overview of the foregoing discussions. It summarises the arguments presented at each 
point, and draws together the components of the thesis into a portrait of the conception,
19
announcement, amendment and implementation of Training for Jobs in the period 
leading up to and including 1984-89. It considers the implications of the empirical 
findings for some of the theoretical points raised earlier, in particular their support for 
the notion of the policy-making continuum. Finally, it assess the pointers to potential 
future work on the subject.
1. Cmnd. 9135, 1984.
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Chapter Two
NAFE in its historical context.
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h i  Introduction
Behind the situation at the time of the 1984 legislation is a complex history of 
developments in public sector education and training which shaped the various services 
then responsible for NAFE. These developments can be sensibly divided into: education 
sector developments which occurred under the aegis of the Department of Education and 
Science (DES); and developments in the field of industrial training and labour planning, 
dealt with by the Department of Employment This chapter sets the thesis in context by 
examining these developments in the period leading up to 1984.
2ul The further education sector in England and Wales. 1944-84
The present system of education in England and Wales, and of non-advanced further 
education as a particular aspect of it, can be traced in its broad origins to the 1944 
Education Act1. A major turning point in provision, it renders the subsequent period a 
suitable one for the analysis of NAFE history.
The first of the following sections examines the detail of the Act Subsequent sections 
consider the background trends which influenced further education after 1944, the 
particular historical developments which transpired in response to these trends, and the 
division of further education and its institutions into the NAFE and HE spheres.
2.2 (i) The legal framework of further education
The 1944 Education Act, in addition to establishing a tripartite system of grammar, 
technical and secondary schools, conferred for the first time upon local education 
authorities (LEAs) a statutory responsibility to provide 'adequate facilities' for further 
education. It defined further education as follows:
(a) full-time and part-time education for persons over compulsory school age;
(b) leisure time occupation in such organised cultural training and recreational activities as are
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suited to their requirements, for any persons over compulsory school age who are able and 
willing to profit by the facilities provided for that purpose.2
There was an original intention that LEAs submit 'schemes' to the Secretary of State for 
Education (or where appropriate the Secretary of State for Wales) which would detail 
proposals on how these responsibilities were to be fulfilled. However, this requirement 
lapsed at an early stage, leaving much existing education provision technically ultra 
vires3. There existed also some confusion over the extent of LEAs' responsibilities 
towards providing for those over compulsory school age a place in a school or college.
In 1981 a working party of officers of the DES, Welsh Office and local authorities 
published a report on their attempts to seek a clearer definition of LEA responsibilities in 
this area. Entitled The Legal Basis o f Further Education 4, the report concluded that the 
state of the law was unsatisfactory: given that LEAs had not followed the requirement for 
submitting schemes of further education after 1944, their present duties were in doubt. 
Amongst other proposals the report recommended that each LEA should have a duty to 
ensure that the needs for further education of the client groups in its population were 
adequately met Amendments to the 1944 legislation redefining LEAs powers and duties 
were proposed. However, the report did not lead to new legislation, and the position 
remained unclear.
The consideration of the statutory framework within which the further education 
sector operates is important to later discussions of the possibilities for government 
intervention in the NAFE curriculum, and to potential strategies for effecting change. This 
theme is picked up in Chapter 3.
2.2 (ii) Trends in English and Welsh education, 1944-84
The changing state-local relationship
The relationship between the central and local institutions responsible for education 
delivery was one of the major areas of change in the sector after 1944. The principal
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parties involved in this issue are the central government (embodied in England today by 
the DES, in Wales by the Welsh Office) and LEAs. The institutional character of these 
bodies is dealt with in Chapter 3, but the discussion here centres on the relationship 
between the two in the matter of implementing education policy. This relationship is 
enshrined in the idea of a 'national system, locally administered'5, in which the DES or 
Welsh Office’" is 'a major operational partner, rather than its sole controller'6. The 
relationship entails LEAs managing the day-to-day running of colleges and schools, 
whilst central departments deal mainly with matters of policy and monitoring, the latter 
through Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI).
The level of influence of the DES over local provision has not been constant over the 
post-war period. Ranson and Tomlinson? identify three distinct phases. The first, 1944- 
55, is described as a phase of strong central control in which the Ministry of Education 
(forerunner to DES) was clearly the dominant partner. This control involved detailed state 
monitoring of local activities, and the use of specific grants through which the Ministry 
could determine which items of LEA expenditure received national funding.
The second period identified is 1955-75, during which time the balance of power is 
argued to have shifted towards the LEAs, as they discovered the scope of autonomy and 
discretion allowed them as the detail of the 1944 Act became ignored. Notably, the 
replacement of the specific grant by a general grant (and later by the Rate Support Grant) 
allowed greater local control over expenditure.
During the third period, 1975 onwards, the DES is considered to have reasserted its 
strength in the state-local relationship against a backcloth of diminishing resources and 
demands for greater political realism and responsiveness to national priorities in college 
and school curricula.
The true picture is perhaps more complex than Ranson and Tomlinson suggest, as 
other actors are involved. At the local level this includes parents, colleges, schools and 
local authority Treasurers departments; at the national level, the trade unions, local
* hereafter referred to as the DES.
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authority associations, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of 
Employment and the Manpower Services Commission (MSC). Crucial to the present 
thesis is the understanding of the public education bureaucracy as a policy network in 
which a range of actors operate. Changes in the balance of this sector are a fundamental 
issue, and should not be simplified to the relationship between LEAs and the DES. These 
points are raised more fully in Chapter 3.
In the meantime, a classification into the periods above can, with the caveats outlined, 
be useful in charting the broad post-war changes in central influence over administrative 
control in education.
One more recent significant development to add to these is the reintroduction by DES, 
in the Education (Grants and Awards) Act of 1984, of specific funding to certain 
identified areas of the curriculum in the form of Education Support Grants (ESGs). 
Though the size of these as a proportion of total DES expenditure was small (rising from 
around 0.5 per cent at the time of their introduction to around 1.0 per cent in 19868), they 
were nonetheless symptomatic of the direction of change current at the period of study.
Demographic change and diminishing resources
Two major forces operating upon educational change are related to the resources available 
to the education service: demographic change; and spending cuts caused by government 
policy and world economic recession. In 1984 the number of students in all age-groups 
was declining following the baby-boom of the 1960s, the peak in each age group coming 
at a different time.
The effect of this decline in numbers was a reduction in funding at all levels, the 
calculation of which was dependent upon student numbers. Added to this was a quite 
independent contraction in the funding given to education as a matter of policy, in marked 
contrast to the financial expansion experienced in the sector throughout the post-war 
period until circa 1976.
The advent of the world recession in the mid-1970s, in particular the effects in Britain
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of oil price increases in 1973 and the IMF loan crisis in 1976, led to a reduction of 
government spending in education as well as many other areas. This contraction was 
exacerbated after 1979 by the monetarist policies of the incumbent Conservative 
government, and the financial regime under which the education service now operated 
was more austere than it had been during much of the post-war period.
The growth o f unemployment
The single element of post-war change which has been perhaps most significant to the 
field of non-advanced further education is the rise of unemployment after the mid-1960s, 
and particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Whilst the overall jobless total 
increased dramatically, from around 500,000 in 1973 to well over 3 million by 1984, 
unemployment amongst young people rose at four times the rate for the population as a 
whole 9. These figures are illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows the overall 
unemployment rate between 1974 and 1984, and Figure 2.2, which indicates fluctuations 
in youth unemployment (school leavers) between 1976 and 1983.
Worries about the possible implications of mass youth unemployment, in social and 
educational as well as employment terms, had by 1984 raised the issue of state provision 
for the 16-19 age group (the major NAFE client group) very firmly to the forefront of 
contemporary political and educational debate.
Changing attitudes - the rise ofvocationalism
The broad underlying changes mentioned so far were variously the cause and 
consequence of changing attitudes towards education since the 1944 Act. These shifts can 
be summarised as: a transition from optimism about the possibilities for educationally- 
inspired change to disillusionment over these, leading to a political schism from a broad 
consensus to ideological diversity; and the rise of what may be termed vocational realism 
at the expense of academic idealism.
It is the latter that concerns us most here. Having once been considered an 
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over a vocational approach which emerged in the mid-1970s. Largely this was prompted 
by growing unemployment, which forced policy-makers to address the problems of those 
school leavers whom the academic system was failing, and whose plight was becoming 
less easy to ignore. Many observers felt that the school curriculum emphasised academic 
at the expense of technical and vocational skills, aimed as they felt it was at the narrow 
group destined for higher e d u c a t i o n a l U 2 .  These views were echoed by the then Prime 
Minister James Callaghan in a keynote speech at Ruskin College in 1976, which 
prompted a Green Paper on the subject in 1977 - Education in Schools: a consultative 
document - and the beginning of what he coined the 'Great Debate'. Callaghan pointed to 
the inadequacy of the education service's input to vocational training, accusing it of
failing to equip pupils with the necessary basic skills and attitudes to enter work 
and that schools and colleges had
begun to fail in their responsibility to the nation's economy13.
He called for this Great Debate to address these problems and formulate policy responses 
which could provide solutions.
Whilst much of the discussion centred on schools, this debate was equally relevant to 
the further education curriculum. The view that
parental 'interests' were to be represented by the state's rational organisation of the school-to- 
work transition, and the matching of appropriate skills and aptitudes to the needs of the labour 
market14,
a view which
formally set the seal on the school-work bond as the rationale for schooling
very much involves and affects further education, always a crucial staging post between 
compulsory schooling and the workplace.
It is arguable whether the Great Debate initiated or merely typified the shift towards 
vocationalism. Some have claimed that it 'at best accentuated an already well-established
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trend'15, and that these attitudes had existed before 1976 without having any significant 
influence over educational change. Whether one sees Callaghan's move as decisive, or 
agrees with Gleeson16 that it was simply the collapse of work which 'completely 
undermined our traditions of schooling', a fundamental alteration in approach is evident 
after 1976. In the 1977 Green Paper and subsequent government material, references to 
the egalitarian ambitions for schooling were no longer present; the political significance in 
these new attitudes being evident in the support received from Rhodes-Boyson and other 
right-wing 'realists’17.
With changing government attitudes to the role of education, which intensified after 
the election of a Conservative administration in 1979, new programmes, initiatives and 
agencies reflected a rapidly developing relationship between the education world and 
government institutions outside the traditional education sphere. These are picked up in 
section 2.3 which details the rise of the MSC.
Before that, the following section considers more detailed developments which took 
place within the further education sector since the 1944 Act.
2.2 (iii) Specific developments in post-war further education
The number of students attending further education courses rose rapidly since the mid- 
1940s,from 1.6 million in 1946 to 3.5 million in 198018. This dramatic rise in numbers 
was matched by an increasing diversity and complexity in college courses. The plethora 
of vocational education and work-related training provided for the school-leaver and 
young adult population in the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s has been described 
variously as a 'rich and varied tapestry'1^  a 'confusion*2*1, ’a jungle*21, and a 'non­
system'22. Dent23 suggests a reason for this in the 'almost limitless possibilities' inherent 
in the wording of the 1944 Education Act which governs the extent of LEA autonomy 
over the nature of local provision*.
*  see section 2.2(i)
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In order to analyse this diverse array of courses and programmes, it is helpful to 
examine specific developments in FE 1944. The first of two sections on this which follow 
deals with the period 1944-76, the second covering the period 1976-89.
Developments in further education, 1944-76
The response made by LEAs to the requirements of the 1944 Education Act is analysed by 
Cantor and Roberts24 by means of a division into three time periods, which subdivide the 
1944-76 phase.
The first of these, 1944-56, saw the establishment of County Colleges in 'technical 
education’ was provided for the 15-18 age group (15 being the school-leaving age after 
1947). By 1956 three main types of college had developed: Regional, Area and Local 
Colleges, the first of these offering the most advanced courses. A fourth type, Evening 
Institutions, dealt mainly with adult recreational activities. However, there developed no 
rigid division between colleges into advanced/non-advanced or specifically 'work-related' 
provision, a matter of significance in considering the 1984 legislation.
Much of the provision was delivered in the form of day- or block-release, which the 
1944 Act sought to promote strongly in order to avoid a repetition of the weak response 
made to a similar measure in the earlier 1918 Education Act. Dent25 notes a dramatic 
increase in the number of young workers released for part-time education or training, 
from 41,500 in 1939 to 600,000 in 196626. Clearly, the new Act was having a greater 
impact than the old, and the further education sector was becoming firmly established as a 
major area of LEA provision. Although still, it must be stressed, well behind schools 
provision in terms of LEA priorities.
The second of the three phases under discussion is 1956-63. In this period ten of the 
Regional Colleges became Colleges of Advanced Technology (CATs). The Education 
Minister of the time 'sequestered these from the LEA province*27, making them direct 
grant institutions in 1962, which was the first step in their later elevation to university 
status.
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A distinction needs to be drawn here in the age-group of the students attending these 
colleges. Whilst local technical colleges aimed heavily at providing for the 16-19 cohort, 
along with mature students and those seeking recreational courses, CATs were aimed 
primarily at post-18 provision, frequently at the advanced level, and operated in much 
wider catchment areas. These differences were never clear-cut, reflecting the blurred 
boundaries of a further education system which developed more through a form of 
organic growth than any kind of planned strategy coordinated at national level. It is 
significant that the period under discussion here coincides with that referred to in section 
2.2(ii) in which LEAs supposedly enjoyed the greater power over education provision 
compared with central government, i.e. 1955-75. The college curriculum, its shape and 
mix of educational levels, was being determined locally, and government intervention 
took the form of building on what the LEAs had created. This is of considerable 
importance in analysing the approach taken to central intervention in NAFE in the 1984 
White Paper, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Following the publication of the Robbins Report on higher e d u c a t io n ^  in 1963, the 
CATs and remaining Regional Colleges were recognised as being primarily providers of 
higher education and were transformed into universities and polytechnics. Meanwhile, the 
Industrial Training Act of 1964 was passed. Its implications for the training sector are 
considered in section 2.3(i), but here it is important to consider its impacts upon NAFE. 
Described in 1972 as ’one of the most far-reaching measures dealing with this sector... 
during the last twenty-five years'29, it transferred a large share of training responsibility 
from industry to the state (the state, in this context, being represented by the public sector 
further education service). The intention was to greatly increase the amount of part-time 
training in day- and block-release courses, and to 'improve the working liaison between 
colleges and industry'30.
Despite these high hopes, however, the number of 15-18 year olds receiving day-/ 
block-release training increased only marginally in the period 1964-70, from 19 per cent 
to 24 per cent31. Given this, the intended 'close liaison’ between the education service 
and industry appeared not to have yet materialised.
Nonetheless, expectations for the future were optimistic. In 1972, the White Paper
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Education: a Framework for Expansion confidently recommended an expansion in the 
further education sector of over 100,000 places, raising the total number in public sector 
colleges to around 375,000 by 1981. This confidence was not to be matched by events 
during the 1970s.
Further education, 1976-84
The three periods used in the previous section were initially suggested by authors writing 
in 1972. After that time much changed, a radical transformation being worked on further 
education in the period 1976-84 by the factors outlined in section 2.2(ii). The 
repercussions of the Great Debate led fairly promptly to the implementation of post-16 
policies by the MSC*. Measures such as the Youth Opportunities Programme and later the 
Youth Training Scheme began to change the face of further education, introducing to it 
many new students with which it had not previously dealt. It has been contended that the 
main beneficiaries of further education in the late-1960s and early 1970s were more able 
middle-class students using it as a second chance (or second choice) route into 
employment or higher education, the less able and 'unemployable' youngsters being 
largely neglected32. This left a gap in provision which, as will be seen, the MSC marched 
into decisively, and it was arguably only in response to this move that the education 
service woke up to its wider responsibilities.
It would be unfair to suggest that the education institutions had not been active in this 
area, however. For example, the Certificate of Extended Education (CEE) was a DES 
initiative already in place in 1976. Analogous to a Certificate of Secondary Education for 
candidates of greater maturity, this programme was initiated in pilot form in 1972. Whilst 
it made provision for post-16 candidates of lesser ability, as a single subject course it was 
not considered to be very compatible with further education progress and tended to be on 
offer more commonly in sixth forms than colleges. Nonetheless, the DES was making 
provision for more 'vocational' type courses in response to the Great Debate before the 
MSC stepped in ahead of it with proposals for the Youth Opportunities Programme.
* see section 2.3.
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Whilst some moves had occurred before the MSC initiatives, therefore, the latter 
prompted a much greater education service response, bringing forth a whole crop of new 
courses and qualifications in the NAFE field. Examples were those courses examined by 
the City and Guilds of London Institute (CGLI) and the Business and Technical 
Education Council (B/TEC). Amongst these were CGLI's Foundation Course, its 365 
course and its Certificate in Vocational Preparation (General), which started in 1981-2, 
and B/TECs General Course.
Furthermore, attempts had been made within the education service to unify courses 
into a single qualification in order to simplify a rather complex pattern of provision. The 
Keohane Committee recommended in their Report (1979) that CEE should be introduced 
universally, but the Further Education Unit (FEU), an advisory body to the DES set up in 
1977, produced an alternative proposal in its report A basis for choice 33. The latter 
recommendations were favoured by DES and eventually incorporated into its booklet, 
17+, A new qualification 34. This proposed a new Certificate of Pre-Vocational Education 
(CPVE), which has been described as a compromise plan centred around A basis for 
choice 35.
These developments were not to bear fruit until after 1984. In the meantime the 
initiative for change in further education was seen to be very much in the hands of the 
MSC. Its activities are considered further in section 2.3 below. This section is concluded 
by a discussion of three further areas crucial to the thesis' remit: the division of FE into 
NAFE and AFE; the structure of LEA colleges; and the identification within that structure 
of 'the NAFE college'.
2 .2 (iv) NAFE in further education
Definition o f NAFE
The term non-advanced further education (NAFE) was first coined in the early sixties in 
order to distinguish this type of provision from both compulsory schooling and advanced 
further education (AFE), otherwise known as higher education (HE). More specifically,
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NAFE can be defined as courses provided for students above compulsory schooling age 
up to GCE fAf level and its vocational equivalents.
The LEA college network
The sections above have dealt with various aspects of the development of LEA institutions 
providing further education. It is important at this stage to present a portrait of the college 
network which the 1984 legislation addressed. The post-war evolution in college types 
had by 1984 progressed to the stage where four broad types of institution were operated 
under local authority control. These are listed below, along with the number present in 
each category (1980 figures36):
i) Polytechnics - dealing almost exclusively with higher education (HE) - 30 institutions;
ii) Colleges and institutes of higher education - mainly providers of HE - approx. 70 institutions;
iii) Colleges o f further education - mainly providers of NAFE - approx. 500 institutions;
iv) Evening institutes - providers of adult leisure and recreational courses - approx 5300  
institutions.
This is a simplified list, a range of other terms existed, including 'colleges of further and 
higher education’ and 'tertiary colleges' (combining sixth-form with NAFE work) among 
others. This suggests that the range of further education colleges represented something 
closer to a continuum than a division into strict groups. There being no clear rules 
governing nomenclature or scope below the polytechnic level, the 'organic' evolutionary 
development referred to earlier had created the slightly baffling array of college types in 
existence. As has been noted elsewhere in the context of HE providers,
individual colleges and institutes vary both according to the proportion of advanced work which 
they provide and also the types of courses which they offer, depending partly on the nature of the 
institutions which went to make them up and partly on the way in which they have developed 
over the past few years.37
To reverse this notion, NAFE colleges would be defined negatively as being those 
institutions which did not offer a significant amount of HE courses, although NAFE itself
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was taught across a whole range of college types. It is clear from this analysis that no 
simple portrait of ’the typical NAFE college' can be drawn. However, the bulk of NAFE 
was taught in colleges which fell into the third category above, colleges of further 
education. It is this type of institution that the discussion of colleges in this thesis will 
mainly refer, although the diversity and complexity of college types must always be borne 
in mind.
Having considered much historical and contextual detail concerning developments in 
the education sector in the post-war years up to 1984, it is necessary now to turn to the 
parallel (and related) evolution of the training sector over the same period.
2 .3  The nost-war industrial training sector in England and Wales
The implications of government-inspired intervention by the MSC in NAFE in 1984 can 
be properly understood only in the context of the values which the Commission was 
introducing from the industrial training sector. In order to furnish such an understanding, 
the following sections detail the relevant historical elements lying behind the status quo in 
1984, whilst the meaning of these developments is examined more theoretically in 
Chapter 3.
To understand the more recent developments in the rise of the MSC, it is pertinent to 
examine the post-war history behind these. This is approached here by recourse to 
sections dealing with: (i) the period up to 1964, the provisions of the Industrial Training 
Act of that year and its continuing effects up to the creation of the MSC in 1973; and (ii) 
the period of MSC growth in the decade leading up to the White Paper Training for Jobs 
in 1984.
Important themes developed here which instruct the thesis' subject include: temporal 
shifts in responsibilities over training provision between public institutions and private 
industry - how this developed over time, shaping attitudes over who should influence 
curriculum design in NAFE; the basis of funding for public sector training; background to 
the establishment of an interventionary national training body, identifying the MSC's
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antecedents.
2.3 (i) Industrial training before 1974
Prior to the second world war, industrial training was delivered almost entirely by 
employers, agreement with the trade unions, and mainly in the form of apprenticeships. 
Associated with these were long indentures, through which trainees on low wages were 
tied to companies for periods sometimes lasting many years. The overall amount of 
training in England and Wales was not high, and varied between industries and from firm 
to firm, more training being undertaken in the heavy industries than, for example, the 
distributive trades38. This situation continued after the war and up to the early sixties, at 
which time only 20 per cent of male school leavers, and only 5 per cent of females, 
undertook any form of skills training at all39.
Concern grew in the early post-war period about training, as even for those in receipt 
of it, the quality and length of time devoted to it were
for the most part unsatisfactory, being mainly related to obsolete... skills40.
Worries about the use of trainees as cheap labour, and union opposition to the training of 
large numbers of young people who might flood the labour market and depress wages, 
hindered the improvement of training provision. At the same time, improvements in 
trainees’ rights in the form of better wages and shorter indenture commitments were 
eroding employers' incentives to train. Increasing awareness of the serious problems 
facing the national training system led to a report being produced by the Carr Committee, 
entitled Training for Skill: Recruitment and Training of Young Workers in Industry, in 
1958. This advocated revised apprenticeship requirements and improved links between 
education and industry, and criticised the restrictive nature of apprenticeship schemes.
The Report led to the creation of the Industrial Training Council (ITC). This body, which 
represented employers, trade unions, the nationalised industries, government and the 
further education sector, can be considered an ancestor of the MSC, being the first attempt 
to centralise responsibility for training in a single national authority. Intended to raise
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training standards, it achieved little more than an increase in the number of Government 
Training Centres (these had been set up as a wartime measure in 1917).
However, the serious concerns being expressed about national training provision 
led to further action under Harold Macmillan's Conservative administration. In 1962 a 
White Paper, Industrial Training: Government Proposals, pointed out the inadequacy of a 
system in which all firms benefitted from training, but in which the responsibility for 
funding fell on only some of those firms. This was followed up in 1964 by the Industrial 
Training A ct, which first introduced the notion of collective provision for industrial 
training arrangements. The aims of the Act were to improve the amount and quality of 
training, and to share its costs more evenly. Its principal measure was the establishment 
of over twenty Industrial Training Boards (ITBs), each responsible for a particular sector, 
overseen by a Central Training Council (CTC), which took on the role of the ITC and 
comprised a similar combination of representatives. The precise number of ITBs varied 
over time: in 1969 there were 26, a figure which fluctuated to 23 by 1981. Each ITB was 
empowered to generate income by means of a levy charged as a percentage of the payroll 
of each firm in its sector. Grants would be paid to firms who offered training, thereby 
intending to promote training by financial incentive rather than by government 
exhortation.
Criticisms of the Act from employers were loud and, apparently, powerful, as in 
1971 a Green Paper was published by the Heath Administration entitled Training for the 
Future, which conceded most of the protestors’ case. Despite this, the subsequent 
Employment and Training Act of 1973 largely perpetuated the existing system.
Most significant to the present work was the 1973 Acts new proposals. These were 
for the establishment of three new bodies: the Employment Services Agency (ESA); the 
Training Services Agency (TSA); and the Manpower Services Commission. These 
developments are dealt with in the next section.
The 1964 provisions and their amendments largely met their demise after the election 
of the first Thatcher Administration in 1979. In 1981 a new Employment and Training Act 
made provision for the abolition of the ITBs. Later the same year sixteen of them were
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pushed into the voluntary sector by the withdrawal of government support.
2.3 (ii) The rise of the MSC: 1974-84
The Manpower Services Commission, having been established by the Employment and 
Training Act of 1973, began its life on 1 January 1974. Accountable to the Department of 
Employment, it was intended to oversee the operations of the ESA and TSA. It has been 
described as a ’constitutional innovation'll, through its having been given executive 
responsibilities rather than being purely advisory. Herein lies a crucial distinction with its 
predecessors, the ITC and CTC.
The new body was firmly rooted in the corporatist tradition of the post-war 
consensus politics still current at the time. It has been described as the ’brainchild' of the 
TUC42, who pressed for a body whose responsibilities would extend beyond training 
into employment services, job creation and national manpower planning. When the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) had persuaded the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 'at the 
last minute' that together they could run such a body, the Prime Minister agreed to the 
proposal.
The structure of the resultant MSC comprised a ten-strong Commission supported by 
an executive arm, the Office of the Manpower Services Commission (OMSC). The 
Commission comprised a membership representative of the CBI (three Commissioners), 
the TUC (three Commissioners), with Commissioners from the education service and 
local authorities and the Chairman making up the total. The notion behind this was that it 
would create partnership and co-operation between the various bodies operating in the 
field of employment
The OMSC originally employed only 40 staff, given that its duties were no more than 
to service the Commission and oversee the operations of the ESA and TS A. These much 
larger bodies employed 13,000 and 3,000 staff respectively, and largely accounted for the 
£125 million annual budget.
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The first Chairman of the Commission, 1974-76, was Dennis Barnes, and in this 
period the first signs of renewed high unemployment created a demand for special 
employment measures in which the MSC became increasingly involved. In the mid-1970s 
its activities were aimed at restoring full e m p l o y m e n t .  The Job Creation Programme 
involved various individual schemes and was launched in October 1975, followed by 
such other schemes as the Work Experience Programme (1976) and the Special 
Temporary Employment Programme. Activities involved amongst other things 
community projects funded to provide work for the long-term unemployed, a later 
example being the Community Programme.
As the 1970s wore on, however, it became increasingly apparent that the employment 
situation was going to get worse before getting any better: new policies were needed to 
address the rising problems of unemployment in general, and of rapidly increasing youth 
unemployment in particular. In 1976 Barnes was replaced as MSC chair by Richard 
O'Brien. This proved a crucial year in the development of the MSC. After Callaghan's 
Ruskin speech had put vocationalism firmly on the public agenda*, the MSC published 
two significant papers, Training for Vital Skills 44 and Training for Skills: a Programme 
for Action 45. The same year saw proposals from the DES under the then Secretary of 
State Shirley Williams that it should organise a major programme of youth training and 
work experience to combat the rising problems. This prompted the drafting of another 
MSC report Young People and Work, which was published in the Spring of 197746.
This came to be known as the Holland Report, after its author, and advocated a similar 
scheme to that being proposed by the DES but to be run under the aegis of the 
Commission. The MSC version was favoured by the Callaghan government, and the 
Commission went on to develop the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP), which 
began on 1 April, 1978. It aimed to provide a range of courses for around 250,000 
youngsters in the 16-18 age-group, and the programme involved a three-month off-the- 
job training component. Whilst much of this was conducted elsewhere, a significant 
proportion was provided in LEA colleges, and this can be identified as the point at which 
the MSC first became significantly more closely involved in funding NAFE. Similar 
training in public sector NAFE colleges was offered to adults under the MSC's Training
* see section 2.2(ii).
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Opportunities Programme (TOPS), which had been in place prior to the Commission's 
inception, and for which it took over responsibility in 1974.
In terms of the Commission's internal shape, the period 1974-8 had seen much 
restructuring. Its size and budget had grown with its increasing importance. The special 
employment measures, originally organised by the OMSC, were handled by a new 
Special Programmes Division (SPD) when they grew in scale. In 1978 the ESA and TSA 
became subsumed into the organisation as the Employment Division (ED) and the 
Training Division (TD), consolidating the MSC as an increasingly significant and 
powerful national body. Its headquarters moved from London to a new large base (with 
room for expansion) at Moorfoot in Sheffield. Numerous departmental restructurings 
took place in the following years. The issue of the MSC's internal structure is taken up in 
Chapter Six, where those parts of it which have become involved in NAFE are more 
closely examined.
The MSC budget grew dramatically through the seventies, as indicated in Figure 2.3. 
This indicates that the actual rise had considerably exceeded the Commission's own 
(1974) projection of future expenditure by 1979, and the annual budget rose even more 
rapidly thereafter. MSC-funded provision was expanded at 'an unprecedented pace'4?. 
There developed a wide network of training workshops, community service programmes 
and Information Technology Centres (ITeCs).
The election of the first Thatcher government in 1979 caused a shake up in public 
policy from whose ramifications the MSC did not escape. A major programme of cuts in 
public expenditure included a proposed decrease in the Commission's budget in the 
period 1979-84 of £94 million, an 18.5 per cent cut48. The members of the new 
administration seriously considered abolishing the Commission,
the creation of a Conservative Prime Minister their leader had ceased to admire and the expression 
of a consensus they despised49.
However, the MSC moved fast to outflank these changes. After establishing a
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Review of the Employment and Training Act, the Commission expressed opposition to 
the proposed cuts, claiming instead for itself a more prominent role in managing 
employment and training measures. This view it backed up in May 1981 with a major 
document emanating from the above Review, entitled A New Training Initiative50. A 
paper set to become a key element in eighties' training policy, it comprised three major 
proposals:
(i) to develop skill training to enable young people entering at different ages with different 
qualifications to acquire agreed standards of skill appropriate to jobs available and to provide 
them with a basis for progression through further learning;
(ii) to move towards a position where all those under eighteen years of age have the opportunity 
of full-time education or a period of work-experience with skill training;
(iii) to open up opportunities for adults to acquire, increase or update skills during the course of 
their working lives.
The requirements for the achievement of these proposals were identified as: a statutory 
machinery to provide for employer and union involvement; co-operation with the 
education services; and adequate funding, from both government and employers.
The MSC paper was issued under the Chairmanship of Richard O'Brien. Shortly 
afterwards he was replaced by David Young, 'a shrewd and ruthless Thatcherite 
strategist'51. In December of the same year, in a turnaround in its attitude to the funding 
of the MSC, the government took on board the above proposals, and issued a White 
Paper entitled A New Training Initiative: A Programme for Action.
The principal NAFE-related measure announced in the White Paper was the 
introduction of a new Youth Training Scheme (YTS), designed to replace the Youth 
Opportunities Programme. After an early period of success, this had become subjected to 
a widespread criticism as a palliative measure which exploited young people for cheap 
labour whilst offering them little in the way of genuine training. The new scheme sought 
to head off such problems by guaranteeing a minimum period of thirteen weeks off-the- 
job training in the year-long programme, which was to be provided either in further 
education colleges or in private training establishments. Negotiations between the CBI
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and LEAs led to college fees being discounted by a third for YTS trainees.
The scheme was divided into three Modes, A, B1 and B2. The last of these, 
accounting for around five per cent of the whole YTS cohort, involved schemes run 
mainly by LEAs or individual colleges. It offered places to those who had not been able to 
secure a place on an employer-based scheme, and contained a high proportion of 
disadvantaged groups amongst its clientele. This boosted the take-up of college-provision 
already connected with Mode A.
The measures announced in A New Training Initiative also led to a changed form of 
provision for those over 18, the Adult Training Strategy (ATS). The ATS was not 
devised as a single scheme but a set of proposals, aimed at all parties involved in adult 
training, to boost its flexibility and adaptability.
The above programmes accounted for the MSC's financial involvement in NAFE by 
the turn of 1984. It was estimated by the government in this year that the Commission 
was spending 'about £90 million as a customer, direct or indirect, on NAFE courses or 
services'. This compares with £875 million total expenditure on YTS and the £250 
million of MSC money being spent overall on adult training programmes52.
One other significant MSC programme affecting the NAFE sector was announced 
prior to 1984. On 12 November, 1982, the Prime Minister announced quite unexpectedly 
the introduction of a new programme for 14-18 year-olds, to be called the Technical and 
Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI). The announcement had been preceded by none of 
the more usual consultation procedures seeking the consent associated with education 
initiatives hitherto. To commence in pilot form in September 1983, TVEI was to be run 
by the MSC in conjunction with LEAs, who were invited to tender for pilot funding. As 
well as marking the first involvement of the MSC in compulsory schooling, this was to be 
a further avenue of its influence over further education once the first cohort of TVEI 
students reached the post-16 stage.
By 1984 it had become quite apparent that the MSC had advanced its importance and 
influence far beyond its modest origins as the overseer of the ESA and TS A, extending its
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role widely in the sphere of industrial training and, increasingly, of education. The 
original brief of the Commission was 'to help people train for jobs ... and to help 
employers find suitable workers'^, and to plan policy for the ESA and TSA. Having 
stepped well beyond this, it had come to impinge upon policy areas previously handled 
solely by the DES and LEAs. The implications of this development, and the factors which 
have driven it, are considered more fully in the next chapter.
Before turning to such closer analysis, it is first necessary to outline the more recent 
changes which have occurred in the fields of further education and training between 1984 
and the present, which go beyond the remit of the empirical analysis to be presented here. 
These serve to complete the historical picture, and indicate how the work here connects 
with contemporary developments.
2lA  Recent changes in the NAFE sphere 
Education
The long-running plans to introduce a new vocationally-relevant qualification into further 
education referred to in section 2.2(iii) finally bore fruit in 1984. At this time the CPVE 
was introduced in pilot form. This course, intended to unify the complicated array of 
vocational qualifications on offer, was overseen by both CGLI and B /T E C . introduced 
fully in September 1986, it was described as a case of 'the DES strikes back'54 in the face 
of the MSC incursion into the post-16 sector, although its capacity for bringing about 
change was called into question.
A more significant development on the qualification front has been the establishment 
of the National Vocational Qualification (NVQ), overseen by the National Council for 
Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ). This body was established by the 1986 White Paper 
Working Together - Education and Training. It was intended to co-ordinate all educational 
and training qualifications below degree level, linking them to a system of four grade 
bands, NVQ I-IV. The purpose was to reduce confusion and boost the recognition by 
employers of vocational qualifications, and also to benefit trainees and students by 45
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providing greater flexibility, accessibility, and comprehensibility. By integrating 
certification and accreditation of previously unconnected areas, it aimed to improve 
progression through knowledge and skill areas. The NCVQ was not given responsibilities 
for examination or validation, but was rather intended to coordinate the work of bodies 
already established in those fields.
The same White Paper announced a national extension of TVEI, which hitherto had 
existed only in pilot form. This was to be carried out over a ten year period commencing 
in the autumn of 1987. Despite earlier assurances that the running of the programme 
would be handed over to the education sector, the White Paper indicated that the extension 
would be administered by the MSC 'working closely with DES and HMT. This provides 
further evidence of the MSC’s ascendancy at this time, of a greater government trust 
invested in the Commission than in the education service.
In October of the same year the new Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth 
Baker, announced the establishment of twenty City Technology Colleges, a new idea 
intended to boost vocational education. To be based in central city areas, and aimed at the 
11-18 age group, these were to be funded direcdy by central government and run by 
educational trusts. Whilst offering a full programme of secondary education, the curricula 
of these schools were to place greatest emphasis on technology, science, business studies 
and d esig n 5 5 . These proposals received a critical response in some quarters, being seen as 
a divisive and discriminatory development which would provide expensive facilities for a 
select few whilst denying opportunities to the majority. At the time of writing only a 
limited number of these colleges had yet become established.
Another major development to substantially affect the further education sector was the 
removal from LEA control (initially only in England) of higher education institutions, a 
measure announced in the 1987 White Paper Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge 56. 
This involved 29 polytechnics and 28 of the larger colleges whose courses were wholly 
or largely at advanced level (as noted earlier, no clear cut division between AFE and 
NAFE colleges exists). A new body, the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council 
(PCFC) was set up to oversee the planning and funding of these institutions. The main 
effect of this on the NAFE sector was a reduction in LEA responsibility for colleges
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nationwide. The AFE courses which remained in the LEA sector were also to be overseen 
by the PCFC, and conversely LEAs were to contract with PCFC colleges for the 
provision of such NAFE courses they still required.
The most significant recent educational development affecting the field of NAFE 
planning and administration, and a development pertinent to this work, is the Education 
Reform Act of 1988. A wide-ranging document the legislation dealt with issues as diverse 
as the new National Curriculum for schools and the abolition of the Inner London 
Education Authority. In the NAFE sphere, there were two major developments, one 
involving college governance, the other dealing with the planning and resourcing of 
NAFE provision.
The new bill announced changes in the constitution of college governing bodies 
affecting their size and composition. A governing body of 20-25 members was 
considered 'sufficient to allow an appropriate balance of the main interests to be 
represented'57. At least half of these were to represent business and employment sector 
interests (including a small trade union component), whereas no more than a fifth were to 
be representatives of the LEA.
In terms of planning and resourcing NAFE, two linked measures were introduced by 
the bill. On one hand LEAs were required to delegate responsibility for college budgets to 
the newly constituted governing bodies, reflecting the government view that all 
educational institutions should be given as much freedom as possible to manage their own 
affairs. At the same time it recognised 'the importance of proper planning and 
coordination of further education provision both between colleges and in relation to 
neighbouring schools’58. In consequence of this recognition, responsibility for strategy 
and planning was to remain in the LEA’s hands.
The bill required that each LEA should submit to the Secretary of State for Education 
a scheme for delegating 'extensive financial powers and responsibilities' to its colleges 
within a continuing framework of strategic planning by the LEA5^ . The Secretary of State 
would be empowered to approve, amend or reject such schemes, and impose one should 
an LEA fail to respond. This echoed the 1944 provision for LEAs to submit FE schemes,
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only in the modem case there was less scope for them to avoid the requirement
In recognising a strategic planning role the Bill largely solidified into statutory form 
the process which had been developing under the NAFE Agreement since 1985. Some 
commentators expressed concern about LEAs’ ability to continue to plan effectively when 
they no longer had control over college budgets60. A statement made by some senior DES 
officers recognises that the Act set up a tension between the college and its LEA, but that 
the government believed this to be a ’creative tension'61. How successfully or otherwise 
these tensions are resolved is a matter yet to be determined. Of more certain advantage is 
the establishment of a clear legal framework for FE, something which the sector had 
previously lacked.
Clearly, the experience LEAs and colleges gained from the operation of the NAFE 
Agreement* has influenced government thinking to a substantial extent. The point has 
evidently been reached where the strategic coordination of NAFE is widely recognised as 
a desirable, workable and effective procedure for achieving educational goals.
Changes in the training sector
One of the national institutions most central to the discussion in this thesis is the 
Manpower Services Commission. It is highly significant to this discussion, therefore, to 
note that a series of major changes have taken place which have completely altered the 
shape of the body which was in 1984 being asked 'to extend its range of operation so 
as to be able to discharge the function of a national training authority'.
The first major alteration in the Commission's structure came in the summer of 1988, 
when the Secretary of State for Employment, Norman Fowler, announced that the 
employment services division was to be subsumed into the Department of Employment 
(DE) bureaucracy, in accordance with the most recent Conservative election manifesto. 
The remainder of the former body was renamed the Training Commission in recognition 
of its new, slimmed-down role. This name proved to be short lived, surviving only
* see Chapter 4
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through a summer which witnessed extensive and sometimes bitter arguments about the 
newly proposed Employment Training Scheme for adults. This scheme replaced the Job 
Training Scheme, which had in turn been a fairly unsuccessful replacement for the TOPS 
programme in 1985. The main opposition was from the TUC, whose reservations 
stemmed from the proposed form of trainee allowance on the scheme, which was to be 
linked to unemployment benefits.
The TUCs role in the Commission had been previously criticised as legitimising 
government measures without significantly influencing policy62. Now, when according 
to some it had become sufficiently weak to be dispensable in the eyes of the government, 
it took a stand on Employment Training at its annual Congress in September 1988, 
refusing to co-operate in the running of the scheme. Fowler promptly announced the 
abolition of the Commission, and its replacement by the Training Agency. This was 
effectively the same institution, minus the Commission, to be overseen directly by the 
DE. Thus fell one of the last bastions of tripartist corporatism, about which it was 
commented at the time:
What is remarkable is not that a Tory Employment Secretary has killed it off, but that it should 
have survived for so long. For a decade it rode the resentment of many and the enmity of a very 
powerful few.63
The abolition of the Commission was formally announced in the White Paper 
Employment and Training in the 1990s, published in December 1988, in which another 
reason contributing to the Secretary of State’s decision was revealed. This was the 
announcement of a new system of training delivery based on local bodies representative 
of employer and other interests. To be called Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), 
these are set to take over responsibility for most of the programmes formerly run by the 
MSC and more latterly the Training Agency, as well as coordinating local training 
activities. The Training Agency is set to continue, its local branches likely to serve the 
executive functions of the new TECs, whilst its regional and national operations will 
continue to coordinate training policy at a wider scale. Significantly for NAFE, those 
areas of the Training Agency's activities which deal with education, largely NAFE 
planning and TVEI, are not to be handed over to the TECs. In consequence this Training
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Agency responsibility is to be conducted at Regional Office level.
A further very significant change is the discontinuation of the annual contract between 
the Training Agency and LEAs, the lynch-pin of the NAFE Agreement Now that LEA 
obligations to conduct strategic NAFE planning are determined by the schemes of 
delegation submitted to the DES, such a change can be characterised as a reversal of the 
earlier 1980s trend which saw educational influence slipping away from the education 
policy sector and increasingly into the MSC orbit. Some of the worst fears of those 
commentators who lamented this development would thus appear to have been averted.
The upshot of all these developments, the restructuring of the MSC and of the 
provisions of ERA, leave the planning and administration of NAFE in a position very 
different to that experienced between 1984 and 1989. The experiences of that period have 
had a clear impact upon the future direction of the sector, and are likely to influence 
NAFE policy-making for some time to come. The findings of this thesis, in illuminating 
various aspects of this experience, substantially contribute to the foundations upon which 
such future policy-making can be based.
This chapter has detailed the historical developments in both education and training 
which have impinged upon the area of NAFE provision addressed in this thesis. Having 
provided this context, the next chapter turns to a more explanatory analysis, which seeks 
to uncover the mechanisms which underlay these events.
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The policy context: perspectives on policy-making and bureaucracies.
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U .  Introduction
The 1984 White Paper Training for Jobs announced a new policy for the provision of 
non-advanced further education. It marked a major policy shift from any past FE 
legislation, and reflected the adoption of a wholly new strategy in the pursuit of policy 
in this area. The legislation embodies a strategic central government initiative aimed at 
restructuring the basis of NAFE delivery in England and Wales. In order properly to 
understand the nature of the underlying strategic objectives it is necessary to extend the 
discussion of the previous chapter to explore the underlying theoretical context within 
which this policy initiative must be viewed. Such a discussion, crucial to explaining the 
significance of the White Paper, is presented in this chapter.
The policy context to the White Paper embraces a number of areas which explain 
(a) the relative circumstances of the education service institutions and the MSC, and (b) 
their respective relationships with central government, in the period leading up to the 
White Paper. These concern:
• the policy networks within which each institution was operating;
• the bureaucratic character of each;
• the recent history and theoretical background to relationships between central 
and sub-central government in England and Wales;
• the parameters of the decision-making and policy implementation processes 
within which governments operate.
These areas are considered in a series of following sections, each of which first outlines 
relevant theoretical perspectives before a second examination analysing their 
significance to the MSC and the education sector. The final section of the chapter 
synthesises these discussions into a theoretical outline of the central government's 1984 
NAFE strategy, identifying its motives, its action in support of those motives, and the 
broad objectives at which it aimed in the ensuing period of implementation.
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1*1 Policy linkages - communities and networks
The first of the four theoretical areas identified above as crucial to explaining the 
meaning of the 1984 White Paper centres on policy linkages between institutions. A 
number of alternative terms exist to describe such relationships. Examples include: 
'policy communities'1, 'policy networks'2, 'clan structures'3 and 'policy sectors'. The 
latter has been defined by Benson as:
a cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and 
distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource 
dependencies.4
Rhodes takes this definition on board, but elaborates it by arguing that such structures 
vary along five key dimensions:
• Constellation of interests - the interests of participants in a network vary by service/economic 
function, territory, client group and common expertise (and most commonly some 
combination of the foregoing).
• Membership - membership differs in terms of the balance between public and private sector, 
and between political-administrative 61ites, professions, trade unions and clients.
• Vertical interdependence - intra-network relationships vary in their degree of interdependence, 
especially of central or sub-central actors for the implementation of policies for which, none 
the less, they have service delivery responsibilities.
• Horizontal interdependence - relationships between the networks vary in their degree of 
horizontal articulation: that is, in the extent to which a network is insulated from, or in 
conflict with, other networks.
• The distribution of resources - actors control different types and amounts of resources, and 
such variations in the distribution of resources affect the patterns of vertical and horizontal 
interdependence.5
Further, Rhodes prefers an alternative terminology. Distinguishing between 'policy 
communities' and 'policy networks', he considers the former to be characterised by:
stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical 
interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities and insulation from other 
networks and invariably from the general public (including Parliament). They have a high 
degree of vertical interdependence and limited horizontal articulation. They are highly 
integrated.
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Policy networks, in contrast, are less integrated, and can take on a variety of forms.
Crucial to Rhodes' conceptualisation is his view that different public policy 
communities and networks do not have a common, single centre, but that the centre 
(characterised in England and Wales by the Cabinet) is fragmented. In effect, 'the 
centre' comprises a system of multiple centres, most clearly represented by the different 
government departments or departmental sections6. So whilst each policy network may 
be centralised, the centre cannot, in Rhodes' view, coordinate them all.
Adopting the concepts and terms* describing policy linkages as thus articulated,
these may now be applied to the fields most directly involved in NAFE as a
consequence of the 1984 White Paper, i.e. the education and employment/training
policy networks. It is to an examination of 'the process of exchange and the rules and
strategies governing resource transactions'7 that this analysis must turn if the
relationships within and between these networks are to be understood. The discussion
which follows concentrates its attention upon the situation as it existed immediately
before the 1984 White Paper: the reason being to furnish a portrait of the situation in
which the new legislation intervened, and against which the new equilibrium which
emerged in the following years was forged. This later situation is outlined by recourse 
w»
to empirical workAChapter 6.
3.2 (i) The NAFE policy community
To consider first the education sector, its pre-1984 linkages may best be described by 
the term 'policy community'**. The sector at this point in time exhibited relationships 
which had been stable over a long period of time (largely unchanged since 1944), was
* Rhodes uses the term 'policy network' as the generic label for all types, a practise which is
followed here when both 'networks' and 'communities' are being referred to.
** From this point on the term 'NAFE policy community' is adopted, as the work here considers 
only bodies involved in NAFE. This may be distinguished from a larger 'education policy 
community' which, though very similar, includes some bodies who have no resource links with 
NAFE.
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highly integrated, its bodies having considerable involvement with each other whilst 
having very little with those outside the community, and a high degree of vertical 
interdependence (a systematic mechanism governing exchanges throughout the 
hierarchy between the classroom and the Cabinet). This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
This shows the institutions involved in NAFE at the national, regional, local and 
college levels prior to the 1984 legislation, i.e. at a time when the MSC's involvement 
was limited to one among many client interests.
At the national level, the key player was the Department of Education and Science 
(DES). Whilst a separate department, the Department of the Environment (DoE), was 
significant as a conduit in the allocation of funds from the Treasury to local authorities, 
it had no direct role in education policy-making. The DES is the hand of central 
government in the education policy community, though one which had, as indicated in 
Chapter 2, enjoyed varying fortunes in its degree of control over the direction of 
educational policy since 1944. (The degree to which the DES was an extension of 
Cabinet thinking, and that to which it had its own independent line, is considered in 
section 3.3 below.)
Associated with the DES at national level are the Further Education Unit (FEU) and 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI). The first of these is a small body which, though 
nationally based, sits in a hierarchical sense somewhere between the DES and the local 
authorities, supported by the consent of both. Established in 1977 under the original 
title of the Further Education Curriculum Review and Development Unit, the role of its 
small and largely seconded staff was to
act as a focal point for curricular matters in further education and to promote a more co­
ordinated and cohesive approach to further education curriculum development in England and 
Wales.8
Funded by DES, but guided by a Board of Management representative of central and 
local government, teachers and industry, it had since January 1983 been a charitable 
company limited by government guarantee. Whilst in this sense its policies and 
programmes were independent, one FEU commentator observed that it had to be aware 
of the sensitivities of its sponsoring bodies, DES and LEA, and that it had to be
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constructive in its comments to ensure that its future not be jeopardised^.
HMI was a more prominent player, being very active in the field as an agent of the 
DES. Its job was to oversee all aspects of both school and further education, and it 
monitored and assessed performance at national, regional and local levels. A DES paper 
stated that
it is the duty of the Inspector, as of other civil servants, to assist the central government in 
discharging the responsibilities that successive parliaments have laid down.10
Local inspectors also acted as college advisers, assisting institutions in solving a range 
of educational problems11. Salter and Tapper state that HMI acts as ’an important 
information broker' between centre and locality in education, the supposed professional 
detachment of the Inspectorate rendering it independent of both12. They question this 
detachment, however, arguing that the HMTs 'myth of autonomy' has the function of 
legitimating DES policy decisions which are based on the information it provides. They 
see it as a 'crucial tool' in the DES efforts to enclose the policy-making process in 
education.
The other important institutions at the national level were the examining and 
validating bodies, the teaching unions and the local authority associations. The first of 
these included such bodies as B/TEC, CGLI and the Royal Society of Arts (RSA), and 
their involvement was largely curricular in impact, as they were responsible for 
determining the syllabus in their respective college-based courses. The teaching unions, 
such as the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education 
(NATFHE), were the principal national representatives of college staff interests, having 
inputs to national negotiations on such issues as teacher salaries and staff development 
programmes.
The local authority associations sought to offer a national voice representative of 
local authority groupings. In NAFE, the relevant bodies were the Association of 
County Councils (ACC) and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA). More 
than mere representatives of local authorities, however, they were key actors in their
own right, forming what Rhodes terms the 'national local government system'^. 
Rhodes suggests that local government policy innovations only rarely originate at local 
level. More commonly, local councils look to the local authority associations
for guidance about what standard of service to provide, for ideas to imitate or avoid, for waip of
tackling common problems and for justifications or philosophies of particular strategies.
The local authority associations thus provided an otherwise disparate group of 
individual authorities with 'a mechanism of ideological integration'. Dunleavy 
underlines this view, stating that policy-making in local authorities does not respond 
straightforwardly to local political inputs14. Rather, policy is seen as being often 
determined by nationally-produced 'fashions', which emerge through the operations of 
the local authority officer professions as a distinct interest group, and which are 
articulated by the local authority associations. This will be aptly demonstrated when the 
key role of these bodies in formulating the policy which emerged from the 1984 White 
Paper is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
At the regional level in the pre-1984 NAFE policy community, bodies known as 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) were intended to fulfill an advisory role to LEAs. 
Their brief was to deliver advice on the FE needs to be met, and to seek to co-ordinate 
provision in their region. An important function was as a forum for the exchange of 
information and ideas between parties interested in NAFE^. RACs also had a role in 
the examination of certain courses at craft and operator levels. England had ten RACs, 
whilst in Wales the Welsh Joint Education Committee fulfilled a similar role. There was 
some liaison at this level with the Regional Staff Inspectors who were part of HMI.
At the local level, by far the most significant player was the local authority. The 
term 'local education authority' refers to those councils who had responsibilities for 
providing education, in practise the shire counties, Welsh counties, metropolitan 
districts, London boroughs and the Inner London Education Authority. In total there 
were 104 such authorities in England and Wales. In these authorities education 
represented only one amongst a number of functions, albeit the most significant in 
resource terms. Administered by one of a series of authority departments, it commonly
60
had a full committee of elected council members supplemented by sub-committees 
which dealt with specific areas such as FE, overseeing the day-to-day activities of the 
executive personnel. Central government resources were not allocated directly to 
education administrators by the DoE, but instead were allocated to the authority as a 
whole in block grant form and mediated through the local elected chamber of 
councillors and the local Treasurer's department. Administrative and policy links, in 
contrast, both upwards to the DES and downwards to colleges, are dealt with in the 
main by the education departments. NAFE is commonly dealt with by a sub-section of 
the department with a title such as 'FE Section' or 'Post-16 Education'.
At the local level of the policy community are the colleges themselves, the 
institutions which are the delivery points of NAFE. Funded by the LEA, their other key 
links are with clients (both individual students and their sponsors), with the examining 
and validating bodies, with the teaching unions, and with HMI, which involves itself in 
curriculum and management issues on a local as well as regional and national basis.
In considering exchange within policy networks at the sub-central government 
level, Rhodes cites five resource types which are involved:
• Authority refers to the mandatory and discretionary rights to carry out functions or services 
commonly vested in and between public sector organisations by statute or other constitutional 
means.
• Money refers to the funds raised by a public sector/political organisation from taxes (or 
precept), service charges or fees, borrowing, or some combination thereof.
• Legitimacy refers to access to public decision-making structures and the right to build public 
support conferred either by the legitimacy deriving from election or by other accepted means.
• Information refers to the possession of data and to control over either its collection or its 
dissemination or both.
• Organisation refers to the possession of people, skills, land, building materials and equipment 
and hence the ability to act directly rather than through intermediaries.16
Rhodes indicates that the effect of these resource considerations upon relationships 
depends upon both the rules of exchange and the skills with which they are deployed, 
i.e. the strategies of actors. Such strategies will be considered more fully in section 3.7, 
but here it is more important to first consider the linkages between bodies in the NAFE
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policy community.
The definition given above of Benson's, that policy networks are delimited by 
breaks in the structure of resource dependencies, is the basis upon which Figure 3.1 
has been drawn. For reasons of clarity, it indicates only two types of linkage, 'flow of 
financial resources' and 'other linkages’, but the various links between policy 
community actors have been constructed in terms of Rhodes five resource categories. 
The first of these, authority, was distributed throughout the Cabinet-DES-LEA-college 
hierarchy, with different levels carrying out different functions. Whilst the Cabinet in 
principal had the most power, in practice it delegated almost of this to its departments 
who acted on its behalf in all but the highest profile issues, such as legislative change. 
In the context of education some of this passed to the Treasury and the DoE, who 
wielded power over resources, but mostly it was invested in the DES. In turn the DES 
delegates powers and responsibilities to the LEAs; and, as noted in Chapter 2, the 
extent to which it did this varied over time, according to the prevailing centralising or 
decentralising trend. The passing on of authority to colleges by the LEA varied less 
over time than between LEAs and between colleges: whilst some LEAs were very 
active in managing their colleges' affairs in some detail, others assumed a virtually 
'hands-off stance, relinquishing authority to college principals and acting simply as 
financiers and guarantors of college activity. Similarly, some college administrators 
were more 'go-ahead' than others in seeking independence to run their affairs with 
minimal direction from above, and the delegation of authority varied between colleges 
within LEAs in consequence.
The other linkages within the policy community as shown in Figure 3.1 did not 
significantly involve the exercise of authority, with the possible exception of HMTs 
semi-directive role in managing the curriculum. Relationships such as those between 
LEAs and the local authority associations, or between colleges and the Examining and 
validating bodies, were more a matter of liaison, negotiation and co-operation than the 
imposition of authority.
To take the second of Rhodes' resource categories, money exchange in NAFE in 
the pre-1984 policy community most significantly involved the flow of central
6 2
government resources, generated from taxes, from the Treasury to colleges (through 
intermediaries), and the flow of course fees to colleges from clients. The routing of 
central resources to the delivery point followed a complicated path: negotiation between 
the DES and other central departments determindthe annual allocation of central 
resources to education. A portion of this amount was allocated to NAFE, included in 
the resources allocated to the DoE for distribution to the LEAs in the form of block 
grant, and thus entered the LEA account handled by the local Treasurer's department. 
This will be combined with local revenue before being allocated to colleges in an annual 
budget The size of this allocation was determined annually by council committees, 
based on considerations such as student and staff numbers, equipment and maintenance 
costs. The greater the number of colleges in an authority, the more complex the 
decision-making over budget allocation. The complex nature of this system crucially 
affected the power relationship between the DES and the lower tier NAFE institutions. 
Boyle argues convincingly that
there can't be a straight single control here for the very simple reason that the Ministry
directly controls so very little money17
the great majority of NAFE monetary allocation being recurrent block grant expenditure 
rather than capital funding from the DES.
The other financial linkages were largely a matter of covering administrative 
expenses, such as the allocation made to the DES for its running costs (which included 
funding HMI), the DES's funding of other bodies such as the FEU and the RACs, and 
the support given to the local authority associations by their member authorities. The 
payment of fees to the examining and validating bodies also figured in this. Not 
included in Figure 3.1 are financial inputs from those outside the NAFE policy 
community, the most significant of which were the tax and rate payers who provided 
the great bulk of national and local public sector financial resources.
The most essential forms of legitimacy, Rhodes' third key resource category, in the 
pre-1984 system were the electoral mandates held by both the central and local 
government administrations. This is the basis of the authority on which the DES
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handed down directives to LEAs and colleges, and of that which the LEAs used both to 
govern college activity and in some cases resist central legitimacy by appeal to their 
local mandate. This matter is considered more fully in section 3.4.
The collection and dissemination of information is a significant consideration in 
this context: the lack of information gathered by anyone in NAFE was one of the larger 
criticisms levelled at the education service at the time of the 1984 legislation. DES had 
long collected and handled some statistical information about NAFE, and the HMI 
inspectors had probably acquired as much knowledge and understanding about the 
workings of NAFE as anyone; but in such a decentralised field, where most curriculum- 
and course-based data were handled locally in a multitude of colleges, and most 
management data were handled in 104 LEAs, no major institution was in a position 
where power over information gave it an effective advantage over any other in pursuing 
its NAFE strategies.
In terms of Rhodes' organisation resource category, the most significant effect in 
NAFE was that whilst the DES formulated policy at the national level, it was 
implemented by a separate agency, the LEA, which in taking responsibility for 
administering educational policy acquired a degree of power over i t  Colleges, in turn, 
could be said to possess some powers to follow their own chosen programmes given 
that the grass roots expertise, held by the teaching staff, was located within them. All 
this was significant to the process of exchange in the direction of NAFE policy, as the 
non-executant centre was able only to influence local outcomes to a greater or lesser 
extent; it could not direct local operations through some form of line management chain. 
Furthermore, the organisational power possessed by LEAs and colleges over the actual 
delivery of NAFE was significant to the manner in which the measures of the 1984 
White Paper became translated into a set of outcomes rather different to those intended.
Another point worth bearing in mind when considering the workings of the NAFE 
policy community is the existence of informal policy-making structures. These are often 
based on personal links between individuals who have been working in the community 
in one capacity or another for some time. Such links may result from regular contact 
over the years, either as colleagues in the same organisation or through liaison and
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negotiations with other organisations. Rhodes observes that education policy-making 
throughout much of the mid-post-war period was based upon informal discussions 
between the officer personnel of certain key parties18. He cites a claim that many 
decisions were made effectively by a 'troika' consisting of the Permanent Secretary at 
the DES, the General Secretary of the National Union of Teachers, and the Secretary of 
the Association of Education Committees^. Whilst these comments refer to largely to 
schools policy, they do underline the importance of attention to personalities as well as 
to organisations in understanding the workings of policy networks.
The bureaucratic nature of the institutions occupying the NAFE policy community 
is considered more fully in section 3.3. First, it is necessary to focus upon the other 
major policy network which was involved in the 1984 legislation, that of employment 
and training.
3.2 (ii) The employment and training policy network
It became evident in Chapter 2 that industrial training had in 1984 long been a matter 
which was dealt with to a large extent by the same bodies which were responsible for 
the employment services, emphasising its work-related nature. The principal bodies 
involved are shown in Figure 3.2.
The Figure has been constructed according to Benson's definition*, which states 
that policy networks are delimited by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies. 
The resources it considers are again the five key elements suggested by Rhodes. The 
choice of the term 'policy network' has been chosen over 'policy community' because 
in this instance, in contrast with the NAFE sector, there was a less rigid vertical 
interdependence, and a greater degree of horizontal articulation between involved 
parties. Whilst the DE-MSC section of the network was organisationally quite rigid, the 
whole was a much looser and more complex constellation of interests.
* see above,f.5&.
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To examine the detail of the figure, the principal public institutions involved in 
employment and training policy in the pre-1984 schema were the Department of 
Employment (DE), the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) and the surviving 
Industrial Training Boards. The MSC's status was that of a quango* accountable to the 
DE (or, in Wales, the Welsh Office**), but with discretionary powers invested in its 
Commission. Its executive arm was divided into three levels, the Head Office in 
Sheffield, eight Regional Offices (excluding an additional one in Scotland), and a larger 
number of Area Offices. Divided into a number of divisions, the principal ones were 
the Training Division and the Employment Division. Whilst both branches operated 
from the same national and regional offices, each had a separate string of Area Offices 
around the country. Whilst the Employment Division was responsible for employment 
functions such as Jobcentres and employment rehabilitation services, the Training 
Division arranged funding for training programmes of various kinds. In financial terms 
the principal of these were YTS, and adult training such as TOPS, but other funding 
was given for such purposes as ITeCs and Skillcentres. At the national level the 
Training Division was responsible also for the financial support of the ITBs.
The other principal parties in the policy network were the employers, trade unions, 
training providers, and the sectoral industrial training organisations (ITOs). Employers 
are depicted in Figure 3.2 as being ’national' or ’local'; it must of course be recognised 
that employers ran businesses at a whole range of scales, the division here being for 
simplicity of presentation. Employers were involved in training either as direct 
providers or as clients of both public and private sector training. In some remaining 
sectors they funded the relevant ITB, or contracted with it as a training provider, and in 
other sectors may have had a similar though voluntary relationship with a Non- 
Statutory Training Organisation (NSTO). At the national level employers were 
represented by the CBI, which negotiated on their behalf with government, the MSC, 
the TUC and others. Employers also had direct dealings with relevant trade unions at 
both local and national levels.
* a quasi-autonomous non-government organisation. The use of this term in the case of the MSC 
is contentious, as noted in section 3.3.
** The involvement of the Welsh Office in Welsh matters is hereafter implied in references to the 
DE.
67
The trade unions' role in training was to both represent their members' interests in 
negotiations about provision, and in some cases to fund or organise training 
themselves. Like the CBI, they had representatives on the Commission, and thus an 
important input to the making of training policy. However, their role has diminished 
from what it once was with the decline in traditional apprenticeships. This accelerated 
rapidly in the recession of the early 1980s.
The ITOs embraced a small number of ITBs and a large number (over 100) of 
NSTOs, some of which were former ITBs. Whilst the ITBs had statutory powers and 
obligations to raise funds by levy and distribute these for training purposes, the 
NSTOswere involved in promoting and co-ordinating voluntary arrangements in their 
sectors.
The other key group in the policy network was that of training providers, both 
public and private sector. Public sector training was conducted largely by LEA 
colleges, but other bodies were involved, including the Information Technology 
Centres (ITeCs) and Skillcentres, and with MSC's increasing prominence, universities, 
polytechnics and schools.
As with the NAFE policy community, it is fruitful to analyse linkages in the 
employment and training policy network by recourse to Rhodes' five categories of 
resource exchange, the first of which is authority. This was somewhat dispersed in the 
network, although significantly more rigid in its public sector bodies than was the case 
in the NAFE policy community. The MSC, although quasi-autonomous, nonetheless 
formed a fairly unrestrictive conduit through which directives from the DE could be 
passed down a civil service management line to the Area level. There was some 
potential interruption to this in the form of the Commission with its corporatist 
representation, but most commentators have observed very little resistance to central 
government authority throughout the Commission's history. (Later history proved the 
futility of attempting resistance, in the TUC's doomed opposition to ET as outlined in 
Chapter 2). This matter is picked up again in section 3.5, which contrasts the NAFE 
and employment/training networks’ appeal to central government as means of imposing
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its policies locally.
Taking the network as a whole, however, there were many linkages in which 
statutory authority was not involved. The ITBs had certain levy-raising powers over 
employers, but apart from this employers were largely free to act as they would with 
regard to their employment and training policies. The trade unions were similarly 
unshackled by the constraints of a higher authority. Public sector training bodies were 
generally subject to the jurisdiction of a directing authority, but private sector training 
providers were, like employers, free to conduct business in their chosen manner.
To consider money exchange, Figure 3.2 indicates the network to have exhibited a 
complex series of links involving numerous financial transfers. The most significant of 
these, however, are the public funds channelled through the MSC and the other 
payments made to providers of training. Money handed to the Commission from the 
Treasury was subdivided amongst its divisions, the largest slice going to the Training 
Division. Whilst some of this was spent on the Commission's own running costs, the 
bulk was paid to training providers for courses or to trainees in the form of allowances. 
The other major income sources for training providers were employers sponsoring 
members of their workforce through courses, and the fees paid by individual students - 
a significant though (particularly in the public sector) much smaller input.
Legitimacy (Rhodes' third category) in the employment and training policy 
network was distributed more simply than in the NAFE policy community. Whereas in 
the education sector the presence of a local electoral mandate compromised central 
authority, here the legitimacy to invoke public powers was held solely by central 
departments under the direct jurisdiction of the Cabinet. Of course, given the greater 
significance of non-accountable private institutions in this network, the directive 
influence could be challenged or ignored in other ways. However, the absence of a 
second centre of publicly-conferred legitimacy in the network was very significant to 
the central government's 1984 strategy, which is considered further in section 3.7.
Information in the network was a resource held by most of its members about their 
own parochial interests, but information about employment and training as a whole was
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most concentrated into the hands of the DE. Its control over the national unemployment 
figures is a well-known area of its information-based power, whilst such nationally-co­
ordinated data as was available on training was held by the DE or the MSC on its 
behalf. A need for improvements in the collection and dissemination of information on 
this subject was nonetheless being widely expressed at the start of 1984, and the White 
Paper Training for Jobs was part of the subsequent process aimed at seeking to bring 
about improvements. Given this, it is perhaps fair to say that no-one was significantly 
imbued with influence over training as a consequence of possessing much information 
about its workings.
Organisation was an important consideration in the provision of training. Whilst 
employers, private and public sector training bodies and even trade unions had the 
grass roots organisation to actually deliver training to trainees, the overseeing bodies 
(i.e. the ITOs and most notably the MSC) did not. The significance for the MSC was 
that it could determine delivery-point mechanisms only by virtue of its spending power: 
if one provider did not offer what the MSC was looking for, it could look elsewhere; 
but were nobody prepared to provide it, the MSC was not equipped to deliver its own 
programmes.This became a significant factor in the derailing of the government’s 1984 
strategy, as discussed in Chapter 4.
These considerations conclude the portrait of the two policy networks involved in 
the 1984 White Paper as they existed immediately before its publication. The ideas 
considered here lead directly into the presentation in Chapter 6 of the new, combined 
network which came to affect the administration of NAFE in consequence of the 1984 
measures.
Before that stage, however, there are a number of other important theoretical and 
empirical aspects which must be considered. The section below follows on from the 
discussion of policy networks to an examination of their constituent bodies' 
bureaucratic character, most notably, the particular characteristics of those bureaucracies 
most closely involved in the government's 1984 policy.
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1 l2  Perspectives on Bureaucracies
The central government’s choice of strategy in the construction of its 1984 NAFE 
policy involved a preference for one bureaucratic institution over another, i.e. the MSC 
over the education service. In analysing the government considerations which led to 
this, and the establishment and development of relationships between the two sets of 
institutions in the subsequent implementation period, an understanding of the 
bureaucratic characteristics of these bodies is essential. The pursuit of such 
understanding is conducted here in two broad stages: firstly, the examination of some 
theoretical perspectives on the nature of bureaucracies; and secondly, by drawing 
portraits of both the MSC and the education service in the terms thus derived.
3.3 (i) Theoretical aspects
This section covers three main themes, which are as follows:
(a) the definition of a bureaucracy, and distinctions between types;
(b)the question of independent organisational objectives;
(c) the role of 'street-level' bureaucrats.
To take the first of these, there is a range of meanings across which the term 
'bureaucracy' can be used, embracing both broad and narrow applications. At its 
widest, it can refer to a whole field within which administrative linkages occur, 
including inter-organisational as well as internal relationships. More narrowly, it can be 
applied specifically to a single organisation, referring solely to its inner workings.
Weber's definition of a bureaucracy follows the latter approach. He lists five 
characteristics which identify his definition, and these are:
(i) a continuous organisation with a specified function, or functions, its operation bound 
by rules. Continuity and consistency within the organisation are ensured by the use 
of writing to record acts, decisions and rules;
(ii) the organisation of personnel is on the basis of a hierarchy. The scope of authority
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within the hierarchy is clearly defined, and the rights and duties of the officials at each 
level are specified;
(iii) the staff are separated from ownership of the means of administration or production. 
They are personally free, ‘subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal 
official obligations’;
(iv) staff are appointed, not elected, on the basis of impersonal qualifications, and are 
promoted on the basis of merit;
(v) staff are paid fixed salaries and have fixed terms of employment. The salary scale is 
normally graded according to rank in the hierarchy. Employment is permanent within 
a certain security of tenure, and pensions are usually paid on retirement.20
For the present purposes it will be useful to consider individual organisations as 
separate bureaucracies, whilst also looking closely at the administrative links between 
them. In analysing an area such as NAFE, where a number of bureaucracies are 
involved in the delivery of a single policy, such relationships become important In 
seeking to describe and understand these, some idea is required of the differences 
between the various bureaucracies involved. This in turn requires a means of 
identifying an organisation's characteristics.
Salter and Tapper argue that
Bureaucracies have their own preferences and ambitions as to how they structure their 
activities basically derived from the need for routinized and predictable procedures for the 
purposes of maximising the efficiency of their operation - as they see i t 21
This describes their notion of the 'bureaucratic dynamic', which becomes expressed 
differendy in different organisations; an organisation’s structure, procedures, guiding 
principles, the overall style in which it operates are the manner of such expression. 
They further state that
in our increasingly complex society, group interests, and the ideologies supporting them, are 
expressed chiefly through highly bureaucratized institutions, such as those which make up the 
education system, which are quite capable of establishing their own logic of development in 
line with their own bureaucratic dynamic.22
Thus over time organisations develop stances which merge ideological assumptions
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into their routine policy procedures, and which strongly influence the response the 
organisation is likely to make to a given set of circumstances. Associated with this 
concept is Rhodes' description of 'appreciative systems'25, relating to the 'accumulated 
wisdom' or 'map of the world' which develops in an organisation, enabling it to steer a 
course through its policy environment. This concept, he argues,
is invaluable for drawing attention to the systematic way in which patterns of organisational 
... values influence, for example, the choice of strategies and set the limits to the range of 
options considered by the policy makers.24
Other writers have concentrated on particular aspects of organisations' 
characteristics. Bums and Stalker25 draw a distinction between 'mechanistic' and 
'organic' types. The former is more rigid, hierarchical and ordered, organisational tasks 
being pursued in a rational, structured and pie-determined manner. 'Organic' 
bureaucracies are much less rigid. In these, individuals interact in a less formal, more 
flexible manner, the reduction in importance of the vertical hierarchy or organisational 
authority allows greater flexibility and responsiveness to the changing demands of their 
bureaucratic tasks.
Related to this is the conflict Merton2^  identifies between rationality and rigidity in 
an organisation. Merton's argument mns as follows: an effective bureaucracy requires 
its procedures to be reliable, which in turn necessitates a strict devotion to regulations. 
In consequence of this, rules become absolutes which are no longer perceived as being 
purely relative to a set of specific purposes. This reduces an organisation's adaptability 
to unanticipated conditions, which in certain instances will lead to ineffective delivery - 
the opposite to the original intent Thus the most rational or effective bureaucracy may 
be rigid, or the opposite, or may be somewhere between these extremes. Determining 
which is best in a given situation does not therefore involve any general rule: rather, it 
is dependent on the nature of the tasks required of the organisation. This identifies the 
important link between organisational function and organisational form. The 
significance of this to the Conservative government’s choice of the bureaucratic 
structure it felt best suited to the purposes of its NAFE policy is considered in section 
3.7.
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A further distinction between bureaucratic types worth mentioning is Lipsky's27, 
which focuses on the autonomy of individuals within the organisation. Where these 
have a high degree of autonomy, Lipsky suggests that individuals are able to play an 
active role in developing new approaches to their tasks, resulting in a sophisticated and 
responsive service. Conversely, reliability is the virtue identified by Lipsky of a 
bureaucracy governed largely by top-down directives, with little autonomy of 
individual officers. Once again, it is recognised that the maximisation of rationality in a 
bureaucracy's form is contingent upon its functions. Accepting this, the consideration 
of such rationality in specific instances must become a matter of case-by-case analysis 
of each organisation in each area of study, rather than one of nomothetic prediction.
Moving on from the above area, the second key consideration in this analysis of 
bureaucracies is the propensity (or otherwise) of organisations to pursue objectives of 
their own, in contrast to objectives imposed from outside. The idea that an organisation 
can have goals which exist independently of the immediate demands placed upon it 
requires a recognition of the development of 'organisations’ as 'institutions'. Selznick 
draws the distinction thus:
The term 'organisation' thus suggests a certain bareness, a lean no-nonsense system of 
consciously coordinated activities. It refers to an expendable tool, a rational instrument 
engineered to do a job. An 'institution' on the other hand, is more nearly a natural product of 
social needs and pressures - a responsive adaptive organism.28
Selznick recognises institutions to be a product of more than their original functional 
design, a secondary informal structure gradually becoming established by the 
individuals who occupy i t  Institutions come to develop a concern for their own 
survival, and interests emerge internally which may not coincide with prevailing 
attitudes outside. This ties in with the ideas expressed above about the bureaucratic 
dynamic and appreciative systems, which recognise the development of an institutional 
ideology or philosophy which will to some extent guide a bureaucracy's activities.
In support of this McGrew and Wilson29 note that an organisation's goals are not 
necessarily equivalent to public ones. Perlman suggests that
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bureaucrats want to maximise their own utility functions30
a consequence of which is that the bureaucrat
will benefit from organisational growth more than from organisational effectiveness in 
providing services at minimum cost or maximum benefit.31
In this scenario,
the maintenance and aggrandisement of the organisation becomes a new policy goal which is 
privately added as a new ingredient to the policy goals which are given to the bureaucracy.32
Such goals may run counter to public imperatives.
Moving on from this to the third area to be considered in this section, the role of 
the 'street-level' bureaucrat, it is profitable to turn to the ideas forwarded by Lipsky on 
the subject. These emphasise the influence on policy of lower tier actors, an influence 
which will vary from one field to another, depending on circumstances and the 
bureaucratic characteristics of the organisation for which they work. In less rigidly 
hierarchical organisations, the scope for discretion (and therefore influence) in the 
lower tiers will naturally be greater. Lipsky notes that one factor determining this is the 
level of involvement of professionals in the field, these having greater influence than 
other types of street-level bureaucrat33. Where an organisation makes extensive use of 
professionals, this is seen as indicative of:
(i) high expertise in the lower ranks;
(ii) complex task;
(iii) supervision difficulties
(iv) need for flexibility and adaptability.34
This view can be turned on its head, and be stated in the form that where the above 
conditions prevail, the role of the lower tier actor will be highly influential, whether or 
not it is considered as strictly 'professional'. Both attributes, the presence or absence of 
professional staff and of tasks which reflect the four factors listed above, are important
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considerations in assessing an organisation's bureaucratic form.
3.3 (ii) Bureaucracies in NAFE
Having arrived at a series of theoretical concepts in the above section, it is necessary 
now to examine the particular institutions which were principally involved in the 1984 
policy change in the terms set out in these concepts. This will provide a further key 
element in unravelling the logic behind the government's strategy. A consideration of 
the characteristics of the education service follows an analysis of the MSC.
The MSC bureaucracy
To consider first Weber's definition, it can be stated that the MSC in 1984 is accurately 
described by his five points, i.e. it was a continuous organisation with specific 
functions bound by rules, hierarchically organised, had staff who were non-elected, 
promoted on the basis of merit, separated from ownership and who worked under fixed 
conditions of employment and remuneration. Having established these more 
straightforward attributes, it is important to identify how the MSC expressed its 
'bureaucratic dynamic’.
To employ Bums and Stalker's terminology of 'mechanistic' and 'organic types' 
of bureaucracy, it is interesting to observe that the MSC exhibited aspects of both. In 
some senses it was rigid, hierarchical and ordered: a firmly structured system of civil- 
service line management from the most senior to most junior grades ensured that 
directives were transmitted through its ranks with little amendment, officers each level 
carrying out tasks as defined for them by their immediate superiors. Thus ensured was 
the rational, structured and pre-determined pursuit of organisational tasks required of 
the 'mechanistic' bureaucracy form. The MSC was highly centralised, policy directives 
being issued at the highest level. It has been observed that this centralisation operated 
spatially as well as in an organisational sense:
Its commands come not only from the top down, but also from the centre outwards.35
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In this sense the Commission was able to implement a specific policy throughout its 
ranks without alteration.
Despite such corporate rigidity, however, the MSC was in other ways remarkably 
flexible. Bums and Stalker's description of 'organic' bureaucracies anticipates that a 
high degree of flexibility or responsiveness results from weaker forms of vertical 
hierarchy and organisational authority. The MSC demonstrated that in contrast it could 
be very adaptable, but rather because of than despite its authoritative structure. Free 
from the lethargy associated with age-old practices, the organisation marking its tenth 
anniversary at the start of 1984 had always been able to adapt and mancevre rapidly 
with changing circumstances. Salter and Tapper, noting this adaptability, observe that
since its foundation ... the MSC has shown itself both willing and able to change its internal 
organizational form and its external organizational linkages in order to expand its 
responsibilities, influences and resources.
This meant frequent changes in the Commission's divisional structure, local 
organisation and the number of staff engaged in different activities. However,
in its public documents the MSC is at pains to claim that this process of adaptation is not ad 
hoc but governed by a regular system of management and policy review ... It publicly 
promotes an image of an organization dedicated to the effective and efficient delivery of 
services through flexible and adaptive structures.36
The Commission's Corporate Plan 1982-86 emphasised this:
The Commission must be prepared to adapt continuously its programmes and their means of 
delivery to changes in the environment and the requirements of its clients.37
Such adaptation was facilitated by a planning style in which short-term horizons 
reduced the stability of its programmes yet facilitated year-to-year change at a 
sometimes dizzying pace.
These observations confirm Merton's claim noted earlier that rigidity and rationality
77
in an organisation do not necessarily go hand-in-hand; the difference in this case is that 
reliable procedures and strict devotion to regulations can be highly rational if an 
organisation's managers adopt a flexible culture which actively seeks to meet changing 
circumstances.
Another important consideration is the Commission's autonomy and its 
accountability. Numerous observers describe the MSC as a quango, but some dispute 
this. One view, defining a quango as
an organisation intended to act independently of representative government and provided with 
accountability machinery to do so
claims that the MSC in contrast
acts on its own alright, but it has no accountability machinery All its boards... are created
by appointment from overseeing bodies.
... Meanwhile those at the receiving aid have few rights and little say. Nor has the 
electorate power to change matters locally. Only the slimmest tie to elected democracy exists, 
and that is at the very top through the occasional parliamentary select committee review.38
The same commentators go so far as to describe the Commission as being 'dictatorial' 
in its methods, and that its supposed practice of eschewing feedback and discussion 
from the lower ranks allowed for little dissent Meanwhile, it is important here to 
consider Lipsky's points (outlined in section 3.3(i)) on street-level bureaucrats, and the 
influence wielded by certain types of actor, professionals are seen in this view as most 
influential. The fact that the MSC's personnel consisted of civil servants on a career 
ladder which took them frequently from post to post, and its having a culture in which 
directives from above were more influential than the exercise of judgement in the lower 
ranks, both tie in with the idea of a bureaucracy in which the street-level bureaucrat has 
less influence.
Non-accountable, therefore, and largely autonomous from directive control from 
any other source than the DE and the Cabinet, the MSC can be said to have had the 
powers, resources and freedom to operate largely as its masters wished. Whilst the 
Commission itself supposedly operated as a representative consultative mechanism, it
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has already been observed above that in practice this constraint was largely ineffectual. 
The significance of the appeal of these facts to government thinkers in formulating the 
1984 NAFE policy will be picked up in section 3.7.
In the previous section it was noted that in addition to a characteristic administrative 
style, a bureaucracy will have a philosophical or ideological outlook stemming from its 
functional role and acquired attitudes. Selznick was noted as having identified the 
existence of organisational goals which do not not necessarily coincide with the tasks 
allotted to an institution from outside and the development within a bureaucracy of a 
concern for its own survival.
The guiding philosophy commonly held to be inherent to the MSC's bureaucratic 
dynamic was a market-oriented, business-centred view, in which the pursuit of 
economic efficiency overrode other considerations. Salter and Tapper describe the 
Commission as having been ’on the industry side of the industry-education fence’39. In 
outlook and policy style they see it as having been sympathetic to and compatible with 
the 'economic dynamic', which prioritises efficiency and profitability in all fields. This 
involved an ideological as well as technical function, in promoting the notion of a 
skilled and flexible workforce as the first priority in the development of employment 
and training policy. Which is to say that its was outlook was vocationalist, with 
(according to some) a 'utilitarian ethos’40, its supposed enthusiasm for which led to 
claims in some quarters of its being 'doctrinaire'4!. The significance of this in the 
context of NAFE is clear: a body whose view of education was that it functioned 
primarily as a means of supplying skilled labour to industry would be an attractive 
attribute in the eyes of a central administration seeking to swiftly impose a market 
ideology upon the education sector against a background of years of incremental 
change. The MSC had an 'unashamedly economic ideology of education'^, in which 
the such notions as that training must be firmly work-oriented 'are laid out as self- 
evident truths', with 'no nonsense about education and personal development'43. 
However, whilst the Commission may have exhibited a clear overall stance, it was not 
tied to any firmly established specific policies which could inhibit it from moving in 
new directions at short notice.
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All of these attributes are important to understanding the MSC's behaviourial style. 
Its approach to the policy field in which it operated has been described as aggressive, 
opportunistic and interventionist44. It has been portrayed as an ambitious body seeking 
ever to extend its functions and adopt new responsibilities, encroaching upon areas 
previously the reserve of other bureaucracies. Certainly its history to 1984 was marked 
by a considerable expansion in both its size and range of activities. Evidence of this 
lies in the initial take-over of the ESA and TSA by the OMSC (see Chapter 2); the 
steady self-sought expansion of its brief in the 1970s (e.g. in 1976 'with government 
consent'4^  to include 'developing and operating a comprehensive manpower policy for 
Great Britain'4^ ); its increasing involvement with training schemes for school leavers, 
such as YOP and YTS; its incursion into schools curriculum policy in the shape of 
TVEI; and the intention expressed in Training for Jobs for it to come to discharge the 
function of a 'national training authority'47. It would appear that such 'empire-building 
proclivities'48 stemmed both from an ambitious organisational culture, and the common 
bureaucratic concern expressed by Selznick (above) for an institution's own survival, 
regardless of any objective need for this.
The MSC possessed considerable freedom, on entering the NAFE policy field, to 
operate without the constraints of an established role:
as a new institution on the industry side of the industry-education fence it did not share 
education’s customary distance from the workaday world, it was not bound by time-worn 
patterns of interaction between institutions and did not have a pre-ordained place in the 
educational policy-making process. These could all have been disadvantages of course 49
The fact that they were not is attributable to other characteristics, notably its rapid 
flexibility and responsiveness to the demands of the moment, with a rigid structure of 
internal authority which could ensure delivery of its management policies. Thus it was 
able to follow whichever requirement was in vogue with the government of the day; 
section 3.5 considers how it did this in the education field in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.
Characteristic of the MSC style was an emphasis on short-term horizons, an action- 
based style and the use of purchasing power as an instrument of change. The short­
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term aspect of this is evident in the constantly changing form of its policy programmes 
year to year, an observation made by a whole series of individuals interviewed by the 
author on the subject. A general view was that the MSC was not given to long-term 
investments of time or resources in programmes whose achievements could not be 
evaluated at an early stage; it wanted measurable results, rapidly-achieved. In 
consequence it was given to sudden policy changes as priorities moved on50. This 
reflects the action style so evident in the tone of the Commission's advertising and 
publications. These generally tended to suggest a dynamic and speedy approach to 
problem issues, and an effective trouble-shooting style of dealing with them. The 
1980s programme 'Action for Jobs' is a quite typical example of this.
The use of purchasing power as an implementation and policy tool was assisted by 
the Commission's rapid-delivery style, which made it attractive to a Treasury eager to 
allocate resources to agencies which could be relied upon to produce results. This made 
expanding its budget a relatively straightforward affair, even at a time of growing fiscal 
restraint, and the MSC used this purchasing clout effectively 'as a political weapon'5i 
in the pursuit of its objectives. At a time when public money was increasingly scarce, 
the MSC financial fioneypot' was a persuasive incentive to toe its policy line. Its 
possession and use of such power made it unpopular with some commentators, some 
of whom state that the MSC used public funding, 'its own personal blackmail', as a 
means of 'ensuring compliance with its directives'52.
There is, however, an important other side to the use of purchasing power as a 
means of achieving organisational objectives. Where a bureaucracy does not directly 
control a delivery mechanism of its own, but instead relies on others to implement its 
programmes, the use of financial incentive to achieve the desired results depends on 
this incentive being greater than any countervailing forces. The MSC, as outlined 
earlier, had no delivery mechanism, instead purchasing implementation on demand of 
results. The discussion of the implementation of the White Paper Training for Jobs 
conducted in Chapter 4 will demonstrate how this proved a key factor in the frustration 
of central government objectives which it had believed the MSC could deliver.
81
The education service bureaucracy
In considering this area it is first necessary to clarify which institutions are being 
addressed in the discussion. As was evident from the analysis of the NAFE policy 
community in section 3.2, the public sector administrative mechanism contrasts with 
that for employment and training in that a number of partners are involved in the policy 
and implementation structure. It cannot therefore be analysed in terms of Weber's 
definition of a model bureaucracy, for whilst the central component, the DES, does 
exhibit many of the characteristics listed in Weber's five categories, the bureaucratic 
structure as a whole is quite different, embracing the whole vertically interdependent 
public sector portion of the NAFE policy community. The discussion here first 
examines the DES; and then the wider institutional structure which needs to be taken 
into account from the perspective of the central Department, an approach justified by the 
need to present the bureaucracy as it appeared to government strategists as they 
formulated their 1984 NAFE policy.
The DES had existed in an approximation to its 1984 form since the second world 
war. In consequence, its practices and institutional culture were rigidly established, as 
were its links with other bodies in the NAFE field. This culture has been described as 
'pragmatic, conservative and evolutionary'53. Its gradualist approach may be attributed 
both to: an institutional style that evolved over a period during much of which its 
activity in directing education policy was limited (see Chapter 2); and alleged 
inefficiencies in its own internal policy-making procedures: 'tensions' between its long­
term planners and the requirements of its Public Expenditure Survey Committee are an 
example of supposed inter-branch policy rivalry within the DES54. Such factors lent the 
DES an 'inertia generated by its past impotence’55. Salter and Tapper state that
like all institutions, the (DES) has over time developed its own momentum, and its own
inertia, which means that its exercise of educational power runs in certain policy grooves.56
Once these grooves become established, any change of general direction becomes 
difficult, especially in the short term. Consequently its bureaucratic dynamic is 
'conservative', its structures 'inflexible'; its historical experience has given it 'an
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incrementalist approach' to the acquisition and exercise of educational power. To use 
the 'mechanistic' and 'organic' terms applied by Bums and Stalker, it is curious to note 
that whilst the DES was perhaps not as mechanistically rigid in its internal structure as 
the MSC, it was actually less rather than more flexible. In consequence,
it has shown itself less than adaptable in the face of new pressures for educational change.57
Whilst supposedly the main state apparatus through which pressures from the economic 
base were translated into educational policy, the DES had generally proved inefficient at 
generating fresh policy suited to the imperatives of the economic dynamic.
Partly this was due to the institutional culture of the Department in the 
philosophical sense. Salter and Tapper argue that as
an established bureaucracy it has goals, needs and an ideology of its own which may well run 
counter in educational policy terms to the demands of the economy.58
R h o d e s5  ^claims that each government department has a distinct policy style which 
leads to the creation of a 'departmental philosophy' akin to the type of philosophy 
earlier ascribed to the MSC. This has been described as the
store of knowledge and experience in the subjects handled, something which eventually takes 
shape as a practical philosophy.60
In the case of the DES this philosophy developed in the era of the post-war social 
democratic consensus, in which educational policy focused much more upon the social 
needs of the individual than vocationalist economic imperatives. When such imperatives 
emerged, therefore, in the late 1970s the DES, given its gradualist operating style, was 
ill-equipped to offer the type of swift institutional response afforded by the MSC.
To look beyond the boundaries of the central state Department to the NAFE 
bureaucracy as a whole, it is evident that the DES's difficulties in making a response to 
new demands wei/e compounded by a lack of firm control over its policy field. The 
whole system of education including NAFE was decentralised, and it was observed that
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many of the administrative lines of control run through the local state, the LEAs, which have 
clear identities and policy preferences of their own. These may or may not be in tune with 
DES priorities.61
This put the DES in a position of considerable weakness in determining the detailed 
implementation of its policies. Very often the LEAs were not inclined to toe the DES 
line, preferring to follow policy routes of their own. When this was combined with the 
necessities of negotiation with other partners in the policy community, such as the 
examining and validating bodies and the teaching unions, the overall effect of the 
complex interdependence was to add more weight to the tendency to inertia already 
present within the DES itself.
Rhodes believes the educational policy community as a whole to have been 
characterised by an incremental policy-making style, and suggests after Dror that
of its very nature, incrementalism fosters scepticism of radical change,provides a 
rationalization for inertia and acts as a bulwark for the status quo.62
This view of the NAFE policy community is of considerable importance to the 
discussion of how the MSC effected its incursion into the field of training in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, which is conducted in section 3.5.
Before that, however, in order to more fully appreciate the significance of the 
central-local relationship which so crucially affects NAFE policy-making and 
implementation, the next section considers in more depth some historical and theoretical 
factors which shaped the relationship between central and local government in England 
and Wales in the run-up to the 1984 White Paper.
84
1A  Relations between central and local government in England and 
Wales
The discussion in this section does not attempt to present an exhaustive discourse on 
the theme of central-local relations in England and Wales. Rather it is an attempt to 
identify those theoretical and recent-historical aspects of these which, it is argued, 
impinged significantly upon the central government's 1984 NAFE strategy. The first 
stage in this process is an analysis of the functional roles of both, the interests they each 
represent and the relationships consequent upon these factors. This is followed by an 
examination of the strategies open to each level in pursuing its interests, and some 
historical detail about such strategies were pursued in the period leading up to the 1984 
White Paper.
3.4 (i) Theoretical aspects of central-local relations
It is important to establish what is meant by the terms 'central' and 'local' government 
in the context of this discussion. Rhodes observes that the term 'centre' ought to be 
understood as 'shorthand for a diverse collection of departments and divisions'6^ . The 
Cabinet can be represented as the linchpin of central authority and decision-making, but 
it must nonetheless be recognised that there are a range of competing interests within 
the central government and between its various departments. Rhodes identifies a 
principal distinction between 'guardians' and 'advocates'. The guardians are in practice 
the Treasury, whose interest is restraining public expenditure, whilst the advocates are 
the service spending departments, some of whom will be involved with sub-central 
government, others not. In the NAFE sector, the DES can be identified as an advocate 
department with an involvement in sub-central government; the DE has a similar role.
In discussing central-local relations in NAFE, therefore, the 'centre' can be understood 
to refer to the sub-network involving the Cabinet, Treasury, DE and DES, with the 
DoE as a partner connected by its resource links with sub-central government.
'Local' government, meanwhile, can refer to a number of different types of sub- 
central authority. In the early 1980s there existed a system of shire and metropolitan
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counties and districts, a two-tiered structure which was echoed by similar arrangements 
in London and Wales. In the discussion of NAFE references to local authorities are 
restricted to LEAs, of which there would only be one in any geographical area.
Two principal countervailing factors govern the basic relationships between central 
and local government: the first is that local government’s powers are determined by 
Parliamentary statutes, i.e. not protected in a constitutional sense from amendment by 
any central administration; the second is that, whilst the centre is clearly more powerful, 
local government is backed by an independent mandate from its own electorate, which 
provides it with a legitimacy to oppose central government policies if its interests are in 
conflict with these. These factors indicate the centre to be ultimately the stronger 
partner, having 'a nigh total monopoly of legal resources'64 but indicate also that local 
government has a powerful capacity to resist Thus local government
can and does pose severe obstacles to the policies of the government of the day
one important reason being that the latter is non-executant in nature, i.e. it does not 
deliver services directly. As a consequence of these factors, any change being 
introduced in circumstances of intergovernmental conflict is liable to be slow.
The two levels of government carry out different sets of functions. A useful tool in 
examining this functional differentiation and other key differences is the dual-state 
thesis forwarded by Saunders65. Saunders approaches the issue of these differences, 
and of how they lead to intergovernmental conflict, by examining the internal and 
external pressures operating upon both parties along four dimensions: the 
organisational, functional, political, and ideological dimensions. In terms of 
organisation Saunders dismisses the ’sterile debate'66 about whether local authorities 
are the 'partners' or 'agents' of the central administration, preferring to see them as 
simply a separate
loci of power which is mobilised in relation to the power exerted by central authority.67
In terms of the functional dimension, Saunders indicates that the specific
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responsibilities of local government lie in the sphere of consumption. This refers to the 
provision of such services as social benefits, personal social services, education and 
housing. In contrast, responsibility for the interests of the production sector - such as 
infrastructure and public investment in industry - is held by central government. 
Dunleavy68 accounts for this by indicating a contradictory central policy which seeks to 
pursue centralised corporatist-style planning, whilst retaining a measure of ostensible 
pluralism for the purposes of popular legitimacy. This, he argues, is afforded by 
vesting social consumption spending in pluralist local government, whose 
constitutional and fiscal dependency on central government limits the potential for the 
damaging effects of pluralist decision-making on the centre. Investment expenditure, 
meanwhile, is kept in central government hands and is thus 'insulated from popular 
control1®.
Saunders argues that, in Britain, after a sustained period of expansion in public 
spending on consumption services, the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s highlighted the 
fact that increased spending in this area was diverting funds from government 
investment in the private sector. At a time of overall contraction in public spending, a 
decline in the profitability in the private sector created a direct conflict between 
production and consumption imperatives, which were both competing for the same 
resources. Since these competing imperatives were articulated through different levels 
of government, this competition led to intergovernmental conflict as the centre 
attempted to introduce downward pressure on local government spending on 
consumption services. The essential point here is that this such conflict is not simply an 
expression of some ideological or organisational power struggle; it is a direct product of 
deeper tensions within the state.
In the political sphere, Saunders argues that the fact of local authorities being more 
open to a range of popular interests which are not expressed at the national level creates 
tensions between governments over the articulation of these interests in local policy.
H e a ^ u e s
Whilst ideologically, in Britain at least, a tension has developed out of a philosophical
A
polarisation between, on the one hand, the private-property oriented market philosophy 
of central Conservative administrations, and on the other, the principles of collectivism 
and the rights of citizenship which he claims to characterise local government. These
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echo a concern with, respectively, production and consumption issues at each level, 
and emphasise the functional differentiation along these lines.
Although the dual-state thesis has been criticised as not providing a fully adequate 
explanation of functional allocation within the state, critics such as Dunleavy believe it 
does successfully highlight a particular empirical patterning of government, if not for 
the right reasons70. Such empirical accuracy fulfils the present requirement of 
understanding specific aspects of intra-state relationships which impinge upon NAFE.
Having identified the key sources of inter-govemmental conflict, it is necessary to 
examine some strategies which have been employed by each level in the pursuit of its 
own interests. The problem from the central government perspective is
how to secure local obedience to central objectives in the face of resistance from local 
authorities which have often claimed a mandate for opposing central government policies.71
Organisational solutions Saunders outlines to this problem include restructuring and 
innovation. Restructuring may involve such changes as the redefinition of local 
responsibilities, the removal or addition of local government tiers, or the spatial extent 
of an authority's jurisdiction. Innovation involves such actions as the introduction of 
different management techniques which diminish the input of councillors, or the 
transfer of powers to alternative forms of delivery agency which are not accountable to 
local politicians.
Other forms of solution include economic approaches, whereby the centre seeks to 
curtail local government expenditure, the larger part of which is funded in England and 
Wales by central grant. Such a strategy is facilitated by the centre's virtually exclusive 
access to the legal powers to enforce it. Saunders also suggests types of political 
solution sought, the 'broad strategy' of which is to remove
key policy-making powers from the democratic sector so as to insulate them from popular 
pressures and render them more amenable to central direction 72
enhancing the role of central actors, 'experts' and private sector interests at the expense
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of local elected officials. Clearly this ties in with the organisational strategy of 
innovation identified above.
Dunleavy argues that in the West such actions are associated in particular with 
functions which affect the production sector:
there has been a clear tendency to centralise, corporatise, depoliticise and insulate from 
traditional representative institutions those areas of policy making which are of direct 
significance to business interests. There has apparently been a continuous structural pressure 
on central government to maintain tight social control over policy areas with major 
implications for capital accumulation and economic development.73
Saunders considers the strategies which are open to local government in Britain to 
resist such central government attack. In all four areas he examines - organisational, 
economic, political and ideological - he sees few options open to it beyond staunch 
rearguard attempts to slow the advance of change.
One other factor which should be mentioned in this context is the question of how 
truly ’local' are the actions of local government in origin, echoing the point made in 
section 3.2 that LEA policy is largely defined non-locally, principally by the local 
authority associations. But whatever the influence of wider bodies it seems fair to state 
that a crucial aspect of the strength of local government derives from a factor which is 
truly local but operates with the same effect nationally, i.e. its independent mandate. 
The ability thus conferred to adopt a line opposed to the centre is the necessary 
condition for conflict to occur in the first place; this is essential to understanding the 
reasons why the central government's policies are not necessarily implemented in the 
way it intends.
3.4 (ii) Developments in central-local conflict in the run-up to 1984
Having examined some theoretical considerations which impinged upon the central 
government stance on NAFE in 1984, it is important now to examine the relevant 
historical detail which shaped relationships at the time of the White Paper. The actual
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experience of central-local conflict in England and Wales in the early 1980s can be 
examined through the strategies open to the respective partners identified by Saunders.
To take the central strategies he proposes, the organisational approaches noted 
earlier were restructuring and innovation. Examples of restructuring include the Heath 
administration's Reorganisation of 1974, which saw a wholesale realignment of local 
authority structures, responsibilities and areas of jurisdiction. Similarly, the abolition 
by the Thatcher government in 1986 of the metropolitan counties and the Greater 
London Council (GLC) can be portrayed as a strategic restructuring move, this one 
arguably being more specifically related to the particular policy objective of quelling 
local government opposition to central policy.
Strategies of innovation in England and Wales have included, according to 
Saunders, a move to corporate management techniques with a consequent reduction in 
the influence of elected councillors, and an expansion in regional-level, non-elected 
forms of government. The latter has involved a transfer of former local government 
functions to new bodies, which include the nationalised industries (councils formerly 
had responsibilities for gas and electricity supplies), regional Water Authorities, Health 
Authorities and various development agencies. Dunleavy agrees, stating that
the number of areas where local authorities are engaged in providing services or making 
investments has dramatically reduced, especially since the 1940s,74
and that this accelerated during the 1970s. These changes, of course, are political as 
well as organisational strategies, and involve the process outlined above of insulating 
policy control from popular pressures and placing it in the hands of professional 
experts and other non-elected interests, particularly in the sector of production and 
investment.
The economic sphere was the main arena for government strategies to quell local 
authorities' independent line in the early 1980s. The Thatcher administration came to 
power promising strict monetarist policies which would substantially reduce public 
spending. Local government was to be pressured to do the same, and measures were
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progressively introduced to force councils to toe the central government's ideological 
line. First, the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act introduced the Block 
Grant to replace the former Rate Support Grant This was to be distributed on the basis 
of Grant Related Expenditure Assessments, which were calculated on the basis of a 
central estimation of local needs. From this was calculated a supposed level of Rates 
which the local authorities should be levying in order to meet the spending 'target' set 
centrally, the Grant Related Poundage (GRP). Councils which overstepped their 
allocated GRP had their Block Grant reduced by the same amount Defiance on the part 
of councils (generally Labour-controlled) which continued to 'overspend' led to 
tougher measures introduced in 1981, which introduced a 'hold-back' system designed 
to enforce a required cut of 5.6 per cent in real terms from councils' 1978-9 spending 
levels75. This procedure was retrospectively legislated for in the 1982 Local 
Government Finance Act. Continued local resistance to central government policy saw 
further legislation, by the second Thatcher administration, in the form of the Rates Act 
of 1984. This introduced 'rate-capping', a process by which the central government 
could selectively introduce sanctions against those councils it felt to be excessive 
spenders, a process which eventually led to the surcharging of councillors in some 
areas where resistance to central policy was fiercest.
It has been argued by Duncan and Goodwin76 that macroeconomic arguments do 
not account for the amount of government attention paid to this area. They point out for 
example that in 1982/3 local government borrowing was only 4.1 per cent of the public 
sector borrowing requirement, public borrowing being 'the lode stone of monetarist 
economic policy'. Their argument centres on the threat posed by local government to 
the credibility of central economic policies, threatening the government line that there 
was no workable alternative to its programme. The crucial point here is that the 
Thatcher governments' attacks on local government did not originate from economic 
theory alone; rather, they indicated its entrenched ideological distaste for local 
government in general. The assiduousness of the government in seeking to ensure local 
compliance with its fiscal policies through several successive pieces of legislation over 
a short period of time suggests more in the way of a sustained attack than an isolated 
policy move. Similarly, the abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan counties was 
widely considered to stem more from central opposition to their political activities (they
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were all Labour-controlled) than from any genuine concern to improve the structure of 
local government. Central policy towards local authorities in the 1980s should therefore 
be viewed with these ideological considerations much in mind.
The ability of local government to resist these changes was severely limited, for at 
each obstacle the central government introduced new legal powers to strengthen its 
hand to enforce its policy. In opposing it, councillors were reduced to strategies of 
protracted non-co-operation, exploiting loopholes in the legislation until these were 
progressively tightened up, and in various other small ways slowing down the 
approach of the inevitable. Saunders notes that in all four spheres of conflict he 
identifies, local councils in Britain
have in recent years attempted yet failed to resist central government77
Important to the present considerations, however, is the fact that local authorities have 
resisted central policies, and have succeeded in using the complexities of the sub-central 
government system to blunt the advance of central domination. As Rhodes notes
The diverse and divergent response of LEAs to contraction illustrates the problems of a non­
executant centre. Whatever its pronouncements on either new levels for education or levels of 
expenditure, its initiative is dissipated in a disaggregated policy system 78
Regardless of the outcome, the above evidence of fierce economic warring between 
the two levels of government demonstrates that the dawn of the Thatcher era saw an 
intensification of central-local conflict, a development which would affect all areas of 
policyTmaking and implementation in which both were involved.
To summarise the key points which have emerged from this section, three factors 
emerge as particularly relevant to the subsequent discussion:
(a) an underlying tension between central and local government in England and 
Wales consequent upon their primary concern with production and 
consumption functions respectively, both of which requirements have been
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competing for limited resources since mid-1970s;
(b) a post-war tendency for local service functions to be progressively transferred 
from democratically-elected councils to non-elected government agencies;
(c) a stance on the part of successive Thatcher governments which was clearly 
antagonistic to local councils, made evident by organisational restructuring and 
fiscal constraint.
Theoretical analysis of the rise of the MSC
It is necessary at this stage to unify into a single overview some of the material 
presented so far. The historical facts concerning the growth and expansion of the MSC 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s were effectively chronicled earlier, in Chapter 2. 
Following which, the early sections of this chapter have outlined some theoretical 
perspectives on the NAFE and employment/training policy networks and the 
bureaucracies which operate within them. It behoves the discussion now to synthesise 
these otherwise disparate observations into a coherent vision of the incursion by the 
MSC into areas which hitherto might reasonably have been considered the preserve of 
the education service. It does this by considering the history again, with the greater 
analytical penetration afforded by the theoretical considerations discussed in this 
chapter.
There are three key related themes. First, the increasing centralisation of education 
that became apparent in the 1970s; second, the rise of vocationalism with its associated 
causes and corollaries; and third, the effects of the expansionist dynamic of the MSC 
upon those areas into which it sought to grow.
The first of these processes is identified by Salter and T ap per?? as part an overall 
tendency towards increased opportunities for the centralisation of power into state 
bureaucracies throughout western Europe after the mid-70s. Education, like other 
sectors, has been affected by this. It was observed in Chapter 2 that a shifting post-war
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balance of power between the DES and LEAs swung back towards the centre during 
the seventies. It is important now to recognise this as being part of a wider process.
The supposed 'troika* of educational partners identified in section 3.2 were the 
DES, LEAs and the teaching unions. Rhodes observes that after 1975 the DES sought 
to reassert its control at the expense of these other partners80. Whilst throughout much 
of the post-war period it had perceived itself as more of a 'mediator'8! between LEAs 
and schools and colleges on the one hand, and the Cabinet and the Treasury on the 
other, it now sought a greater central role for itself in the formulation of policy and the 
acquisition of educational power. The field best suited to this task was provision for 16- 
19s - i.e. NAFE, perceived by the DES as the logical 'lever' by means of which the 
system could be reoriented in such a way that its influence would be increased. The 
reasons Rhodes cites for this were that, located as it was in the school-work gap, it had 
not been accorded priority by any of the partners, and thus had fallen under no-one's 
directive control. In consequence it was 'less hedged around by statutory 
constraints'^, making it a rich area for redefinition by the first party to take a major 
interest in its affairs. A key document in this development is the so-called Tellow 
Book’, a confidential memorandum prepared in 1976 for the then Prime Minister,
James Callaghan. This criticised schools for not adequately equipping their pupils with 
the skills necessary for working life, and formed the basis of Callaghan's Ruskin 
speech which sparked off the Great Debate. Supported by the encroaching economic 
recession with its spiralling youth unemployment, and persistent complaints from 
employers about the inadequacy of schools provision, the philosophy of educational 
vocationalism which emerged in this period became a potentially powerful weapon for 
those at the DES seeking enhanced influence in the educational policy community.
With the support of a Treasury keen to see its investments in education yield more 
obviously productive results, the DES set about 'side-stepping its partners in the trioka 
of the education policy community'83, seeking to expand its policy space in the 16-19 
field. Vocationalism proved a powerful force in an era of political re-evaluation, but 
dangers to its policy existed in that such forces are inevitably open to exploitation by 
other interests. Expanding into new territory for the DES meant leaving itself 'open to 
challenge from other policy networks'84. It was noted earlier that training had long
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been a responsibility of the public sector institutions of the employment and training 
policy network, i.e. the DE and latterly the MSC. These were
ever eager to defend their turf ’against the possible "capture" of training by the Department of 
Education',85
and were likely to pose a challenge to any new DES moves into the sector. If it was to 
succeed, it needed to show an ability to deliver new, vocationalist policies on the 
ground more effectively than its rivals.
Early tests of this ability included the formulation of a new policy on post-16 
institutional structures, and in making a response to the needs set out by Callaghan for a 
programme of work experience and training for the young unemployed. In neither case 
were the results encouraging. The first foundered on arguments over a draft circular 
issued by the 16-19 sub-committee of the Expenditure Steering Group (Education) of 
the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance. The then Education Secretary 
Shirley Williams had 'wanted a prompt response to (its) deliberations'86, but criticisms 
of the draft circular prevented its further progression, a second, political sub-committee 
being set up to further consider the issue. Progress was slow because 'a consensus did 
not exist within the policy community'87, and this reflects the difficulties the DES faced 
in attempting to force through a policy line. The junior minister responsible for the 
political sub-committee is quoted as saying of this situation
for God's sake let's get something decided. For ten years we've been at it and we now need a 
decision.88
Rhodes suggests that this comment could be 'the epitaph of the policy community'8^  
The incident expresses much about DES impotence.
The second example is even more relevant to the consideration of competition for 
the training policy space, as it involved the MSC and the DES in conflict for the first 
time. It was noted in Chapter 2 that DES proposals to organise a major programme of 
youth training and work experience were superseded by a similar scheme (YOP) run 
under the aegis of the MSC. This major setback for DES ambitions derived largely
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from the impact of the Holland Report90, which convinced the Cabinet that the 
Commission was best placed to meet the needs of the moment
These examples illustrate the nature of the conflict between the DES and the MSC 
for control of the vocational policy space. Both harboured ambitions of acquiring 
greater responsibilities, but possessed a differing potential to succeed because of the 
contrasting nature of both their respective policy networks and their expressions of the 
bureaucratic dynamic. In the previous sections of this chapter a whole series of such 
contrasts were observed. In terms of the policy networks, these included significant 
contrasts in the organisational structure, the flow of authority, degree of autonomy and 
accountability, and financial linkages. Whereas in the employment and training network 
the public sector organisational linkages were internal to one bureaucracy (the MSC), in 
the NAFE sector a more complicated structure necessitated negotiation, co-operation 
and the pursuit of mutually agreed policies before change could be effected. Thus while 
the DE could issue directives to local level via the tiers of the MSC, the DES was 
unable to secure the implementation of its policies with any degree of certainty. Whilst 
the only opposition to the activities of the MSC could stem from refusal to accept its 
money, the DES frequently met resistance from LEAs who had policies and priorities 
of their own, and the political legitimacy to pursue them. Whilst the 
employment/training structure could virtually assure delivery, the central body of the 
NAFE sector could only guarantee the attempt A more cynical view of this contrast is 
contained in the view that
The basic appeal of the assault of the MSC on the education system is that democracy is
inefficient.91
Another central factor in the differences between the two bodies, at a time of severe 
fiscal constraint, was the use of public money. Whilst the MSC could allocate funds 
from its central budget to local implementation through a simple chain of line 
management, control over money in the NAFE sector fell into a number of hands, 
denying the DES the power to determine in any specific way the manner in which it 
was spent at the local level. Money could be allocated to the MSC with a sure
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knowledge of what it would be used for, the same did not apply to the NAFE route. 
Ranson quotes a DES official on the subject:
'we had... a serious problem in persuading Whitehall that we could deliver'.
In sharp contrast the MSC
has a big bag of gold, is a centralised bureaucracy and can deliver the goods'.92 
And again:
the Treasury is very critical: education has promised and not delivered. If you give £50m to the 
MSC it will buy you a hard edged reduction in youth unemployment, whereas if you put 
money in the RSG ... That is why we lose out. The Treasury-Cabinet line is pay money to 
an organization which will get things done quickly. The Treasury has been a strong 
controlling influence. The Treasury/MSC link has been a key one. We are trying to gain the 
same relationship 93
The DES was unable to form such a relationship because of resource linkages 
fundamentally different from those of the MSC.
In addition to the above, there existed strong bureaucratic contrasts. The MSC had 
a management structure which ensured swift and obedient response to its directives, 
and an operational culture which was amenable to sudden, wholesale changes of 
direction. A young body not tied by the allegiances and expectations of longstanding 
negotiating arrangements with partners in its field, it could adapt as required in a very 
short time. The DES, in contrast, established in its role for many years, was firmly 
locked into a procedural culture and negotiation network which severely hampered its 
ability to respond quickly to any development; it was fundamentally unadaptable. Its 
approach to policy-making and change was incrementalist, accustomed to gradual 
development encumbered at every stage by extensive consultation procedures.
Whereas the DES was in the habit of pursuing long-term goals, cautiously 
implemented over a number of years, the MSC pursued its policies with unashamedly 
short-term horizons, seeking early results. The horizons of politics being equally 
limited, it thus perfectly complemented the dynamics of political imperative. Problems
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such as an impending youth unemployment crisis make rapid solutions a political 
necessity, and the bureaucracy best placed to come up with such solutions is the most 
liable to attract Cabinet patronage.
Furthermore the MSC had a clearly market-centred, business-oriented 
philosophical stance, took an economic view of education and training and was thus 
naturally vocationalist. The DES in contrast was, despite its attempts to expand into the 
vocational education policy space, philosophically rooted in the era of the social 
democratic consensus, with all its attention to the needs of the individual. A Cabinet 
with a newly 'work-oriented' perspective on education was likely to be most convinced 
by a bureaucracy whose colours were firmly and unequivocally nailed to the 
vocationalist totem, than by a recent and not altogether convincing convert.
Lastly, there is the question of institutional competitiveness. It was observed above 
that the MSC was aggressive, opportunist and interventionist in style, keen to expand 
its policy space and increase its responsibilities. Whilst the DES was also seeking to 
expand its influence in the late 1970s, the MSC attributes of authoritative command, 
flexibility, reliability, direct purchasing power and a freedom to reformulate policy at 
the drop of a hat gave it advantages the DES could not hope to match.
It would however be a mistake to imagine that the MSC or DES were in any way 
seeking conflict with each other. The case was rather that
to create new institutions gives rise to the probability that they will clash with existing 
institutions so that there is an internal conflict within the state bureaucratic apparatus.94
The MSC was little over two years old when the influential papers of 1976* staked its 
claim to a role in the training of young people. Both the Commission and the DES were 
looking to extend their influence into an area for which no institutional responsibility 
was defined, neither having any past precedent to draw upon to establish a right of 
influence. The reason they both moved into the area at the same time was that they were 
responding to the same political and economic pressures, in consequence of which they
* see section 2.3 (ii)
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found themselves in competition. The institution which would emerge as dominant in 
the policy area would be that best equipped to answer the imperatives of the moment. 
The above contrasts between the two bodies and policy networks illustrate the reasons 
why the MSC was ultimately more successful.
The pressures acting on the Callaghan government to introduce change in the area 
of youth training policy in the late 1970s were impossible to ignore. Changes in the 
economy and the associated spiralling of unemployment necessitated a rapid departure 
from the longstanding equilibrium in education and training. Salter and Tapper note that
While some kind of gap has always been tolerated between the demands made by the economy 
on the educational system and the quality of labour supplied by that system, there must come
not
a point where changes have to occur if the mismatch between demand and supply isto result 
in unbearable tensions and social fracture.95
In this situation,
The more its bureaucratic dynamic fosters the formation of education policies sympathetic to 
economic demands the more powerful is an institution.96
As a consequence of all the above factors, the MSC was able to present itself as 
uniquely placed to fulfil the needs of the economy by promoting a system of education 
and training fit to meet them. Geoffrey Holland, one of the architects of the MSC's rise 
to prominence, claims it to be
doubtful that any government department could have been so well-placed as the MSC to 
facilitate and underpin such developments 97
It succeeded where the DES failed; the latter, in the process of attempting to reassert 
control within its own policy community by redefining the purposes of education, had 
'constrained its ability to extend its d om ain '98 . Its internal constraints made it 'a victim 
of the very ideology it had so conscientiously sp o n so red '9 9 . However, as Rhodes 
points out, it would be a mistake to see the MSC's expansion simply as an incursion
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into the territory of the DES: it has taken over a policy space in which the DES had 
limited previous involvement and which it aspired to control. It was
a policy space awaiting occupation not capture.100
The DE had long been established in training, and the vocational area for young people 
was very much on the boundaries of both communities. The surprising feature of the 
developments which took place is the relative ease with which the MSC became the 
natural choice to adopt functions which might have been expected to be handled by the 
NAFE policy community.
After its success in developing YOP, the MSC consolidated its new position. As 
Moon and Richardson noted in 1984,
the MSC has, in a short period of time established itself as the focal point of vocational 
training and has been tremendously effective in expanding its administrative territory.101
Through its ability to quickly deliver politically-urgent results without fuss or waste of 
resources, it acquired the allegiance of the Treasury and the ear of the Cabinet The 
initial threat to this position posed by the election of the first Thatcher government with 
its commitment to cut public expenditure in all areas was met as effectively and astutely 
as its other challenges. As detailed in Chapter 2, the ploy of the New Training Initiative 
succeeded in winning a government reappraisal which strengthened the Commission's 
hand, and saw it receive new responsibilities for the coordination of youth and adult 
training.
The announcement of TVEI in 1982 marked another major boost to the MSC's 
pivotal role as a conduit for government action. This initiative emphasised how central 
was the Commission in the early 1980s to government thinking on youth, education 
and training policy. Section 3.7 considers how, with this in mind, the strategists of the 
Thatcher government perceived the potential of the MSC as a tool for securing the 
desired policy changes as they turned their attention to the next item on their educational 
agenda: non-advanced further education.
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An outline of the governments approach to its 1984 strategy which synthesisies the 
theoretical perspectives outlined in this chapter is conducted in section 3.7. Before that 
it is necessary to cover one fujher theoretical area crucial to any account of such 
strategy; that is, an overview of the nature of policy-formulation, decision-making and 
implementation.
3.6 P o l i c y fo r m u la t ion ,  d ec i s io n -m a k i n g a n d ,  i m p lem en ta t io n .
The raison d'etre of the present chapter is to provide a basis for understanding the 
government NAFE strategy in 1984 - why it did what it did. Previous sections have 
examined the particularities of the policy networks and bureaucracies which were to 
deliver NAFE under the proposals of the new legislation. What remains is the need to 
set NAFE policy-making in the wider context of policy-making generally: how it is 
formulated, how decisions about it are arrived at, how it is implemented. These 
questions raise a series of issues about the possibilities within which policy strategists 
work. To understand the approach of the government's strategists in 1984, therefore, it 
is necessary to identify the limits to those possibilities. This section undertakes such a 
task by considering alternative approaches, and adopting one which may be used to 
characterise the process which occurrred in NAFE, both in the run-up to and the 
period which followed the White Paper.
For the purposes of this study, theories concerning the means by which policy is 
conceived, adopted and implemented can usefully be split into two broad perspectives. 
The first of these embraces a top-down model involving rational decision-making by 
upper echelon actors; the second views policy-making as a wider and more complex 
process involving active participation at all levels.
3.6 (i) Top-down approach
This conceives there to be a division of labour between those who formulate and those 
who implement policy. The former are seen to operate in the upper tier of the policy
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process. They carry decision-making authority, set goals, and make rational decisions 
between alternative policy options according to which is most conducive to the 
achievement of the chosen goals102. The latter's role is to pursue these strategies as 
effectively as they are able, faithfully following such guidelines as have been handed 
down to them from above. Thus policy is seen as being a recognisable entity which can 
be clearly identified by both parties, perhaps enshrined as a piece of legislation, and 
hence evaluation of the policy becomes a matter of measuring how closely the policy 
outcomes match the original objectives. The process is portrayed as cyclical. In the first 
instance there is a period of policy formulation, followed by an implementation phase. 
This stage includes monitoring and evaluation of policy outputs, the results of which 
are fed back to the policy makers to inform another round of policy decisions, which in 
turn are once again handed down to the implemented. Ham and Hill103 note that this is 
a prescriptive rather than responsive or flexible approach to policy-making. They state 
that its position embodies the following: (a) that policy should be made by elected 
representatives, implemented by subordinate and obedient public officials, and (b) that 
policy-making involves goal-setting followed by activities in pursuit of these goals 
which may be systematically monitored.
This approach involves a number of key assumptions. Broadly these concern: 
firstly, the authority which those in the upper tier of the policy process can exert over 
what takes place at the lower levels; secondly, the ability of the upper tier to 
successfully formulate an informed policy which is sufficiently detailed to be applicable 
at the local scale when implemented; and, thirdly, the very existence of policy as a 
recognisable entity.
Firstly then, on the question of authority, the top down approach considers the 
policy makers to be a dominant group, for whom policy is an identifiable piece of 
property of which they are the owners. Similarly, they are seen to monopolise the 
decision-making process, with the implicit requirement that substantive decisions 
relating to the implementation of the policy be referred back up the line for their 
approval. Any unsanctioned alteration or interpretation of these decisions represents a 
challenge to the authority of the dominant group. In state policy-making such as that for 
the public sector NAFE this group is the central government, and in particular its
102
ministers and their teams, who are accorded superior legitimacy over all other actors in 
the policy field as a consequence of the government’s electoral mandate. Hence, it is at 
this stage only that ideological imperatives are permitted to enter into the policy process; 
these in turn require the approval of the electorate at regular intervals. As we have seen 
this situation can become complicated by the existence of other, independent mandates 
lower down the hierarchy, but the important principle at this stage is the concept of a 
distinct decision-making group.
The second major group of assumptions centre on the ability of the above group to 
adequately formulate policy which is sufficiently comprehensive to instruct the 
implemented in the details of their activities. For such comprehensiveness to be 
attained, the decision-making 61ite is required to be highly informed on a wide range of 
detailed issues. These include previous practice, the demands and powers of various 
interest groups at different levels, the amount of resources (in both time and money 
terms) required to carry out the various phases of implementation, and the likely 
consequences of alternative courses of action. Naturally it will be the role of the lower 
tiers to provide such information, it being their responsibility to ensure that the 
decision-making 61ite is making rational choices on the basis of as complete a body of 
information as can be achieved within available resources. The assumption that this is 
what they in fact do, i.e. that they are not selective in the information they supply to 
their superiors, is very important.
Furthermore it is assumed that either: (i) the policy handed down by 
decision-makers is formulated in sufficient detail as to inform the ground-level 
implementers as to how to respond to contingent local circumstances, or (ii) that where 
such detail is not built in to the initial policy, that the decision-makers have sufficient 
time available to deal with any detailed implementation problems that are referred back 
up to them by implementers who have no personal authority to act independently on 
these.
The corollary of the above approach is a view of 'implementation' as
those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement
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of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions.104
This epitomises the top-down view of the policy process, and embraces the idea that
much can go 'wrong' between policy formulation and output105
Extensive work has been done in this area by Pressman and Wildavsky much of whose 
concern is with the extent to which successful implementation depends on linkages 
between different organisations and departments at the local level106. Their analysis is 
mathematical in approach, quantifying the number of linkages' between these 
organisations in the implementation of an area of policy and theorising that the greater 
the number of these linkages, the higher the quality of cooperation required between the 
various partners to avoid a shortfall between policy objectives and achievements. This 
notion they identify as 'implementation deficit', a function of the number of linkages, 
whose minimisation becomes an important goal.
In line with this view is Gunn's perspective, which requires ten preconditions for 
'perfect implementation’. These typify the top-down approach, and provide a useful 
portrait of how it would prefer the policy process to appear. His preconditions for 
'perfect implementation’ are:
(i) that circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling 
constraints;
(ii) that adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the programme;
(iii) the required combination of resources is available at each stage as well as overall;
(iv) the policy to be implemented is based on a valid theory of cause and effect;
(v) the cause and effect relationship is direct, with few if any intervening links;
(vi) policy is implemented by a single agency which need not depend on other agencies for 
success;
(vii) complete understanding/agreement over objectives - these conditions persist 
throughout the implementation process;
(viii) it is possible to specify, in complete detail and perfect sequence, the tasks to be 
performed by each participant;
(ix) there is perfect communication between and coordination of various elements 
involved in the programme;






















Figure 3.3: The top-down model
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The top-down view of the policy process as outlined in this section can be summed up 
simply as in Figure 3.3.
3.6 (ii) Weaknesses of the top-down model
There are a number of problems surrounding the top-down model, and these are rooted 
in its assumptions. Whilst it would be inaccurate to suggest that it it is widely put 
forward as an achievable goal, it nonetheless is suggested as an ideal to which the 
efforts of all those involved in the policy process should be aimed. In doing so, it fails 
to take into account some crucial and basic factors which need to be recognised in order 
to fully understand the way in which the policy process operates.
Principally, the deficiency of the top-down model is that it overemphasises the 
distinction between policy-making and implementation. Implicit in this are three 
erroneous assumptions, referred to above, which to summarise concern:
(a) the power-relationship between the decision-making 61ite and the lower 
administrative tiers;
(b) the ability of the decision-making 61ite to formulate a policy which is 
sufficiently comprehensive;
(c) the existence of policy as a recognisable entity.108
The power relationship referred to in assumption fc) considers the highest policy tier to 
exercise effective authority over the lower tiers. This fails to consider two significant 
areas. These are, firstly, the possible existence of other legitimate sources of power 
within the policy system, and secondly that bureaucrats within the administration will 
inevitably possess a degree of interpretative discretion in carrying out their activities, to 
a greater or lesser extent.
To take the first point, in a pluralist society any policy area will embrace a number 
of interest groups who will independently exert such power as they possess to 
influence the decision-making process. Trade unions, employers organisations, lobby
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groups, trade associations, powerful private individuals or institutions are all examples 
of such influences, and where the interests of such groups conflict with those of the 
policy-makers (or indeed each other), decision-making inevitably requires negotiation 
and compromise between these competing interests. The policy-making dlite are unable 
to force decisions on the policy area concerned without the support of at least some of 
the major interest groups who are involved in it.
In examining NAFE policy we shall be looking at the national government as the 
decision-making elite, and Barrett and Hill note that implementation problems arise in 
such areas due to, firstly,
the normative assumptions of government - what ought to be done and how
and
the struggleand conflict between interests - the need to bargain and compromise.
This tension represents
the reality of the process by which power/influence is gained and held in order to pursue 
ideological goals.
They emphasise four reasons why compromise is an inherent factor in policy, which 
are that many policies:
(i) represent compromises between conflicting values;
(ii) involve compromises with key interests within the implementation structure;
(iii) involve compromises with key interests upon whom the implementers will have an 
impact;
(iv) are framed without attention being given to the way in which underlying forces 
(particularly economic ones) will undermine them.1Q9
In this context it is further relevant that policy in an area such as NAFE, which requires 
the local implementation of national decisions, involves a relationship between central 
and local government which, as noted in section 3.4, is far from a straightforward 
matter of the latter carrying out the former's instructions. The effects of this in NAFE
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are considered in Chapter 4.
The second area embraced in assumption (i) is the notion that administrators are no 
more than the unthinking tools of the decision-makers, simply the operational 'hands’ 
of the policy-making 'brain1. This view is inappropriate: firstly, administrators cannot 
be impelled to act in a regulated manner - Hill and Barrett no note the inherent difficulty 
of controlling implementing actors, the process of their day-to-day work invariably 
presenting them with situations where their response requires a certain amount of 
individual discretion. Secondly, it is desirable for all concerned in the policy process 
that they do this: without individuals' responsiveness at the moment of incidence to the 
detailed complexity of contingent circumstances, any administrative organisation would 
become inoperable.
At the same time it is important to accept the limitations of the individual's role. 
McGrew and Wilson draw attention to the
limited information-processing capacity of real individuals.111
They cite the notions of Steinbruner112 who, in making out a case for what is described 
as 'grooved thinking', argues that as a consequence of these limitations individuals 
become 'programmed' to respond to particular organisational information flows which 
shape their basic thinking process.
Individuals thus come to think along certain 'grooves', simplifying complex tasks into 
crudely defined decisions in individual cases.
Two points need to be noted here. Firstly, that such decisions, however crudely 
defined, do in fact occur. Secondly, that the above statements apply with equal force to 
individual actors at the top of the decision-making hierarchy.
This consideration leads on to the second key assumption of the top-down model, 
concerning the ability of a policy-making 61ite to formulate a policy sufficiently 
comprehensive to be straightforwardly implemented. This assumption requires two 
things of the policy-makers. Firstly, a considerable degree of expertise in the policy
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area; secondly a detailed and up-to-date knowledge of the prevailing contingent 
circumstances under which the policy is to be carried out.
Both of these require the policy-makers to be extremely well-informed, and the 
assumption breaks down for a number of reasons. We have already noted the limited 
information-processing capacity of individuals- the expectation that individual actors or 
small groups in decision-making Elites can be equipped with enough knowledge and 
understanding of an entire policy network to control its most detailed workings is 
clearly exagerated. Saunders makes this point thus:
Even in the most rigid and hierarchical of state bureaucracies, those occupying lower-level 
positions invariably retain some degree of autonomy and discretion in their relations with 
those at the top, for in no organisation can the formal leadership hope to lay down and 
monitor all aspects of policy and its implementation.113
In addition to this are the time constraints which inhibit policy-makers from concerning 
themselves with the day-to-day detail of policy implementation decisions, as well as a 
number of good reasons why it is considerably more practical to leave some 
decision-making to the implementation phase. Some of these are that:
(i) conflicts cannot be resolved during the policy-making stage;
(ii) it is regarded as necessary to let key decisions be made when all the facts are available 
to the implementers;
(iii) it is believed that implementers (professionals, for example) are better-equipped to 
make key decisions than anyone else;
(iv) little is known in advance about the actual impact of the new measures;
(v) it is recognised that day-to-day decisions will have to involve negotiation and 
compromise with powerful groups.114
The issue of expertise and where it is located is crucial in this context In many fields, 
and in particular those where a large number of professional staff are engaged close to 
the 'coal-face' of activity, this will be largely outside any legislative dlite. In the case of 
NAFE, where the expertise of lecturing staff and LEA and college administrators is 
called extensively into play, this aspect is of considerable importance.
A further consideration is that not only do administrators in the lower echelons
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participate in decision-making once policy positions have been decided; they also play a 
contributory role in the initial determination of these positions. This derives from their 
function of providing the bulk of the information upon which the decisions of the 
senior policy-makers are based. McGrew and Wilson argue that the policy directorate is 
not simply a controlling functionary, but that it is in part controlled by the selection of 
information by those below sending it up, for example in the form of
feasibility studies which ... define their nominal masters’ decision space.115
Salter and Tapper claim that the DES bureaucratic elite, for example, is very influential, 
ministers being unable to master the wide range of areas of educational expertise in 
which the Department deals. It is therefore difficult for them to challenge the 
institutional policy agenda they inherit, and must ’make choices between policies 
presented to (them)'116. McGrew and Wilson note that at the higher levels of 
organisation the 'principles by which information is classified and acted upon' become 
more abstract and purely policy-oriented rather than case-oriented117. Both are crucial 
in the fullest development of policy.
The above points have already hinted at the inadequacies of the third major 
assumption of the top-down model, that policy exists as a recognisable entity which can 
be handed down in a complete form to implementers. Ham and Hill118 consider this a 
dangerous assumption, and also state that it may not make sense to refer to an 
organisation’s goals as if they can be simply stated. At one extreme the form in which 
policy is handed down may represent no more than a 'stance'119, which is easy to 
identify, but much more difficult to turn into policy on the ground. At the other policy 
may be enshrined in detailed legislation, which may be complex, legalistic and difficult 
to interpret simply as a set of direct day-to-day guidelines. However, whilst it is here 
that the formulations produced by the highest tier will be the most comprehensive, it is 
important to note that (a) such detail will almost certainly have been produced by actors 
below the decision-making dlite (who will have thus delimited their superiors’ 
'decision-space' as noted above), and (b) that even at this level of detail, such a 
document will not approach the complexity of the daily tasks routinely thrown up by 
the unpredictably changing circumstances within which implementers operate.
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In view of these considerations it can be concluded, along with Ham and Hill and 
others, that
Implementation rarely involves the direct translation of policy goals into action120 
and that decision-making
rarely proceeds in such a logical, comprehensive and purposive manner.121
3.6 (iii) Alternative view - the policy-making continuum
There is widespread support for the view that policy-making continues into the 
implementation phase, which may involve
(i) continuing flexibility;
(ii) concretisation of policy in action;
(iii) process of movement back and forth between policy and action.122
Noted earlier was Lipsky's stress upon the role of 'street-level' bureaucrats, stated to 
be very significant policy-makers. The claim is that
the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, the devices they invent to 
cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the policies they carry out123
They are of crucial significance in determining the allocation of goods and services, 
making
choices about the use of scarce resources under pressure.124
Their reasons for making specific decisions is unlikely to be politically-motivated or 
tuned towards any coherent policy goals, related rather more, claims Lipsky, to the
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reduction of pressure upon themselves. Which is to say, they are fundementally 
pragmatists. However, this in no way minimises the implications of their contributory 
function; their interpretative role in adjusting statutory or other policy requirements in 
line with local imperatives must be seen as a highly significant aspect of 
implementation, and of the concretisation of policy in action.
As noted in section 3.2, Lipsky argues that the scope of of discretion exercised by 
street-level bureaucrats is determined by the degree to which they can be considered 
professionals. Dunleavy emphasises the potential for policy-formulation by 
professionals in a field
through their internal process of ideological development, rather than through the operations 
of their professional institutions in an interest group mould.125
The presence of educationalist professionals in the NAFE sphere, particularly at the 
LEA and college level is, in this analysis, clearly a significant factor in the development 
of the sector’s policies.
The corollary of the above considerations is that an alternative perspective is 
required, which recognises the true nature of policy development. Such an approach 
could usefully embrace the alternative 'bottom-upf analyses, for example the 'backward 
mapping' forwarded by Elmore126, but must not fall into the trap of excluding or 
undervaluing the contribution of crucial upper tier actors in reverse fashion to the 
top-down model. It must recognise that policy-making is a complex, dynamic and 
iterative process involving decision-making in every tier of the hierarchy in a given 
policy field. It must lay sufficient stress on the interpretative role of implementing 
actors in fleshing out bare policy 'stances' into the diverse and complex form in which 
policy manifests itself on the ground. It must emphasise that policy develops over time, 
and can never wholly exist in the form of written statements, however comprehensive 
their scope. In recognising the point that it is
hard to identify particular occasions when policy is made127
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it becomes clear the policy-making must be seen as an organic process in which detail is 
constantly revised in the context of praxis. The notion forwarded by Barrett and Fudge 
of implementation as
a policy/action continuum in which an interactive and negotiative process is taking place over
tim e!28
therefore emerges as a useful construct. This suggests a process involving two groups, 
those seeking to put policy into effect, and those upon whom action depends. Such a 
view emphasises the need to focus on the interactions between actors and agencies in 
order to better reflect the complexities and dynamics of these interactions. Barrett and 
Hilli29 argue for an 'action-centered' mode of analysis, a position which recognises:
(a) changing and changeable policy;
(b) complex interaction structure;
(c) outside world which must interfere;
(d) inherent difficulty of controlling implementing actors130
These reflect, not 'implementation deficiency', but integral aspects of the policy 
process.
use&W
The policy-making continuum becomes the mostconcept, therefore, in analysing 
an area such as NAFE where the above considerations unquestionably come into play.
It may usefully be outlined in diagrammatic form as in Figure 3.4.
These ideas will be used in Chapter 4 to examine the reasons why the original 
proposals of Training for Jobs became blunted at the implementation stage. Meanwhile, 
having established a construct with which to analyse the policy-making process in 
NAFE, it is necessary to turn to the specific considerations which were being made by 
government strategists in the run-up to the 1984 White Paper.
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1«2 The Thatcher government's 1984 NAFE strategy
The purpose of this chapter has been to present a central argument of the thesis, that 
which seeks to account for the intent in the government strategy which lay behind the 
1984 White Paper. The previous sections of the chapter have developed a series of 
theoretical and historical constructs upon which such an argument may be based. This 
final section seeks to present the argument as concisely as possible by recourse to the 
ideas thus justified.
The relevant arguments are divided here into four categories. These are:
(i) The motivating goals and other imperatives which fuelled moves for policy 
change.
(ii) The outcomes required of the new policy.
(iii) The strategic options open to central government to effect the changes it 
desired.
(iv) The eventual choice which became expressed by the White Paper.
3.7 (i) Imperatives for change
In considering the forces which were responsible for the changes proposed in 1984, a 
distinction can usefully be drawn between the 'open' objectives, and more 'hidden* 
factors which require more penetrative analysis. To consider the openly-expressed 
objectives first, these related to issues of what was educationally-desirable in the broad 
context of the needs of the nation as a whole, and of extensive criticisms of the existing 
structure of NAFE. They centred on a view that present provision was inefficient, 
inflexible, unresponsive, and in many instances anachronistically rooted to past 
requirements and to tradition, for example the continued widespread use of 
apprenticeships with their restrictive conditions such as time-serving and union- 
membership. In a pressured economy in which skill shortages were becoming 
increasingly apparent, and in which the poor showing of Britain's training record 
against that of its competitors was an increasing cause for concern, greater attention on
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the part of NAFE to the needs of industry was widely held to be necessary. Whilst not 
uncontroversial - LEAs, colleges and educationalists generally staunchly defended the 
record of NAFE - this view was not particular to the Thatcher government; it had wide 
currency elsewhere. Therefore at the surface level a new policy attempting to deal with 
the problem would be popular.
However, it is argued here that the hidden imperatives behind the 1984 policy 
change were equally important in bringing it about, if not more so. These two can be 
divided into two areas - the particular ambitions of the Thatcher government; and deeper 
structural and historical influences operating within the state. The factors peculiar to the 
administration of the day can be further separated in to two areas, political and 
ideological imperatives. The conceptual division is that the first of these refers to factors 
impinging upon the government from outside, whilst the second refers to its own 
internal dynamic.
In terms of ideology four key areas are seen a significant: the market; public 
expenditure; the philosophy of education; and local government The Thatcher 
administration came to power on a clear platform based on liberal monetarist 
economics. On the one hand this embraced a deep belief in the value of the market, 
whose associated forces were seen as the most efficient way of organising public 
provision. It placed a premium on competition and the provision of consumer choice as 
a means of improving services and reducing waste. It contrasted strongly with the 
collectivist view in which state planning sought to create efficiency, and argued for a 
reduced role of the state, and a reduction in state expenditure wherever possible. This 
could either be achieved through greater efficiency or cuts in services. The programme 
which had been in place throughout the first Thatcher government (1979-83) had 
followed these ideas, and the new parliament continued this approach.
In terms of vocational education, the philosophical view of this was that public 
expenditure in this area should be considered an investment in skilled labour power, 
and thus closely in tune with the economic dynamic. It implicitly rejected the notion that 
public money should be spent on provision aimed at the non-vocational needs of the 
individual, this latter requirement being seen as very much a secondary consideration
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and anyway a matter for the individual to arrange independently.
The other ideological area considered here is local government. In section 3.4 
above, which provided outline of the Conservative government's reassertion of central 
authority over local government, it was argued that this process was spurred by a deep 
ideological distaste on the part of central government for the institutions of local 
democracy. In part this can be ascribed to the other ideological consideration which 
have already been identified - these include : the view that local authorities were very 
much bound to the old consensus notions in which collectivist- type provision was 
widely perceived to be the norm; the idea that local government could be an impediment 
to the introduction of market-based, private-sector service provision; and that local 
authorities spent an unacceptably large amount of public money. But perhaps the most 
significant factor is the aspect of Thatcherism which believed in 'rolling back the 
frontiers of the state*. In this vision, central government had a necessary function in 
such areas as national defence and the enforcement of law and order, local government, 
being almost wholly involved with the provision of consumption services, was 
carrying out a role better left in private hands and regulated by market forces. The ideal 
saw a small number of key powers invested in a strong central state, with the majority 
of functions provided by the private sector. Therefore, any Thatcherite policy directed 
at the local sphere was likely to express the ideological desire to reduce both the 
responsibilities and the spending power of councils.
This consideration leads on to one of the three major political factors operating on 
government thinking at the time of the White Paper. That is, its offensive against local 
government was causing problems because councils were resisting it with considerable 
public attention. This might not have mattered, given the supremacy of centre over 
locality argued to be inevitable in section 3.4, had not these councils been mounting a 
political challenge to government. Many authorities, most notably the large labour- 
controlled councils in metropolitan areas were offering not merely resistance but an 
ideological challenge to government policy, threatening, as argued earlier, to drain 
public confidence in the belief that 'there was no alternative'. Undermining local 
government therefore became not just desirable but a matter of urgency, and the 
strength of anti-local authority feeling in the Cabinet can be accounted for thus. The
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consequent motivation was either to strip local government of its powers and 
responsibilities, or to sidestep its opposition.
The other two key political considerations were the continuing problem of 
unemployment and timing in the life-cycle of the parliament. The rise of unemployment 
associated with the recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and of youth 
unemployment as a particular extreme aspect of it, was a powerful political force 
throughout this period. It had become very high profile as a consequence of criticisms 
of YOP and the summer riots of 1981, which combined public fears of the perils of an 
unoccupied young workforce with public dissatisfaction over measures to tackle the 
problem. Although YTS had been introduced as a bold attempt to quench the issue, 
and a combination of rising employment and demographic decline was later to lower the 
public priority of the issue, policy-formulation at the time in question here must 
nonetheless be understood as occurring against a background of considerable political 
concern over provision for 16-19 year olds. NAFE, as a major provider, was inevitably 
close to any new thinking in this area. Politically sensitive areas such as this lend 
urgency to associated policy efforts, and the need for quick results would affect policy 
in NAFE as it had in other areas involving the youth problem.
The other political factor which should be noted is that seven months before the 
publication of Training for Jobs, the government had been re-elected with one of the 
largest majorities of any administration for many years. If there was any time 
appropriate for a dramatic and perhaps risky policy innovation, it was then.
The last consideration in this analysis of 'hidden' motivations behind the 
government's policy is that relating to structural and historical factors. These largely 
concern Saunders' dual-state model in which tensions within the state are a product of 
deep-seated structural factors, and Salter and Tapper's arguments about the 
centralisation of education. In Saunders' analysis, as described in section 3.4, the 
principal distinction between national and local government responsibilities is a 
respective emphasis on production and consumption functions. Whist sustainable and 
desirable at a time of economic expansion, the fiscal crises of the mid-late 1970s and 
beyond led to a conflict to interests and a need for central government to invoke its legal
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powers to subdue local demands. Thus it is argued that the Thatcher government's 
attack on local government only served to intensify an existing structural trend towards 
central-local conflict, adding weight to the influence of this factor in policy-formulation.
The centralisation of education identified by Salter and Tapper is described in 
section 3.5. Their argument is that the steady centralisation of DES influence in the 
education policy community evident since the late 1950s was part of a both a wider 
centralising tendency at work throughout western Europe and an increasingly self- 
conscious attempt by the DES to gain the upper hand. The appearance of vocationalism 
had the effect both of giving the DES a potential weapon to increase its influence and 
exposing its basic inability to do this, because of its entrenched bureaucratic character. 
The MSC had consequently profited by picking up the vocationalist ball and running 
with it fast As such, it was the focus of all attention in education at a time when 
centralisation of government power was very much in favour with the administration of 
the day. It had been successfully used to steamroller through a new policy for schools 
in the shape of TVEI, and could be expected to feature prominently in any new moves 
to strengthen the power in education of the central state.
3.7 (ii) Intended outcomes
The White Paper's specific objectives are considered much more fully in Chapter 4, 
which examines its meaning and intentions in more detail. Here, though, as a means of 
summarising the above sections, it is useful to identify the specific outcomes to which 
all the above motivations were pointing at the start of 1984. The Conservative 
government wanted:
• Major changes in further education - it wanted the education service to provide 
at the NAFE level courses which were less costly, more relevant, offered more 
flexibly, by management structures which were more responsive to the needs of 
others than to their self-defined priorities. This meant a greater degree of 
consumer choice, particularly for employers. Old-fashioned forms of provision 
which did not meet the needs of the moment should not be funded out of the
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public purse.
• A more appropriately skilled and flexible workforce - the above conditions were 
expected to achieve this.
• Additional tools to tackle youth unemployment - NAFE would be one of a 
number of fronts along which this could be tackled; in all of them the political 
sensitivity of the issue meant desire for quick results.
• Further centralisation of educational power - to effect the above policies it was 
necessary to wrest influence from the lower levels and increase that held by the 
centre. This issue is picked up again below. This was to be concomitant with:
• A reduction in the influence over education o f local politicians - as part of the 
government's overall attack on local government, this was to be one amongst 
many areas where local powers were to be eroded, in line with a trend 
stretching back throughout the twentieth century (see section 3.4). This 
objective was emphasised by the government's interest in taking control of 
NAFE as a form of economic investment whilst blunting local authorities' 
capability to invest in NAFE as a form of social consumption. It would also 
facilitate the desire to remove collectivist influences from education and 
strengthen the influence of education as an economic investment in labour.
• The minimisation of public expenditure on NAFE - in line with government 
policy on public expenditure generally, NAFE expenditure was to be entrusted 
to hands which could be relied upon to deliver the central government's 
objectives to the exclusion of other priorities.
• The advance of Conservative policy at a time of strength - an expression of the 
desire to maximise on the advantages of a large majority in a young parliament 
to further the aims of the Thatcherite project for a new, market-oriented society.
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The above points provide an overview of the strategic objectives which fuelled 
government thinking in developing its Training for Jobs policy. This overview can be 
profitably simplified by recourse to a model of government intentions which draws 
upon the notions of 'top-down' and 'policy-making continuum' approaches to the 
process of government decision-making.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the policy-making continuum, but does not express the 
relative overall power of the higher and lower echelons. In Figure 3.5, therefore, the 
model is developed by considering three simple variations of the continuum.
Whilst Figure 3.5 (ii) echoes the earlier diagram, (i) and (iii) illustrate the extremes. 
In (i), a picture is presented which recognises the inevitability of policy development at 
all stages of the implementation process, yet in which the centre/top is very much the 
dominant partner, the parameters for local/lower-tier discretion being very narrow. 
Conversely, (iii) indicates a position where lower tier actors are more influential, their 
opposite numbers in the upper-tier having a much reduced role.
The purpose of bringing this model into the discussion at this stage is to 
characterise with greater clarity the nature of the 1984 policy initiative. It is argued that 
in Training for Jobs, in order to achieve the objectives outlined above, the attempt was 
being made to move from a position in which local actors (principally in the LEAs) 
were largely in control of NAFE policy, to one in which the central state had a much 
more significant influence; i.e., the government was seeking to move from a position 
akin to that in Figure 3.5 (iii), top one more like that in 3.5 (i). It was seeking to alter 
the very structure of the policy-making continuum.
It would be ingenuous to suggest that government strategists believed possible a 
wholesale shift of NAFE control into a few hands at the centre. What is argued here is 
that they envisaged a decisive shift in that control away from local authorities and 
towards more centralised decision-makers. Associated with this was a parallel shift, of 
a decentralising nature, of local power from public to private hands, i.e. from LEAs to 
local employer and business interests. This, as argued above, was a trend characteristic 
of the Thatcher years and of the ideology which fuelled them.
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FJsure 3.5: Variations in the policy making continuum
m  CENTRE/TOP-POM1NATED SITUATION:
CENTRE LOCALITY




C O N C R E T I S A T I O N
(Iii) LOCAL/LOWER-TIER DOMINATED SITUATION:
CENTRE LOCALITY
C o N C R E T I s A T I O N
Source: Compiled by the author.
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The next section considers how this overall objective became translated into a 
particular strategy which could be defined, published and pursued
3.7 (iii) Strategic options
In considering the issue of options open to central and local government in pursuing a 
policy strategy, Rhodes identifies as many as eleven major approaches131. Briefly, 
these are:
bureaucratic - central government using its legal authority to restrain or
direct local action;
incorporation - cooption and joint decision-making;
consultation - involves no commitment to making modifications;
bargaining - process of mutual exchange;
penetration - local authority seeks allies within the centre;
avoidance - no agreement, each follows its own policy;
incentives - financial inducements offered to secure implementation;
persuasion - by means of rational argument/advice etc.;
professionalisation - creation of single-issue policy areas dominated by
professionals
factorising simplifying issues through subdivision.
Before considering which of these forms apply to Training for Jobs it is worth 
recalling Saunders' two categories of organisational strategy (outlined in section 3.4), 
'restructuring' and 'innovation'. These point to the two options which, it is argued, can 
be seen as the broad choice facing government strategists as they devised a NAFE 
policy designed to meet the objectives outlined above. These are:
(i) Legislative intervention in the NAFE policy community;
(ii) Innovation by other means.
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To take the first of these, legislative intervention is an approach which fits into Rhodes 
'bureaucratic' category. It offered the strategists many difficulties and few attractions. 
The analysis above of the NAFE policy community and its bureaucratic structure 
indicate that it was a field where impediments to rapid change were many, and 
developments were invariably slow. Recent experience with legislation on local 
government finance had demonstrated the potential for frustration and delay inherent in 
attempts to compel local councils to follow government policy by means of altering the 
legal framework. Furthermore, the process of major legislative change which 
restructures statutory responsibilities is itself very time-consuming, as the long 
parliamentary passage of the later Education Reform Bill amply demonstrated. For a 
government keen to see quick developments in the 16-19 field, and with a busy 
legislative program of radical proposals to squeeze into parliamentary time, a wide- 
ranging bill which redefined national and local responsibilities for NAFE would not 
have suited its purpose.
The other broad alternative was to adopt an innovative policy which would 
somehow sidestep the quagmire of local government responsibilities and effect change 
by other means. The alternatives Saunders offers include the imposition of new 
management techniques upon local decision-making - again a potentially slow process - 
and the utilisation of alternative non-elected forms of sub-central government. The 
growth of these bodies since the last war was outlined in section 3.4, and the use of 
such bodies as regional water and health authorities to take on former local government 
responsibilities was a tried and trusted practise. And in the shape of the MSC, the 
government had a ready-made candidate for the task which had already successfully 
made significant inroads into the vocational field. If the MSC was to be used to further 
government policy, the question now was how. It would have been impossible to 
simply hand over responsibility for all of NAFE to the Commission without the sort of 
major legislation already identified as unattractive. The answer lay in recent experience.
A little over a year previously, the Prime Minister had announced to the House of 
Commons the introduction of a new form of vocational provision in schools, to be 
funded and overseen by the MSC - i.e. TVEI. The announcement had been preceded by 
none of the consultation which normally accompanied such initiatives, and the
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government had succeeded in steamrollering its policy through without significant 
impediment At a time when all public funding was scarce, the attraction of new money 
was irresistible to many LEAs. The ready involvement the MSC had been guaranteed 
by the staunch support of its Chairman, David Young, for Thatcherite policies (see 
Chapter Two). The question now for the government was whether a similar venture be 
mounted in NAFE. The answer to this question is considered in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
The 1984 White Paper Training for Jobs,
1 2 9
U .  Introduction
It has been suggested that:
it is a well-proven strategy to make a radical policy announcement and then return to the logic 
of negotiation. Such a strategy is an indicator of the asymmetric relationships of policy 
communities wherein the centre has structural power.1
The publication of the White Paper Training for Jobs can be cast as just such an 
announcement, although whether its intended effects included its own modification 
through negotiation is open to question. That the White Paper is an attempt to reassert 
central government priorities upon local authorities was argued in the last chapter. This 
chapter will indicate how its announcements were indeed radical, and how they were 
followed by a period of argument, dispute and negotiation which led to the diversion of 
policy from the government's strategic path. The first section outlines the provisions of 
the White Paper, and discusses its underlying meaning. Subsequent sections chart the 
period of dispute and the rapprochement which followed; the Agreement which 
emerged; and the provisions of the amended policy which were to be implemented. It 
provides an interpretative analysis of these developments, before going on to identify 
specific areas of enquiry which emerge.
The White Paper
The White Paper Training for Jobs was published on 31 January, 19842. It was 
presented to Parliament jointly by the Secretaries of State for Employment, Education 
and Science, Scotland, and Wales, demonstrating its cross-sectoral character. The 
White Paper's proposals are outlined in the section below; the following section 
analyses their underlying meaning.
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4.2 (i) The proposals
The White Paper covers a number of areas related to vocational education and training 
(VET). It starts by setting out the Government's broad strategic goals and then 
identifying 'roles and responsibilities' in VET, before going into detail. This includes 
discussion of the Youth Training Scheme, the Technical and Vocational Education 
Initiative (TVEI), adult training and occupational skills training, and the comments 
addressed to these are largely statements of progress so far. The section which deals 
with NAFE, entitled New Arrangements within Vocational Education, appears towards 
the end of the document, and occupies only 11 of its 56 subsections. It is in this 
passage, however, that the most significant and far-reaching new proposals are 
presented.
The section on NAFE starts by identifying a need for greater responsiveness, 
stating that
public sector provision for training and vocational education must become more responsive to 
employment needs at national and local level,
and that for this to be achieved
the public sector needs a greater incentive to relate the courses it provides more closely to the 
needs of the customer and in the most cost-effective way.
The White Paper then expands upon the recent growing role of the MSC in carrying out 
training responsibilities, and the government's intention to develop these further to the 
point where the Commission would
discharge the function of a national training authority.
In line with this intention the White Paper unveils the government's plans for 
NAFE. Noting that current expenditure on NAFE in England and Wales to be 'about 
£1.2 billion per annum', it claims approximately £800 million of this to be devoted
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to 'work-related' provision. The MSC is noted to have been already spending around 
£90 million as a customer of NAFE courses or services. The new proposal for NAFE 
spending is outlined thus:
We have decided that the amount to be devoted by the Commission to such provision in 
England and Wales should increase to £155 million in the financial year 1985-6, and to £200 
million in 1986-7. The intention is therefore that the Commission should by 1986-7 account 
for about one quarter of the total provision in this area.
However, this was not a proposal for new funding for NAFE:
The resultant reduction in the need for local authority expenditure will be taken into account in 
settling the relevant rate support grants.
Decisions about which courses were to be supported by the MSC were to be taken 
'in consultation' with the education service as well as employers and other parties, but 
the Commission was not to be tied to considering LEA provision alone:
It is envisaged that the great bulk of the resources, though not necessarily all, will continue to 
be spent within local authority colleges (my italics).
The importance of the Commission taking account of LEAs' own plans is stressed, as 
is the need for 'reasonable continuity of provision'.
Whilst future appointees to the Commission representative of the education 
professions and the local authority associations would involve a role for the Education 
Secretary, the members would continue to be appointed by the Employment Secretary.
4.2 (ii) Interpreting the White Paper
The language of the above statements is characteristically sedate, but they represent 
nonetheless a very dramatic series of proposals. A system of NAFE funding which had 
been in place since 1944, and in a similar form since earlier times, was to be radically
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transformed by handing over LEA funds to a non-elected national quango which was 
not even to be obliged to spend the money in the public sector. The proposals had 
profound implications for the NAFE sector.
The meaning of the White Paper can be understood only by considering the 
strategic intention of government outlined in Chapter 3. There it was argued that the 
Conservative administration was moved to define these proposals from a 
range of motives, only some of which related specifically to the demands of NAFE. As 
far as the VET objectives were concerned the White Paper's statement about the public 
sector needing 'a greater incentive’ to meet needs cost-effectively indicates the 
envisaged outcome of a more efficient market-oriented and employer-dominated NAFE 
system. To bring this about, it was necessary to place a greater degree of ideological 
control over the curriculum and its management into the hands of central institutions. 
Therefore, the complementary strategic intention was a radical shift in administrative 
power away from local authorities and towards the centre, moving from a situation of 
high local influence to a position more akin to a ’top-down' form of policy-making.
The means by which this was to be achieved avoided any attempt at a complex 
restructuring of the statutory framework, employing instead a strategy of by-passing 
existing obstacles through existing channels. The method employed, as is evident from 
the White Paper, principally concerned an innovation in funding arrangements, a 
potentially deft move which if successful could transform NAFE more swiftly than any 
intervention in the legal framework.
The nature of this approach can be described by means of Rhodes' categories as a 
strategy of avoidance and incentive. It did not seek to secure LEAs' or colleges' 
cooperation for the policy, having not consulted or even informed them about its plans. 
It simply presented them with a. fait accompli, in the belief that the attraction of the 
money now held by the MSC would win out over any attempts to defeat the policy. The 
steady backing of the MSC for the policy was seen as beyond question: it had a tried 
and trusted record of delivering whatever the government required of it, an expansionist 
culture which would thrive on extended responsibilities, and one of the Prime 
Minister's staunchest supporters at the helm. With an election years away, the 
possibility of uncooperative LEAs holding out for a change of central government was
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not considered a serious threat.
Figure 4.1 indicates diagrammatically how the funding change was intended to 
operate as a means of restructuring power relations in NAFE. Following the notions of 
Rhodes' resource transaction linkages within policy networks3, the figure indicates the 
flow of authority between the key bodies of the NAFE policy community in 1984. This 
authority was inseparably bound up with the resources linkages which connected the 
same bodies. Part (a) of the diagram illustrates the position prior to the White Paper. It 
summarises the point established in Chapter 3 that the ability of the centre (represented 
by the DES) to influence local NAFE outcomes was considerably hampered by the 
intervention of local democratic autonomy deriving from LEAs' independent electoral 
mandate. The figure illustrates how this acted as a filter to the flow of central authority. 
Part (b) of the diagram illustrates the position envisaged by the proposals made in 
Training for Jobs. Here, the problem of local autonomy has been circumvented by 
introducing an additional, local flow of 'authority' from the MSC to the LEA and its 
colleges which, being money-based, was not subject to being filtered out by 
considerations of local political legitimacy.
With its basis in money resources, the use of the term 'authority' in this context is 
open to question. It is based upon the understanding, held by the government, that the 
amount of RSG placed in MSC hands was a sufficiently great incentive to ensure that 
LEAs became subordinated to the need to recoup the money from its new controllers. 
The concept of 'authority' in this sense, i.e. supposed to stem from power over money 
rather from statutory legitimacy, is an inherent feature of the chosen strategy of 
financial juggling over legal restructuring. Given this, the choice of 'about a quarter' of 
total provision involved a key strategic estimation. That is, it was necessary to balance 
the shift in resource allocation between RSG and the MSC in such a way that the 
amount chosen would invest the MSC with sufficient financially-derived authority to 
fulfil the government's strategic purpose, without being so large as to be counter­
productive in terms of political controversy.
The question of strategic balance makes it important to be clear on two points of 
detail surrounding the funding change, countering the widespread misconception that
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Figure 4.1: Change in authority over NAFE envisaged by Training for Jobs'
(a') Perceived pre-legislation situation (bl Envisaged post-legislation situation










Source: Compiled by the author
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25 per cent of LEAs' NAFE-related block grant had been handed over to the MSC 
under the terms of the White Paper. Firstly, the 'quarter' being entrusted to the MSC 
was not all new funding. The Commission was already responsible for £90 million 
worth of expenditure on NAFE. Secondly, the change related only to the funding of 
work-related provision, which itself made up only around two-thirds of all NAFE 
under the definition being employed in the White Paper. Consequently, the actual 
increase in MSC expenditure was equivalent to only a 16 per cent reduction in the 
NAFE portion of RSG4. However, whilst it is true that the Commission already had a 
financial input, this took the form of funding placements in such programmes as TOPS 
and YTS, its role being that of a client much like any other, which sent trainees to 
colleges and paid the requisite fees. That is, it operated on the demand side of NAFE 
provision. The new role associated with the 16 per cent additional funding was 
markedly different in nature, in that it covered provision which went beyond its own 
public sector training programmes, investing it with a role on the supply side of NAFE 
for the first time.
The question of whether the amount of money considered appropriate by 
government to secure this actually was a sufficient incentive to LEAs revolves around, 
not just the amount, but the intended use of the money. If the MSC's newly acquired 
funds were guaranteed to find their way back into LEA colleges one way or another, 
the Commission's power would be diminished. It is this consideration which is key to 
understanding the clause in the White Paper which states that 'it is envisaged that the 
great bulk of the resources, though not necessarily all, will continue to be spent within 
local authority colleges’. By introducing the possibility that the Commission could look 
elsewhere for its courses if not satisfied with public sector provision, the MSC was 
provided with a lever over the whole of provision, not just its 16 per cent share. This 
level of control provided the degree of centralised authority the government required. 
Without this authority, the whole strategy might be frustrated. The issue of how 
successfully it was established in practice is considered in the following section, which 
discusses reactions to the White Paper.
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I x i  The period of dispute. January 1984 - Mav 1985
4.3 (i) Reactions to the White Paper
The principal reaction to Training for Jobs on all sides was one of surprise. The 
initiative was announced without warning to the LEA community and, supposedly, 
very little to the MSC. However, whilst the MSC's Director Geoffrey Holland claimed 
later that the announcement of the new arrangements was 'totally unexpected'5, other 
observers have stated that
it is hard to see how [the plan] could have been developed without the tacit acceptance (and 
silence) of the then Chairman [David] Young,6
suggesting a collusion on the part of the MSC consistent with the expansionist 
proclivities ascribed to the institution in Chapter 3.
As with TVEI before it, there had been none of the traditional consultation with 
educational and local authority interests, who greeted the initiative 'with dismay*7. 
Whilst the MSC immediately set about establishing the appropriate local and national 
machinery to deliver its side of the new arrangement with customary zeal, those 
affected in the education community refused to accept the White Paper as a fait 
accompli, choosing instead a course of non-cooperation and resistance.
The local authority associations were in the forefront of this resistance. It was 
argued in Chapter 3 that the 'local' policies forwarded by councils around the country 
are in general more accurately seen as national policies developed by the local authority 
associations, and so it proved in this instance. These bodies vocalised the widespread 
reaction amongst the LEA community which thoroughly opposed the planned changes. 
In particular, the associations raised four specific criticisms, which were:
(i) the 'lack of prior consultation among the partners in the education 
service’; *
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(ii) the 'implied assertion that LEAs were unresponsive in their provision of 
work-related NAFE';
(iii) 'the transfer of resources to the account of MSC';
(iv) the 'intervention by government in the powers and responsibilities of 
LEAs'.8
A period therefore ensued during which the MSC was faithfully attempting to start 
operating the new arrangements, as it had been asked to 'as a matter of urgency' in the 
White Paper, whilst the local authorities were hampering it at every turn9. All LEAs 
refused to cooperate, and the MSC was left attempting to implement joint arrangements 
on its own. Whatever the knowledge in the higher echelons, it is clear from interview 
evidence that MSC local staff had had no more prior warning that they would be 
required to implement a major new policy than had LEA officials. In this period, LEA 
staff for the most part would not even talk to their counterparts at MSC Area Offices, 
which made the latter’s task of defining a new role extremely difficult.
The local authority associations sought from the relevant ministers' evidence of the 
alleged shortcomings of NAFE, and proposed joint action where these could be 
demonstrated. Meanwhile, negotiations during the spring and early summer of 1984 
which were conducted at both elected member and officer level with the MSC proved 
'inconclusive'10. A very significant factor in this period was the role of the MSC 
Chairman. As already noted, at the time of the January announcement this had been 
David Young, whose complicity as either an architect or sympathiser in the formulation 
of government policy is suggested both in the quotation above and in his subsequent 
career as Secretary of State for both Employment and Trade and Industry. Whilst he 
remained in the MSC chair, any deviation from the government line could not be 
expected. According to one source, in the period between the spring and autumn of 
1984, both parties were 'glaring at each other', refusing to concede any ground. In this 
scenario, David Young was 'a key figure', and the MSC held firm to the government 
line while he remained chairman through his belief that
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LEAs would crumble because of the financial constraints.11
That is, to use the terms of the analysis above, he believed the amount of funding 
transferred away from RSG was sufficient incentive. Throughout this period, 
therefore, there was little change. The LEAs and their representative organisations 
continued to refuse to have anything to do with the White Paper's proposals - this was 
reaffirmed in July 1984 when the Council of Local Education Authorities Conference 
endorsed a resolution reaffirming the opposition of AMA and ACC12. Meanwhile, the 
government and the MSC held firm, waiting for the local authorities to crack under the 
burden of financial pressure.
4.3 (ii) Rapprochement
In the late summer of 1984, David Young was awarded a peerage by the Prime 
Minister, eager to promote him to Cabinet rank. The chairmanship of the Commission 
passed to a new incumbent, Bryan Nicholson. This represented a turning point 
Nicholson did not share Young's staunch Thatcherite stance or his determination to 
make LEAs toe the government line. Instead, he sought a workable solution that would 
end the deadlock. This new thinking emerged at a meeting of the Commission in 
September 1984, at which its members took the view that whilst it had received a clear 
instruction from the government to proceed with its new responsibilities for NAFE, in 
complying it should seek to do so in collaboration with LEAs, rather than unilaterally. 
Whilst such a deviation from the government line might normally have been 
unthinkable - especially given the Conservative administration's notoriously 
authoritarian style and huge parliamentary majority - the fact that the chairman was new 
afforded him a certain protection. That is, Nicholson believed he 'would be able to get 
away with something the government didn't like' whilst he was still a new appointee, 
'without having the branch sawn off behind him'^.
Despite the Nicholson initiative, relations between the MSC and the local authority 
associations remained tense - there followed 'a further difficult period of 
consultation'14 - but eventually the two sides managed to reach some agreement. The
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crucial first stage of this was to establish procedures for the transfer of resources to 
LEAs in 1985-6, the first year in which the new arrangements would apply. The 
satisfaction of all parties on this required the MSC to return the full amount deducted 
from the RSG in the first year - 'a blank cheque1 according to one o b s e r v e r ^  - with no 
conditions other than a verification that the money would be spent on work-related 
NAFE. The second part of this interim agreement was the establishment of a joint 
MS C/local authority associations Policy Group which would review existing NAFE 
provision, in the manner the associations had been arguing for, and draw up proposals 
for the MSC's future involvement in NAFE. This event is described by Cuthbert as a 
rapprochement based upon a reduction in 'goal incongruence1 between the MSC and 
LEAs16. Already, much of the original plan's thrust had been diverted, in that the MSC 
was now negotiating for influence rather than seeking to impose its authority.
The agreement at this stage was nonetheless a fragile one. The AMA's consent to 
its terms was conditional - it still steadfastly opposed the policy outlined in Training for 
Jobs, and made its ratification of the interim agreement subject to its approval of the 
Policy Group's proposals. It is significant that the AMA was dominated by Labour 
authorities, and its fiercer opposition may therefore be attributable to political resistance 
to Conservative policies. The 'folklore' that allegedly developed in the AMA political 
community after agreement with the MSC was reached held that
the government could have been defeated but for the ACC authorities giving in.17
That is, the whole Training for Jobs policy could have been subverted and the money 
returned to RSG as a consequence of unquenchable political resistance on the part of 
the local authorities. The ACC officer who outlined this view vehemently refuted the 
idea. He believed the contrary pressure, that of pressing financial need, was coming 
close to breaking the LEA unanimity of opposition. Many Labour-controlled authorities 
in particular were already suffering severe financial restrictions as a result of rate- 
capping and related policies, and the ACC officer claimed that 'both types of council 
were wobbling' (i.e. both Conservative and Labour). He estimated that a small number 
of them, 'about five', were talking directly to the MSC about coming to a separate 
arrangement. In this view, the interim agreement to establish the Policy Group was the
140
best the LEAs could have hoped for.
The NAFE Policy Group was in fact the upper tier of a three-level structure. Its 
membership comprised actors at the political level, i.e. MSC Commissioners and 
elected members (i.e. from the ACC, AMA and Welsh LEAs), and was chaired by 
Bryan Nicholson. It met infrequently, its role being to set guidelines and forge 
agreements, to ratify proposals for the future of NAFE. Below this was an officer level 
Working Group, chaired by Sir Roy Harding, and it included members from a wide 
range of interested organisations - AMA, ACC, WJEC, CBI, TUC, NATFHE, B/TEC, 
MSC, DES, HMI, DE and the Welsh Office. This group was responsible for designing 
a set of proposals over a two-month period that could be presented to the Policy Group 
for discussion. Below the Working Group was a Technical Group, containing officers 
from ACC, AMA, DE, DES and MSC, whose task it was to work on 'small but 
important' details of the policy under formulationi8. The direction of policy-making 
thus involved movement up the hierarchy, the Technical Group providing a range of 
options to the Working Group, who combined this with other deliberations in 
presenting options to the Policy Group. The final policy decision was taken by the 
group of actors who had the least involvement in developing i t
The report of the Working Group was presented to the final meeting of the Policy 
Group on 28 May 1985, sixteen months after the publication of the White Paper.
± A  The NAFE Agreement
4.4 (i) Proposals of the NAFE Working Group
The Working Group had a two-month lifespan, during which time it gathered 
information and comment on NAFE from a wide range of sources, and explored a 
range of themes. An early problem was encountered in seeking to define what was 
meant by 'work-related' as opposed to other forms of NAFE. In finding that it did 'not 
consider that it is possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition', it decided to keep its 
working definition 'as broadly based as possible'. One commentator, in emphasising
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this difficulty, suggested that the only type of NAFE provision which could not 
somehow be conceivably work-related was 'special education for the geriatric'1^ .
Moving on from definitions to considering NAFE provision in general, the 
Working Group found that
significant agreement existed in the objectives sought by all parties for work-related NAFE.20
Its overall conclusions cited evidence of much local activity in the development of work- 
related NAFE, and a high level of responsiveness. Nonetheless, it found the current 
quality of planning to be 'varied', and whilst there were 'many cases of quick and 
effective response to employer and individual needs', this was not universally 
applicable and NAFE was open to improvement. It identified a range of areas in which 
'both MSC and LEAs would wish to extend and promote existing good practice'.
The key proposal put forward to the Policy Group was for the establishment of a 
local planning structure in which both the MSC and LEAs would play a part. This 
picked up on the White Paper's stress on the importance of MSC's taking account of 
LEAs' own plans for NAFE. The Working Group's decision was based on the local 
authority association view that whilst the government and MSC sought greater 
responsiveness to needs, there was inadequate understanding of what this meant, i.e. 
there was insufficient information about what the needs were and no consensus on how 
best to meet them. To tackle the situation it was necessary to systematically review local 
needs, evaluate current provision and identify good practice where it existed. Only on 
this firm basis could future strategy be planned. The Group recommended that LEAs 
produce a three year Development Plan, which would be agreed upon after consultation 
'with MSC, local employers, trade unions and other relevant parties'21. The 
Development Plan would cover a three-year period, but each year would be reviewed 
and extended a further year. The Plan would:
• review the range of existing provision;
• review the arrangements for local consultation;




• identify areas for change;
• give an indication of the effectiveness of the allocation of resources.22 
The plan would need to be flexible in order to ensure maximum responsiveness.
In addition to the Development Plan there would be an Annual Programme which 
would identify specific areas of provision, the courses which the LEA proposed to 
offer during the first year of the Plan. This might include:





(ii) the development of existing provision for example by -
adapting structures to improve responsiveness 
improving the information base 
developing marketing systems;
(iii) discontinued provision;
(iv) a review of resource allocation in the programme as a whole. This would include an 
examination of those parts of the plan where no change was being sought because 
existing provision was agreed to be responsive to identified local need.23
The two documents would be a basis for a contractual agreement between the LEA and 
the MSC. The contract would be signed between the MSC local Area Manager and the 
LEA, on the basis of which funds could be transferred.
The MSC’s most important contribution to the Development Plan would be a 
supply of labour market information by means of which local needs could be identified 
and responded to. This was to fulfil the provision in Training for Jobs that
it will remain the government's role, exercised largely through the Manpower Services
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Commission, to assist the flow of information about skill needs, training provision and jobs, 
especially at local level.24
The Working Group recommended the above proposals unanimously. What it 
could not reach agreement upon, however, was the detail of the funding arrangements 
necessary to support the proposed Plan and Programme. The basis of the disagreement 
was as follows:
In essence, the gap lies between the MS C/DE Officers' view that accountability entails 
specific rather than general funding, and the alternative view that specificity is incompatible 
with the development plan approach, and brings with it additional and unproductive 
administrative effort.25
The settlement of this issue was left to the Policy Group, but the Working Group did 
suggest (a) that financial allocations should be determined at national rather than local 
level, based on nationally-agreed criteria; and (b) that a proportion of the MSC's NAFE 
fund be held back to fund national initiatives, in order to facilitate its envisaged role as a 
national training authority.
Several other key recommendations were forwarded by the Working Group. These 
included a proposal to establish a national advisory group to continue the work of the 
Policy Group, and that necessary regional consultations in NAFE could be conducted 
through the machinery of the Regional Advisory Councils. Perhaps the most 
significant, however, is the recommendation that whilst LEAs' consultative 
arrangements should be 'full and wide ranging',
it would not be appropriate for MSC to be represented as of right on each college governing 
body and advisory committee, (my italics)26
This matter is picked up in section 4.4 (iii).
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4.4 (ii) The Agreement
The meeting of the Policy Group on 28 May 1985 accepted the report of the Working 
Group ’almost without modification' - a fact which appears to confirm the notion 
discussed above of policy-making flowing up, as well as down, the policy hierarchy. 
What remained to be decided was the still controversial issue of the funding 
arrangements.
The argument rested on the specificity of funding. The MSCs refinement of the 
somewhat brief outline contained in the White Paper proposed a form of support which
would be proportional, varying from course to course and given and withdrawn differently each 
year.27
That is to say it would be a subsidy on NAFE, rather than actual funding. The ACC 
officer interviewed believed that in practice this would have meant support for such 
’glamour courses' as IT, but would have left the LEAs in severe difficulties over 
courses from which the MSC's support was withdrawn or for which it was prepared to 
offer only partial funding. Whilst the White Paper had envisaged only a 'reasonable 
continuity' of provision, he observed that NAFE, in contrast to the MSC, had a long 
history and tradition; it should be regarded as something
a bit more stable than the MSC is prepared for, or displays itself in its own programmes.28
In offering their financial proposals, MSC representatives were apparently
not too clear on what exactly they would fund.29
He argued that the further education service did not need the MSC to tell it, for 
example, that information technology was important or that engineering and 
construction courses needed modification. Given this, that both sides could be equally 
well expected to identify what was required of the system, he questioned the purpose of 
the MSC’s proposed method of allocating funds.
1 4 5
The local authority association members of the Policy Group were not prepared to 
accept this proposal, and it was rejected. Instead the Group forwarded a proposal of its 
own. Under this, whilst ownership of the Development Plan would reside with the 
LEA, the Annual Programme would be a joint document which would set out in detail 
the courses LEAs would provide in the year it covered. These would be costed, and 
would identify provision and expenditure institution by institution. This Programme 
would be the basis of the contract signed between the MSC and LEA, and the flow of 
work-related NAFE funds from one to the other would be consequent upon evidence of 
its satisfactory delivery. Such evidence would be provided by a nationally-agreed 
monitoring procedure. Given satisfactory progress towards stated objectives, the LEA 
would receive funding phased over the year with payments being made each month. 
Funding for succeeding years would be determined by discussions between the 
partners at the start of each three-year cycle. Funding could be renegotiated during the 
academic year if this proved necessary. It has been argued that these arrangements 
involved not 'funding' as such, which implies discretion and specific payments, but 
actually 'an MSC shareholding in NAFE'30. That is, the transfer of resources involved 
the whole sum or none at all, depending on a generalised agreement about the LEA's 
entire programme. This reduced the MSC's leverage over NAFE by comparison with 
its own specific funding model.
Having established these proposals, the Policy Group reached agreement and 
argued their acceptance by all partners thus:
The group unanimously recommends to the constituent bodies, the MSC, the ... AMA, the 
... ACC, that they should consider (these proposals) as presenting a partnership approach to 
developing work-related Non-Advanced Further Education in accordance with the proposals set 
out in the White Paper Training for Jobs. 31
It affirmed the view of the Working Group, that it
was unanimously convinced of the merits of the concept of the collaborative development 
plan. It would benefit employers and individuals through the opportunities for LEAs to 
provide, and for MSC to bring its labour market intelligence to bear upon, NAFE relevant to 
rapidly changing employment needs. It would also allow the two principal agents LEA and 
MSC, jointly to evaluate the outcomes and ensure their cost-effectiveness.32
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In accepting the proposals made by the Working Group, the Policy Group 
recommended the establishment of a NAFE Implementation Group with a constitution 
similar to its own (i.e. representative of MSC, AMA and ACC at the highest level), and 
a complementary NAFE Evaluation Group to do 'the day-to-day working out'. These 
bodies were established, and worked with officers from all the partners to formulate a 
detailed NAFE policy which could be passed down to individual LEAs and MSC Area 
Offices in the form of specific guidance. Over the period leading up to the first year in 
which the new planning arrangements would take place,1986-7, a document entitled A 
Guidance Handbook was put together for despatch to local officers. This itself was a 
compromise document, held to
offer the best match between the interests involved although various parties have reservations
about particular elements.33
It expanded on the 'general framework' produced by the Policy Group, and set out in 
detail what was expected in local planning arrangements. It was followed up by a series 
of similar documents in subsequent years. This represents further evidence of policy 
detail being formulated lower down the decision-making hierarchy.
4.4 (iii) Interpreting the Agreement
The Report of the Policy Group states confidently that its proposed NAFE provisions 
fulfilled 'the requirements of the White Paper'34 This view, however, is partly 
connected with the MSC’s concern to appear loyal to government thinking, and very 
much depends on an interpretation of what the requirements of the White Paper actually 
were.
In section 4.2 it was argued that Training for Jobs was only partly inspired by 
educational or training motives, and partly from a central government tactic designed to 
enhance central control over the NAFE curriculum at the expense of LEAs. Quite apart 
from the government's desire to remove influence from the local authorities for 
ideological and political reasons, it was perceived that the educational objectives could
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only be achieved through enhanced central authority. Without this, the government's 
aims of a more market-oriented and employer-based NAFE system could become 
subverted by lower tier actors who did not share its ideological vision.
Earlier, it was noted that an ACC officer interviewed had questioned the purpose of 
MSCs proposal for a specific funding arrangement, when both sides would be capable 
of identifying which courses were needed. The answer to this question is that the 
funding proposals were primarily motivated not by purely curricular objectives but by 
the intention of providing MSC with greater authority over the NAFE curriculum and 
its management In the process of negotiating the Agreement, this key aspect of the 
government strategy was conceded to the local authority associations. It was observed 
earlier that the specific funding plan was central to the White Paper's purpose, as it 
fuelled the possibility that the MSC could look elsewhere for its VET courses if it was 
not satisfied with what LEAs had to offer, giving it a lever over all NAFE provision. 
Without such discretion, the central strategy might be frustrated. In the event, it was 
frustrated: in giving up this point and agreeing to an alternative financial plan, 
government hopes for powerful MSC control over NAFE were dashed.
In addition to the above, MSC influence was further curtailed by the clear statement 
in the Policy Group findings, noted earlier, that MSC would not be represented 'as of 
right' on college governing bodies and advisory committees. That is, the LEAs retained 
complete authority over their colleges, and any dealings the MSC was to have with 
them could not be conducted without at least the tacit consent and approval of their 
LEA.
Having established that the government’s NAFE objectives were frustrated, it is 
necessary to consider why. The explanation lies in the power of the local mandate held 
by the LEAs. It was argued in Chapter 3 that whilst the local authorities’national 
organisations were more influential than individual councils, being the key initiators of 
'local' policy, their power was nonetheless rooted in the locally-derived electoral 
legitimacy of individual authorities. It was this factor which enabled the associations to 
refuse to cooperate with either the government or the MSC on the basis that they did not 
agree with government policy. In a policy sector where a second source of electorally-
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derived authority did not exist, such resistance would not have been possible.
However, the factor of the mandate, whilst important, does not adequately account 
for the local authority associations' success. It was also noted in Chapter 3 that local 
government's ability to resist government was ultimately very limited, because of the 
centre's hold over the legal framework within which it operated. The best local 
authorities could aspire to was to retard the implementation of central initiatives by 
policies of non-cooperation and resistance, as borne out by the experience of local 
authorities in England and Wales. What was different in this instance was that the 
central government was not attempting to invoke its legal superiority over local 
government, instead seeking to bring about a swift policy change by other means. 
Rather than seeking to compel LEAs to implement its policies, it adopted a 'carrot and 
stick' approach, taking financial resources away from them and offering them back 
again, via the MSC, if the authorities were prepared to follow its wishes. It was noted 
in section 4.2 that the calculation of the size of the financial incentive was a crucial 
strategic decision. Unfortunately for the central government, it appears that it 
miscalculated, and found LEAs prepared to risk losing the money rather than agree to 
central proposals. As a consequence, the policy became derailed.
One other important consideration here relates back to the factor identified in 
Chapter 3, that MSC did not deliver its own programmes. Not having any 
implementation machinery of its own, it relied upon purchasing power to persuade 
other actors to deliver programmes on its behalf. If it was not satisfied it could turn 
elsewhere. This approach might worked in such a scheme as YTS, where an 
unsatisfactory managing agent could easily be dropped in favour of another candidate. 
In the case of NAFE, however, if LEAs refused to follow its plans it was in no position 
to seek £200 million worth of NAFE courses from an alternative source, because there 
was no such source to turn to. The scale of the sector foiled its main strategic weapon. 
Provided LEAs presented a united front of opposition, the MSC could wield no control 
over NAFE. This was crucial in bringing the Commission to the negotiating table under 
Nicholson.
To illustrate the effects of the NAFE Agreement upon the original Training for Jobs
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Figure 4.2: Actual change in authority over NAFE produced by ‘Training for Jobs’
(^Envisaged post-legislation situation (c) Actual post-legislation situation
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\strategy, Figure 4.2 compares the envisaged outcome (as portrayed earlier in Figure 
4.1) with the actual one. It demonstrates that in the event the filter of the local mandate 
succeeded in moderating the influence of the MSC just as it had that of the DES.
The mistake should not be made, however, of conceiving the LEAs as victors in 
this battle. The outcome was a compromise, and some of the strategic objectives were 
achieved. The MSC now had a clear role in NAFE, where previously it had had none. 
If LEAs' plans did not satisfy the Commission, it could still withhold its money. The 
Policy Group indicated that with its partial funding role the Commission would
not only contribute to but would influence the decision making to a very discernable extent. 
(my italics)35
Whilst the MSC's direct purchasing power had not proved strong enough to overcome 
LEA opposition, it nonetheless proved more powerful than the statutory interventions 
of the DES. It was noted above that at the time the various parties eventually gathered at 
the same negotiating table, a number of LEAs had 'begun to wobble', and were 
tentatively seeking individual agreements with the MSC. The financial pressure was 
proving to be a potent force, and had the united front of LEA opposition began to 
crumble, the local authority associations' demands may not a have been conceded. As 
suggested earlier, the NAFE Agreement was the best the associations could have hoped 
for. That is, they were powerful enough to modify central policy, but not powerful 
enough to defeat it.
A further important point in this context is the significance of individual actors in 
influencing policy outcomes. The power of the individual in such cases is always 
contentious, but the effects of the removal of David Young from the MSC chair at a 
crucial moment cannot be disregarded. It is a matter for conjecture whether, had he 
remained in place, the LEAs or the MSC would have cracked first. Either way, both 
possibilities remain. In recognising the significance of Bryan Nicholson's more 
conciliatory approach, the absolute power of the LEAs to have resisted government 
intentions is brought further into question.
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Despite national level agreement, the poverty of local relations between LEAs and 
the MSC at this time should be noted. Quite apart from any ideological differences 
about NAFE, LEAs were deeply suspicious about the appearance of a rival institution 
on the scene. It should be remembered that the Commission was at the very height of 
its powers. Steady expansion through the late 1970s had been followed by even greater 
influence following the publication of the New Training Initiative. In 1984 it had 
recently acquired responsibility for TVEI, and the number of trainees on the new YTS 
was still growing. It had been cast by Training for Jobs in the role of a national training 
authority. Now it had been given powers in NAFE, nobody could predict what 
advances into the education sector might come next. These considerations go a long 
way to accounting for the ferocity of LEA resistance to the White Paper in the period 
1984-5, which might not have been so great had the Commission not been perceived as 
such a threat.
Despite the MSC-local authority associations rapprochement and their forging of 
the NAFE Agreement, there remained in 1985 considerable suspicion about the future 
of the MSC in NAFE. In a book published that year Salter and Tapper stated their belief 
that
there can be no doubt that the MSC will use (its) financial control to push the curriculum in 
particular directions.36
Also, putting the matter in the terms of inter-network rivalry, that
the ability of the DES to resist the MSC's colonisation of FE is highly suspect
the restriction of MSC's stake to 25 per cent being very likely 'only a holding 
operation'37. In considering how the new 'partners' began working together, it is very 
important to appreciate the atmosphere in which they were joined. The question of how 
relationships between the two developed is given detailed attention in Chapter 6.
Before this, however, it is necessary to turn to the basis upon which the empirical 
work is founded. Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the thesis' methodology, 
identifying the chosen techniques, the justification for their use, and the manner in
1 5 2
which they have been employed to generate the material discussed in this chapter, and 
in Chapters 6 and 7.
1 5 3
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L x l  Introduction
The subject area of NAFE planning is very young and in consequence it has a small and 
limited literature and few sources of good data. Hence the development of new 
empirical work is of paramount importance. This chapter sets out the methodology 
adopted in the thesis to provide such empirical work. It considers the factors which led 
to the choice of the methods adopted, and outlines how the research was conducted.
The first section deals with some general influences on choice of method. 
Subsequent sections consider the differences and usefulness of extensive and intensive 
research, the choice of methodology, and the nature of the approach finally adopted.
5^ 2 . Some influences on the choice of method
A number of factors need to be considered in the selection of a research methodology. 
These include the scale of analysis, the nature of the information required, the number 
of objects about which it is intended to comment, and the objectives of presentation. In 
developing a methodology which may suitably interrogate the issues raised by the 
NAFE Agreement and its aftermath, it is important that these factors be addressed.
Take first the scale of analysis. In the instance of NAFE this can be viewed in two 
ways. In one sense the research is a quasi-national study, considering policy across the 
area affected by the 1984 legislation enacted in Training for Jobs, i.e. it covers the 
whole of England and Wales. In another sense, however, the thesis is a is a study of 
local areas, either those covered by local education authorities or combinations of these 
which made up MSC Areas. These are the component parts of 'a national service, 
locally administered'1. It is necessary that the research design be aimed at both these 
levels.
Second is the nature o f the information required. It is necessary to identify as 
precisely as possible the raison d'etre of the research enquiry. Massey and Meegan2 
note the importance of addressing this before selecting a methodology, in particular in
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terms of the respective emphasis being placed upon patterns and processes. In this 
instance the research objective is, on one hand, to gather a large body of information 
which could illuminate the often complex workings of a hitherto under-researched field. 
At the same time, it seeks to identify the mechanisms which influenced NAFE 
outcomes. The methodology required, therefore, must allow the collection of abundant 
new data, whilst permitting a depth of enquiry sufficient to uncover the processes 
significantly influencing NAFE.
Third, the number of objects under investigation imposes practical constraints upon 
research design: for example, upon whether one can seek realistically to study an entire 
population, or whether a sample only is feasible. In addition, because of the numbers 
involved, different hierarchical levels in any system admit of different forms of 
appropriate analysis, and thus provide the researcher with different sorts of 
information.
As discussed above, the present study is aimed at two levels, a national perspective 
combined with the study of LEAs and MSC Area Offices. Each offers different kinds 
of information on NAFE planning, and the number of objects at each level informs the 
nature of the methodology to be employed there. Whilst the delivery of NAFE is 
focused largely at the college and course level, much of the planning and strategy is 
focused at the LEA and Area Office levels. Since this thesis is primarily concerned with 
the bureaucracies that determine strategy it is appropriate to select the LEA and Area 
Office levels as the primary unit of enquiry. This creates some considerable advantages, 
which lie chiefly in the number of LEAs (104) and Area Offices (48) in England and 
Wales. This made possible some form of enquiry in the entire population, or at least a 
significant proportion of it. A survey could be aimed at the whole and face-to-face 
interviews could be carried out amongst a large and representative sample. At the 
national level, advantages lay in the practicability of in-depth interviews with key actors 
and observers who, though less informed about local detail and the variation of 
characteristics between individual areas, could provide an overview highly 
complementary to other work which did examine localities.
Fourth, the presentation of the findings also has an influence upon the choice of
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methodology. An output in the form of a doctoral thesis permits extensive and detailed 
presentation and discussion of data. The collection and interpretation of this in the 
NAFE field therefore also affects the selection of the methods eventually employed.
A further consideration of considerable importance to the choice of the thesis 
methodology is the value of extensive and intensive approaches. The respective 
qualities of these are considered below, and their usefulness to the objectives of the 
research are evaluated in the following section.
Extensive v. intensive research
The debate over the use of extensive and intensive approaches in social science research 
revolves around their relative merits and their complementarity. The discussion here 
considers the characteristics, generalisability and explanatory power of each approach, 
and their capacity to be used alongside one another in a mutually-enhancing fashion.
5.3 (i) Characteristics
The chief characteristics of extensive research identified by Massey & Meegan3 are its 
use of 'aggregate statistics, surveys and statistical analyses' which are commonly used 
in 'discovering general patterns of spatial change'. They indicate it to be frequently 
based upon a taxonomic approach
aimed at identifying pervasive systematic trends in aggregate variables and exploring common 
features and relationships within these aggregate patterns4
Sayer & Morgan5 note that typical of the extensive methodology is the use of large 
scale formal questionnaire or interview surveys, either of whole populations or 
supposedly representative samples, and the use of descriptive or inferential statistics 
and other numerical techniques, such as cross-tabulations.
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Intensive research, according to Massey and Meegan emphasises abstraction, as 
opposed to the empirical generalisation they claim to be common in extensive research. 
They state intensive work to be
heavily dependent on non-standardised and qualitative analytical techniques 
and that it
is increasingly being used to explore in detail how causal processes work out in specific 
cases.6
Sayer and Morgan describe intensive techniques' use of
less formal, less standardised and... mainly qualitative forms of analysis7 
Examples include interactive, unstructured interviews and ethnography.
5.3 (ii) Generalisability
Whilst extensive research tends to examine a large number of objects, intensive 
research usually concentrates upon a small number, or even single examples. The 
former frequently aims to cover entire populations, or samples of a proportion 
supposed large (and therefore representative) enough to allow the drawing of statistical 
inferences. The latter is less concerned with representation and more with maximising 
the depth, detail and understanding of those objects under its scrutiny.
Harr6 claims a key decision in planning research to be the choice between
an extensive method aimed at investigating the common properties of a large number of 
individuals
or
an intensive method in which individuals are examined, one by one, with no prior 
assumptions about the similarities or differences between them.8
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Theodossin identifies some pros and cons of techniques which reflect these approaches:
Questionnaires... have a tendency to impose a 'shape' o n ... responses, and may on occasion 
even 'lead' the recipients, but they have the virtues of being relatively inexpensive, ideally 
producing a large volume of easily quantifiable data.... Interviews/discussions (allow) the 
respondents more opportunities to structure the experience to their own ends and can offer the 
potentiality for deeper and fuller expression of individual attitudes, but the resulting data is 
often so diverse as to render tidy quantification difficult9
The two approaches tell the researcher different things about the subject at issue. 
Extensively-produced data allow generalised statements to be made about the whole 
population, including those objects not directly studied, on the basis of inferences 
drawn from the 'representative' sample. Intensive research, on the other hand, allows 
one to make detailed and highly informed statements about the objects studied, which 
may or may not apply to those not studied. This is important: whilst it can be agreed 
with Sayer and Morgan10 that, though the detailed concrete characteristics of individual 
cases are not generalisable, the underlying mechanisms and structures can be expected 
to occur elsewhere, it remains conjecture as to whether or not they actually do.
In selecting a research methodology, it is important to identify the extent to which it 
is intended to make generalisations from the empirical data about the whole population 
under study, and to choose one's approach accordingly. The more extensive approach 
is that which offers the most generalisable results.
5.3 (iii) Explanatory power
The other consequence of the factors which make extensive research more, and 
intensive research less, generalisable is an inverse effect on explanatory power. In 
theory it would be possible to employ a methodology which combined wide-ranging 
representativeness with great depth and detail, but in reality social research entails a 
trade-off between the two on the grounds of sheer practicality.
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Massey and MeeganU claim that from the intensive perspective, ’the identification 
of common outcomes’ (as in extensive research) ’cannot be used as explanation'. 
Pecki2 agrees, stating that a single datum does not 'speak for itself. Sayer and Morgan 
note that extensive research
often fails to indicate what processes have produced the patterns it reveals.13
They allow that extensive research does possess some limited explanatory power, 
noting a usefulness in the initial exploration of data. However they stress its 
vulnerability to the ecological fallacy when inferences are made about individual cases 
on the basis of the overall results. They do note the potential for a converse fallacy in 
the use of intensive findings, but that this is avoided if such findings are not alleged to 
be representative.
The greater explanatory power of intensive research is rooted in its level of detail, 
and the responsive flexibility of its more qualitative methods, which avoid the rigid and 
sometimes inappropriate simplifications which extensive techniques impose upon then- 
subject matter.
To summarise, whilst both extensive and intensive research provide descriptive 
analyses of the objects under study, they employ different techniques and answer 
different questions. Extensive research employs formalised, aggregate and often 
quantitative techniques, and provides data which is highly representative but has low 
explanatory power. Intensive research is more informal and qualitative, and whilst its 
findings are less open to generalisation, they do offer data whose explanatory power is 
strong.
5.3 (iv) Compatibility
Having identified the respective qualities of these two approaches, the issue turns to 
whether they are mutually exclusive, or whether they may be used together in a 
complementary fashion.
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Massey and Meegan cite as apocryphal the notion that the different methods are 
applicable at different levels of analysis,
the extensive at the macro-level, say, and the intensive at the micro-level14
This vision, they point out15, fails to recognise that the differences lie not in their 
analytical scope but in their explanatory frameworks. In considering the possibility of 
using both approaches in a single piece of research they then pose the question:
does one (the extensive) set the agenda for the other (the intensive) ?16
For this to be possible it is required that the extensive and intensive techniques 
being employed are compatible - something which cannot, according to Massey and 
Meegan17, be assumed. Sayer and Morgan note that the two methods 'define their 
objects and boundaries differently’18. Their approach to explanation is frequently very 
different, extensive techniques tending to favour the notion of 'additive causality' in 
contrast to the structural interdependence seen as central to intensive approaches19. It is 
not necessary to enter this matter here in detail; the important point is that extensive and 
intensive approaches cannot necessarily be employed together, and that to do so with 
validity requires in each case the careful construction of a compatible framework for 
their use.
Sayer and Morgan20 concur in claiming that complementarity between the two 
approaches is possible in principle. Their view is that whilst intensive research is 
primarily explanatory, extensive data is 'primarily descriptive and synoptic', and that 
both can be present a single methodology under the right conditions. These hinge on 
the homogeneity of the population and the relevance of the categories used in the 
extensive analysis to define the characteristics of the sample or population. Their notion 
is that extensive techniques may be used to discover the incidence and extent of 
mechanisms or processes identified by intensive research.
Massey and Meegan claim that extensive research may in some circumstances 'set
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the agenda1 for intensive analysis; Sayer and Morgan that extensive research can be 
used to illuminate intensive findings. Peck indicates the usefulness of the extensive 
approach in highlighting patterns which require explanation through more detailed 
analysis21. Movement from one to the other in either direction is therefore being 
forwarded variously by these authors, and it seems valid to argue for a dialogue 
between the two approaches at different stages of research, where appropriate.
5 .4  Choosing an approach
In the above sections some of the requirements of the methodology of the thesis have 
been outlined, and some alternative methods considered. This section examines how 
the choice of approach has been made, in the light of the identified requirements, on the 
basis of different techniques’ respective merits.
The requirements identified in section 5.2 above may be summarised thus:
(a) a need to aim at both local and quasi-national levels;
(b) a lack of abundant data and secondary material in a new and 
under-researched field entailing a need to collect a large amount of data 
representative of the whole field;
(c) a need to go beyond descriptive analysis and provide data which has high 
explanatory power,
(d) a requirement for detailed and wide-ranging analysis and presentation of 
findings consequent upon the thesis format
On one hand these factors are the bases for choices over the use of extensive and
A
intensive research methods; on the other they form the components of a case for 
adopting an 'iterative' approach to the research. These ideas are outlined in turn below.
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5.4 (i) A combination of extensive and intensive methods
The four factors (a-d) above indicate a clear case for the use of both intensive and 
extensive analysis in the present research. The requirement for both 'depth* and 
'breadth' of coverage suggests, whilst not pretending that the differences between the 
two types of research can be reduced to a banal simplification, that the use of both 
approaches will provide the required perspectives in a way that constriction to one or 
other would not allow. In practice, the particular methods actually applied are a 
combination of questionnaire survey and interview techniques.
However, the necessity has been noted of carefully constructing a framework 
which allows a complementarity to be developed between the two approaches. This 
cannot be assumed to exist, and must be addressed here before any combination of 
approach can be justified.
5.4 (ii) An iterative approach
The need to construct a complementarity of approaches is tackled here by the adoption 
of an 'iterative' approach to the research design. This is an attempt to avoid the use of a 
unidirectional strategy which employs extensive work as a means of simply 'setting the 
agenda' for subsequent intensive analysis, or identifying processes through intensive 
work which may be 'tested' through extensive verification. Rather, as argued for in 
section 5.3 above, there is an attempt to establish a dialogue between the two 
approaches in which each informs the other in a mutually-supporting fashion at 
different stages of the research. This does involve agenda-setting and attempts at 
verification, but importantly this is attempted in both directions, extensive work at one 
stage being at the same time instructed by, and the guiding basis of subsequent, 
intensive analysis.
A further advantage of an iterative approach is its value to the researcher as a 
progressive learning exercise in the field of study. Intelligent interrogation of one's 
subject matter requires an informed understanding which is only available as a product
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of research. The potential vicious circle here is avoided if one adopts a stage-by-stage 
investigation, in which each new sortie into the field is (a) of a depth and detail 
enhanced by the findings of the previous stage, and (b) the basis upon which 
subsequent investigations may be more informed still.
LJL The methodology of the thesis
The outcome of the above considerations is the research design finally chosen. The task 
here is to first introduce the methods applied in the thesis, and subsequently to explain 
their nature both in terms of their position in the intensive-extensive analysis and the 
manner in which they respectively contribute to the thesis' aims.
The empirical work carried out can be subdivided into the following three broad 
areas:
(i) a series of unstructured interviews with actors at local and national levels 
throughout the course of the research;
(ii) a national questionnaire survey of LEAs;
(iii) a series of semi-structured interviews with MSC staff.
In terms of the intensive-extensive division, the above can be understood as a 
balanced combination of both. The informal interviews of the first group represent an 
intensive-style approach, whose actual intensity and depth varied in a manner described 
in the relevant section below. The questionnaire survey of LEAs was a clear example of 
extensive research, although it did contain some open-ended elements more associated 
with intensive work. In the final group, the semi-structured interviews mostly involved 
an intensive form of enquiry; extensive components were present nonetheless, intended 
to broaden the scope of the final results.
In line with the iterative approach outlined above, this was adopted in the sense of
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the semi-structured interviews being guided by the findings of the LEA survey, which 
in turn had been instructed by the evidence gained from informal interview work. 
Furthermore, the informal interviews themselves had reflected a stage-by-stage 
progression reflecting an expanding body of research knowledge which the process 
was generating.
All these points are taken up in more detail in the following sections, which outline 
the important features of the three broad research components.
5.5 (i) Informal interviews
The first of these was a process which both pre-dated and succeeded the work carried 
out in the other two. It can usefully be split into three sub-categories as follows:
(a) early ’trawling exercises' designed to expand the researcher’s knowledge of the 
NAFE field. This allowed that subsequent work could proceed with the benefit of 
an enlightened grasp of the concepts and issues involved, providing a depth and 
contemporaneity of understanding not available from any literature review. The 
subjects of these interviews included officers at the MSC's head office in Sheffield; 
national level officers at the Further Education Unit (FEU) and the Association of 
County Councils (ACC); LEA officers involved in NAFE at the local level; college 
staff involved in planning at the institutional level; and academics specialising in 
further education research.
(b) substantial interviews with a selection of the above group, which explored the 
important themes and issues identified earlier in more depth and with a greater 
focus on the particular research goals of the thesis. Of particular value here were 
members of staff at the FEU and ACC at the national level, and local officers in 
LEAs and MSC Area Offices around the country. In three localities staff from two 
or more involved parties (i.e. the LEA, the MSC Area Office and in one case local 
college staff) were interviewed in an attempt to provide the emerging picture with a 
wider and more representative perspective.
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(c) a round of interviews carried out with the specific aim of developing the national 
questionnaire of NAFE officers and the series of semi-structured interviews with 
MSC staff. Initially a process of refining and editing the series of questions 
identified as important in earlier investigations, the latter part of this exercise 
involved a process of piloting the questionnaire in the format devised, testing its 
suitability and its propensity to yield a sufficiently rich and utilisable bank of data. 
The same process applied to the development of the MSC semi-structured 
interviews.
As is apparent from the above, this approach involved contacting and meeting a number 
of officers in different positions on a series of different occasions. It is important here 
to draw attention to the value of this process in establishing a relationship of mutual 
trust and confidence which allowed an exchange of ideas and information on the subject 
which would not have been achievable given a more distant or formal approach. 
Information gathered in this way represented a very valuable source in the extent to 
which it allowed meaning to be inferred from what might otherwise be rather sterile 
facts had they been derived wholly from questionnaire or cursory interview methods.
It can be noted that the above approach of informal interviews is best seen as an 
example of intensive research, although caution should be exercised here given that 
some of this work will have been, in the initial stages of the research, carried out at a 
level fairly close to the surface of the problem. Nonetheless, it has been very significant 
for the thesis: the whole process has been one of increasing involvement at 
progressively deeper levels of discussion, notably with those subjects referred to with 
whom good contacts were established and subsequently consolidated. The end product 
of the informal interview process has been a considerable intensive exploration of the 
subject matter under interrogation.
5.5 (ii) National questionnaire survey of NAFE officers
It has been noted above that, among other things, the thesis' required a wide-ranging 
source of new data referring to the NAFE planning experience of local areas. As a
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result it was decided to conduct a piece of extensive research in the form of a 
quasi-national questionnaire survey across the whole of England and Wales. This was 
to be despatched to NAFE executive officers in local authority education departments. 
These were the actors most fully involved in the planning process within LEAs. The 
decision to aim the survey at the education side of the LEA-MSC partnership followed 
from the fact that NAFE was, via colleges, a local authority-delivered programme. It 
also reflects the MSC's insistence that 'ownership' of the Development Plan and 
Annual Programme lay with the LEA.
The survey aimed to pose questions on a range of issues, whose broad thrust was 
developed in the early stages definition of the of research topic, but whose detailed 
content and orientation had to be developed through a combination of literature analysis 
and the informal interviews referred to above.
The literature analysis involved, in addition to general reading in the fields of 
education and local government, the examination of various government White Papers, 
MSC publications, and statements made by a series of organisations at the time of the 
NAFE Agreement in 1985. There was some examination of secondary literature in the 
form of research papers dealing specifically with NAFE, but it emerged that little in the 
way of detailed research existed. The bulk of the information required was therefore 
derived from direct approaches to the actors in the field.
The first round of interviews geared to this objective were conducted with 
individuals who were highly informed observers or actors involved at the national 
level. These included staff at the Head Office of MSC, the headquarters of the ACC, 
the FEU, and academics at more than one university, as referred to in section 5.5 (i) 
above on informal interviews. The interviewees were able to provide a feel for the 
issues which were important, and a national overview of what one might be seeking in 
such a survey.
The next stage involved interviews with the local actors themselves: some of the 
LEA officers to whom the questionnaire would be sent This involved meeting five 
LEA NAFE officers in different parts of the country: a London borough, a northern
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metropolitan borough, a Midlands shire and two further shire authorities in the east of 
England. This variety was intended to be representative of the various LEA structures 
that would be included in the analysis. Further local discussions involved meetings 
with MSC Area officers, in one case in the same locality as one of the LEAs visited, in 
order to provide a dimension of balance in the preparation of the questionnaire's subject 
matter.
By means of the above combination of primary and secondary sources, a set of 
questions was defined and the format of the survey established through a series of 
drafts. These draft questionnaires were modified through a process of further 
deliberations on the part of the author, discussions with the thesis supervisor and other 
colleagues and further discussions with some of the national level interviewees referred 
to above.
This process led to a final stage of preparation which involved the draft 
questionnaire and the proposed covering letter being subjected to a pilot with three of 
the LEA officers previously visited. This pilot produced the last revisions before the 
drawing up of the final nine-page document, a complete version of which is shown in 
Appendix B.
The survey mainly involved the respondents giving answers by means of ticking 
boxes opposite a range of response options. This reflected an aim of making the 
resultant set of survey data comparable and hence manageable to analyse. It allowed the 
returns to be synthesised into an overall perspective. However, respondents were also 
encouraged to write in answers of their own to each question where they considered 
relevant. Also, a number of open-ended questions were provided. It was hoped that 
these provisions would to some extent offset the drawbacks of the formal check-list of 
survey-led responses that could provide the advantage of generalisability at the cost of a 
distortion of local variation. Nonetheless the data set derived from this work represents 
a largely formal source of research information.
The strategy of sending the questionnaire to the full population of 104 LEAs 
anticipated the strong likelihood that there would not be a complete response. The
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intention was rather to gather a sample which was as large and representative of the 
whole as possible. The alternative approach of targeting a selected sample would have 
had the advantages of providing for a representatively even distribution of responses. 
However, this approach was rejected on the grounds of maximising the response rate in 
order to gain as high a proportion of the total as possible. The higher the response rate, 
the more justifiable would be any conclusions and generalisations made from the data. 
The problem in this strategy was the need to iron out biases caused by the possible 
over-representation of some types of authority or region over others. The manner in 
which this problem was tackled is outlined below.
The discussions undertaken to refine the surveys content had also been used to 
investigate the optimum timing of the survey's despatch and collection. Factors 
determining this included the ebb and flow of respondents' workloads at different 
stages in the NAFE planning cycle and academic year, and the need to avoid a 
coincidence with other surveys in the field.
As a result of these deliberations, the finalised survey was sent to the 104 LEAs of 
England and Wales on June 20,1988. The date by which respondents were requested 
to make a return was July 25. An additional request was made for respondents to 
include copies of their authority's Development Plan and Annual Programme and any 
other information which they might be able to provide that could enhance the value of 
their response.
Various follow-up stages ensued before the collection of the survey was complete. 
These were aimed at tackling the problem of providing an even representation of 
respondents that would echo the balance of the full population. This required: a similar 
proportion of: (a) different authority types - shire counties, metropolitan boroughs etc.;
(b) authorities in each of the nine standard regions in England and Wales; (c) authorities 
of different size; (d) variations in LEA type within the above groupings - e.g. between 
inner and outer urban boroughs, highly populated and sparsely populated shires, core 
and peripheral areas.
The means by which this requirement was pursued was as follows. Firstly,
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attempts were aimed at maximising the total number of responses: a reminder letter was 
issued on July 26 to all authorities who had not sent a response by the first closing date; 
further reminder letters accompanied by fresh copies of the survey instrument were 
despatched to non-respondents on October 3. By October 14 a total of 64 completed 
surveys had been received, at a response rate of 61.5 per cent.
At this stage, attempts were made to match responses to the required proportions of 
each type. The intention was to contact LEAs of types under-represented among the 
respondents and make special requests of them to respond. The danger of introducing 
bias through this process was addressed by contacting all authorities of the type 
required, on the assumption that only some of them would be persuaded to respond. 
Fortuitously, however, the responses collected already had been fairly well balanced 
anyway, and the problem of under-representation was largely confined to central city 
and Welsh county authorities. Both these groups were contacted, and further responses 
were obtained from some LEAs within them.
The most problematic area in assessing representativeness was in group (d) above, 
because judging which areas are 'peripheral' or 'densely populated’ is a somewhat 
subjective process. The acceptance of the final sample inevitably entailed some 
interpretation on the part of the author, one largely based on the analysis of a 
developing map of responding authorities, which appears in its final form here as 
Figure 5.1.
The survey was closed on 17 November 1988 and no further responses sought 
after this time. By this time, 70 completed questionnaires had been received, at a 
response rate of 67.3 per cent.
The balance of the survey against the population in the various categories referred 
to above is indicated in Figures 5.2 - 5.4, and the accompanying tables. Table 5.1 
indicates LEAs by type*, as a proportion of both the population as a whole and of the 
survey sample. Figure 5.2 illustrates these figures graphically. The final column in
* LEA 'type' is used here to distinguish between shire, borough and district authorities.
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Figure 5.1: Map of respondents to the LEA survey
IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Responding Authorities





sam ple % Total % Sample % Difference
London Boroughs (inc. ILEA) 21 1 4 2 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 0 . 2
Metropolitan Boroughs 3 6 2 4 3 4 . 6 3 4 . 3 0 . 3
Shire Counties 3 9 2 9 3 7 . 5 41 .4 3 . 9
Welsh Counties 8 4 7 . 7 5 . 7 2 . 0
Average: 1 .6
Figure 5.2: Respondents by LEA t\pe
□  Welsh count ies
13 English counties
Metropolitan boroughs 
®  London boroughs
All LEAs Respondents
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Table 5.2: Respondents by region
Total Total
R egion  no. LEAs respondents % Total % Sample
Yorks/Humbers ide 1 1 9 1 0 . 6 1 2 . 9
W.midlands 1 1 8 1 0 . 6 1 1 . 4
Wales 8 4 7 . 7 5 . 7
South West 7 4 6 . 7 5 . 7
S.East  (inc. London) 3 2 2 3 3 0 . 8 3 2 . 9
North West 1 8 1 1 1 7 . 3 1 5 . 7
North 8 4 7 . 7 5 . 7
E.Midlands 6 5 5 . 8 7.1
East Anglia 3 2 2 . 9 2 . 9
Average:


























Table 5.3: Respondents by LEA t\p e
Total
LEA size LEAs
1 - 3 institutions 5 0
4 - 6 institutions 2 1
7 institutions or more 2 5
No data 8
LEAs in
sample %  Total % Sample % Difference
2 9 48 .1 4 1 . 4 6 . 7
1 7 2 0 . 2 2 4 . 3 4.1
1 8 2 4 . 0 2 5 . 7 1 .7
6 7 . 7 8 . 6 0 . 9
Average: 3 . 4
Figure 5.4: Respondents by LEA size
All LEAs Respondents
Table 5.1 indicates the percentage difference between population and sample for each 
type. It demonstrates that, with a maximum variation of only 3.9 per cent from the 
mean in the 'shire counties' category, and variations of less than 1.0 per cent for 
London boroughs and metropolitan districts, that the sample is closely representative by 
LEA type, the average variation being only 1.6 per cent.
Similar evidence is found in the case of LEAs subdivided by region, as illustrated 
in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3. For the nine regions in England and Wales, the maximum 
percentage variation between the population and sample is 2.3 per cent, and the average 
1.46 per cent, again providing a closely representative picture.
A third subdivision of LEAs considered is that by LEA size. This refers to a 
division of the LEAs into groups according to the number of NAFE institutions within 
their jurisdiction. These groups are 1-3 institutions, 4-6 institutions and more than 7 
institutions. The figures shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 were derived from the 
Municipal Yearbook of 1987 *22. Here there is a greater margin of variation, the 
average being 3.4 per cent and the maximum 6.7 per cent. These figures are 
nonetheless low enough to confirm, along with those above, that the survey is highly 
representative of the full population of LEAs in England and Wales.
5.5 (iii) Semi-structured interviews
The required balance of extensive and intensive techniques argued for earlier 
necessitated that the major MSC-based enquiry offset some of the rigidity imposed by 
the earlier LEA work, whilst retaining a degree of representative comparability between 
MSC Areas. The approach taken was to use semi-structured interviews with a sample 
of the Area Office population. This retained the advantages of the questionnaire 
approach whilst adding a new dimension. The approach recognised the value of using 
the LEA survey as more than just a model for a complementary replica, realised its
The available data required some interpretation, as it was not collected in a uniform format for 
the Yearbook, in 8 cases there was no data on NAFE institutions. Some marginal distortion is 
possible as a result.
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potential for providing an authoritative descriptive overview, and signalled fruitful 
avenues for further, more detailed work. The semi-structured interviews were therefore 
able to fulfil the task of providing a set of data which could be compared against the 
LEA responses for the purposes of triangulation and verification, whilst also going a 
stage further. That is, they were able to provide an opportunity for deeper investigation 
at a more meaningful level into the issues which had become established or suggested 
by the earlier work, fulfilling the terms of the 'iterative1 approach outlined earlier.
There is a degree of academic debate about the relative merits of formal and 
informal interviews. The advantages attributed to the former generally refer to 
objectivity and scientific rigour, whereas flexibility and depth are claimed on behalf of 
the latter. The lack of each advantage is Used as criticism of the other.
Deutscher23 is cited by Brenner24 as a proponent of formalised interviews. 
Deutscher argues for 'the desirability of socially sterile conditions in the interview 
situation’ which he claims to reduce the possibility of researcher-bias in the responses 
gathered. Sayer and Morgan25 also cite this as the rationale behind standardised 
interviewing, along with the idea that it allows 'controlled comparisons' to be made.
However, Sayer and Morgan claim that the cost of this pursuit of 
'representativeness' is a loss of explanatory penetration:
Extreme standardisation which disregards the different types of respondent can in fact make 
comparisons rather meaningless, because they fail to register the fact that different questions 
can have a vastly different significance (for different respondents).26
Brenner accepts that the interviewer will
influence the situation of action in the interview by means of (the interviewer's) own 
performance
He argues, however, that social interaction with the interviewee is inevitable:
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The interview constitutes an interpersonal encounter. Hence, attempts at measurement in 
interviewing take the form of fleeting social relationships which resemble those of everyday 
life,27
i.e. they have an ethnographic element.
Sayer and Morgan argue for the acceptance of this truth, and for a positive 
response on the part of researchers. This would seek to use such interaction 
consciously in order to maximise the flow of information, rather than continuing to 
pursue standardisation -
an awkward and often distorted form of (non?) communication.28
The response to these issues adopted in this thesis is to take on board the idea of 
interactive interviewing, whilst not abandoning a structured element In the context of 
the present work, the term 'semi-structured interview' is being used to mean the 
following: a set of predetermined question areas put to each interviewee in a manner 
approximately similar to that put to the other interviewees in the study (the exact choice 
of words being made by the interviewer at the time); whilst attempts are made not to let 
the interview slip into irrelevant areas, the interviewee is allowed to tackle each question 
as he or she feels appropriate.
The use of the same question areas, and in many instances the same questions, 
provides for a set of answers which may be compared with other responses and 
synthesised in subsequent analysis. The open-ended nature of the interviewees' 
response provides a flexibility which allows a large volume of relevant information to 
be elucidated.
This describes the manner in which the interviews with MSC local officers were 
carried out. The development of the question areas was based heavily on the format of 
the LEA questionnaire (to allow a strong element of comparability), but also involved a 
series of informal interviews with national and local MSC actors to establish what other 
or deeper issues would be appropriate to address.
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The choice of interviewees was also intended to enhance comparability with the 
LEA survey. In one sense this entailed the choice of the LEA respondents' opposite 
numbers as the point at which an interview was sought, i.e. the NAFE HEO employed 
at each MSC Area Office. In another sense it involved the choice of the Area Offices 
themselves.
This choice was based upon two factors: a desire to interview MSC staff in those 
areas from which a response had been received from one or more corresponding LEAs; 
and the importance of representativeness, in terms of region, urban/rural nature, 
core-periphery location, the number of LEAs covered by the Area Office, the nature of 
the LEAs, and so forth.
Nine Area offices were eventually chosen for the study. These included an office in 
each region in England and Wales bar one, with two offices being visited in one large 
region. Area Offices which were chosen covered: a single midlands county authority, 
the office being located in its largest city; two northern metropolitan boroughs; two 
counties in the east of England; one large and one small LEA in the south of England; a 
single county authority in the north-east; two LEAs in south Wales; five London 
boroughs; a densely-populated shire in the West Midlands; and three metropolitan 
boroughs in a north-western city. A more explicit revelation of the location of these 
offices is prevented by the need to preserve confidentiality, an important element in 
persuading interviewees to be confident and forthright in their responses. Thus they are 
referenced in the text by means of alphabetic labels, which are detailed in the List of 
Interviewees at the end of the thesis.
The nine Area Offices visited were responsible for dealing with a total of 29 LEAs. 
Of these, 15 had been respondents to the LEA survey. Of the non-responding LEAs, 
only one was the Area Office's sole authority, the others being in 3- and 5-LEA 
metropolitan Areas and a 2-LEA shire county Area. This provides considerable 
justification for crossover and comparative analysis in the use of the LEA and MSC 
survey data.
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5_l£  Use of the data
The results from the'empirical work outlined above are described in the chapters which 
follow. It is not intended that they be presented in a format based on the manner in 
which they were gathered. Rather the intention is that they be presented in a thematic 
way, and in a manner which flows from the discussions raised in the earlier chapters.
This chapter has attempted to concentrate upon the thinking and methodology 
behind empirical work and the manner in which it was carried out. This has been done 
in order to facilitate understanding of how the material presented in the remainder of the 
thesis was derived, and clarify the basis upon which statements attributed to its 
empirical analysis have been made.
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The restructuring of the NAFE bureaucracy.
1 8 3
<L1 Introduction
The importance of bureaucratic restructuring as a strategic tool of central government 
policy implementation was stressed in earlier chapters. These discussions presented a 
critical analysis of the NAFE and employment and training policy networks, and an 
outline of the strategic objectives behind their linking in the proposals of Training for 
Jobs. This chapter is the first of two chapters which present the thesis' main empirical 
findings. It examines the impacts of Training for Jobs and the subsequent NAFE 
Agreement on bureaucratic arrangements in both policy networks, and the relationships 
which developed between them as a new, more extensive NAFE policy network 
emerged. These findings are derived from the extensive survey and interview work 
detailed in Chapter 5.
The particular focus of this chapter is on bureaucratic arrangements within the key 
institutions involved, i.e. the MSC and LEAs. There were identified as being the 
primary points of enquiry in Chapter 5. Section 6.2 below considers the MSC's 
institutional response to Training for Jobs and the NAFE Agreement*. Section 6.3 
examines the response of LEAs. Section 6.4 considers the nature and quality of 
relationships between the MSC and LEAs as they developed in the period 1984-9, and 
the problems encountered along the way. Together these forge a portrait of the new 
NAFE policy network which had developed by 1989.
£ .2  The institutional response of the MSC to the NAFE initiative
In examining the institutional arrangements established by the MSC to administer the 
NAFE Agreement, this section presents much new research information on the internal 
workings of the MSC hitherto unavailable in the public domain. It considers in turn the 
organisational set-ups at national, regional and local level, and the intra-office 
relationships both between levels and between different offices at the Area level.
Hereafter referred to (where jointly) as the 'NAFE initiative'.
1 8 4
6.2 (i) Arrangements at national level
The national-levels of the MSC's operation were conducted from its Head Office at 
Moorfoot in Sheffield. Its broad structure, indicated in Figure 6.1, comprised the 
appointed Commission beneath which operated a large and complex executive, divided 
into a number of operational sections. These varied in their detailed composition over 
the years, a reflection of the MSC's fluid bureaucratic character, Figure 6.1 illustrates 
the structure which existed prior to the removal of its responsibilities for employment 
services and the subsequent abolition of the Commission during 1988. At this time 
NAFE was administered as part of the Training Division.
The detailed internal Head Office structure varied considerably during the period of 
study, especially during 1988, and it is an unnecessarily complex procedure to 
illustrate it at each stage. More important to note is the structure of the FE branch, 
which was more constant through this period. This was divided into four sections, 
numbered FE 1-4. FE 1 dealt with NAFE policy, a staff of twenty dealing with 
strategic considerations, issuing guidance and liaising with other parties, notably the 
local authority associations. FE 2 dealt with projects covered by the Development 
Fund**, whilst FE 3 was an advisory section coordinating regional NAFE advisors. FE 
4 was responsible for administration and monitoring, and for general liaison with the 
field operation of NAFE. It gave advice on performance indicators, financial questions 
and 'the routine business of keeping the show on the road'1. These division are 
illustrated in Figure 6.2. The role of Head Office in NAFE as articulated through these 
divisions was seen as twofold by a senior officer within the FE branch2. The first job 
was policy advice, steering local officers in the form of both formal and informal 
advice. The first of these was covered by the Guidance Handbook and its annual 
updates, the latter conducted through ad hoc contact as and when problems arose. The 
second task of the Head Office operation was 'making sure what we are trying to do is 
acceptable in LEA eyes'. This meant regular liaison with the local authority 
associations, the DES and the Welsh Office. Formal contact of this type was conducted
** see Chapter 7.
1 8 5


























Source: A user's guide to the Manpower Services Commission, 
Thomson and Rosenberg (1986), p.29.
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Figure 6.2; MSC internal organisation for NAFE
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at the highest level through the Joint Consultative Group, which comprised four 
Commissioners (including the chair), local authority association politicians, and 
representatives from the DES and NCVQ. The presence of four Commissioners meant 
that the group was ’very influential'. Below this were some officer-level groups, the 
NAFE Advisory Group (which succeeded the NAFE Implementation and Evaluation 
Groups referred to in Chapter 4) and a group overseeing project work, the MDF 
Officers Group. All of these groups fell with the Commission in late-1988, to be 
replaced by informal liaison procedures.
6.2 (ii) Arrangements at regional level
At regional level the NAFE work of the MSC involved 3-4 principal actors, these 
being:
- the Regional Director and/or the Assistant Regional Director,
- the Regional Further Education Adviser (RFEA);
- an HEO dealing with NAFE at the Regional Office.
The RFEA was the principal actor among these. This was a part-time post 
appointed on a three-year basis, and was occupied by an officer with a long experience 
in the field of further education, typically a retired college principal. The RFEA’s role 
was intended to provide, in a complex field, a dimension of educational expertise which 
the MSC would otherwise lack, thereby permitting more informed judgments by MSC 
staff in dealing with LEA statements and submissions. Recognising the fence-crossing 
involved in this sort of appointment one MSC officer described the job as being akin to 
that of a ’poacher turned gamekeeper^. In particular the RFEAs’ job broadly 
comprised:
(a) giving advice to Area Office staff, and to LEA staff should they require, 
drawing on their wider experience of the field;
(b) commenting on LEA Development Plans and Annual Programmes, 
suggesting amendments/improvements where necessary;
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(c) providing a regional overview of NAFE which would be lacking from a 
purely local perspective.
However it is important to note that within these broad parameters the actual activity of 
the RFEA varied quite considerably from region to region, depending upon the 
individual approach of the officer in post. That is to say, it appears to have been in the 
nature of the job that there was much room for discretion and interpretation on the part 
of its occupant to conduct it as he or she thought best
Working directly beneath the RFEA at the regional office on NAFE was usually an 
HEO devoted full-time to coordinating regional activity in the field. The HEO’s task 
involved backing up the RFEA, dealing with Area Offices on a day-to-day basis and 
with Head Office where necessary, issuing guidance, discussing any problem areas and 
dealing with queries and work connected with Development Fund projects. This 
officers role was likened to a 'post-box' in the context of communication up and down 
the administrative line ^3. The division of labour between the RFEA and the HEO 
NAFE was not tightly defined, and would vary from one Regional Office to another, 
but it appeared that the RFEA devoted more time to educational issues, whereas the 
HEO's role was more managerial.
Of the other two posts mentioned, that of Regional Director and Assistant Regional 
Director, the first of these was ultimately responsible for the delivery of all activity in 
the region, and in this sense therefore a significant part of the NAFE line management. 
The latter of the two may or may not have been involved in NAFE, depending upon the 
Region. One or other of the two would commonly attend high level MSC-LEA 
meetings, and perhaps chair any regional conferences. In general however, there was 
very little involvement on the part of these officers in NAFE as compared with other 
MSC programmes, except where an individual opted to take a particular personal 
interest in i t
In one local interview4 a regional SEO was indicated to have been involved in 
NAFE; this had occurred where for some time there had been no RFEA in post. No 
other interviewees cited an SEO role in their region, however.
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Finally, apart from the above posts there would be some administrative and clerical 
support staff backing up the HEO.
The senior national-level officer interviewed indicated the role of the Regional 
OFfice in NAFE. It was there 'to add a little weight at times1, for example in formal 
meetings; to provide a coordinating force; and to add some form of overview where 
there were boundary problems4. He suggested that the precise role would depend upon 
the interpretation of the individuals concerned.
6.2 (iii) Arrangements at local level
The role of the Area Office in NAFE was indicated as having responsibility for 
establishing relationships with LEAs, for day-to-day discussions, and for taking action 
where change was required5.
The routine administration of NAFE activity conducted in MSC Area Offices can 
be divided into two broad areas. One was the mainstream activity of negotiating each 
LEA's Development Plan and Annual Programme, and monitoring their 
implementation. The other was the overseeing of projects carried out by authorities or 
colleges which were financed out of a central MSC budget. Whilst the latter is dealt 
with in Chapter 7, the former involved:
(a) at the start of each planning round, issuing national Guidance to each LEA;
(b) supply of labour market intelligence to LEAs and colleges;
(c) negotiation of Plan and Programme content;
(d) monitoring;
(e) issuing of payments to LEAs every two months, subject to evidence of the 
Programme being satisfactorily delivered.
Beyond these formal requirements, there generally occurred much informal contact 
and information exchange between Area Offices and LEAs.
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The staff structure in Area Offices was based on civil service grades, in 
descending rank from the Area Manager who would normally be a Grade 7 (former 
Principal Grade) officer, supported by an Assistant Area Manager. Below this would 
be a small number of Senior Executive Officers (SEOs), a larger number of Higher 
Executive Officers (HEOs), with a larger number still of Executive Officers (EOs) and 
Administrative Officers (AOs) making up the lower ranks.
The total number of staff in the Area Offices sampled varied from as low as 60 
to as high as 150, the average number in post at the time of enquiry being 103 
(although an average derived from the designated cadres would be a little higher).
The number of SEOs was typically 3, there being one example each of an office 
with 2 or 4 SEOs. Of the SEOs, one would carry some responsibility of NAFE, this 
constituting the line management link between the Area Manager and the NAFE HEO. 
NAFE typically represented a small portion of this SEOs duties, which commonly 
included such other responsibilities as strategy and resources, coherence, TVEI issues, 
and, most commonly in the sample, YTS (in 4 cases out of the 6 for which such 
information was detailed).
The HEO level was that in which almost universally the spadework of NAFE was 
carried out The number of HEOs in the Area Offices sampled ranged from 11 to 20, 
the average number being 17. Of these, it was most common that only one would be 
engaged in NAFE work.
In those Area Offices sampled the amount of HEO time devoted to NAFE ranged 
from 40 to 100 per cent. In 7 out of 9 cases the full time equivalent or near equivalent 
of one officer was engaged in this work. In 2 of the 6 cases this meant two HEOs 
devoting 50 per cent of their time to NAFE. In these and the remaining 2 cases the 
HEO's remaining time was taken up by work on labour market intelligence (LMI), the 
two parts of the job occupying roughly half the officers' time. In another example this 
had been the case until six months previously.
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In one Area Office there were two HEOs devoting 50 per cent of their time to 
NAFE, one dealing with mainstream and the other with project work. Another example 
saw two HEOs spending 50 per cent of their time each on NAFE and LMI, one officer 
being devoted to each of the Area's two LEAs.
Two interviewees, whilst dealing mainly with NAFE, identified other minor 
responsibilities in TVEI and programme coherence, one of them having additional 
responsibilities for youth development projects. Only two interviewees claimed to work 
exclusively on NAFE.
It appeared untypical for EOs to be very much involved in NAFE work. There 
were two cases only (hi) of substantial involvement, these being of an EO devoted 50 
per cent time to NAFE, one in an office whose HEO spent only 40 per cent of her time 
engaged in NAFE work, the other being additional to a full-time HEO. One other cased 
saw an EO doing 'some shadowing', and a thirdc indicated an EO having been involved 
10 per cent in NAFE until six months previously, when the HEO previously engaged in 
a combination of activities switched full-time to NAFE. As one interviewee0 pointed 
out, it was important that MSC staff not be too junior, as dealing with LEAs often 
meant liaising with fairly senior and experienced staff there, and meeting like with like 
became important
The officers interviewed were asked if their posts had been created especially for 
the purpose of delivering NAFE, and if so when. What emerged was that:
(a) reorganisation, post-splitting and alteration had occurred in most Area 
Offices, suggesting very fluid arrangements in staff deployment;
(b) most Area Office NAFE posts were held to have existed since shortly after 
the White Paper, in four cases (°.4e,g) having been established for the 
specific purpose of NAFE delivery, and in one case11 a definite case of 
responsibility-shuffling;
(c) in two cases (°.d) the posts were identified as having come into existence 
later, when the actual process of working with LEAs first began in late 1985.
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Interviewees were also asked about their length of tenure in the post, and the 
number of other officers who had occupied i t  Two of the officers interviewed OW had 
been in post since planning began, but in all the other cases there had been staff 
changes. Three Area Offices teb»c) had seen two appointees to the post, and one each 
had seen threef and fours appointees. Another sole appointee*1 to the post had only been 
in it since early 1988, taking over from an SEO-delivered job.
The NAFE section was the smallest section in all Area Offices, seeing much less 
input than such other MSC programmes as Employment Training and YTS. The 
amount of time devoted to it overall appears, from the evidence outlined above, to have 
been quite limited. In general it comprised a single full-time HEO post supported by 
occasional EO involvement, minimal SEO time and a degree of administrative support 
at the clerical level. On top this would be the input of the Area Manager, which would 
depend very much upon the interest taken by the individual concerned. In two cases 
this had clearly been significant: one interviewee0 noted the importance of his Area 
Manager’s role in establishing the Area Office-LEA relationship, and his continuing 
devotion of around 12 full days per year to NAFE. Another*1 described her work with a 
previous Area Manager as a kind of 'double-act' in NAFE, although the present 
occupant of that post was less involved. Other cases saw much less involvement, one 
officers describing her Area Manager's input to NAFE as 'minuscule'. Where Area 
Managers were involved it was likely to be in attending key meetings with LEA staff, 
or intervening to add weight to the MSC position where senior LEA staff or politicians 
became involved. The signing of the Contract and ultimate management responsibility 
for NAFE delivery in the Area were the most important tasks allocated to this post.
In one case the Area Office's notional allocation of staff time to NAFE was 
provideds. The proportions of time supposedly spent at each rank on this work were 
identified as follows:
SEO -0 .3  
HEO -1 .5  
EO - 0.1 
AO - 0.1
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The notional total of full time equivalent staff was therefore 2. In practice, however, 
there was little staff time available above one full time HEO. Here, as elsewhere, it 
must be remembered that in the early days of NAFE, the refusal of LEAs to become 
involved with the MSC left designated NAFE staff in the Area Offices without a 
function, and so they became linked to other responsibilities before planning got 
underway. One officer noted that Area Offices had much discretion over their 
distribution of responsibilities, and that there was frequently much cross-over of tasks.
The level of knowledge and understanding on the part of the remainder of Area 
Office staff about what NAFE was and work it involved appears generally to have been 
very limited. Education work was apparently perceived as an activity distant from the 
mainstream of MSC endeavour. Two officers O3-6) spoke of a ’mystique* surrounding 
their activities within the office. This was claimed to be a product of at least two 
factors. First, the comparatively small scale and low level of staff involvement. The 
other was sensitivity to wary and resistive LEAs which had demanded caution, 
especially in the early days, a need to 'use kid-gloves'. One officer pointed out the 
initial need to keep the MSC staff small and discrete so as not to crowd out meetings 
and thereby intimidate those LEA opposite numbers who originally had no desire or 
mandate to cooperate.
This low level of MSC staff commitment appears to have been maintained 
throughout the planning process to the time of the interview survey. There appeared at 
no time to have been significant extra resources envisaged for the expansion of MSC 
NAFE activity in Area Offices.
6.2 (iv) Relationships between different levels of MSC over NAFE
The significant relationships at issue here are those between the Area Offices and 
Regional and Head Office respectively.
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Regional Office relationships
This varied from one Area Office in the sample to another, but in general contact 
between these two bodies appeared to occur quite often, typically at least as often as 
once a week, and in some cases almost on a daily basis.
The amount and nature of this contact appeared to be in part dependent upon the 
nature of the RFEA in each region; in two cases (s*11) it was indicated that a new 
Advisor had recently been appointed and that in consequence the level of contact with 
the Area Office had risen sharply.
Not surprisingly, geographical distance between the two offices had some effect on 
the nature of contact between their staff. Whilst in some cases they were located in the 
same city or even the same building, in others the intervening distance could be over 
100 miles, a clear influence on the practicability of frequent personal contact. Those 
more distant from the Regional Office had to make up in telephone contact and 
correspondence what they lacked in frequent face-to-face discussions.
Whilst some Area Offices made extensive use of the Regional Office for advice and 
a wider perspective - one officer'd stated that Regional Office operated like a consultant’ 
for her office - others were less likely to involve Regional officers heavily as a matter of 
policy.
In addition to the above there occurred regional meetings of MSC officers in some 
form in all the Areas sampled, bar two (go). In one of these a recently-appointed RFEA 
had taken to more frequent field visits instead). The nature of such meetings varied 
from regular monthly formal gatherings of all MSC officers in the region discussing a 
range of issues and engaging in staff development activities, to occasional meetings, 
perhaps twice a year, convened to discuss new project or planning guidance. The 




Contact between Area Offices and MSC Head Office at Moorfoot in Sheffield appeared 
to be very limited. It was in the nature of the Commission's institutional character that 
internal contact between centre and locality was conducted in a disciplined manner 
along the channels of line management7. This meant Head Office dealing largely with 
Regional Offices, and Regional Offices in turn with Area Offices. Reasons indicated for 
this were that otherwise Head Office 'would get swamped' with requests for 
information or advice from Area Offices, and that it would be difficult for Regional 
Offices to maintain an informed overviews.
Nevertheless, some contact did occur. Such as it was, this appeared to be mainly in 
the form of specific questions which local officers wished to pose to staff in the NAFE 
section at Moorfoot The advantage of direct contact over queries included a quick 
response from central staff who had expertise in the field at issue, where a more formal 
approach might slow the whole process down. Interviewees indicated that they kept 
their Regional Office informed of such contacts, often getting advice from the Regional 
HEO or RFEA on whom best to contact at Moorfoot.
The subject of such queries would often be related to Development Fund projects, 
rather than policy or programme issues, for it was in the former area that any required 
expertise might be more likely to reside outside the experience of local or Regional 
officers. Even given the above, it appeared that most local officers took any questions 
they may have had to Regional level where the RFEA was likely to provide an adequate 
response.
An additional form of involvement noted by one intervieweed was as a part of the 
MSC's internal NAFE User's Group, a body on which a selection of officers from 
around the country were periodically represented to share experience from their areas.
There appeared to be very little direct contact between Head Office and Area level 
instigated from Moorfoot. One interviewee^ described it as 'an event' for such a thing 
to happen when compared with the contact occurring over other MSC programmes.
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Occasionally, officers from central departments would visit Area Offices for specific 
purposes, perhaps as a staff development, evaluation or information-gathering exercise. 
Aside from this contact which would occur fell into two camps:
(i) research and development project work;
(ii) contact by mail - guidance and requests for information.
The other kind of written contact involved requests for information, including 
numerous questionnaires on a variety of issues. All officers interviewed noted the 
preponderance of these and the heavy workload they engendered; several suggested a 
lack of foresight or sensitivity in the timing of their despatch, which they claimed often 
coincided with peak periods in the planning cycle. One interviewee in particular** 
described these questionnaires as 'a real bugbear', and local officers cited several 
reasons as to why they caused problems:
(i) poor timing - and a suspicion that this was traceable to ministerial pressure to 
gamer information;
(ii) volume of work required, especially where local staff were asked to provide 
information on issues which they had not been required to obtain from the 
LEAs;
(iii) repetition of requests for the same information;
(iv) oversimplification - often the questionnaire instruments would contain series 
of tick lists giving such options as 'good/adequate/inadequate1 to questions 
which in some cases embraced highly complex and politically-charged 
issues which were not amenable to such treatment In such cases the quest 
for simplicity was held to obfuscate an accurate assessment Again, 
ministerial requirements were suggested as possible motivations for this 
approach.
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6.2 (v) Contact between Area Offices
Within Regions, contact between Area Offices appeared to vary in frequency, and to 
depend to a fair extent on interpersonal relationships between particular NAFE HEOs. 
Between regions, contact appeared to have be negligible.
Seven of the nine officers interviewed indicated that they met colleagues from other 
Area Offices at regular meetings convened by the Regional Office. Other, less formal 
types of contact appeared to be comparatively rare in most cases. Two officers Ov) 
indicated regular contact with a number of other NAFE HEOs in their Region. Two 
more noted regular contact with one or two other HEOs in particular, onef putting this 
down to proximity and common interests, the other0 to the development of good 
personal links. One officer^ claimed not to have time for such contact outside formal 
meetings, NAFE representing as it did only 50 per cent of her duties. For most 
officers, contact with colleagues within their region seemed to be largely issue-based, 
occurring when needs arose. One intervieweed stated that she was much more likely to 
seek advice over a problem from Regional staff than from her opposite numbers at Area 
level.
One officer* indicated that contact was fairly likely to occur accidentally, as a 
combination of duties sometimes entailed NAFE HEOs meeting whilst operating under 
other hats.
Another officer0 noted the difficulties thrown up when one's nearest colleague was 
based 40 to 50 miles away, a factor mitigating against adequate liaison through 
face-to-face exchange of information and experiences. On top of this, two officers (c-e) 
made the point that NAFE was very much Area-based and often very locality-specific. 
Two corollaries were claimed to emerge from this: one was that the experience of 
different NAFE officers may not be usefully comparable; the other was that HEOs tied 
up in the affairs of their own 'patch' had little time to spend worrying about what might 
be going on elsewhere.
Another point, made by three separate interviewees (b.c,g), was that NAFE staff
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became rather isolated within their Area Offices. Often the only members of its staff 
dealing substantially with NAFE, where their work was shared it was commonly done 
so with no more than one other officer. Unlike in other MSC work the NAFE staff 
were not dealing with the delivery of a specific programme, their contact with field 
activity being remote, via the LEA and college implementors. And it was pointed out0 
that whereas, for example, YTS staff in the office may have as many as five or six 
direct colleagues based in the same room, NAFE officers' colleagues were usually 
based in other cities. A consequence of this pointed out by two interviewees M) was 
that NAFE HEOs had a closer interaction with their LEA counterparts than they did 
with colleagues in their own organisation. Even less contact was evident between Area 
Offices in different Regions.
Several officers believed it unfortunate that there was not more inter-regional 
contact, that advantages were to be had from this. One officer0 stated that within his 
Area Office, other MSC Regions were regarded as 'foreign territory', and his seeking 
to foster links across regional boundaries would be considered 'strange'. In some cases 
the drawing of Regional boundaries could be extremely obstructive: a case in point 
concerned two cities 20 miles apart whose NAFE institutions took students from each 
others' population, but which were separated by a MSC Regional boundary and 
administered quite separately0. A Regional officer interviewed1 identified an existing 
Regional Office role in resolving boundary problems between Areas within its region, 
though admitted there was less attention paid to such matters between Regions. This, 
he emphasised, was in the nature of a regionally-structured organisation. There 
apparently were meetings between NAFE HEOs from the various Regional Offices 
from time to time, but these did not appear to address localised inter-regional matters.
The overall network of intra-MS C contact over NAFE, both within and between its 
different levels, is indicated by Figure 6.2 above. The Figure is based upon the 
situation that existed at the time of the survey of local MSC NAFE officers in 1989, but 
reflects fairly accurately the situation throughout the period of joint planning. It 
identifies the interface at which the MSC met LEAs over NAFE, a matter which is 
explored more fully in section 6.4.
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LlI  The institutional response of LEAs to the NAFE initiative
The organisational structure of local education authorities typically involved a number 
of operational and support divisions overseen by a Chief Education Officer (CEO) or 
Director of Education. Unlike the MSC, there was no rigid standardisation in the titles 
of posts or departments, but LEAs nonetheless tended to commonly reflect a broadly 
similar grade and divisional structure. Examples of LEAs1 divisional structures 
included one which had two operational divisions (one each for Schools and FE) and 
two support divisions (on curricular and advisory matters respectively); and another 
whose four sections dealt with Schools, FE, Common Services, and Development and 
Buildings. Schools sections were generally the larger of the operational divisions, and 
FE was not necessarily treated as a separate area, some LEAs having sections on, for 
example, all post-16 provision.
6.3 (i) NAFE staffing arrangements
A typical LEA grade structure would have been, in descending order from the Chief 
Education Officer or Director, Deputy Director of Education; Principal Education 
Officer, Senior Assistant Education Officer, Assistant Education Officer, and so on. 
Since no systematic use of titles was made, however, the LEA survey asked 
respondents to identify the grades of those officers responsible for the NAFE task in 
each LEA by means of their rank position within the authority, the CEO being ranked 
1. Table 6.1 indicates the results of this question. It emerges that the great bulk of the 
NAFE task was carried out by officers of ranks three or four, these being cited by 
respectively 33 and 37 of the sample of 60 respondents who answered the question.
The overall number of officers engaged in NAFE in LEAs was also explored, the 
results of this enquiry being shown in Figure 6.3. It provides clear evidence that most 
LEAs had very few staff devoted to NAFE work, the majority (51 per cent) having 
only one, the average being 1.6. Another indication was sought by asking respondents 
to indicate the total staff time, expressed in terms of full-time equivalent weeks per 











Table 6,1; Number of  staff j w loy&d m.NAFE at each l e a  grade
G rade 2 3 4 5 6
No. times cited* 11 33 37 6 1
*  note that some respondents cited more than one grade
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Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data
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0 to 200 weeks, with an average of 20 weeks. The distribution of staff time is indicated 
in Figure 6.4. The evidence suggests that on average LEAs actually devoted less than 
half of one full-time post to the NAFE task.
Further exploration was made of LEA staffing arrangements considered new 
appointments made by LEAs in direct response to the new work generated by the 
NAFE Agreement. As indicated in Table 6.2, as many as 42.9 per cent of respondents 
indicated that there LEA had made no significant alteration in its staffing arrangements 
in response to the new demands, whilst 38.6 per cent had appointed new posts and
24.3 per cent had redistributed staff responsibilities within the LEA to meet these. A 
majority of authorities - 54.3 per cent - were indicated to have responded to the NAFE 
initiative by either appointing new staff or redistributing responsibilities. Breaking 
down the figures by LEA type* indicates that larger authorities and shire counties took 
either of these steps in more cases (75.0 and 72.2 per cent respectively) than either 
medium-sized/smaller authorities (52.9/44.8 per cent) on the one hand or metropolitan 
districts/London boroughs (45.8/30.8 per cent) on the other. A picture therefore 
emerges of a greater devotion of resources to NAFE on the part of LEAs in larger, 
usually county, authorities, a finding which backs up claims by smaller and less well- 
resourced LEAs that they were most stretched by the demands of joint planning.
6.3 (ii) The role of other authority departments
In seeking to investigate the institutional arrangements made within LEAs the 
survey sought to establish the involvement of other authority departments, in addition 
to the education department. The question asked respondents which departments 
supplied the education department with information over NAFE, which actually 
participated in planning, and whether the relationship between the two had strengthened 
since 1984. The results are shown in Table 6.3, and indicate that the most significant 
relationships were with the planning, treasurer's and economic development 
departments, which supplied information on NAFE in 75.7,45.7 and 38.6 per cent of
* For an explanation of the divisions made by LEA type and size, see Chapter S.
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Table 6 2 :  New NAFE-related staffing arrangements a t LEAs
The following number of respondents indicated that in their authority:
%
New staff posts have been created centrally at the authority since 1984 
specifically for work on the NAFE................................................... 27 38.6
Staff duties at authority level have been redistributed specifically to 
facilitate NAFE planning............................................................ 17 24.3
There has been no significant alteration in LEA staffing arrangements 
as a consequence of the NAFE Agreement......................................... 30 42.9
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
Table 6.3: Involvement of other local authority departments
The table indicates for the listed authority departments (a) the nature of any participatory role 
they may have had in the preparation of the Plan, and (b) whether their relationship with 











Planning...................................................... 53 75.7 8 11.4 7 38.6
Chief executive's.......................................... 13 18.6 1 1.4 5 7.1
Treasurer's.................................................... 32 45.7 7 10.0 11 15.7
Economic Development............... ................. 27 38.6 6 8.6 16 22.9
Personnel..................................................... 3 4.3 1 1.4 2 2.4
Social Services............................................. 4 5.7 0 0 1 1.4
Other............................................................. 3 4.3 3 4.3 4 5.7
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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cases respectively. Actual participation of other departments was generally low, the 
highest figure being 11.4 per cent (for planning departments). The strengthening of 
relationships was most evident in the same three departments, although the highest 
figure was again for planning departments. Whilst in the overall totals the figure for this 
was a minority at 38.6 per cent, the figure for shire counties was a majority, 53.6 per 
cent, with metropolitan districts showing 41.7 and London boroughs only 15.7 per 
cent Again there appears to have been greater support available for NAFE in the larger 
county authorities.
Another interesting discrepancy appeared in the supply of information to education 
departments by economic development departments as analysed by LEA size. Whilst 
larger authorities were indicated to engage in this in 33.3 and medium-sized authorities 
in 23.5 per cent of cases, smaller authorities indicated this in as many as 82.8 per cent 
of cases, higher even than their indicated frequency of receipt of information from 
planning departments (72.4 per cent). It would thus appear that economic development 
departments are an important source of support for smaller LEAs in NAFE.
The main finding on the involvement of other departments however is that 
education departments retain strong control over their NAFE work, the greatest 
involvement of other departments being in the supply of information rather than 
significant participation.
A related question investigating whether any council committees other than the 
education committee took on some direct responsibility for compiling the NAFE plan 
found this to be so in only three cases, indicating that this is clearly not a significant 
factor in NAFE.
6.3 (iii) College arrangements
The LEA survey investigated the involvement of college staff in the NAFE planning 
process, both prior to the announcement of Training for Jobs and at the time of the 
survey. It asked respondents to indicate whether senior college management,
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departmental heads, lecturing staff and inter-collegiate staff committees were involved 
in a participatory or consultative capacity in both years, the results being shown in 
Table 6.4.
The figures indicate that senior management had become much more involved in 
planning since 1984, its participatory role rising from 45.7 to 71.4 per cent of cases. 
Departmental heads were less involved, but their involvement had risen from 17.1 to 
41.4 per cent of cases. Whereas lecturing staff and inter-collegiate staff committees had 
no or virtually no participatory involvement in 1984, the role of the latter had risen to 
over one fifth (22.9 per cent) of cases by 1988. Lecturing staff remained fairly isolated 
from the process.
Figures broken down by LEA type indicate that whilst the participation of senior 
management remained fairly stable in both metropolitan districts and London boroughs 
(rising from 62.5 to 66.7 and 61.5 to 69.2 per cent respectively), in shire counties it 
rose dramatically, from 28.6 to 71.4 per cent. A similar pattern was evident by LEA 
size, the largest LEAs showing an even more dramatic rise from 16.7 to 83.3 per cent 
whilst medium and smaller authorities showed less change, retaining participation rates 
of between 47 and 65 per cent throughout the period. The largest authorities also 
showed the greatest increase in the participatory involvement of departmental heads 
through the period, with a rise from 0.0 to 50.0 per cent.
These results are of considerable interest, as larger authorities may have been 
expected to be better placed to plan without the participatory assistance of senior college 
management, given their greater resources. These figures would therefore suggest a 
decision on the part of such LEAs to involve college staff for the enhancement of Plan 
quality, this being a more important factor than the employment of college resources 
where LEA resources were limited.
The survey also enquired as to the creation of new staff posts within colleges 
specifically for work on the NAFE Plan. Only 10 per cent of respondents indicated that 
this had taken place within their authorities, suggesting that this was not a highly 
significant form of response to the NAFE initiative. The evidence suggests that the bulk
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Table 6.4: Participation of college staff in planning. 1984-9
1934-5
Participatory Consultative 
#  % #  %
1938-9
Participatory Consultative 




(4) inter-collegiate staff committees....
32 45.7 38 54.3 SO 71.4 27 38.6
12 17.1 30 42.9 29 42.9 31 45.7
0 0 10 14.3 7 14.3 13 18.6
1 1.4 8 11.4 16 11.4 9 12.9
The table shows which of the following members of the LEA's colleges' staff were currently, or in 
1984-5, involved in the compilation of the LEA's NAFE Plan (respondents indicated whether they played an 
active, participatory role, or merely a consultative one).
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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of newly-resourced activity has gone on at the LEA rather than college level.
6.3 (iv) Influences of the NAFE initiative on LEA-college relationships
A number of interviewees in a variety of positions suggested that the NAFE initiative 
had increased LEAs1 directive power over their colleges. An ACC officer interviewed 
argued that, prior to the 1984 legislation, the LEA role in NAFE was generally a matter 
of control rather than management, involving the setting of expenditure ceilings and 
enrolment targets. Within such requirements colleges were largely free to manage their 
own affairs. The NAFE Agreement had altered this position by giving LEAs greater 
management responsibilities, and with them a greater influence over college work?. An 
LEA interviewee confirmed this, stating that his authority, having formerly been 
'typified by autonomy at all levels', was now undergoing a change to a more corporate 
style of management, involving planning and rationalisation which retained only the 
stronger elements10.
The senior MSC NAFE officer interviewed indicated that some LEAs had 
welcomed the change, some 'who'd lost control' had seen it as opportunity for 
strengthening the LEA hand, perceiving the MSC as a lever to their advantage11. In line 
with this, one respondent to the LEA survey noted that MSC involvement has led to 
colleges being more responsive to the LEA'.
Another LEA officer indicated that the new conditions had assisted rationalisation 
within his LEA by means of its having produced 'an attitudinal change in colleges’ in 
favour of this. The NAFE initiative had produced an excuse for change, and some tools 
to facilitate it12.
6.3 (v) Influences on other relationships
The main other relationships in question here are those between LEAs, those between 
LEAs and Regional Advisory Councils, and those between individual LEAs and the
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local authority associations. With regard to the first of these, the NAFE initiative 
appears to have acted to a limited extent as a spur to inter-LEA contact within regions. 
Some evidence emerged of inter-LEA contact in regional fora from face-to-face 
interviews with LEA officers, more than one interviewee noting the value of sharing 
experiences comparing notes on what each was being told by its local Area Office13. 
However, a question investigating this for the whole population of authorities in the 
LEA survey found the following results:
Table 6.5 Involvement of LEAs in mutual regional consultations
Heavily involved ..............................................................................................  4.4
Actively involved ............................................................................................... 26.5
Little involvement ............................................................................................  47.1
No active involvement ......................................................................................  22.1
(sample: 68 LEAs)
This indicates that only a minority (30.9 per cent) were actively or heavily involved in 
such discussions, most LEAs having litde or no involvement in such consultations. 
One MSC local officer interviewed claimed that relationships between her two LEAs 
were less good than their respective relationships with the Area Office14. Another 
interviewee pointed out that regional LEA groupings are not always completely 
harmonious, individual authorities with diverse political backgrounds and sometimes 
conflicting interests being unable truly to speak with one voice, but they did provide 
some form of consultative body which could facilitate NAFE at the regional level0.
Regional Advisory Councils had been identified by the Policy Group as a potential 
source of coordination between LEAs over NAFE, but do not appear to have played a 
significant role. Only one interviewee or survey respondent even mentioned these 
bodies, and then to indicate that they were more concerned with advanced further 
education and therefore not very relevant.
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The local authority associations, having been highly instrumental in developing the 
NAFE Agreement, continued to play an important national role in coordinating LEA 
NAFE activity. Very significant in this regard was the NAFE Officers Liaison Group, 
established on the initiative of the ACC officer interviewed. Its role was to bring 
together local and national officers to boost understanding and identify genuine problem 
areas, as well as to provide back-up for local authorities in a form which could match 
the back-up available to MSC Area Offices from the upper echelons of the 
Commission. The group brought together national negotiators with local officers, 
enabling forms of feedback and monitoring not easily available through long distance 
contact15.
One LEA officer noted the ACCs usefulness as 'a watchdog1 over local MSC 
NAFE officers who would sometimes portray national guidelines and suggestions as 
'cast iron rules’16.
A survey question investigating the involvement of individual LEAs in the NAFE 
Officers Liaison Group produced the following results:
Table 6.6 Involvement of LEAs in NAFE Officers Liaison Group
% LEAs
Heavily involved ...............................................................................................  18.3
Actively involved ..............................................................................................  23.2
Little involvement .............................................................................................  25.0
No active involvement .....................................................................................  33.3
(sample: 60 LEAs)
As can be seen from these figures there is evidence of considerably more LEAs being 
involved in the national forum than with each other (as indicated in Table 6.5), 41.6 per 
cent being heavily or actively involved, and only a third indicating no involvement The 
suggestion which can be inferred is that vertical interdependence (between individual 
LEAs and their national associations) was a more significant factor in inter-authority 













Figure 6.5: LEA internal NAFE administrative structure 
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Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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Figure 6.5 summarises the internal LEA links which pertained to NAFE. It 
illustrates financial and 'other' linkages, the latter being a term for various 
administrative links involving such activities as liaison, consultations, information 
exchange and mutual participation. It represents the education department's role and its 
connections with 'other departments', which as noted above were principally likely to 
be planning, treasurer's and economic development departments. Links to the MSC 
were mainly conducted by the officers of the FE section, and possibly by colleges 
themselves. This latter issue is addressed in the next section.
L A  Relationships between the MSC and LEAs
This section considers MSC-LEA relationships under four headings, which concern:
• their overall structure;
• their quality, and changes in this 1984-9;
• the use of MSC sanctions against LEAs;
• problem areas affecting relations.
6.4 (i) S tructure of MSC-LEA relationships
The structure of relationships between the MSC and LEAs can be usefully examined at 
three broad levels, national, regional and local.
National level links
National level relationships were largely based on the NAFE Implementation and 
Evaluation Groups, representative of both the MSC and the local authority associations, 
which became replaced by the NAFE Advisory Group in 1988. These conducted 
ongoing negotiations on the development of the NAFE Agreement from one planning 
year to the next
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The Commission's Head Office dealt almost wholly with the national associations - 
contact between Moorfoot and individual LEAs was very limited, according to all 
interviewees who commented on this, and indeed appeared to be discouraged by the 
MSC, who preferred to keep LEA dealings to local level where possible.
Regional level links
Regional contact did occur, however, in the regional MSC-LEA fora already identified. 
These met occasionally, perhaps two three times per year, to seek a regional overview 
compatible with the wishes of both the Commission and the region's LEAs. On an 
individual basis, contact between Regional Offices and LEAs varied. In most cases it 
was held by Area officers to be no more than occasional, sometimes exceptional. One 
interviewee^ indicated that her LEAs might occasionally contact Regional Office to 
confirm or check something, and a regional officer spoken to said he might from time 
to time go straight to an LEA with a particular point if the Area officer was unavailable*1. 
In one instance* at least, however, it was clear that the Regional Office had a very heavy 
involvement with its LEAs, and that a significant amount of MSC-LEA liaison in that 
Area took place without the involvement of the Area Office.
Normally the Area Office would be informed about any significant involvement of 
Regional Office directly with LEAs, although in one or two Areas there were 
exceptions to this, occasionally leading to problems*.
Area Office - LEA links
The major MSC-LEA interaction, however, was between individual authorities and 
Area Offices. Earlier sections identified the NAFE HEO at the Area Office, and an 
education officer of grade 3 or 4 to be most typically the principal actors at each, and it 
is contact between these which was the most frequent and significant In addition to 
these, more senior officers would be involved in official meetings and more junior 
officers in the more routine administrative aspects of interaction. The LEA survey
* see section 6.4.4
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explored the possibility that some authorities may have appointed an officer specifically 
to liaise with the MSC over a range of programmes, including NAFE. The responses 
showed that 30.0 per cent of LEAs had such an officer, from which it can be concluded 
that whilst such appointments have established themselves as common, they had not 
become typical of LEAs as a whole.
Both the LEA survey and the survey of MSC NAFE HEOs investigated the 
frequency of contact between Area Offices and LEAs over NAFE. From the MSC- 
derived evidence, contact between MSC local officers and LEA NAFE staff appears to 
have been both frequent and to have increased over the period of planning. Seven of the 
nine interviewees indicated that they were in contact with LEA officers more often than 
once a week, some on an almost daily basis. Even the officer with the least contact with 
his LEAsf met with or spoke to his counterparts there more often than once per month. 
There was evidence of variation within Areas as well as between them, local officers 
meeting staff from some LEAs more than from others.
Under the terms of the Contract signed between them, all Area officers were 
required to hold formal meetings each year with their LEA counterparts, these being 
supplemented by informal contact Often these involved senior Area Office staff. 
Largely a provision made at a time when LEAs were very reluctant to spend time 
dealing with MSC, these meetings appeared in general to be of decreasing significance, 
as there was clear evidence of a shift away from formal towards much more informal 
contact. In several cases Area Office-LEA contact had evidently become very intimate 
and familiar, the staff of each coming casually and routinely into informal contact 
(a,c,d,e). One officer claimed that both parties sometimes became 'stuck for things to talk 
about' at some of the formal meetingsf. Symptomatic of this development appeared to 
be the national proposal current at the time of enquiry that the following year only one 
formal meeting would be required to take place17.
The evidence of the LEA survey is presented in Figure 6.6. In contrast with the 
MSC evidence it suggests that frequency of contact was more commonly less than 
weekly but more than monthly, a finding more plausible given the higher sample. This 
still represented a degree of contact well in excess of the few formal meetings required
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Table 6.7: Frequency o f  Area Office-LEA contact over NAFE
Respondents indicated the frequency of contact between MSC Area Office and the 
authority education department over NAFE planning:
No. LEAs 
# %
(1) day-to-day................................................................................... 6 8.7\ / J  J
(2) more often than once per week...................................................... 17 24.6\ / r
(3) more often than once per month................................................... 35 50.7
(4) more often than once every three months...................................... 10 14.5
(5) less often than once every three months......................................... 1 1.4
(sample: 69 LEAs)
Figure 6.6: Frequency of  contact between LEA and MSC officers over NAFE
4 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(categories as in Table 6.7)
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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under the Contract.
When the results are broken down by LEA type and size some significant patterns 
emerge. LEA type was particularly significant in this context, because MSC Areas were 
partly based upon this criterion. London boroughs were served by Area Offices which 
covered 5 LEAs; metropolitan districts were generally administered by the MSC in 
groups of 3 (occasionally 2 or 4), whilst shire counties were frequently dealt with by an 
Area Office covering no other LEAs - at most they shared an Area Office with one 
other. These factors inevitably had important implications for extent to which frequent 
contact was possible - an MSC NAFE HEO dealing with a single county authority 
would clearly have more time to develop links than a counterpart dealing with five 
London boroughs.
The results broken down by LEA type are shown in Figure 6.7*. The line graph 
has been used as a means of comparing authority types against one another in a simple 
manner. It is apparent from the data that London boroughs and metropolitan districts 
are heavily weighted towards the centre (with high percentages in category (3), 1 week- 
1 month), whereas shire counties show a much higher level of contact than these in the 
'more often than once per week* category. Shire counties show much more evidence of 
day-to-day contact than the other two groups, London boroughs the least. These results 
support the expectation that the less authorities an Area Office had to deal with, the 
more contact occurred.
By LEA size, for which data is shown in Figure 6.8, a similar pattern emerges, 
only here the differences are even more marked. Larger authorities show the greatest 
contact, with a high level in the day-to-day category (22.2 per cent) steeply falling away 
to low levels in the other categories. Medium-sized LEAs show no evidence at all of
* The graphs for Figure 6.7 and 6.8 have been produced by means o f weighting the percentage 
figures in each category geometrically to reflect the nature in which the frequencies in each 
category vary. That is, percentages for category (5) in Table 6.7 were multiplied by 1, (4) by 2,
(3) by 4, (2) by 8, and (1) by 16. Because these weightings are in a sense arbitrary no figures 
have been attached to the axes on the graphs, which are meant to be indicative only. On the y  - 
axis Incidence' refers to the number of LEAs cited in each category, the x  -axis showing relative 
frequency. However, the graphs retain the rigour of the exact figures used to generate them; the 
points marked show the weighted scores for each of the five categories. Figure 6.8 indicates the 
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day-to-day contact, whilst smaller authorities show a figure of 7.1 per cent, although in 
category (2), 'more than once per week', medium-sized LEAs show a higher figure 
than smaller authorities (29.4 per cent as against 14.3 per cent), although both are still 
below the figure for larger authorities (38.9 per cent). Reasons for this would have 
been strongly connected to those given for differences by LEA type, i.e. the 
administrative structure of the Area Office network. However, the differences being 
more marked suggest other factors at work. Possible causes include bigger staff 
contingents at larger LEAs allowing more time to be devoted to contact with the MSC. 
Also, an important factor would have been that the more colleges in an authority, the 
more work was required to develop a NAFE Plan, and consequently greater would 
have been the need for liaison between the two bodies.
From the MSC survey, four factors emerged which appeared to influence
or determine the frequency of contact:
(1) the quality of the relationship between the Area Office and the LEA - how 
close and cooperative, and the degree to which the LEA was prepared to 
involve the MSC;
(2) geographical distance between the Area Office and the education offices - a 
constraint on the nature of contact (whether face-to-face or otherwise) rather 
than the amount. Clearly important here would be the urban/rural nature of 
the locality in question as an influence on this distance;
(3) the time of year, in relation to the stage in the planning cycle, contact varying 
with this. One officer11 identified a pattern in which the period February - 
June saw much contact over negotiation and drafting of the Development 
Plan and Annual Programme, followed by a summer lull, which was 
followed in turn by much monitoring and steering committee activity once 
the academic year got underway in September.
(4) the number of centrally-funded projects current in the Area, and the amount 
of work being generated by these. Two officers specifically stressed the
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importance of this factor (<W.
One other factor which should be mentioned is the degree to which MSC NAFE 
officers were engaged in other work which may have brought them together with LEA 
staff under other hats, e.g. LMI work. In one case in particular6 the local county was 
described as being very 'tight', the officer interviewed indicating that the same people 
were likely to encounter one another in a whole series of settings, some quite incidental 
to NAFE.
It was claimed by one MSC officer6 that Area Office contact with local authority 
officers was much more frequent over NAFE than for any other MSC operation. An 
LEA officer, on the other hand, considered MSC often spent more time on other 
programmes in which less money was involved, and believed the Commission ought to 
devote more time to NAFE18.
To summarise the main conclusions on frequency of contact:
• The bulk of contact between LEAs and MS C Area Offices on average occurred 
with a frequency between once every week and once every month, with a 
significant proportion of contact in the frequency ranges of more than weekly and 
between one and three months.
• There were, however, marked variations within these figures. Different types of 
authority showed varying levels of contact, shire counties showing the most, with 
London boroughs and metropolitan boroughs well behind. The nature of the 
MSC's Area Office structure, assigning different numbers of LEAs to a single Area 
Office, undoubtedly had a strong impact on this.
• The figures diverged even more markedly by LEA size, with larger authorities 
showing by far the most frequent contact Possible reasons included the greater 
workload dealt with in larger authorities, and the more abundant staff likely to 
reside within their education departments.
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Both surveys also investigated staff secondments between LEA and MSC Area 
Offices. Four of the nine MSC officers surveyed indicated that their Area Office and the 
LEA had seen exchanges in the form of staff secondments of one form or another. In 
one case the extent of this was a week spent by a MSC NAFE officer at an LEA Open 
Learning Unitb, whereas in another a local MSC officer had been seconded on a regular 
basis to an LEA to assist in its data-collection activities, a function which occupied 10 
per cent of her timed. In another instance, whilst the officer interviewed had not 
personally been seconded, he indicated that an officer from the most local of the two 
LEAs had shadowed his SEO for a few days and that reciprocal involvement of other 
MSC staff had taken place.
The LEA survey found evidence of only 14 LEAs who had seen MSC staff 
seconded to them, and even fewer Area Offices, 7, having hosted LEA staff. 
Secondments do not overall appear to have been a very significant form of MSC-LEA 
interaction.
Area Office-college links
Under the terms of the NAFE Agreement, MSC was given no direct access to colleges 
over NAFE except with LEA consent, either tacit or explicit. Different experiences on 
what happened in practice emerged around the country. For example, one LEA officer 
interviewed indicated that his Area Office sought 'much more1 college involvement, and 
did not necessarily go through the LEA in approaching colleges19, whereas another 
claimed there was no contact, and that this would be 'strongly discouraged' if 
mooted20. Again, an MSC HEO who indicated difficulties in dealing with his 
somewhat recalcitrant LEA noted it had no objections to the Area Office talking to 
colleges! Only one MSC officer interviewed perceived LEA opposition to her contact 
with colleges as a problem, in a case where the single-institution authority in question 
was both ill-inclined to involve itself in its college's planning and obstructive to MSC 
attempts to do the samed. In consequence the Area Office and the college had got 
together on an informal basis independently of the LEA and worked things out 
together. LEAs generally appeared to be happy for MSC staff to go into colleges and 
deal directly with college staff: a question in the LEA survey found that 39.4 per cent of
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LEAs welcomed such contact, 39.4 per cent taking no view and only 21.2 per cent 
actually discouraging direct contact. However, interview evidence suggested LEAs 
generally preferred be informed. It is clearly important nonetheless to recognise 
considerable local variation on this aspect of NAFE links.
To consider one form of this variation - the frequency of Area Office contact - on 
the basis of the MSC survey, this appeared to vary both between and within MSC 
Areas. Two interviewees (f*s) stated college visits were very rare, and another had no 
contact with colleges in one of her two LEAsd. In other cases NAFE HEOs were 
frequent visitors to particular individual colleges. The two main factors which appeared 
to influence the frequency with which a given officer would visit a particular college 
appeared to be (a) whether a specific piece of work was being conducted there, such as 
a Development Fund project or a monitoring study, and (b) the personal connections of 
the officer concerned with the college's staff. Some officers interviewed were 
well-known throughout their Area, having worked there in various capacities for some 
years (edl), and could drop in and out of most colleges with familiarity. Others had 
well-established links with some local colleges but not others - in one caseb an example 
of the latter was caused by an LEA reorganisation under which the introduction of a 
new tertiary system had caused a wholesale change in senior college management. 
Another officer11 indicated that after a year in post she was still only starting to get 
involved with the colleges in one of her three LEAs, in contrast to much better contacts 
developed in the other two.
The number of colleges in an Area was of some importance. This varied widely, 
the number being an important possible constraint on the practicability of visiting all 
colleges frequently.
One officers who now had frequent and open contact with all his Area's colleges, 
stressed that this situation was a very new development, and that as recently as twelve 
months previously such contact would not have been possible. He claimed that having 
once been seen as an outsider he had now achieved something much more like 
colleague status now, and much of the former unwieldy correspondence had now been 
replaced by face-to-face contact. He cited the loosening of formalities between the
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LEAs and the Area Office as an important factor in this development. He also noted that 
the demands of the new ERA legislation* had persuaded LEAs of the value of greater 
MSC involvement in their colleges' activities at a time when much was being required 
of LEAs without new resources being made available.
Frequency of contact between Area Offices and colleges was also explored in the 
LEA survey. Figure 6.9 shows the results of this enquiry, illustrating that, as in the 
case of AO-LEA contact, contact most commonly occurred more often than once per 
month but less often than weekly, with very little evidence of frequent contact, there 
being evidence of none at all on a day-to-day basis. Figure 6.10** compares frequency 
of contact of both LEAs and colleges with Area Offices, clearly demonstrating that 
contact took place more frequently with LEAs than colleges.
A more detailed enquiry into the nature of MSC-college contact sought to identify 
the most significant linkages. Respondents to the LEA survey were provided with a 
matrix, along one side of which were listed various MSC posts, along the other three 
tiers of college staff. Respondents were asked to tick the box where these categories 
coincided if the contact in question occurred in their authority. The results are shown in 
Figure 6.11.
The general pattern evident from these results is that the level contact was (a) in the 
case of colleges direcdy proportional to the rank of the staff, and (b) in the case of the 
MSC indirectly proportional to the remoteness of the staff from the NAFE process. 
That is to say, in colleges the most MSC contact occurred with senior management, 
and the least with college lecturers. At the MSC, college contact mostly involved Area 
Office staff, least involving the Regional Director.
The most contact of all occurred between senior management and Area Office staff, 
which was indicated to occur in 78.2 per cent of cases. Contacts between senior 
management and TVEI staff were high at 65.5 per cent
* see Chapter 2.















(2) more often than once per week
(3) more often than once per month
(4) more often than once every three m onths
(5) less often than once every three m onths
(6) no contact
(7) don't know














NAFE - college  
♦  NAFE-LEA
High Frequency Low
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data




AO staff Area RFEA Regional TVEI staff 
Manager Director
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data
2 24
The same figure (65.5 per cent) is evident for contact between MSC Area 
Managers and senior college management. After this the only significantly widespread 
contacts were those between Area Office staff and college departmental heads (43.6 per 
cent) and between Area Office staff and college lecturers (23.6 per cent), other figures 
being below 5 per cent.
6.4 (ii) Quality of MSC-LEA relationships
The period of dispute and non-cooperation outlined in Chapter 4 indicated that the MSC- 
LEA relationship over NAFE did not get off to a good start. This section examines how 
relationships developed, at both national and local level, to a position by 1989 where 
relations had substantially improved.
A senior MSC officer interviewed, referring to the period in 1984 when the local 
authority associations had refused even to negotiate with the MSC until the proposals of 
Training for Jobs were modified, claimed it to have been very difficult to set up a new 
operation under such circumstances21. Progress had been made, he claimed, by the 
attempt of the MSC chair (Bryan Nicholson) to take 'soundings' and build up personal 
relationships. This officer drew a distinction which emerges as central to understanding 
the MSC-LEA relationship, that between the personal and the formal. Whilst, he 
claimed, personal relationships became close and cooperative 'fairly rapidly’, even at 
the time of the interview (1989) there remained things the local authority association 
representatives 'can say to us easily informally, but have difficulty in saying formally'. 
The rapid achievement of the cooperation which led to the NAFE Agreement occurred 
because 'both sides wanted to make it work’, neither relishing the alternative situation 
of attempting to carry on without agreement. Put more simply, the LEAs wanted the 
MSC money, and the MSC wanted a cooperative partner. He claimed the obstacle to 
this had been the White Paper’s specific proposals, and the NAFE Agreement had 
paved the way for mutually-acceptable progress. As a result, national-level 
relationships had improved 'immensely'.
The local officers interviewed in the MSC survey gave a picture of a very tense
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period in the early stages, in which relationships were frosty and distant, LEAs in 
general disdaining any more contact than was absolutely necessary for the recoupment 
of what they still regarded as their money. Not all the officers interviewed had been in 
post long enough to give an accurate indication of the position in 1985 when joint 
planning first began, but most were able to offer sorne information on this. A Regional 
officer interviewed stated that initially the MSC was perceived by many LEAs as an 
'enemy', treated with 'suspicion, uncertainty and apprehension'*1. Having originally 
refused to speak to the Area Office, the financial 'carrot' eventually 'brought them 
reluctantly around the table'a. One local officer claimed both her LEAs had been 
'difficult' at the outsetd, and another, whilst not having been in post at the time, 
understood that the early relationships had been very problematic11.
In one Area, where there had been a well-developed relationship between the Area 
Office and the LEA prior to 1984 because of high take-up of MSC schemes in 
recession, there had nonetheless been jibes in response to the White Paper, claims that 
the Area Office was 'holding an axe over’ the LEA, objections about interference, and a 
clash of personalities between the Area Manager and the Chief Education Officer6.
In only one case did an interviewee, a comparatively recent appointee, claim that 
the Area Office-LEA relationship had been good from the outset, although in one of his 
two LEAs this referred to the point at which the LEA had appointed a full-time officer 
to deal with NAFE planning, a short time after the Agreement^.
Several officers indicated that progress towards improved cooperation was slow, 
although one claimed a thaw had occurred rapidly, a strong pre-existing relationship 
between the Area Office and the local authority having caused the initial stir to subside 
rapidly6 This officer made the point that whilst many colleges were as suspicious as 
LEAs, some were familiarised in dealing with MSC through its various schemes, and 
links there helped provide a foundation upon which to build bridges to the LEA as a 
whole.
One local MSC officer claimed that early encounters had been the scenes of 'some 
real blood-on-the-carpet meetings' which, she claimed, were the most difficult that she
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had had anywhere with anyoned. Nonetheless, these had cleared the air and paved the 
way for less adversarial discussions later on. It appears that following the White Paper 
most Area Offices and LEAs went through a difficult period, the duration of which was 
considered by one officer to have been around 18 monthsd. During this period the 
officer claimed to have had to be ’careful with every word spoken' to LEA staff. After 
this time, however, it appears that relations began steadily to improve. One officer 
emphasised that the relationship had to grow in its own time, that progress had been 
gradual as officers from each side began to consider and understand each others' 
positions0. This officer described the improved position he was now able to work 
within as having been hard-won, the Area Office having had to 'woo' the LEAs over a 
prolonged period.
Across the 9 Areas surveyed, it appeared that by the time of the survey relations 
with the LEAs were generally fairly good, and in some cases very good. There was a 
widespread view that LEAs had come to see the advantages for them in the planning 
relationship, rather than it being no more than an unwelcome imposition One 
officer stated that both sides having come to understand each others' positions, aims 
and objectives, now saw that these were not so very far apartb. The MSC represented 
an extra resource. For many LEAs, a Regional officer claimed3, the Area Office had 
come to be seen as 'an ally' rather than a foe. It seemed certain that the MSC had 
become viewed in a much more positive light than might have seemed possible in 
1984-5. Several officers had developed very close personal links with LEA staff, and 
had reached the stage of dropping casually into each others offices in the manner of 
colleagues (^e).
The most important development of all appeared to have been an increase in trust 
between the two parties (a,b,c,g). Initial LEA suspicions about the MSC's motives, 
amidst talk of hidden agenda involving the gradual take-over of education by the 
Commission's employer-based market philosophy, placed a mental barrier in the way 
of confident LEA acceptance of the Area Office, the idea that the MSC wanted 'to 
impose its thinking on education', which one local MSC officer claimed was 'not what 
we're about at all'b. Whether or not there was originally any such intention underlying 
the motives of the 1984 government proposals, local MSC officers, whose task it has
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been to implement procedures instigated elsewhere, appeared to have been much more 
concerned with the pursuit of straightforward and openly stated administrative 
objectives than the ideological manipulation of education. This well reflects the points 
made in Chapter 3 identifying the role of street-level bureaucrats in the routinisation of 
policy goals into day-to-day procedures. The absence of a 'hidden agenda' was now 
accepted by LEAs, according to one intervieweeb, it being a prerequisite of the mutual 
trust which had developed.
More than one officer confirmed the view that there existed a difference between 
formal and informal relationships. One drew a distinction between the political and 
functional or executive branches of the LEAsb. Whilst in the former there still occurred 
a degree of antagonistic 'posturing' - at the time this officer claimed that 'some public 
relationships are hanging by a thread' - behind the scenes at officer level the degree of 
cooperation was very good. She stated of politically contentious matters that their LEAs 
'did not take it out at officer level’. Other officers noted that the majority of the 
politicians' attention was in any case devoted to schools provision6, the great attention 
given to FE after the 1984 White Paper being the aberration. This meant NAFE work 
could go on for the most part unhindered by councilors' intervention. It was rare, in 
any case, for Area Office staff to come face to face with the politiciansb.
A contrast in attitudes at different times could occur at the officer level too: one 
Regional interviewee stated that there was still much passing of 'snide remarks' about 
the MSC at meetings by officials who, off the record, were happy to acknowledge the 
benefits of the relationship*. Another officer6 indicated that there was still much banter' 
involving continuing complaints about interference, but that this did not substantially 
interfere with a healthy and positive working relationship.
Not all LEAs and Area Offices got on as well as might be wished for - one 
single-institution LEA in the south of England still maintained a very distant 
relationship with the Area Officed, another in a large northern city insisted on keeping 
contact at a very formal levelb, and others simply did not keep much contact at all of 
any kind with the Area Office above that to which they were committed under the terms 
of the Contracts. One officer, though stating his own Area Office-LEA relationship to
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be a very good and unproblematic one, claimed this was not the case elsewhere in his 
region. His LEA, in fact, 'stuck out like a sore thumb' by contrast with Area Offices’ 
experience in neighbouring LEAse.
Whilst describing the attitude of his local LEA as having developed positively from 
a 'hands-off view to a very 'pally-pally' relationship, the officer noted that it still 
involved ups and downs: it could best be described as 'a love-hate relationship's. The 
LEA was very proactive and had many ideas of its own, so at times it would inevitably 
become irritated by the MSC's intervention. The development of a good working 
partnership in this case had meant becoming familiar and comfortable with each other, 
learning where each other stood, without necessarily being in complete harmony all the 
time. It was 'like a marriage'.
Despite relations being generally good, it was clear that they could still be very 
sensitive. One officer claimed that her very good relationship with a particular LEA was 
very reliant upon specific personal contacts, and that a sudden turnover of staff could 
upset the delicate accordd. Another claimed to have had good relations so far, but to be 
uncertain of what might happen should a confrontation occur, of what would be the 
outcome of, say, an LEA 'digging its heels in' over a point of dispute*1.
Another interviewee cited an instance where apparently good relations were 
suddenly and unexpectedly threatened by a problem relating to the LEA's displeasure 
over a budget cut imposed nationally*5. Once again, as in the early days, threats had 
been made to withdraw cooperation and cease dialogue with the MSC, and the situation 
was for a while in danger of deteriorating substantially. In this instance the problem had 
been overcome without a major rift. The sudden fracturing had its root cause outside 
the Area Office-LEA officer arrangements, in this case in a combination of national 
policy-makers and local politicians. A different MSC interviewee*1 stated that her 
generally cooperative LEAs were still, 'deep-down, very wary' of the Commission. 
Clearly, despite relationships between the MSC and LEAs locally being generally very 
good, there did appear to exist an underlying fragility which necessitated constant 
attention to their maintenance.
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The overall view from the MSC survey interviews of generally good relations 
between Area Offices is confirmed by the evidence of the LEA survey. This 
investigated the quality of working relationships between local MSC and LEA staff, 
and how this had altered since 1984. Respondents were invited to assess this 
relationship in their authority by means of six categories presented to them to indicate 
which best described it in 1984-5, the year when the White Paper was first published, 
and 1988-9, the planning round current at the time of the survey. The results are shown 
in Figure 6.12*.
In the figures for 1984-5 there is evident a very clear majority of respondents (70.7 
per cent) who indicated that their authority fell into the first two categories, ie. highly 
co-operative and productive working relationship1 and 'good working relationship1. Of 
these as many as 15.5 per cent indicated the first category. In the other categories in the 
1984-5 round, a substantial number indicated a fair working relationship (32.8 per 
cent). A small number indicated a poor relationship (8.6 per cent), whilst only one 
respondent perceived there to have been a very poor relationship. Two respondents 
indicated the relationship between their authority and the MSC to have in been, in the 
1984-5 planning year, distant and irrelevant.
At a time prior to the White Paper it would appear, therefore, that relationships 
were generally good, according to the survey respondents' perceptions. This finding is 
significant in considering the way in which relationships developed after the White 
Paper was announced.
In the figures for the 1988-9 planning round, there is evidence of a marked 
improvement in the quality of working relationships to a point where as many as 85.5 
per cent of respondents perceived them to be described by the first two categories, 30.4
* Of the six categories, two require explanation. The first category is written as 'highly
cooperative and productive working relationship'. This was chosen in preference to 'very good' 
as an attempt to set the tone of the responses and draw genuine distinctions between the 
categories, avoiding bland hedging on the part of respondents. The next four categories are 
listed as 'good', 'fair', 'poor' and 'very poor', as it was not thought necessary to describe what 
was meant in more than one case. The category 'distant and irrelevant relationship' was included 
on the recognition that in 1984-5 some LEAs would have had no dealings at all with the MSC, 
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per cent of these putting them in the category 'highly co-operative and productive'. Of 
the remaining 14.5 per cent, nearly all described the working relationship as 'fair', with 
one respondent only describing it as poor.
Figure 6.13 shows the percentage change in each category between the two years. 
It is quite clear from these data that the movement was towards better relationships, 
with a 14.9 per cent rise in the first category contrasting with decline in categories 3-6.
When the data are broken down into LEA groups, some notable discrepancies 
emerge. By LEA type, the 1984-5 figures show some marked differences (see Figure 
6.14a). Whilst respondents in London boroughs all gave answers in the first three 
categories only, respondents in metropolitan districts indicated category 2 much more 
frequently than any other category, though were represented in all categories bar Very 
poor'. Shire counties appear to have had the least good relationships of the three 
judging by these 1984-5 figures - the largest group of shire county respondents (45.0 
per cent) indicated 'fair working relationship’, only 35.0 per cent indicating 'highly co­
operative' or 'good'.
However, the figures for 1988-9 show a quite different picture. Figure 6.14b 
indicates very little variation between the figures for the three authority types. This can 
be taken as evidence of the NAFE Agreement having had some levelling effect in 
making LEA-MSC relationships more homogeneous, at least in terms of LEA type.
Figures 6.15a and 6.15b show the figures broken down by LEAs' political control 
in both years. As with LEA type, there is evidence of wide disparity in the 1984-5 data 
contrasting with near-homogeneity in the 1988-9 results. This similarly supports the 
contention as the data on LEA type that the NAFE Agreement has spread co-operation 
more evenly. There does not appear to be any discemable relationship in the 1984-5 
figures: Labour-controlled authorities show a fairly even distribution peaking in the 
'good' category, LEAs with no overall control a rough distribution peaking in the 'fair' 
category, whilst Conservative-controlled data is up and down. It is more likely that 
factors outside political control had a more influential role on executive-level links with 
the MSC.
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The overall conclusions to be drawn from the survey data on MSC-LEA 
relationships are as follows:
• In the planning year 1984-5, immediately prior to the introduction of the White 
Paper Training for Jobs, there is evidence that relationships between LEAs and 
MSC Area Offices were generally good.
• Changes in the period up to the 1988-9 planning round saw a general 
improvement in relationships.
• Figures broken down by LEA type and political control suggest that wide 
disparities in the earlier year contrast with a fairly uniform pattern in 1988-9. 
There is evidence of the NAFE Agreement leading to greater homogeneity in the 
relationships between LEAs and MSC Area Offices.
6.4 (iii) Sanctions
As noted in Chapter 4, the NAFE Agreement made provision for sanctions which could 
be applied if LEAs did not meet the provisions of its Annual Programme as agreed in its 
Contract with the Area Office, in three possible ways: refusal to sign the Contract (upon 
which payments depended); suspension of payments during the year, and renegotiation 
of the Annual Programme involving a smaller payment of funds.
MSC interviewees were asked if any of the above had occurred in their Areas since 
joint planning began. Several reported late signing of the contract, but in all cases bar 
one this was attributed to administrative and timetabling problems rather than disputes. 
The one exception involved a disagreement about a form of words which the LEA had 
been unhappy to accept, but which the Area Office had insisted upon. The LEA had 
eventually caved in to MSC pressure, 'but not with good grace! One officer said the 
situation with one of her LEAs had come very close to a dispute preventing the contract 
being signed, and closer still in another part of her Region, but in neither case had this 
actually occurred^.
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Suspension of payments during the year was not reported by any of the officers 
interviewed, although a Regional officer interviewed reported instances of this 
elsewhere about which he had hearda. Renegotiation of the Annual Programme and 
does not appear to have happened at all throughout the history of joint planning, a fact 
confirmed by the senior NAFE officer interviewed at MSC Head Office22. More than 
one interviewee (M stressed that it was usual to sort problems out before these extreme 
stages were reached. The officer at Moorfoot said that Head Office kept up its 
information on developments, but had so far had never had to intervene between an 
Area Office and an LEA.
It was pointed out that the MSCs powers of enforcement were limited and had to 
be recognised as such fro). One officer, stating that her approach was to help solve 
problems rather than 'wave the big stick', noted that the stick was not very big anyway: 
in support of this an officer in one of her LEAs stated that it had 'several wrappings of 
wool around it’, and was in fact 'more of a sausage', unlikely to be treated by LEAs as 
a major threat. The MSC interviewee claimed that while money could be withheld, at 
the end of the day LEAs could be confident that they would get it anyway, the MSC 
having no real 'teeth'. Also, it was pointed out by the same officer and others that the 
MSC's input to authorities' NAFE budget, though significant in absolute terms, was 
proportionally not big enough to intimidate LEAs into compliance over a major dispute. 
One officer claimed the MSC's input to be less than one tenth of her LEAs' NAFE 
budget11, and another that his LEA had already come close to questioning the value of 
meeting MSC demands in order to receive a small and decreasing revenue).
Quite apart from the above factors, most Area Offices seemed to value the 
relationships carefully built up with LEAs too much to want to sacrifice them by being 
heavy-handed. One claimed talk of withholding money would have had 'a very adverse 
effect on the relationship we are trying to build'd. This underlined the view expressed 
by an FEU officer that the MSC, having spent years seeking to be accepted in the 
education community, was unlikely to jeopardise such hard-won relationships over 
planning details, and had refrained from flexing its financial muscle against LEAs for 
this reason2^ .
2 3 5
6.4 (iv) Problem areas
Areas identified in early informal interviews as having caused problems between the 
MSC and LEAs were put to respondents to both the LEA questionnaire and the MSC 
interview survey. Table 6.7 indicates the problems specified in the LEA survey in the 
rank order of their significance as identified by the respondents*.
General comments on these findings include that there seems to have been a fairly 
high level of problems being experienced in the given areas, with 12 of the 19 areas 
showing scores of more than 50 per cent. Some of the items relate to issues covered in 
Chapter 7, but it is useful to address here those which affected the MSC-LEA 
relationship as a means of providing an overview of the problems which affected this 
relationship. The analysis of the data is carried out below by using (and in some cases 
merging) the categories in Table 6.7, interspersing information from the MSC survey 
and other interviews where appropriate. This is followed by the inclusion of some 
further areas derived from the MSC survey, and finally by a section dealing with 'other 
problems'.
Unpredictability of MSC demands
A number of LEA officers interviewed identified problems over this issue. These 
related mainly to the requests made of LEAs by the MSC in the national Guidance 
handed out every year. The Guidance Handbook was agreed at national level with the 
relevant local authority associations, but nonetheless caused controversy. The aspect
* A list of identified problems was divided into two groups, which were: (i) MSC policy and
structure; (ii) administrative relationship. These were presented to respondents who were invited 
to indicate whether their authority ha4 in each area experienced major, minor or no problems.
To render the results more meaningful, a weighting factor has been used to assign a single score 
to each category. The method used involved assigning the weightings 2,l,and 0 to the option 
'major problems', 'minor problems' and 'no problems' respectively. The data under each were 
multiplied by these weightings, and the products added up and expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum possible score (i.e. the score obtained if all respondents had indicated 'major 
problems').
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Table 6.8 Identified problem areas by rank order of weighted percentage scores
%
(1) unpredictability of MSC demands, i.e. ’goalpost-shifting' at short notice  81.6
(2) unnecessarily large burden of administrative w o rk ................................  71.7
(3) specific funding allocated for insufficient periods of tim e .......................  66.9
(4) unnecessarily large requirement for information .................................... 66.7
(5) insufficient assistance with set-up costs of plan-related activities................ 62.9
(6) uncertainty over criteria for allocation of Central Reserve Fund...............  62.3
(7) lack of experience/understanding of educational matters by MSC staff.  59.4
(8) incompatibility of MSC planning timetable with LEA committee cycles  55.1
(9) speed with which MSC expects LEAs and colleges to take decisions 53.7
(10)duplication of demands already made by other bodies, e.g. DES, HM I  53.7
(11)inaccurate assumptions made by MSC about past college performance .......  52.9
(12)insufficient clarity of MSC objectives ...................................................  51.6
(13)insufficient integration of CRF projects with rest of NAFE planning  46.3
(14)incompatibility of MSC and LEA budgetary cycles................................  44.7
(15)rapid MSC staff turnover ......................................................................  44.6
(16)rigidity of MSC adherence to details of annual contract............................. 36.8
(17)duplication of demands between different branches of M SC .......................24.2
(18)intervention in local matters by MSC regional office............................... 18.5
(19)intervention in local matters by MSC head o ffice ...................................  17.4
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picked up in preliminary interviews as most irksome to LEAs was the tendency for the 
guidance to change markedly from year to year. One LEA officer claimed the MSC was 
'constantly changing the ground rules - you think you have a system, then it changes'24. 
Another described the changing requirements as 'an annoyance', being frequently at short 
notice and late - an example of the latter being new announcements on monitoring 
requirements after the academic year had begun25. The MSC was guilty of 'moving the 
goalposts'. This phrase was mentioned in a number of interviews, as was the tendency 
for MSC policy to reflect a 'flavour of the month'. This, one LEA officer claimed, was 
true both in NAFE and of the Commission's own programmes which it conducted in 
LEA colleges, notably those involving its adult training strategy26. This lack of stability 
made it 'hard to keep up’, and the officer stated her belief that constant criteria allowing 
'time for consolidation' would be very beneficial. A respondent to an LEA survey 
question asked to identify particular problems wrote:
Flavour of the monthism' - The MSC has a marked tendency to invent bright ideas, which are 
frequently ill-thought out, they run them for very short periods and then they are dropped or 
subordinated to a lower priority. This causes LEAs extra work with no extra resources to no 
lasting effect other than increasing cynicism to MSC initiatives.
The LEA survey data outlined in Table 6.8 shows that this issue stood far and away 
above the others as that perceived to be causing LEAs most problems, with a score of 
81.6 per cent This result confirms the impressionistic view gathered from the intensive 
data to have been widely and strongly held across the LEA spectrum. A score of 51.6 per 
cent for the problem of 'insufficient clarity of MSC objectives' further supports the view 
that the Commission's requirements caused difficulties, and that LEAs were in many 
cases unclear exactly what was being asked of them.
In the MSC survey, five interviewees identified minor problems over shifting policy 
directives from Head Office, two of them major problems. Of those who identified no 
problems, two officers specifically put this was down to local solutions. One claimed this 
depended on the local relationship and 'the degree to which you (as an MSC officer) are 
prepared to be flexible^; the other stated that it was 'well accepted' by his LEAs as 
inevitable, that this was the nature of the MSC, and that they had to adapt its mobile 
naturef. One officer suggested a more serious problem in that the MSC was not perceived
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locally to be consistent in its monitoring requirements, there being a lack of a clear long 
term line'c. This officer also noted that this problem could in part be traced to the 
changing requirements of government. A respondent to the LEA survey stressed this 
point:
The MSC officers are very reasonable people to deal with. They are however under pressure from
Head Office or (the) Department of Employment. LEAs need to recognise that pressure.
This last point was taken up by an officer from the ACC27. He claimed the constant 
changes to be attributable to the Treasury and central political policy. The MSC was 
under pressure to produce results, especially as it had made a compromise in the NAFE 
Agreement which had run against government wishes (see Chapter 4). Results in this 
context meant demonstrable change; the MSC wanted each year to ’notch another 
measurable, countable bit', to provide annual evidence that 'the screw is turning'. The 
officer believed confusion arose from the Commission being under pressure to fulfill its 
perceptions of the Employment Secretary's own perceptions of what should be done. Its 
determination to issue new guidance every year stemmed from a combination of pressure 
for change and results, and a lack of understanding - the latter being partly accounted for 
by its inexperience at programme-delivery, and its being accustomed to seeking short, 
sharp solutions.
A senior MSC NAFE officer recognised problems in this area, stating that the local 
authority associations 'try to remind us to be sensible in our demands'28. However, 
whilst accepting the need to avoid 'too much change', he defended the continual 
development of requirements, on the grounds that 'we do want to keep lifting people up', 
aiming at a step-by-step improvement of the service. The LEAs' Plan ought to be 
flexible, because 'we don't live in a fixed environment'. Problems arose often because 
individual LEAs could not perceive the overall strategy being pursued.
The administrative burden
The heavy workload imposed by the new planning arrangements was a common 
complaint in LEA interviews. The evidence in the LEA survey supported this view,
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finding the second most significant problem to be ’unnecessarily large burden of 
administrative work' (which scored 71.7 per cent), and the fourth highest to be 
’unnecessarily large requirement for information' (66.7). Fifth highest was 'insufficient 
assistance with set-up costs of plan-related activities' (62.9) whilst 'duplication of 
demands already made by other bodies, e.g. DES,HMI' scored 53.7 per cent, the ninth- 
equal highest score. All these together point towards the fact that LEAs had genuine and 
serious problems in dealing with the administrative burden created by joint NAFE 
planning, the lack of new resources devoted to this activity exacerbating these problems.
A certain degree of MSC insensitivity to this fact is indicated by a score of 53.7 per 
cent for problems concerning the 'speed with which MSC expects LEAs and colleges to 
take decisions'. The implication is that the Commission did not necessarily tailor its 
demands to the capability of most LEAs to respond to them. It also appears to confirm 
differences in the institutional culture of the two bodies, as described in Chapter 3, there 
being a tension between the MSC's results-seeking dynamism and educational bodies' 
more cautious forward movement. Respondents to the MSC survey were asked to 
comment on their experience of LEA being slow to respond Six out of the nine 
interviewees indicated minor problems in this area, one complaining especially of the 
lateness of LEA information-provision in advance of monitoring meetings*1. Whether or 
not this can be attributed to LEA inefficiency or an unreasonable burden, it is clear that 
MSC officers had higher expectations than were being met More than one MSC officer 
put problems in this area down to the low position of NAFE in LEAs' overall priorities, 
an important factor which inevitably resulted in low resources and difficulties in meeting 
outside requests for information on time0.29.
A major LEA complaint being picked up from the intensive preliminary work was 
that MSC Area Offices were asking LEAs for large quantities of information about NAFE 
courses and administration for the vague purpose of 'monitoring', without giving clear 
reasons why it was necessary. There were complaints that MSC, in asking for 
information without having a sound rationale, had in some cases asked already stretched 
NAFE staff to arrange for the collection of information already being supplied to other 
bodies. It was further suggested that local MSC officers did not themselves know the 
purpose of it, merely following instructions from above, and that even that those at the
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top were unsure of a clear purpose. LEA officers appeared to feel that they were bearing 
the brunt of MSC experimentation over exactly was needed to furnish the information 
good planning required, again without any extra funding to do so. There was the 
suggestion that because of the financial relationship between the two bodies, LEAs1 
greater educational expertise had been subordinated to a large degree to the views of the 
MSC, whose staff were less well-placed to know what was and was not useful for 
monitoring provision.
In addition to indicating the existence and significance of problems in this area, 
respondents were invited to specify which information, if any, had proven particularly 
problematic to collect. Twenty-three respondents gave specific answers to this invitation. 
A disparate range of information types were cited, but no single piece stood out: the 
collection of information on student destinations, which was cited by eight of the twenty- 
three respondents who specified information types, was the most prominent. Though a 
small proportion of the overall response, it would appear to identify an important problem 
area in being specified by a third of those who opted to identify particular information 
(see also section 7.3).
Allocation of specific funding for insufficient periods o f time
A common approach used by the MSC was to provide funding on a short-term, perhaps 
annual basis, in the hope that it would aid the establishment of structures that could 
survive independently after the funding had ceased. This pump-priming approach 
reflected the market-oriented/private enterprise bent ip the MSC’s institutional culture 
identified in Chapter 3. There were widespread views expressed in the LEA survey that 
in many cases this had not been very successful, and a score of 66.9 per cent for 
problems under this category indicates LEA officers were not happy with this approach in 
NAFE. It might have ben expected that smaller, less well-resourced authorities, would 
tend to rely on the MSC to support new initiatives at a time when squeezes on block grant 
funding to LEAs meant little money being available from within. Interestingly, however, 
the experience of problems over this appears to have been quite evenly spread between 
LEAs of different types, whilst by LEA size it was the larger authorities which indicate 
the most problems: a 71.9 per cent score, compared with 64.7 for medium-sized LEAs
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and 51.7 for smaller authorities.
Lack ofexperiencefunderstanding o f educational matters by MSC staff
A complaint raised a number of times in interviews was that the MSC (having been 
asked to become involved in NAFE quite suddenly and without warning) entered the field 
without the required educational expertise. Several LEA officers interviewed drew 
attention to this, one claiming that MSC staff ’have had to do much learning'30, another 
that MSC don't really understand NAFE, or education generally', an example being 
Area Office staff confusing staff: student ratios with average class size. The latter noted 
that whilst local officials recognised this, there was less awareness of the problem at the 
higher levels, creating difficulties over its Guidance statements. He stated that whilst 
'goalpost-shifting' was a bad enough problem in itself 'when you understand the rules of 
the game,... MSC don't even know what a goal is*31.
An officer interviewed from the ACC agreed that the Commission was insensitive to 
the educational world and had no expertise32, and the senior MSC officer interviewed 
admitted 'problems of understanding in the early days', given that FE was 'a complicated 
business'. The Commission had had 'to make sure our people were saying sensible 
things' to LEA officers who were already agitated by the White Paper33.
Whilst the Commission had taken measures to get around these problems, notably 
through the appointment of the regional FE advisors, it is notable that at the time of the 
LEA survey, three years into joint planning, the issue was still perceived as a source of 
problems to the tune of a 59.4 per cent score, which indicates that as far as the LEA 
respondents were concerned the MSC still had some way to go to remedy the situation.
Incompatibility o f MSC planning timetable with LEA committee and budgetary cycles
A  problem clearly arose in the relationship between the two bodies in that LEAs followed 
a committee cycle based around the academic year and other local authority priorities, 
whereas the MSC operated on the basis of the financial year. Implications for allocating 
funding were resolved without too much difficulty by including late academic year
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payments in the budget of the new financial year. Coordinating planning procedures on a 
common format proved more difficult. That the problem remained significant in 1988 is 
illustrated by its 55.1 per cent score in the LEA survey.
In the MSC survey, five interviewees indicated no problems in this area; of these, 
one claimed the Area Office slotted in with the LEAs1 schedules whilst the other 
commented that the LEA staff were competent and worked the problem out themselvesf. 
Of the three officers who identified minor problems, one officer stated that the MSC 
timetable had not fitted in with college governors' and LEA sub-committee meetingse. 
Another noted the difficulty that much of what was discussed with LEAs had to be treated 
in confidence until it had been through council committees11.
With regard to the coordination of budgetary cycles, a score of 44.7 per cent in the 
LEA survey indicates that budgetary co-ordination was less problematic than that of the 
committee and planning timetables. In the MSC survey, six interviewees identified minor 
problems in this area. One stated that whilst it had been a problem for her LEAs, it was 
'not one they've screamed about*11. Another three all pointed out the problems of 
coordinating the financial and academic years. The senior MSC NAFE officer 
interviewed stated that 'you can't win with budgetary cycles', they created an inevitable 
coordination problem34. He revealed that a plan was underway to shift the MSC NAFE 
financial year to accommodate the problem.
Inaccurate assumptions made by MSC about past college performance.
The issue of inaccurate MSC assumptions about past NAFE performance in colleges 
refers back to the controversial objective stated in the White Paper Training for Jobs that 
colleges should become more responsive to employers' needs. Complaints were picked 
up in picked up in LEA interviews that the MSC had approached working in NAFE with 
LEAs on the assumption that the White Paper's assertions were accurate, or nearly so, 
the implication being that colleges had a poor record requiring drastic interventionary 
change.
The question of MSC being perceived to have brought unfair assumptions into their
243
i
approach to NAFE was put to LEA respondents, and a score of 52.9 per cent indicated a 
significant proportion of LEAs encountered problems in this area. One LEA officer 
interviewed tied this problem in with the MSC's ’different operating culture - it acts as if 
with an assumption of mistrust’.
Notable discrepancies in the LEA survey data on this matter arose by both LEA type 
and size. Whilst London boroughs showed a score of only 36.4 per cent, metropolitan 
boroughs indicated 52.1 and shire counties 60.7 per cent, approaching a perceived 
problem-level nearly double that of the London boroughs. By LEA size smaller 
authorities showed a much lower score (46.3 per cent) than either medium-sized LEAs 
(52.9) or larger authorities (69.4). These two sets of figures suggest a greater problem in 
those large LEAs which were usually served by a single MSC Area Office.
Staff turnover
Staff turnover in Area Offices and LEAs was identified as a source of problems in 
both the development of planning arrangements and the maintenance of good relations. In 
the case of the MSC, the fairly frequent shifting from post to post characteristic of the 
Civil Service was cited a number of times as a problem area in the preliminary interviews, 
which suggested this to be a major bone of contention. An officer interviewed in the 
MSC survey, who was the fourth in her post since planning began, identified major 
problems in this areas. She claimed this to cause particular difficulties over monitoring, 
where she felt new officers coming in and having to learn the ropes (in an area where 
continuity was very important) imposed a considerable hurdle.
Interestingly however, none of the other officers interviewed considered there had 
been any problems in this area; one claimed this to be down to the LEAs getting on with 
the process themselves, which to a degree made him often ’feel superfluous in this job’, 
suggesting that Area Office staff turnover would have little impact on NAFE planning in 
his Area. In support of this, the score from the LEA survey data of only 44.6 per cent 
indicates this issue to have been much less significant than many other problem areas in 
respondents' eyes, and provides an example of how extensive work can usefully refute 
the wider incidence of findings suggested by intensive analysis.
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Staff turnover at the LEA was cited as a serious problem in a preliminary interview 
with one MSC officer, who said the NAFE staff at one of his five LEAs had altered 
completely in a year, seriously hampering the local re la tio n sh ip 3 5 . An officer in the MSC 
survey claimed to have experienced major problems in this areas. Two others noted very 
minor problems, one referring mainly to college staff changes. The other six indicated no 
problems, despite one case of an LEA having had three Assistant Education Officers 
dealing with FE in the course of the previous year. One officer claimed that staff changes 
at the LEA had greatly improved working relationships^
Rigidity of MSC adherence to details of annual contract
Accusations on the part of LEA officers in the preliminary interviews of a narrow and 
demanding pedantry characterising the MSC's approach to ensuring the terms of the 
annual contract were fulfilled are not well supported by the data from the LEA survey in 
this category. A score of 36.8 per cent indicates that this was not a highly significant 
problem area. The overall impression from the MSC survey interviews is that 
considerable flexibility was exhibited by Area Offices in seeking local solutions, a matter 
covered in Chapter 7.
Intervention in local matters by MSC Regional and Head Office
There were suggestions garnered in preliminary interviews that in some cases the higher 
echelons of the MSC could disrupt a healthy local relationship between LEAs and Area 
Offices. One LEA officer claimed that MSC Regional Office 'interferes a lot’, and was 
'searching for a role'36, another that whilst local officers were amenable to thrashing out 
problems informally, the more distant Regional Office could disrupt this. One respondent 
to the LEA survey complained that
Regional, Area staff and the FE Advisor have different, and in some cases conflicting, 
requirements'.
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Further evidence of the potential disruption of the local MSC-LEA relationship 
through the intervention of a higher level of the MSC was given by respondents to the 
MSC survey. Whilst only two interviewees stressed significant difficulties herecJ, one 
provides a case example which illustrates some important aspects of the nature of the 
relationships that developed between the MSC and LEAs.
The officerc in question had good relationships with both LEAs covered by his Area 
Office, a fact attributable to painstaking effort over a prolonged period. The building of 
mutual trust had involved a deliberate development of personal contacts, and the 
far-sighted efforts of an Area Manager who had recognised the value of good relations, 
and who from the outset had sought to soothe LEA fears about MSC 'imperialism' and 
negotiate a pragmatic and cooperative partnership.
Despite local stability in the status quo however, this relationship was apparently 
subject to 'boat-rocking' from outside, in particular from the periodic intervention of the 
Regional Office. The latter was accused of a lack of sensitivity to local arrangements, and 
a tendency to 'bulldoze its way in' and upset the local equilibrium with no regard for the 
consequences, largely because these would be felt only locally and not by the Regional 
officers themselves. Quoted examples included the Regional Office taking it upon itself to 
contact the LEAs directly without consulting the Area Office (perhaps in the form of a 
letter outlining a new requirement, or statements made at Regional MSC-LEA meetings), 
which breached locally accepted agreements over the extent of MSC demands of the 
LEAs that year.
The consequences for the Area Office were a diminution of its credibility in the eyes 
of the LEAs, when the latter realised it was ignorant of such developments, and injury to 
the mutual trust upon which so much of the local arrangements depended. The officer 
stated that on such occasions it usually fell to his office to take much 'renewed time and 
effort to repair the damage', a wasteful and avoidable exercise. Not surprisingly perhaps, 
the LEAs in this Area had a very negative view of the Regional Office.
Looking at this issue from the opposite perspective, the interviewee in question 
recognised that at the Regional Office, local staff were to some extent perceived as being
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'in bed' with the LEA. He considered that the nature of the Area Office's position in 
NAFE entailed it acting as a mediator between two sources of pressure, one being the 
higher echelons of the MSC and government, the other the LEA. Sometimes the 
resolution of these meant putting the pressure on LEAs to deliver, but sometimes, he 
argued, it required standing alongside the LEA in resisting the higher MSC view. Whilst 
the Regional Office tended to perceive this as 'batting for the LEA' it was, he argued, no 
more than was sometimes necessary to secure agreement. It was, he felt, easy for the 
Regional officers to assert from a distance that the LEAs had to 'toe the line', but in 
reality high-handedness was counter-productive. There was a lack of appreciation by the 
Regional Office that the MSC's NAFE work at the coal-face meant dealing with people, 
and that sensitivity mattered. He strongly believed that secondments of Regional and 
Head Office staff to Area Offices would wake them up to the realities of day-to-day 
dealings with an LEA.
However, most MSC interviewees claimed the LEAs’ view of Regional Offices to be 
good, in some casesd very good. Evidence from the LEA survey, which under these 
headings yielded low scores of 18.5 and 17.4 per cent respectively for intervention by 
Regional and Head Office, indicated that this issue had not been a major source of 
problems overall
LEA reluctance to observe nationally-agreed criteria
Respondents to the MSC survey were asked to indicate whether they had experienced 
problems through LEAs being reluctant to follow planning requirements determined by 
national level negotiations between the MSC and the local authority associations.
Four officers claimed there had been no problems in this area, whilst four more 
pointed to a minor problem. In two cases M) it was that the local LEAs had questioned 
the relevance of some requirements to their part of the country. For example in one 
south-coast authority the need for a detailed planning policy on ethnic minorities was 
questioned when these existed in only one city in the county, where the issue was dealt 
with by the local college in its own policies. In both cases the problems had been talked 
through and overcome.
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In another Areah problems had arisen the previous year as none of three metropolitan 
LEAs had complied faithfully with the national criteria in their Plan and Programme. 
However, the officer concerned, knowing what the LEAs were doing in practice, was 
satisfied that their efforts were acceptable and persuaded her seniors to accept Plans and 
Programmes which were ostensibly unsuitable on this basis.
Only one officer'cited major problems over this issue, having in the previous year 
had a dispute with his LEA over a form of words to be used in its Plan, which the Area 
Office had insisted should appear to meet national guidelines. The LEA had eventually 
capitulated under threat of sanctions being applied.
Slower pace of LEA bureaucratic procedures:
The MSC survey explored respondents views on any problems caused by the slower 
pace of LEA procedures. Three interviewees identified no problems, although one noted 
that they were slower, stating that his office recognised and anticipated this. Five noted 
minor problems, the LEA staff he dealt with tending 'to ignore their own bureaucracy at 
times'e. One officer claimed LEAs to be 'notoriously slow to change'*, and cited an 
instance where his predecessor had had to pressure the elected members of an authority in 
order to speed things up.
Again the accepted limitations of LEA resources devoted to NAFE were widely cited 
as an important factor (*.<>). One stated that the more LEA officers involved, the more 
prompt was the action3. In her LEA there was only one full time LEA officer dealing with 
NAFE.
Interestingly, one respondent to the MSC survey suggested that in his experience, 
MSC bureaucratic procedures were often a lot slower than those of his LEA, for example 
in Head Office keeping the Area Office up to date with changes in the planning 
requirements. The LEA would receive circulars from Head Office advising it to approach 
the Area Office for further information, which it sometimes yet knew nothing about The 
LEA accepted such delays in MSC internal communication, which at times provided 'a
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good excuse' when things went wrong.
Other problems
Other problems mentioned by respondents to the MSC survey included the observation of 
one officer in a northern single county authority, regarding his LEA's gathering of 
statistical information in the early stages®. This had taken some while to get going, largely 
through the LEA's concern to make sure they had got the process right and were 
producing the information that was required. Such problems he claimed were dealt with 
by both parties working together on them in close cooperation. This officer was at pains 
to stress that problems in his Area had been very few, because of a competent and very 
motivated LEA, but that this was untypical in his region. At regional meetings he claimed 
to have become notorious for not having problems to report, in strong contrast to all the 
other HEOs present.
A number of LEA survey respondents drew attention to problems relating to a view 
of MSC as lacking in appreciation of the way things were at the LEA. These ranged from 
a perceived MSC unawareness of the financial constraints on LEAs connected with 
government cuts in block grant funding, and a lack of appreciation of LEAs' lesser staff 
resources, to MSC's lack of sympathy or understanding about LEA political 
structures/systems, to MSC's lack of understanding about NAFE. One LEA survey 
respondent put problems relating to financial pressures thus:
A lack of awareness that the financial controls operated by Central Government over Local 
Government (particularly penalties for overspending and the threat of rate-capping), the 
variations in these year to year, and the time-lag/uncertainty of RSG attracted by NAFE, all 
prevent a rational approach to NAFE planning and additional provision.
An officer in a north-western metropolitan Area did identify major local problems 
resulting from one of the LEAs having been rate-capped in the previous year11. The 
enforced budget cuts had apparently seen the council lose 4,000jobs overall, some of 
them in the education department. As a consequence the planning process could not be 
properly carried out; the Area Office had adopted an understanding and supportive
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position, and a very rough plan had been accepted. A similar circumstance had arisen in 
another authority in the Area, one of whose colleges had accepted PCFC status and so 
passed out of LEA control, causing a traumatic period while this happened. Again, the 
Area Office had taken an understanding and supportive line. The officer in question 
stressed the importance of not being high-handed in these situations, and of seeking 
diplomatic solutions to such problems.
*
The effects of all the above factors upon the restructuring of the NAFE policy network 
are considered further in Chapter 8. Before that, it is necessary to consider the empirical 
evidence generated on the impacts of Training for Jobs upon the practice of NAFE 
planning.
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Chapter Seven
Impacts of Training for Jobs on the practice of NAFE planning.
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I x l  Introduction
In studying the impacts of Training for Jobs, the last chapter concentrated upon the 
bureaucratic structures and administrative relationships which developed in response to 
the White Paper and the subsequent NAFE Agreement. In analysing the impacts of the 
legislation overall, it is necessary to go beyond the institutional response of the parties 
involved, and to look to some of the more significant areas of NAFE planning practice 
upon which the new policy impinged.
This chapter identifies and analyses these key areas. It focuses on the significant 
activities required to support planning, such as monitoring and the collection of labour 
market information; it focuses also upon the issues of funding, liaison with other 
groups, and the use of centrally-funded projects to establish and disseminate good 
practice throughout the NAFE system. Finally, it considers the area of curriculum 
change, and goes on to consider the impacts of the NAFE initiative on this and the other 
significant areas of change which occurred in NAFE between 1984 and 1989. Before 
considering these issues, however, it is necessary to present information gathered about 
the experiences of LEAs and their MSC partners in implementing the NAFE Agreement 
in the early years of their joint involvement
LEAs* NAFE planning experience
The practical experiences of NAFE planning varied widely for LEAs across England 
and Wales. This section considers these experiences from a number of angles, the first 
being differences between authorities in their approaches to the construction of the 
Development Plan and Annual Programme*.
* Hereafter referred to, where jointly, as the 'Plan'.
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7.2 (i) Approaches to Plan construction
A view which emerged from early interviews was that LEAs1 approach to writing their 
Plans varied broadly between 'top-down1 and 'bottom-up' styles. Involving a different 
concept to the top-down policy-making model outlined in Chapter 3, these can be 
conceived as two poles of a continuum describing the degree to which the process was 
centralised/dispersed. An ACC officer interviewed preferred the term 'circumference- 
in' to 'bottom-up1, as the former better expressed the dispersed physical nature of many 
authorities' institutional pattemsi* He argued that circumference-in Plans were in 
general the best. His ideal situation saw these taking the form of collaborative exercises: 
an LEA would rely on colleges to identify their needs and make proposals for action to 
meet them. The LEA would then accept or reject these, and assimilate a college-based 
Plan for the whole authority.
The LEA survey investigated this issue by seeking to establish the relative extent of 
top-down and circumference-in planning. Three questions specifically addressed the 
issue: one asking about who had been involved in the work of drawing-up the Plan; 
who had been involved in decision-making over its eventual contents; and the level of 
participation of college staff at various grades.
The results to the question are shown in Figure 7.1. This shows clear evidence of a 
shift over time in the use of top-down and circumference-in approaches to planning. 
Top-down planning is in this instance indicated by the categories 'single LEA officer' 
and 'LEA team', whereas circumference-in approaches are indicated by those categories 
showing a collaborative arrangement between LEAs and colleges (categories c,d,e in 
Figure 7.1).
According to the data gathered, in the first planning round, in 55.7 per cent of 
cases the Plan was produced centrally at the LEA by a single officer or team, whereas 
in only 40.0 per cent of cases (excluding 'other') were college staff involved, either 
directly or by submitting reports to the LEA.
In contrast, the results for the most recent planning round indicate that only 30.4
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Figure 7,1; Participation in Plan construction 1934-5 & 1988-9
C atego ry : 30
(a) single LEA officer
(b) LEA team
(c) LEA/college team
(d) college staff writing those parts of the 
plan relevant to their institution
(e) LEA officer/team editing 
subm issions written by college staff
(f) other
first plan (sample 70 LEAs) 
n  most recent plan (sample 69 LEAs)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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per cent of Plans were produced solely at the LEA (a drop of 25.3 per cent on the first 
round), whereas 63.8 of Plans involved the contributions of college staff (an increase 
of 23.8 per cent).
Some notable differences emerged by LEA type, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. In the 
case of the first Plan, London boroughs showed a definite bias towards collaborative 
LEA-college arrangements, this being so in 69.2 per cent of cases as 
compared with 30.8 who indicated a wholly LEA-based approach. The reverse was 
true for shire counties, where 75.0 per cent of authorities showed an LEA-based 
approach compared with only 17.9 per cent indicating collaboration. Metropolitan 
districts fell between the two.
In the case of the most recent Plan, however, the picture had changed, with all 
LEA types moving to a similar position where LEA-college collaborative arrangements 
predominated. The data shows that the shift from wholly LEA-based Plan production 
was most marked in the shire counties.
A similar pattern emerged when the results were broken down by LEA size, as 
shown in figure 7.3. This shows that progressively larger authorities made the greatest 
use of LEA-based Plan production in the first planning round, whereas in the most 
recent Plan the differences between authorities had been reduced.
4
The suggestion of the evidence is therefore of a shift from a situation in which top- 
down approaches were common in the first planning round (1986-89 Plan), to one by 
the second round (1987-90) in which circumference-in approaches were the most 
common. The overall trend showed at the outset a greater incidence of centralised, top- 
down approaches in the larger LEAs and the shire counties (which in the majority of 
cases were the same authorities) than in the smaller, urban authorities, with the former 
exhibiting the most change towards collaborative approaches by 1988.
The second of the LEA survey questions to address the issue of top-down versus 
circumference-in approaches examined officer-level decision-making concerning the 















Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data
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Figure 7.4; Plan decision-making, 1984-5 & 1988-9
Respondents indicated that the following made the final decisions as to what was included in the draft 
NAFE Plan submitted to elected members for approval:
(a) LEA staff
(b) college staff
(c) combination LEA/college staff
(d) other
■  first plan (sample 70 LEAs)
El most recent plan (sample 69 LEAs)
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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approval. Figure 7.4 shows the results of this enquiry.
The pattern evident is of LEA staff taking sole responsibility for sending drafts to 
elected members for approval in a majority of cases, in both the first and most recent 
years of planning (72.9 and 65.2 per cent respectively). There was only limited change 
across the period. In no case at all was it indicated that college staff made this decision 
without the involvement of LEA staff, in either year.
When these figures are broken down by LEA size and type, significant patterns 
again emerge. Figure 7.5 shows the proportion of respondents indicating each category 
for both planning rounds by LEA size. A relationship is evident in these figures. Whilst 
the smallest LEAs (1-3 institutions) had in both years an approximately even share of 
LEA-based and joint LEA/college approaches to decision making, the largest (7+) were 
LEA-based in 100 per cent of cases in both planning years. The middle-sized LEAs (4- 
6) fell between, and showed more change towards joint arrangements than the other 
two, accounting for most of the limited variation between the two points in time.
The figures broken down by LEA type show a similarly clear relationship, as 
shown in Figure 7.6. Here it was the shire counties which showed the greatest use of 
LEA-based decision-making, though not as overwhelmingly as the '7+' authorities 
group.
The inferences to be drawn from these data are as follows:
• LEA-based decision-making was more common than joint procedures. Contrasting 
these results with those of the previous question, it appears that centralisation in 
terms of decision-making was more established than that concerning the Plans' 
compilation.
• Change towards more decentralised, circumference-in approaches, though 
marginally present, was also less marked than for Plan compilation.
• The findings broken down by LEA size and type would support two hypotheses:
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Figure 7,6; Plan decision-making in eaeh category by 3 lea  types
(a) First Plan:
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Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data
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i) that smaller authorities frequently had insufficient resources to conduct planning 
properly without the assistance of colleges, whereas the larger LEAs were more 
commonly equipped to cope with such demands;
ii) the greater the number of institutions in an authority, the greater was the need 
for coordination and central control over disparate and sometimes competing 
colleges. This was especially so in the more geographically-extensive shires, 
where institutions were often isolated from one another, and LEA staff had an 
important role in bringing the threads of separate programmes together.
The third question investigating this area focussed on the involvement of college 
staff in the planning of NAFE, and was discussed in Chapter 6. Table 6.4 in that 
section indicated that senior college management had had a participatory involvement in 
a large minority (45.7 per cent) of cases in 1984-5, which had risen to 71.4 per cent at 
the time of the survey. The equivalent figures for college departmental heads showed an 
increase from 17.1 to 41.4 per cent over the same period.
The evidence from this question once again supports the prime finding of these 
investigations. Namely, that the use of 'circumference-in' approaches to planning 
increased markedly over the period of joint LEA-MSC NAFE planning. Whereas at the 
start of this period the use of top-down methods was the most predominant approach, 
new methods came to affect particularly the construction of NAFE Plans, particularly in 
larger authorities. There was less change in the degree of decentralisation of decision­
making, suggesting that the increased participation of college staff in planning did not 
extend to increased power over the content of NAFE Plans, their involvement being 
limited to a contributory input.
Some individual comments from LEA interviewees illustrate support for a 
circumference-in approach. One officer stated that his LEA believed colleges were 
better placed to assess demand and to respond to it, the role of the authority being to 
coordinate rather than direct their activities2. Another indicated an LEA desire to 
'embrace as much grass roots input as possible*3, particularly in the construction of the 
Annual Programme, and a third that his LEA's Plan was compiled from colleges' own
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'action plans'4.
7 .2  (ii) P la n  q u a l i t y
Commenting on the quality of the first three Plans produced across England and Wales, 
an FEU officer charged with evaluating progress suggested the first year plans were 
'very variable' and 'mostly terrible'5. They had in most cases been 'a sinecure'Adirected 
at meeting the minimum obligations to secure the receipt of payments from the MSC. 
They showed 'much addled thinking', especially over the notion of responsiveness. 
There had been very little strategic content, little in the way of objectives with 
timescales - 'the basis of monitoring and evaluation' - and much in the way of 
educational cliches.
An officer interviewed in the MSC survey complained that the local LEA had 'tried 
to bamboozle us', its first Plan having been sent to the Area Office in the form of nine 
separate Development Plans and nine Annual Programmes, one for each college in the 
countyj. The FEU officer indicated that this approach had not been uncommon, citing 
as an example a large urban midlands authority whose first Plan had comprised eleven 
volumes.
An LEA officer in an eastern shire county indicated that her authority’s first Plan 
had involved 'much guesswork'6. It had been written single-handedly by the principal 
eduction officer responsible for NAFE, after some hurried discussion in the department 
to come up with some objectives to include in the document. This reflects an approach 
claimed by an ACC officer interviewed to have been common in the first round, that of 
a single senior LEA officer sitting up 'with a towel over the head and a pot of coffee' to 
write the Plan in one night to meet the MSC deadline and get hold of its NAFE money.
The previous section noted evidence of a significant transition from this type of 
approach to one where a wider range of LEA and college staff became involved, and 
the clear increase in circumference-in planning can be expected to have had a positive 
effect on Plan quality. Improvements also stemmed from improved experience and
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understanding of strategic NAFE planning, a process new to many authorities, and 
progressively accrued as each planning year came round.
The LEA officer in the eastern shire referred to above noted significant 
improvements in her authority's Plan in the second and third years. The second 
Development Plan had ’built on the first’, and the third (current at the time) had a much 
more developed LMI section. Its objectives were linked to specific proposals for action. 
The following year's Development Plan was intended be slimmer, whilst the Annual 
Programme had become 'easier to run now underway'. Another LEA officer signalled 
his authority's intention in future to make the Development Plan ’a short, incisive, 
direct document' which stated clear, 'tractable' objectives. The first of these two LEAs 
was one picked out by the FEU officer for particular praise, being one of several 
examples of formerly rather inactive authorities which had seized the initiative 
following the impetus afforded by the NAFE Agreement Conversely, some formerly 
effective authorities had not significantly improved their performance in response to the 
new arrangements. It seems fair to conclude along with an MSC officer responsible for 
five London LEAs that plan quality remained Variable’ between different authorities 
after three planning rounds.
7.2 (iii) Involvement of outside parties in Plan production
Use o f NAFE committees
The LEA survey investigated the use made of boards or committees established 
specifically for the production of or comment upon authorities' NAFE Plans. The 
results indicated that a majority (55.7 per cent) of LEAs had such a committee. Some 
variation was apparent by LEA type, with shire counties indicating the use of a 
committee in a majority (60.7 per cent) of cases whilst London boroughs and 
metropolitan districts indicated lower figures (46.2 and 45.8 per cent respectively).
The questionnaire also investigated the constitution of these committees. Table 7.1 
indicates the proportion of authorities which were indicated to involve participants in
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Table 7.1: Consitution o f NAFE boards! committees
Of the respondents who indicated that their authority had a board or committee specifically responsible
for the production of or for comment on the NAFE Plan, the numbers of respondents indicating that
this board included the following representatives were: „ ft/
ff /o
(1) elected authority members................................................................ 21 53.8
(2) authority staff.................................................................................... 37 94.9
(3) college staff....................................................................................... 34 87 2
(4) MSC officers..................................................................................... 19 48.7
(5) Careers Service officers.................................................................... 21 53.8
(6) HMI inspectors.................................................................................. 4 10.3
(7) individual employers /  employers' representatives.......................... 17 43.6
(8) Chamber of Commerce members...................*................................ 12 30.8
(9) trade union representatives............................................................... 17 43.6
(10) other.................................................................................................. 7 17.9
sample: 39 LEAs
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
267
Veach of the ten categories shown. From the table it is apparent that the most commonly 
represented groups were, unsurprisingly, LEA and college staff, at 94.9 and 87.2 per 
cent respectively, followed by elected authority members and Careers Service staff, 
both 53.8 per cent.
After these came MSC officers (48.7 per cent), representatives of employers and 
trade unions (both 43.6 per cent), and Chambers of Commerce (30.8 per cent). HMI 
were represented in only 10.3 per cent of cases.
The overall finding is therefore that members of such bodies were most commonly 
individuals closely involved in NAFE on the LEA side.
MSC involvement in Plan production
Having noted that the involvement of MSC officers in NAFE boards and committees 
was rather less common than that of LEA officers, the MSC survey sought to 
investigate the matter further. The aim was to identify the extent of MSC officer 
involvement in the actual production of NAFE Plans, as opposed to the mere 
acceptance or rejection of these. The FEU officer interviewed indicated that many LEAs 
had, at least originally, taken a view that the MSC should leave planning up to them, 
and then ’dumped' a finished Plan on the Area Office.
To explore this, interviewees were asked to describe the extent of their involvement 
in the drafting of the LEAs' Development Plan and Annual Programme, and the extent 
to which this had changed over the period of mutual involvement Since there was no 
formal requirement for liaison in this area, any involvement would have been a matter 
of local voluntary cooperation.
Of the 9 officers interviewed, 8 were involved in discussions or liaison of some 
kind with their LEAs during the various stages of Plan and Programme drafting, 
although not necessarily with all the LEAs in their Area. In most if not all cases this 
appeared to have differed considerably from the situation in early planning rounds, 
when a Plan and Programme would commonly anive by post along with a request for
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the allocated money.
In the case where there appeared to be the closest Area Office-LEA liaisons the 
officer concerned spoke of a fairly distant situation having changed in only 3-4 years to 
one which saw extensive Area Office participation. This officer had developed a 
distinctly collaborative role, making comments and suggestions at all stages, the final 
planning and Programme documents being very much the product of a joint effort This 
officer was in the current year actually drafting the labour market report section of one 
of his LEAs1 Development Plan, a circumstance fairly unimaginable in 1984.
Another officer*1 described a situation with one of her two LEAs in which both 
parties discussed the year's aims and priorities from their point of view before the 
national Guidance was issued, and then went through the latter jointly when it arrived, 
setting out a mutual programme for meeting agreed targets. Both parties maintained 
informal liaison throughout, with a by now much reduced emphasis on formal 
negotiations. Again this contrasted with the early years of the process, at which time 
'sketchy' plans had been sent in for approval or rejection.
An officer dealing with a single LEA indicated that despite not being a party to LEA 
management meetings his involvement extended throughout the planning process, and 
he worked jointly with LEA staff in the drafting of the Plan and Programme6. This 
circumvented the danger of an expensively-prepared document being referred back for 
changes, and assisted the achievement of a mutually satisfactory piece of work. Whilst 
this officer had reservations about the content of the authority's somewhat glossy Plan, 
its value as a highly effective marketing document coupled with an understanding with 
the MSC about what was actually going on in the colleges made for an acceptable 
arrangement.
Three other officers 0>.gW, all in multi-LEA metropolitan areas, indicated that they 
engaged in some discussions and negotiations in the Plan and Programme drafting 
stage, although some LEAs covered by this group continued to send in draft plans 
without prior discussion. All three officers expressed a desire to improve the overall 
level of liaison in this area, and at least two of them seemed to be making progress
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towards this (gJO.
Partly, the differences in the level of involvement would have been a product of 
LEA type, attitudes and style, a fact illustrated by different levels of liaison between 
MSC officers and different LEAs in their Area. In one case11 close cooperative links 
with one LEA contrasted with very low levels of consultations with another, the 
relationship with a third authority coming somewhere in between. Further illustrating 
this point, in one example of close liaisond, the same officer had, in contrast, very 
limited links with the other of her two LEAs. It would appear to have been significant 
that this latter was a small, single college authority, whereas the other LEA was a large 
multiple college authority with greater resources and a more developed administrative 
machine. Such factors would clearly be important in determining the feasibility of 
extensive liaison.
What appears to be significant also is the length of tenure of the HEO in post In 
three of the examples of close liaison listed above M.e), the officers had been in post 2, 
4 and 5 years respectively. This contrasted with the second three fogM, who had been 
in post 18 months, 1 year and 6 months. Whilst these officers would have inherited 
pre-existing arrangements with LEAs to a certain extent, stress should be laid on the 
importance of the development of personal links. It would appear that the more these 
were allowed to develop, the greater was the potential for collaboration, provided there 
existed a willingness in the LEA to allow this.
7.2 (iv) Local interpretation of national policy
The discussion of the nature of policy-formulation, decision-making and 
implementation presented in Chapter 3 stressed the role of street-level bureaucrats in the 
reformulation and concretisation of policy directives into a more specific and more 
detailed policy on the ground. The routinisation of broad objectives into day-to-day 
tasks was argued to necessitate a degree of discretion on the part of implementors, a 
degree of freedom to make their own interpretation on the basis of local circumstances. 
In the context of this argument it was important to examine the issue of local
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interpretation of national NAFE policy by Area Offices and their LEAs.
Interviewees in the MSC survey were asked to indicate the extent to which their 
Area Office interpreted national Guidance in order to make the NAFE process relevant 
to local needs. One interviewee stated that over the course of the period in which NAFE 
planning had taken place, the Area Office and its LEAs had developed local 
arrangements for meeting the requirements agreed at national level by the MSC and the 
local authority associations0. Much less important now, he claimed, than struggling to 
meet outside-imposed criteria was the identification of what was possible and a joint 
process of working together towards goals thus defined. Such goals were intended to 
reflect local needs, and to ignore factors irrelevant to the area. Making an informed 
judgement was the key Area Office task in this situation, in the sense of identifying 
accurately what the LEA could and could not achieve. The latter would not be 
demanded of it, but the former definitely would, even if the LEA claimed itself unable 
to deliver.
Another officer stressed the importance of learning what could be realistically 
asked of LEAsd. Having taken the starting point as what it was able to provide, the 
Area Office had concentrated each year on seeing how far each authority could go 
towards the long-term objectives, rather than on aiming for 'the perfect Plan'. In the 
first instance she and her colleagues had taken the national Guidance as a basis upon 
which to work - she drew attention to the fact that the original Guidance Handbook had 
included the caveat 'as far as possible' in stating what LEAs should provide - and until 
the present year had continued to use it as a target In the present year there had instead 
been an attempt to develop a local strategy, to identify what the Area Office really 
wanted out of the process, and influence the LEA on the basis of this.
An officer who dealt with a fairly truculent LEA indicated that all the objectives 
included in the Plan had to be specifically agreed in advance. None were imposed 
where agreement could not be reached, suggesting a high degree of LEA influence over 
the employment of local discretion!
One officer, claiming that procedures in her Area reflected realistic goals, noted
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differences between LEAs in her multi-authority Areas. Some LEAs went above 
national targets - not surprisingly, she stated, these were not held back. Other cases 
were more problematic. Often it was clear that an LEA's planning and monitoring 
procedures were inadequate, but that the Area Office was not at that stage going to get 
anything better out of it. In these circumstances, long-term interests necessitated 
making allowances and accepting what was available, in order to achieve the best result 
that was realistically practicable. The pre-requisite of such tolerance was that the LEA's 
best attempts were being made to improve. It also, she stated, involved an 'act of faith' 
on her part that their Programme was being delivered as arranged. An LEA officer 
interviewed in the same Area claimed that 'the MSC are flexible', being more concerned 
that the contract was being honoured than with the detailed specifications of the Plan 
structure. A 'reasonable compromise’ had thus been possible7.
All the interviewees who offered a view on this claimed there was local 
interpretation of the national requirements in their Areas, although local MSC staff did 
seek as far as possible to follow national guidelines. These findings give clear support 
for the arguments made earlier for the importance of lower-tier discretion in the 
implementation of policy.
2x2 M onitoring
The issue of monitoring was one which caused some of the initial difficulties in the 
LEA-MSC relationship. These related to the workload being placed on LEA officers 
required to carry out the monitoring work - one described the process as being 'arduous 
and a burden'8 - a factor identified as the most significant problem area in section 6.4 
(iv). It also reflected problems which stemmed from MSC officers' lack of educational 
expertise, which could lead to misunderstandings over what forms of monitoring were 
practicable and of value.
This section explores the issue of monitoring from each side, by first presenting 
the information gathered on the subject in the MSC interview survey, followed by a 
presentation of data from the LEA questionnaire.
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Monitoring from  the MSC perspective
A senior MSC officer interviewed gave an overview of the monitoring process in which 
he described how initial expectations of a system of formal reviews had become 
superseded in practice by much more informal arrangements^. Whilst there had 
originally been much in the way of 'formal, cool, eyeball-to-eyeballf meetings at which 
'inches-thick documents' were discussed at length, monitoring had now become a 
much more continuous process in which officers from both parties talked through 
problems at an early stage and worked on solutions together. This had progressed to 
the point where the latest Guidance Handbook required only one formal meeting, the 
purposes of retaining one being twofold: to ensure the participation of senior 
management, and 'in case we're being given the runaround'*. The officer commented, 
however, that early caution had given way to openness and flexibility, and that LEAs 
had generally been very cooperative in providing information. Monitoring was now 
conducted *by exception', a method which necessitated trust in what the LEA identified 
as meriting MSC attention. The alternative was 'a rather arid plod through reams of 
material'.
The above overview can be illustrated more fully by recourse to the MSC survey. 
Respondents stressed on a number of occasions that it was not the MSC's task to 
monitor NAFE courses, but to monitor the LEAs’ own monitoring of these (<tf.iO).
Two officers noted that it was beyond the authority of the Area Office to go into 
colleges and check on what was happening (b.e), and another noted that it was also 
beyond its resources4. It was pointed out that in agreeing to the LEAs’ Plan and 
Programme the MSC was agreeing to its monitoring procedures alsob. There was still 
no MSC brief to become involved in the curriculum, or go into classes or lecture rooms 
in the manner of HMI; it could only advise and influence such matters indirectlye. One 
officer noted that at monitoring meetings in his Area it was the LEAs who set the 
agenda for discussion^.
* The latter comment suggests mutual trust (a matter considered more fully below) remained at 
least partially qualified.
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The form which monitoring took varied considerably from one locality to another. 
All Area Offices and their LEAs were required to hold at least two formal monitoring 
meetings every year under the terms of the Agreement But outside of these there was 
much room for differences in approach. These centred on three areas:
• the degree to which quantitative and qualitative assessment were used in 
proportion to one another,
• the overall formality or informality of the process;
• whether, instead of an attempt to monitor the whole of provision, there had 
been a decision to concentrate on chosen areas as indicators of the whole.
One officer claimed that the business of monitoring hitherto had been very much a 
matter of ensuring the Annual Programme was being met, of checking numbers on 
course starts, enrolment figures, course completions, staff-student ratios and the likee. 
Only now was his Area Office looking beyond this towards seeking evidence on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of Programme delivery. One officer stated that in her Area 
the MSC concentrated on qualitative assessment of the year’s trends, leaving the 
quantitative analysis to the LEA staffd. To demonstrate themselves competent and 
informed in this area was sufficient One officer noted that her office had in the current 
year deliberately moved away from the 'number-crunching' exercise which had been 
employed in earlier rounds11. In another case an interviewee stated that it was her Area 
Office's approach to consider both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the monitoring 
process.
One officer gave an indication of how the formal side of monitoring was 
subdivided. There were two broad monitoring areas, the Annual Programme and 
Development Fund projects. The former involved two processes: quantitative analysis 
of figures; and discussion in meetings of steering groups set up to oversee the delivery 
of the programme. These groups comprised local MSC officers, LEA staff and college 
principals, and their meetings fulfilled the formal obligation outlined in the Contract 
This part of monitoring dealt with qualitative issues such as open learning, equal
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opportunities, TVEI coordination etc., concentrating on a general overview of 
provision as opposed to specific instances. Development Fund projects were monitored 
by their own individual steering committees, although there was some attempt to draw 
these together to some extent to reduce the monitoring workload.
All officers had to engage in a minimum amount of formal monitoring with their 
LEAs, but the extent to which emphasis was placed on this or more informal methods 
varied from one Area Office to another. Originally, with early Area Office-LEA 
relationships in many cases being quite distant (see Chapter 3), the whole of their 
contact tended to be on a fairly formal footing. Now that relationships had generally 
softened there had been a gradual development of more informal arrangements. These 
included the study of developments on a more ad hoc basisd, perhaps monitoring 
different areas on a continuing basis throughout the year and maintaining a regular 
dialogue over developments with LEA staff.
A northern metropolitan officer explicitly indicated current moves towards a less 
formal approach15. Another officer in a multiple-LEA Area indicated that whilst 
monitoring had hitherto tended to be conducted 'around the table' with LEA and college 
staff, this was being supplanted by a less structured approach of going directly to 
colleges and monitoring chosen areas of interest11; whilst formal meetings still took 
place, their importance had diminished. One of her LEAs having at first been resistant 
to this idea was apparently now becoming more in favour of it.
Other Areas had seen less relaxation of the formalities. One officer noted that 
monitoring with his two LEAs was restricted to quarterly meetings. At these the MSC 
sought to ensure its requirements were being met, but in between which monitoring 
activity was conducted by the LEAsf. Another officer noted that with five LEAs to 
cover, the formal monitoring meetings with each of them added to the quarterly project 
monitoring meetings left her little time to build up informal monitoring procedures 
alongside theses. Nonetheless she was hoping to move towards this, having targeted 
one LEA for closer involvement already, and planning to target a second when her 
workload permitted.
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A number of Area officers indicated that they were not making the attempt to 
conduct comprehensive monitoring by examining the whole of provision. One officer 
stated that when faced with a sometimes huge computer print out of the information an 
LEA has supplied about its whole Annual Programme, it was unclear what could be 
usefully done with such a large data sett1. As response to this problem, the Area Office 
in question had adopted the approach described above of monitoring by exception. 
Having talked through the year's developments with LEA staff on a TOC category-by- 
category basis, monitoring officers identified areas of significant change and 
concentrated their discussions on these. Other officers identified similar procedures in 
their own Areas. One spoke of looking for trends in the overall figures, and of 
focussing on particular areas of interest which emerged4. Another stated that it was the 
objective of monitoring to identify change, and that she used the statistical data to 
produce graphs and charts which could illustrate such change most effectively, in order 
to best disseminate the information gathered from monitoringb. This officer also 
employed the practice of asking her LEAs to produce a paper giving their assessment of 
developments, of how far they had gone towards meeting their stated objectives, from 
which she would pick out the salient points for joint discussion. One officer described 
the MSC's monitoring work as being a matter of dealing with the periphery of NAFE, 
concentrating on 'the new, the altered and the deleted'e. This was where the evidence 
(or a lack of it) of the hoped for responsive developments would be apparent
Two offices indicated their adoption of what one of them described as a 'case 
study approach' to monitoring. For one this was a topic-based approach involving the 
selection and close study of two TOC areas as samples of the whole*. This involved 
looking at the total picture in a part of the curriculum, rather than looking at only some 
aspects of the whole. Her monitoring involved analysing such factors as first year 
starts, first to second year progressions, exam results and student destinations, as 
indicators of performance in the areas of marketing, MIS, staff development, course 
development and so on. The other of these two officers had, in one of her two LEAs, 
chosen a selection of courses and a sample of colleges for in-depth monitoring, and 
sought to discuss any trends at college leveK
It was recognised that monitoring in the early days of joint MSC-LEA planning
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had often left much to be desired. One officer who had been in post throughout the 
planning period claimed that there had been very little useful guidance on this from 
Head Office, and that Area Offices had had to develop their own responses^. A second 
officer echoed this sentiment, stating that Head Office had issued Tittle really useful 
advice on detail'0; there had been contradictions between national Guidance, Regional 
advice and the realities of local interplay. The first of these two officers said of her Area 
Office that the staff had 'rather groped our way on this - in common with most people'. 
The reason for this, she claimed, was mainly attributable to the fact that, originally, 
Head Office had no more idea of what should be done than did local staff; it had learnt 
what it now knew as a consequence of studying the activity out in the field - i.e. 'good 
practice' had 'come up from the ground'.
There had been a certain amount of bad feeling between LEAs and the MSC 
resulting from these early uncertainties. LEA staff had accused the MSC of holding up 
'hoops for them to jump through'! i, without giving good reasons why. Some of the 
MSC officers interviewed agreed that initially there had been some truth in this 
accusation: monitoring had originally been a matter of meeting specified criteria0, which 
supposedly were to be demanded of LEAs in return for transfer of the NAFE money. 
When LEAs had asked about the purpose of some information upon whose collection 
they were not keen, the answer was not clear, a fact which did not assist in developing 
LEA trust and confidence in the Area Office.
Partly this was a function of the MSC’s lack of expertise and understanding in 
what was for most of its staff a new field. Several officers pointed to improvements in 
this area (a.hg), and one noted the importance of this in promoting the MSC's credibility 
in the eyes of the LEAs, which helped provide them with a greater position of trust and 
influences.
There appeared to be some agreement that monitoring procedures were generally 
now much better. One officer stated that whilst the MSC had previously indeed been 
asking for information without knowing why, it now did know why, as a consequence 
of its greater experience in the fielda. Another identified improvement as a consequence 
of two factors: an increased sense of LEA 'ownership'; and attempts by the Area Office
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to make the process more meaningful0. The first of these had been a question of getting 
the LEAs to see the monitoring requirements as a matter of concern for themselves also, 
not simply as a means of getting the money. The second had been the development and 
interpretation by the Area Office of the requirements to make them practical, achievable, 
relevant and above all useful. This meant their reflecting local needs and ignoring 
aspects which did not apply in that Area. Another officer stated her philosophy on the 
matter that if information was to be demanded from LEAs, it should be returned 'with 
value-added' in order to convince them of the usefulness of the exerciseb. Given that 
monitoring was the area of the NAFE work that her LEAs had been least enthusiastic 
about', she tried hard to make it useful to them, as a means of 'turning negatives into 
positives’ and 'getting rid of the deadwood1.
Another officer cited difficulties she had experienced with monitoring in her early 
experiences of the job, having been appointed six-months previously^. Having had to 
'start from scratch' she now felt that the experience of one planning round had given 
her a much better grasp of the task's requirements, and had consequently been able to 
win the LEAs' respect and trust. This she felt to be very important, a source of leverage 
and influence without which the task would be much harder. She felt that monitoring in 
her Area had in the past not been well-developed, but that its effectiveness was now 
improving.
The improvement in monitoring relationships was several times connected to the 
development of partnership between Area Offices and LEAs. One officer noted the 
increasing tendency of both parties to develop local definitions of national planning 
guidelines in collaboration0. Others stressed that in their Areas monitoring was 'a joint 
review process' in which both sides offered their perceptions15, that the process 
proceeded successfully on the basis of mutual traste, and that a sense of partnership had 
developed with both parties feeling they had their 'feet under the same table', as 
opposed to a former sense of virtual enmityg. This officer claimed that a good 
relationship was crucial, for without it monitoring would be no more than a procedural 
exercise. One officer described a move away from the notion of the MSC 'standing 
over the LEA, demanding what it wanted' towards a genuine partnership, working 
together and tackling problems jointly**.
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Flexibility on the part of the Area Office seemed an important factor in developing 
such partnership. One officer illustrated this with the example that, provided an LEA 
accepted a requirement for collecting a piece of information but indicated genuine 
problems in achieving it, the Area Office was quite prepared to allow it to postpone the 
job until the following yearc. Another officer stated that the MSC in his Area would not 
'get excited about minor deviations' from the Programme, merely wanting to ensure 
that the attempt to deliver was being madee. In one case an officer claimed that she 
always sought to look at problems from an LEA point of view, a stance which she 
believed allowed the greatest influence for the MSO.
One officer made the point that monitoring could be a learning exercise for LEAs, 
requiring them to explore areas many of them would previously not have consideredd. 
In joint monitoring meetings at colleges she had been 'struck by the naivety' of some of 
the LEA staffs questions, and believed it had been valuable for them to go through the 
process. Also useful for the LEAs had been the ability to blame unpopular demands for 
information or course changes on the MSC, thus deflecting opposition to its moves. 
The officer was quite happy for the Area Office to be used in this way if it brought 
about positive change.
Interviewees were specifically asked to comment on the possibility that LEAs 
could have been 'pulling the wool over their eyes' in the case of monitoring, in order to 
get their money without having to move in the ways demanded of them.
Some officers stated that this had been a concern in the early daysR One stated 
that in those days the Area Office 'didn't know the bottom line on anything’4, i.e. given 
their lack of experience and expertise MSC officers were uncertain as to whether or not 
they were doing the right thing. An example she gave was that in one of the first years 
40 courses listed in the Annual Programme did not appear. The LEA gave reasons and 
cited a 'swings and roundabouts' effect, stating that there were 40 other courses 
elsewhere to make up for this. It was not clear to the Area Office whether to believe this 
or not, and in fact over such issues it could still not be 100 per cent certain. Another 
officer referred to the potential danger of being *blinded with science' in education*.
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One officer, whilst admitting initial concerns in this area, claimed the problem had 
not arisen with his LEA due to a relationship conducted in good faith on both sidese.
He 'felt good1 about his relationship with the LEA, confident in its honesty, and past 
experience had led him to trust its staff. He noted that there certainly was scope for the 
LEA to juggle with figures between TOC areas, but that the LEA was just as concerned 
about efficiency and effectiveness as the MSC. Its own standards were high, and it 
could be trusted to keep its colleges closely monitored and ensure they were moving in 
the right direction.
Another officer citing his LEA's honesty indicated that its staff 'wouldn’t bother to 
take the trouble' to deceive the Area Office, the mutual relationship being 'blunt, if not 
cordial'j. Overall, the senior MSC officer interviewed believed that, despite initial 
concern in this area, the issue was 'not a worry now’13.
More than one officer pointed to the improvements in information-gathering which 
had reduced the possibility of this problem occurring. One believed it to be less and less 
possible as MIS became increasingly sophisticated: LEAs could now often be expected 
to have the information asked for, so it was ever harder for them to claim it was not 
available to thems. Another officer stated that up until the last twelve months deception 
had been a possibility since information was not being collected 'in a usable form'b. 
Now that the Area Office had progressively more quantitative information at its 
disposal, its greater knowledge and more pertinent questions meant it was getting 'too 
close for comfort' for LEAs successfully to bend the truth. Whilst LEAs were still 
likely to 'tell us what they want to tell us', the officer was confident that she could get 
an accurate picture. Another officer stated that there were now mechanisms to prevent 
the problem, the increase in expertise and available information reducing the danger*. 
But she also stressed the importance of the improvement in mutual trust. She claimed 
that now LEAs could see the use and value of the whole process, they were more 
prepared to be open and honest with the MSC. One officer noted in this context that 
three years previously, when the Area Office asked for information and the LEAs 
proved reticent, MSC staff believed LEA officials were being obstructive41. It had 
turned out that the LEAs did not in fact have the information, but were reluctant to
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admit this. Subsequent improvements in information-gathering meant that they were 
now much better placed.
Two officers developed the view that the longer an individual HEO was involved, 
the more experience he or she would gain(gJ0. The more well-informed, the more such 
an officer would become credible in the eyes of the LEA, and the less likely they would 
be to consider being untruthful in discussionsg. The situation under these circumstances 
would become based much more upon mutual respect and trusts. This same officer, 
who had not been in post a full year at the time of the interview, nonetheless indicated 
that this problem was a real danger, and that she was sure that such deception had 
happened in her Area. She indicated that she was prepared to accept a certain amount of 
this, depending upon what it was she was after - if the information was really important 
she would work very hard to obtain it accurately.
One final point worth noting on monitoring which emerged from the interviews 
related to LEA-type. Large, multi-institution authorities required a much more extensive 
monitoring apparatus to oversee their progress than would a small single-college LEA. 
One interviewee, whose two LEAs each represented one example of the above, 
indicated that the vast bulk of her monitoring work was carried out with the larger 
authority*1. In the case of the other LEA there was less to know, knowledge was 
consequently very full, and she claimed that as a result of this the obligatory formal 
monitoring meetings 'had to be spun out sometimes’.
Data from the LEA survey on monitoring and the use of evaluation techniques
The LEA survey investigated monitoring activity at both authority and college levels. It 
sought data both for current activity and for that conducted in the 1984-5 planning 
round, in order to provide a picture of change over time. Table 7.2 indicates the results 
of an enquiry into the information gathered by LEAs in both years and whether 
monitoring and evaluation had become more common activities.
Part (1) of the question illustrated in Table 7.2 lists pieces of information LEAs 
were asked by the MSC to collect under the terms of the Contract The column relating
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Table 7.2: LEA monitoring ofNAFE in 1984-5 & 1988-9
Respondents indicated whether their authority undertook for the purposes of its NAFE courses any of the following 
arrangements 1984-5, and whether it was doing so in 1988-9:
(1) Required its colleges to collect and and supply data on:







7 10.1 60 87.0 76.9 1 69
(b) total enrolments........................................................................... 48 69.6 66 95.7 25.1 7 69
(c) enrolments for each course........................................................ 44 63.8 66 95.7 31.9 5 69
(d) completion/drop-out rates by course.......................................... 6 8.7 52 75.4 66.7 2 69
(e) information about when and why students leave courses early...
(f) attendance figures by course......................................................
3 4 3 49 71.0 66.7 2 69
18 26.1 35 50.7 24.6 8 69
(g) examination results.................................................................... 24 3 4 3 47 68.1 33.3 4 69
(h) applications received annually by course................................... 4 5 3 25 36.2 30.4 5 69
(i) relevance of leaver's acquired skills to their Erst destinations ... 
(2) Conducted its own monitoring of NAFE provision in colleges.....
0 0 22 31.9 31.9 69
15 21.7 55 79.7 58.0 69
(3) Conducted its own evaluation ofNAFE provision in colleges...... 9 13.0 37 53.6 40.6 69
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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to the planning round 1984-5 indicates that LEAs1 record at collecting this information 
before joint planning was introduced was somewhat patchy. Whilst enrolment figures 
by course and overall were collected by over 60 per cent of LEAs, fewer than 10 per 
cent collected information on completion/drop-out rates by course, information about 
non-completers and annual applications received by course, whilst none at all had 
gathered information on the relevance of leavers' acquired skilled to their first 
destinations.
The figures for the 1988-9 planning round show some dramatic changes. The 
right-hand column of Table 7.2 ranks the percentage change in each of the categories, 
and indicates the area of greatest change to have been the collection of information on 
the first destinations of leavers This rose from being collected by only 10.1 per cent of 
LEAs in the 1984-5 planning round to 76.9 per cent by that for 1988-9. It was noted in 
section 6.4.4 that this had been an area stressed heavily by the MSC as a good 
performance indicator for NAFE. The view was not wholly shared by LEAs, and an 
ACC officer suggested that destinations after ten years were much more significant**. 
Nonetheless, there is clear evidence of the attention to this area leading to significant 
change in practice.
The other categories which scored high rankings in the 1988-9 column tended also 
to be those which showed low figures for 1984-5. The information collected most 
commonly at the earlier point, i.e. enrolment figures and examination results, remained 
so in the later year, but showed lesser percentage increases having started from a strong 
base. Only two categories were collected by less than 50 per cent of LEAs in the 1988- 
9 round, annual applications received (36.2 per cent) and information on relevance 
(31.9 per cent). What emerges most clearly from the data is that the collection of all the 
information types listed rose significantly over the period. Whether this can be 
attributed wholly to the influence of the NAFE Agreement is open to question; this 
matter is explored further in section 7.8.
The other figures in the table support the idea that monitoring increased 
considerably in the period under consideration. Whilst only 21.7 per cent of LEAs are 
reported to have conducted any monitoring during the 1984-5 planning round, the
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figure had risen to 79.7 per cent in 1988-9. The surprising feature of this result is how 
low the latter figure is, given than 100 per cent of LEAs were supposed to be 
monitoring NAFE under the terms of the Agreement, a factor which may be accounted 
for by incomplete responses or may indicate some LEA foot-dragging on carrying out 
monitoring themselves. Either way, there has been a clear and significant increase 
between the two points.
The use of evaluation procedures in NAFE is a key area which the NAFE 
Agreement sought to address, given its primary concern to introduce mechanisms 
aimed at maximising NAFE quality. In the responses to the above question evaluation 
was reported to be carried out by fewer LEAs than monitoring. The 1988-9 figure, at 
53.6 per cent, was nonetheless a very significant increase over 13.0 per cent in 1984-5. 
To explore this issue more fully, a more detailed question was posed, the results of 
which appear in Table 7.3.
The question explored six types of evaluation: follow-up surveys/questionnaires; 
self-evaluation by lecturers; course monitoring by client committees; monitoring by 
senior college staff; and monitoring by LEA inspectors. It is quire evident from Table
7.3 that in the 1984-5 planning round no form of evaluation was employed by a large 
number of LEAs, the highest figure being 30.8 per cent for 'regular course monitoring 
by senior college staff. The only other type of evaluation used in more than one fifth of 
all authorities was 'course monitoring by committees representative of college clients’ at 
(24.6 per cent).
However, by the 1988-9 planning round there is evidence of marked increase in a 
number of categories. Course monitoring by senior college staff remained the most 
significant technique (78.5 per cent of LEAs), but the use of more objective sources of 
information had become much more significant, notably the follow-up 
questionnaire/survey of students and employers (76.9 and 70.8 per cent of LEAs 
respectively). Survey of other groups had risen to sizeable minorities of LEAs, but the 
only other forms of evaluation to become very common were reported to be course 
monitoring by client committees (52.3 per cent) and regular self-evaluation by course 
lecturers (46.2 per cent).
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Table 7.3: LEA evaluation ofNAFE in 1984-5 & 1988-9
Does the authority at present, or did it in 1984-5, promote any of the following policies for course quality 
assessment in its colleges ?
1984-5 1988-9
(1) Follow-up questionnaire or interview survey of any of the following to
investigate client satisfaction, course relevance, teaching aualitv etc.: #  % #  %
(i) students.................................................................................................. 12 18.5 50 76.9
(ii) employers.............................................................................................. 10 15.4 46 70.8
(iii) Industrial Training Organisations.......................................r.......................... 10 15.4 20 30.8
(iv) Chambers of Commerce......................... ........ ......... 3 4.6 16 24.6
(v) students' parents.................................................................................... 1 1.5 4 6 2
(vi) community groups................................................................................ 2 3.1 15 23.1
(vii) ethnic minority groups........................................................................ 2 3.1 14 21.5
(viii)others (specify).................................................................................... 1 1.5 6 9.2
(2) Regular self-evaluation by course lecturers................................................. 12 18.5 30 46.2
(3) Course monitoring by committees representative of college clients..........
(4) Regular course monitoring by senior college staff.....................................
(5) Regular course monitoring by LEA inspectors...........................................
16 24.6 34 52.3
20 30.8 51 78.5
7 10.8 22 33.8
(Sample - 65 LEAs)
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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The overall picture which emerges from these data are as follows. The evaluation 
of NAFE provision had in 1988 become a significantly more common activity since 
1984-5. The judgements of senior college staff had been and remained a key element in 
the evaluation of college provision; where subjective judgements were called into play, 
it appeared that these actors brought such judgements to bear most influentially. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence of a considerable increase in the use of follow-up 
questionnaire or interview surveys to gather attitudes about college provision, 
spreading wider the sources of hard data upon which the more subjective judgements 
could be brought to bear. The survey of the key client groups - students and employers - 
has clearly been the most important form of this. The extensive use of bodies 
representative of client groups suggests evidence of action to meet concerns about 
responsiveness to client needs.
One or two additional points arise from breaking the figures down by LEA size. In 
each of categories (2),(3) and (4) significant differences emerged, which are illustrated 
by Table 7.4:
Table 7.4: Differences in use o f evaluation techniques bv LEA size
%
(2 ) (3) (4)
84-5 88-9 84-5 88-9 84-5 88-9
1-3 institutions 38.5 5 3 . 8 42.3 6 9 . 2 50 .0 7 3 . 1
4-6 institutions 6.7 4 6 . 7 18.7 5 0 . 0 25 .0 7 5 . 0
7+ institutions 5.6 3 8 . 9 11.1 3 3 . 3 11.1 8 3 . 3
In each case the smaller authorities showed a greater use of each evaluation technique 
for 1984-5. The figures indicate that by the 1988-9 planning round a more even spread 
of these techniques had arisen, although the smaller authorities still showed a 
considerably greater use of evaluation through monitoring by client committees (69.2 
per cent). The most striking changes over time were in the category 'regular course
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monitoring by senior college staff, which saw increases in all LEA sizes, but most 
markedly in the case of larger authorities, whose figure rose from 11.1 per cent (the 
lowest for 1984-5) to 83.3 per cent (the highest for 1988-9).
7 .4  Funding and nroiects
This section considers two aspects of funding in the NAFE planning process: the 
central resource created to fund development projects and, first, the costs incurred by 
LEAs in administering the new arrangements.
LEA costs
The funding of all local government activity had in the years covered by this study 
come under tight budgetary pressure from the centre, as recounted in Chapter 3. Within 
this, NAFE activity was squeezed tighter by the imposition of additional duties without 
any concomitant rise in grant allocation. There was in fact over time some reduction in 
the money made available for NAFE, the inflation factor for MSC funding being set at a 
lower level than that for block-grant funding to LEAs15.
The LEA survey sought to explore the claim made in a preliminary interview that 
some authorities were ’insufficiently resourced to meet the needs of NAFE'16, 
particularly in the light of shifting MSC demands. Table 6.8 indicated that the problem 
area defined in the survey as ’insufficient assistance with set-up cost of Plan-related 
activities' ranked as the fifth most serious in respondents' perceptions with a percentage 
score of 62.9, indicating widespread LEA dissatisfaction over this matter.
The survey sought to identify whether LEAs had budgeted NAFE planning as a 
separate activity, in an attempt to estimate the absolute cost of the process. Only one 
LEA indicated this to have occurred, without specifying a figure. The only figure 
identified was by a NAFE HEO in London who claimed that one of his boroughs had 
identified an annual cost of £11,000 to administer NAFE.
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A second question in the LEA survey aimed at this issue asked respondents to 
indicate whether their authority had seen an increase in the share of LEA resources 
devoted to post-16 activity. Only 18.6 LEAs were reported to have done so. This result 
is curious, given that greater resources might be expected to have been required simply 
to get the new work done, and would suggest that many LEA NAFE officers were 
struggling to meet their new obligations without any improvement in the support they 
were receiving from their departments.
In the light of the tightness of resources in NAFE, the need to seek additional 
funding became of increasing significance, along with greater moves towards 
marketing and charging more for college services. The investigation of the most 
prominent directions in which extra resources had been sought was therefore another 
important avenue of enquiry. A question was consequently posed to the LEA 
respondents which aimed to gain some insight into the financial links LEAs developed 
with bodies outside the main funding framework, resourced by the twin incomes of 
central block grant and the MSC.
The results are shown in Table 7.5, which ranks the sources in their order of 
frequency. The most commonly approached source - Education Support Grants (ESG) - 
were introduced in 1986 as a means to fund local programmes from a national fund. 
Administered by DES, it represented approximately 0.5 per cent of the annual national 
allocation to LEAs, which was held back to be offered to LEAs for specific projects.
That the ESG figure should be higher than that for MSC is intriguing, as the 
Development Fund through which LEAs made bids for MSC money was established 
(unlike ESGs) specifically and exclusively for funding projects in NAFE. Nonetheless, 
the number of LEAs seeking the MSC central resource evident from these data is very 
high. The section below on projects covers this more fully.
The next most commonly-approached sources, PICKUP and local collaborative 
project (LCP) programmes, were set up by the DES and MSC respectively as initiatives 
in adult education and training, both of which had been in place some time and were
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Table 7.5: NAFE funding sought by LEAs from other bodies
Respondents indicated whether their authority/its colleges actively sought additional NAFE funding from 
any of the following sources:
# %
(1) Industrial Training Boards......................................................................................... 20 28.6
(2) Non-Statutory Training Organisations........................................................................ 10 14.3
(3) MSC.......................................................................................................................... 64 91.4
(4) private-sector training bodies..................................................................................... 8 11.4
’(5) European Social Fund............................................................................................... 56 80.0
(6) Education Support Grants........................................ *................................................ 68 97.1
(7) PICKUP..................................................................................................................... 59 84.3
(8) College Employer Links Programme.......................................................................... 24 34.3
(9) Responsive College Programme................................................................................ 23 32.9
(10) Local Collaborative Projects...................................................................................... 55 78.6
(ll)others (specify)........................................................................................................... 10 14.3
sample: 70 LEAs
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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being run down by the time of the survey. The attempted use of these sources appears 
to have remained high in this period.
Most interesting perhaps is the high figure recorded for approaches to the 
European Social Fund (ESF). The other sources in the top five listed above all existed 
within the framework of the structures operated by the DES and MSC. The ESF 
represented a quite separate avenue of funding, and it is interesting that as many as four 
in five LEAs have used it as a means to seek additional resources for NAFE .
When the figures are broken down by LEA type, it emerges that London boroughs 
made markedly less attempted use the ESF than other authorities. Only 38.5 per cent of 
them did so, compared with 82.1 per cent of shire counties and 100.0 per cent of 
metropolitan districts. They similarly were much less prone to approach LCPs for 
funding, only 46.2 per cent doing so compared with 83.3 per cent of metropolitan 
boroughs and 92.9 per cent of shire counties. (This latter was naturally related to the 
existence of LCPs in an area, something which varied widely across the country.)
There is also evidence of London boroughs being less active in seeking funding from 
the PICKUP programme, a figure of 61.5 per cent contrasting with 85.7 per cent of 
shire counties and 91.7 per cent of metropolitan boroughs.
The extensive approaches made to outside bodies and funds suggests that the 
administration and delivery of NAFE placed considerable financial pressure on LEAs, 
who found it necessary to look beyond the more traditional forms of public educational 
funding.
Centrally-funded projects
1. Aims and organisation
Noted above in Chapter 4 was the creation of a central MSC fund made up of a small 
proportion (originally five per cent) of its overall NAFE budget. Having started life as 
the Central Reserve Fund (CRF), later becoming the Mutual Development Fund 
(MDF), by the time of the MSC survey it had become the Work-Related Further
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Education Development Fund*. The CRF ran during the academic years 1986-7 and 
1987-8. Its main emphasis was on research and development, intended to enable LEAs 
to make their NAFE provision better related to labour market information17. Having 
originally been administered from Head Office, in late 1986 responsibility was largely 
transferred to Regional level. The MDF ran during 1988-9, and its emphasis was more 
on the embedding of good practice. With a budget boosted by the input of additional 
MSC funds, it shared its characteristics with the later Work-Related FE Development 
Fund. Such projects fell into two broad camps:
(a) Research and development projects, which were administered centrally from the 
MSC Head Office at Moorfoot Area officers were not usually involved in these, 
unless invited out of courtesy to be observers on R&D projects in their Area.
(b) Embedding projects, which were funded regionally and locally overseen. Each 
year the Development Fund identified certain themes, such as equal opportunities 
or the embedding of a certain type of practice. Project money was awarded to 
LEAs either directly or on behalf of their colleges on the basis of bids which they 
were all invited to submit. The success of a bid would depend in part upon its 
relevance to the year's priority themes.
The task for the Area Office NAFE HEO, once a project had been agreed and 
launched, was to ensure the establishment of a steering committee which each project 
was required to have to oversee its progress and consider its strategic development, and 
to act as a member. The workload involved for local officers over this varied very much 
according to the number and scale of projects underway in the Area.
In the previous year one Region cited had been allocated £600,000 for projects; in 
the current year this had risen to £1.1 million, indicating an increasing importance being 
attached to project worka. At the same time the budget for mainstream NAFE had gone 
down. The senior NAFE officer interviewed at Moorfoot admitted that there was an 
attempt to build up the Development Fund, which had been unintentionally at the
* Here it will be referred to, where all three incarnations are being considered, simply as the 
’Development Fund'.
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expense of mainstream NAFE funding. The reasons stemmed from a concern that not 
enough was being done to implement ideas and good practice.
Benefits identified as a consequence of project work included their having acted as 
a catalyst for senior management, in allowing the awareness of lecturing staff to be 
pushed upwards in projects which often had a very grass-roots impetus*1. One officer 
described the Development Fund as ’the most important tool we have1*1. The Fund was 
greatly appreciated by LEA staff, and especially colleges, who very much valued there 
being a source of money exclusively designated to NAFE. Seeking money through 
authority committees was an altogether more difficult process, more constricting. The 
MSC could be more flexible, making money available in the short term if required.
A local officer in southern England indicated that Development Fund projects had 
been a great success in her regiond. Her Area Office and the Regional Office had been 
very concerned to ensure their LEAs received a good portion of the national 
Development Fund, and their success in achieving this had been very beneficial in 
terms of boosting local MSC-LEA trust and confidence. The region as a whole had 
seen a 30 per cent overspend in the previous year, having taken up the slack from other 
regions which had experienced an underspend.
2. Allocation of Development Fund resources
The preliminary informal interviews and MSC survey work produced evidence of much 
discontent over the allocation of central project funding, and evidence of great 
variations in the amount of money being allocated in different Areas. An officer at 
Moorfoot noted that initially, at the time of cool relations, LEAs would not take the 
money, but after a while there was something of a rush once authorities realised the 
advantages18.
A local officer in a northern county authority indicated that his LEA had been 
spectacularly successful at getting funding from this and other sources! In the first year 
of the then Central Reserve Fund it had received £0.5 million out of a total national 
fund of £5 million, and ran 13 projects. He claimed this was because the LEA had got
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its bids in 'while the others were still talking about it'. Other LEAs had complained that 
this authority had now had more than its fair share of Development Fund money, and 
should receive less in future. The interviewee did not share this view; his authority had 
gained its advantage through merit, having 'got its finger out' when others had not. Its 
staff thought ahead, and its project bids were still received weeks before those of other 
authorities.
An LEA officer interviewed took a different view, arguing that the most 
Development Fund money was received by those authorities who were 'fleet of foot' as 
a consequence of being accustomed to making bids for various forms of outside 
funding1^ . These were not necessarily the authorities who needed the money most. 
Many genuinely needy authorities lacked the organisational tradition attuned to making 
such bids, and had lost out.
The same officer claimed the problem was a serious one as the Fund represented 
'a considerable amount'. However, an officer in a north-western metropolitan Area 
pointed out that Development Fund money varied between LEAs as a proportion of 
their total NAFE budgeth. In two of her three authorities it represented around 3 per 
cent of the total, whereas in another, whose overall budget was much smaller, it made 
up 10 per cent. The significance to the authority therefore would vary in consequence.
The senior MSC NAFE officer interviewed had little sympathy' with individual 
LEAs' complaints that the Fund was not distributed on a pro rata basis20. He felt these 
to stem largely from backwoods authorities' who were doing little and could be 
expected to 'moan'; the complaints were not coming from LEAs who had done much to 
improve. The purpose of the fund was to reward initiative, and to be spent only on 
certain specific things. He felt that the fact that all NAFE money had been allocated 
automatically before had probably helped create the problems the NAFE Initiative was 
seeking to tackle.
The extent of LEA discontent over the Development Fund was explored in the 
LEA survey. Table 6.8 indicated that the issue of specific funding being allocated for 
insufficient periods of time scored highly as a problem, being the third highest factor
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with a score of 66.9. Uncertainty over criteria for allocation of the (then) CRF scored 
62.3 (the sixth highest problem score), whilst 'insufficient integration of CRF projects 
with the rest of NAFE planning1 was a significant but lesser problem, coming thirteenth 
of all the factors listed with a problem score of 46.3.
The MSC survey also explored MSC officers' perceptions of problems in this 
area. Four officers of the nine interviewed identified problems. One (in the same Area 
as the LEA officer cited above) claimed that these had been 'major' and 'frightful'0 .
The other three indicated minor problems, one noting some contractual problems 
arising from the difficulty of getting projects completed within the financial year in 
which funding was made available. Another noted his authority felt it was 'not getting 
its fair share'.
The third of these officers identified a more significant problem0. He stated that in 
his area a number of late starts had led to confusion over the allocation of funds, some 
proposals getting money, others not He claimed that the process had been too informal 
- that much had been arranged by telephone, resulting in what some had felt was a less 
than equable distribution. He suggested that had more of the arrangements in his region 
been conducted in writing, the whole process might have been fairer.
Other interviewees, in claiming this area had not been a source of significant 
problems, indicated how potential difficulties had been tackled in their Areas. One 
officer®, who stated that Development Funding was perhaps more of a problem at 
Regional than local level, stated that local inequities were avoided by the NAFE HEOs 
from the Area Offices of the Region getting together and having a 'carve-up' 
beforehand.
Another officer suggested that this caused no problems provided the LEAs 
believed they had received their fair share*1. In pursuit of this goal she tried to ensure 
that the three LEAs in her Area received fairly even proportions of the annual budget, in 
which attempt she claimed to have been quite successful to date.
In one case the local officer interviewed claimed that, far from causing problems,
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the matter of allocating project money had been of considerable benefit in her Aread.
The Area Office had from the outset shown itself anxious for LEAs to get hold of as 
much money as possible from this source. Having been successful, this had created a 
lot of goodwill between them, and been important in the early stages of building a 
proper partnership. LEAs were encouraged to be ambitious in submitting bids, and to 
have some in reserve at all times in case any additional money should become available.
Two comments offered on early problems in this area were that Head Office 
initially 'had no idea how much work it was taking ont> in delivering the (then) CRF, 
and that the arrangements for CRF had simply 'not been properly though out’d.
7 .5  Labour market information
A central plank of the rationale behind the 1984 NAFE initiative was the perceived need 
to increase the responsiveness of LEA colleges to the requirements of employers. It 
was recognised to be a problematic goal, given the lack of good information about what 
employers really did require. Some pointed to employers' poor record in accurately 
articulating even their own companies* needs*
The generation of labour market information or intelligence (LMI) therefore 
became identified as a crucial area for rapid development, to facilitate both improved 
responsiveness and greater and better marketing of college course provision. Under the 
terms of the NAFE Agreement (reported in Chapter 4) the development of LMI was a 
role assigned to the MSC, which would supply LEAs with accurate and up to date 
information at the local level. This was not intended to discourage LEAs from 
producing their own, but did identify it as a clear MSC responsibility.
The Commission had experienced numerous problems in this area, however. 
Officers in the MSC’s LMI Unit at Moorfoot drew attention to the considerable amount
* This perception that employers had not been good at articulating their own needs was recorded 
by a number of interviewees (d.®£); one MSC survey respondent indicated the further difficulty of 
convincing employers that they could influence course content if they were prepared to detail 
how®.
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of time and money devoted to the development of a system called the Training 
Information Framework, which had eventually to be cancelled, significantly delaying 
progress21. This had been substituted by the smaller and more successful CALLMI 
(Computer-Assisted Local Labour Market Intelligence system) which operated at a 
more local scale. The supply of LMI for the purposes of NAFE had been a key 
consideration in the development of the new system.
The MSC survey investigated the experiences of local LMI delivery from the Area 
Office perspective. Every Area Office supplied each LEA with an annual labour market 
report, in line with its obligation under the Agreement. The form and distribution of this 
report varied, but in general it dealt with similar issues of labour market trends and skill 
shortages identified nationally, regionally and locally from a range of sources. One of 
the major sources was CALLMI. Being a complex system which was not very 
’user-friendly', and because of the requirements of preserving confidentiality, LEAs 
and colleges were generally not given direct access to this, and information from it was 
disseminated in report form.
In addition to the annual report, two Area Offices sent out a quarterly supplement 
(M), one of thesed and one other Area Officec sending out monthly reports. Four 
officers sent out occasional documents, usually topic or sector based, on issues relevant 
to their locality (c.e,f.g). Aside from this, it was up to LEAs and colleges to come to the 
Area Office with requests for additional information, something which occurred to a 
greater or lesser extent across the sample.
With regard to how the supply of LMI issuing from Area Offices had changed 
over the years of joint planning, the officers interviewed gave differing answers. In 
most cases there appeared to be much data about, and generally the overall amount 
seemed to have risen, although in one case the amount produced by the LEA had 
apparently fallen due to reduced resourcesf.
The comments of two interviewees are of particular interest in considering this 
issue. The first of these officers claimed that the amount of LMI supplied had increased 
steadily with the improvement of understanding over what LEAs actually wanted and
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could make use ofd. The other officer stated that in his Area changes had been not so 
much in the overall amount of material supplied, but in the nature and usefulness of that 
which was provided0. It was now less raw, more sorted into Technical Occupation 
Categories (TOCs), and represented an attempt to get the right information to the right 
people, rather than simply producing lots of i t  The first of these two officers claimed 
that her Area Office had never been in the business of 'flooding people with reams of 
indigestible information' in the first place, and that improved understanding and an 
increased flow of intelligence went hand in hand.
There appeared to be a widespread acceptance among local MSC officers that the 
LMI produced in the early days of NAFE planning was not of a high standard, 
although 2 of the 9 officers interviewed were confident that good LMI had always been 
available in their Areas OMO. In one of these cases this was assisted by a very pro-active 
LEA and an HEO in post with long experience in the locality. Even in this case the 
officer concerned suggested LMI had improved over the years of NAFE planning. The 
other of these two officers had worked for thirteen years in this or related fields in a 
metropolitan locality which despite containing three LEAs was almost wholly 
composed of a single Travel To Work Area (TTWA), a neighbouring TTWA 
overlapping it only marginally. Having over this time developed good links with 
industry she felt confident to assert of herself and her colleagues that in terms of LMI, 
'we know our patch'. In contrast, an officer in London complained that with a TTWA 
as large as the capital's, producing LMI for a single borough was highly problematic^.
Several of the officers acknowledged early difficulties in providing LMI. Two of 
these made this point by emphasising how greatly LMI collection and provision had 
improved since NAFE planning began, through improved understanding of what LEAs 
wanted, more systematic methods of gathering information from employers, and an 
improved ability to analyse the data so gathered M). Another stated quite baldly that in 
the early days of NAFE, the 'veracity and quality of LMI was open to question^, and 
tantamount to 'crystal ball gazing'*. The point was made, however, that for the 
situation to improve it had been necessary to gain experience over a period of years 
before the MSC could confidently claim to offer what it aimed This process had 
been inevitable, but had been gone through, as a result of which the MSC's LMI had
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indeed improved and would continue to do so. One of officer emphasised the credibility 
factor at stake on this issue, and stated her belief that MSC credibility in her Area had 
been substantially improved over the recent period* Whereas before the Area Office 
had been guessing at what employers wanted, she now felt it knew what they wanted.
Two other officers, however, offered a much more pessimistic view of MSC LMI 
provision in their Areas. One stated that it was 'not that good at all', being insufficiently 
structured or specific* The other was even more critical, stating a strong personal view 
that in LMI, which she described as an area 'of the most crucial need', the amount 
provided to LEAs was inadequate, and the skills required to use it were lackingg. She 
felt ill-equipped to interpret and make sense of the data produced, and the LEAs in her 
area were no more qualified. Yet they were expected to plan their provision on the basis 
of it. The whole subject was a problem in her Area, a 'hole* in provision, a 'burning 
need' over which something urgently needed to be done. Overall, she felt the MSC 
could provide a better service. An LEA officer in the same Area claimed that the value 
of some of the LMI supplied was 'less than the weight of the paper' upon which it was 
written, stressing particularly a failure to integrate national and regional with local 
data23.
The senior NAFE officer interviewed at MSC Head Office recognised concern in 
this area, stating that 'we were not as clever as we would like to have been in the early 
days'24. He stated however that 'we always had a gut feeling ... which was better than 
LEAs* gut feeling', though not necessarily better than colleges'. LEAs' own LMI had 
been the weakest of all (although some other authority departments were strong in the 
field) but none had the national dimension that the MSC could offer. However, whilst 
the MSC had improved, the LEAs had made 'greater strides’ on LMI, having started 
from a poor base.
Respondents to the LEA survey were asked to offer their judgements on the 
quality of MSC provision, whether 'excellent', 'adequate' or 'inadequate'. Table 7.6 
shows the results to the question, which indicate that only one respondent found MSC- 
provided LMI to be excellent whilst 43.1 per cent saw at as adequate. A majority, 55.4 
per cent, saw it as inadequate. When asked to identify reasons for this inadequacy, the
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Table 7.6: LEA view of kSC-provided LMI
Quality of LLMI provided by MSC: 
(1) excellent
(sample: 65 LEAs)
MSC-provided LLMI is: (a) too detailed.............................
(b) needs to be more summarised
(c) not sufficiently localised .
(d) too localised...........................
(e) other inadequacy....................











Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
299
most common complaint was that the LMI provided was ’not sufficiently localised', 
cited by four-fifths of those who identified an inadequacy. In addition to these data, it is 
worth noting that a further 20 per cent of respondents, all of whom had ticked the 
’adequate’ category, nonetheless recorded dissatisfactions under the heading 'other 
inadequacy1, which suggests that a very large majority of LEA respondents were 
dissatisfied with the MSC's performance in this area. The reasons stated in addition to 
the insufficiency of local detail seemed hinged largely on a lack of analysis of the data 
supplied, as typified by the following observation:
(MSC-provided LMI) is the major source but it is inadequate in so far as it is information not 
intelligence; it makes generalisations from specifics; it sometimes is used to support MSC 
prejudices without evidence. Bill apart from our own evidence it is all we have got25 (my 
italics).
The senior MSC NAFE officer interviewed believed the MSC knew what it 
wanted on LMI, and was 'getting there slowly'. There had been a problem in that at 
first the LEAs had been asking it the wrong questions, to specify which courses were 
required which was 'not our job'; because the LEAs were asking for something the 
MSC could not offer it had been 'on a hiding to nothing'. With the discontent thus 
aroused he could not claim overall to be yet satisfied with the MSC's LMI provision, 
but was nonetheless content that the Commission had been delivering a reasonable 
service; it had 'put a decent act together'26.
Comfort could be drawn for this view from the indication in Table 7.6 that a clear 
majority of the LEA respondents, 77.2 per cent, felt MSC-provided LMI to be 
improving, with only 22.8 per cent feeling otherwise.
The LEA survey also sought to investigate how use of the MSC's LMI data 
compared with that of other sources. A question posed on the subject offered a series of 
options whose importance respondents were invited to indicate in terms of the 
importance with which they figured in the drawing up of NAFE planning priorities.
The results are shown in Table 7.7.
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Table 7.7: Use made bv LEAs of different LMI sources
(a): Results by cateeorv
Respondents indicated the relative importance of the following sources of information on local NAFE requirements in terms of the 









# % # % # % # %
(1) MSC - provided local labour market information............ 15 22.1 29 42.6 20 29.4 4 5.9 68
(2) LMI produced by authority-sponsored surveys................. 15 26.8 23 41.1 6 10.7 12 21.4 56
(3) LMI from other sources.............................................. . 9 23.7 15 39 3 4 10.5 10 26.3 38
(4) comments volunteered by employers to colleges................ 31 47.7 28 43.1 6 9.2 0 0.0 65
(5) information gathered from employers by college s ta ff........ 36 53.7 27 40.3 3 4.5 1 1.5 67
(6) informal sources, e.g. press reports ...................................... 7 11.3 34 54.8 18 29.0 3 4.8 62
(7) judgement of college staff................................................. . 27 41.5 33 50.8 3 4.6 2 3.1 65
(8) others..................................................................................... 6 60.0 2 20.0 1 10.0 1 10.0 1C
(b): Rank try weighted, scores
%
information gathered from employers by college staff  82.1
comments volunteered by employers to colleges....................  79.5
judgement of college staff....................................................... 76.9
MSC - provided local labour market information................... 60.3
LMI produced by authority-sponsored surveys......................  57.7
informal sources, e.g. press reports......................................  57.5
LMI from other sources.........................................................  53.5
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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Part (b) of the Table shows the categories ranked by weighted scores. It is 
apparent from these figures that colleges and college staff were the most significant 
players in this area, the three categories standing out most prominently being 
'information gathered by employers from college staff, ’comments volunteered by 
employers to colleges'*, and the 'judgement of college staff (scoring 82.1,79.5 and 
76.9 per cent respectively). It would seem fair to suggest that these bases for planning, 
especially the latter, represented the traditional approach used by LEAs/colleges, prior 
to the demands for more formally-organised planning systems. If this is accepted, the 
evidence here would indicate that the new structures created by the NAFE Agreement 
had not advanced to the point of replacing the main pre-existing arrangements.
It is significant that the source of information given most attention in the 
discussions leading to the NAFE Agreement, the local LMI provided by the MSC, 
should be only the fourth most prominent, coming well behind the leading three 
sources at 60.3 per cent Four respondents even stated that MSC-provided LMI was 
not used, and only 22.1 per cent considered it very important. It did, however, figure 
slightly more prominently than that produced by authority-sponsored surveys (57.7 per 
cent), with informal sources close behind (57.5 per cent). Respondents did not indicate 
much use of sources other than those listed in the question. The low response suggests 
other forms of LMI were not of great significance in drawing up NAFE planning 
priorities.
On the basis of evidence from the MSC survey, there appeared to be some 
considerable variation in the degree to which LEAs and colleges requested information 
from then MSC. The nature of the LEA/college, whether inclined to be very proactive 
in this field or otherwise, would have been of considerable importance, as would the 
extent of the resources available to i t  There were authorities which differed in these 
regards within the sample of interviews.
For example, one interviewee in the north-easte stressed that his very go-ahead 
county LEA hadAforced to be very proactive in identifying and meeting needs ever since
* The distinction between these two categories being based on the origin of the initiative for the 
link
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the recession in manufacturing (the foundation of the local economy) had begun to hit 
in the late 1970s, and that its gathering and analysis of LMI was consequently very 
advanced. In fact, the interviewee suggested it was it was ahead of the MSC in many 
respects, for example in providing a better 'brokerage' service for pooled labour market 
data than the CALLMI facility.
Two other interviewees identified LEAs within their Areas that were very 
'go-ahead' on the LMI front and had carried the pursuit of such intelligence to an 
advanced stage. In one northern metropolitan Area it was clear that both LEAs would 
much rather have been left to develop this side of the work themselves, and felt quite 
self-sufficient as it wasb. The second of these two officers noted that two of her three 
LEAs lagged behind the other, and had both had marketing audits carried out which had 
showed up deficiencies in their use of LMI in marketing college courses11. Both 
authorities were now beginning to put right these deficiencies.
One officer described how her LEA was engaged in LMI collection of its own, 
having a highly developed system of NAFE subject panels to inform its planning 
process®. But in this and one other cased the interviewees criticised their authorities' use 
of the data made available to them, feeling that much more could have been made of it 
given the will. For example it was suggested that one way in which they could improve 
on this was to test the detail of LMI findings against their own assumptions relating to 
provision, rather than simply treating their collection and identification as an end in 
itselfd. There was criticism from several officers of some LEAs' tendency to regurgitate 
whole extracts from MSC reports in their own Development Plans.
Two further Area officers indicated that colleges in their LEAs were beginning to 
set up LMI units, procedures and databases of their own, but in both cases would 
continue to rely on MSC support for some time yet (c.0. In one case, however, in a 
large metropolitan area with multiple small LEAs, the officer interviewed claimed that 
the authorities' staff had very little idea about LMI at all, and seemed to be straggling 
badly in this areas. A lack of expertise connected with a lack of resources appeared to 
be significant.
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To examine the LMI LEAs generated themselves, a question was posed on the 
subject in the LEA survey. This asked respondents to identify any involvement in a list 
of areas in both the 1984-5 and 1988-9 planning rounds. The results are shown in 
Table 7.8. The Table defines five areas of activity, one having four subsections 
detailing information types. Some of the categories overlap: there is no water-tight 
separation, for example, between a 'systematic consultative process with employers', 
'discussions with employers about future training needs’, and the 'assembly or 
employment of details of anticipated future employer needs'. The categories were 
intended merely to explore different aspects of related themes to achieve a full picture. 
Comparison of results between them is less about trying to discover one area of 
activity's domination over another, more about teasing out priorities within linked 
areas.
Most striking in the light of the above point is therefore the dramatic rise evident 
across the board, all categories showing a rise of over 25 per cent between the two 
years, half of them showing rises of over 50 per cent. Whilst in 1984-5 no category 
showed more than 50 per cent of LEAs engaged in its activity, by 1988-9 only two 
showed under 50 per cent.
Such changes led to a position where in five out of the eight categories listed, 
more than 70 per cent of LEAs are shown to have engaged in such activity. The data 
indicate that the collection of LMI had become an area of considerably greater activity 
for LEAs. In the light of the increased emphasis which had been placed on 
responsiveness and marketing in the period, and the cuts in LEA and college resources 
which necessitated moves in that direction, such increase in activity was not surprising. 
It is noteworthy nonetheless that in the NAFE-related activity for which the MSC 
undertook most responsibility it was LEAs which took much of the initiative.
To consider the individual areas listed, that to which LEAs were clearly devoting 
the most attention to in both 1984-5 and 1988-9 was the recording/employment of 
information on expected changes in local population and student numbers. The figure 
can be seen to have risen from 44.8 per cent in 1984-5 to as high as 95.5 per cent of 
authorities by 1988-9. That demography should have been a key issue at a time when
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Table 7.8: LEA collection of LMI in 1984-5 and 1988-9
Respondents indicated whether the education department did, in 1984-5 or in 1988-9: 1984-5 1988-9
# % # %
(1) Engage in a systematic consultative process with employers........................................ 12 17.9 37 55.2
(2) Record the number of consultations between college/LEA staff and employers............. 4 6.0 21 31.3
(3) Record the nature of consultations between college/LEA staff and employers................ 5 7 5 24 35.8
(4) Assemble/employ: (i) written description of local labour market................................ 17 25.4 57 85.1
(ii) records of labour market data sources..................................... 10 14.9 47 70.1
(iii) info, on expected changes in local population and student nos ... 30 44.8 64 95.5
(iv) details of anticipated future employer needs............................... 13 19.4 50 74.6
(5) Hold discussions with employers about future training needs....................................... 22 32.8 51 76.1
(sample: 67 LEAs)
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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an imminent decline in the number of 16-19 year-olds had received a lot of attention is 
not surprising. What is more interesting is that in 1984-5, before the greater public 
attention to this area, it was the same area which received most LEA attention. This 
says much about LEAs’ planning and awareness prior to the 1984 White Paper and its 
implicit criticisms.
The production of a written description of the local labour market was the second 
most common activity, being conducted by 85.1 per cent of LEAs in 1988-9. A higher 
figure might have been expected as such a description was an integral part of the NAFE 
Development Plan in its typical form. That this was the area to have shown the most 
change since 1984-5 (59.7 per cent) appears to be a clear product of that fact.
The attention being paid to employers’ future needs was clearly up over the 
period, high figures being recorded in 1988-9 for both the assembly/employment of 
details on employers' anticipated future needs (up 55.2 to 74.6 per cent) and for the 
holding of discussions with employers about future training needs (up 43.3 to 76.1 per 
cent). These seemed more significant areas than the systematic consultation of 
employers*: the data show that a lower number of LEAs (55.2 per cent) were pursuing 
this activity in 1988-9. This category also showed the third lowest percentage increase,
37.3 per cent.
The assembly and use of records of labour market sources was an area showing a 
high proportion of LEAs engaged in this pursuit in 1988-9,70.1 per cent, in a category 
which had shown considerable increase (55.2 per cent) since 1984-5. The keeping of 
such records would in itself indicate that this was a matter now treated with much 
greater significance by LEAs. However, the areas in which least activity and least 
change overall was indicated were the recording of the number and the nature of 
consultations between college/LEA staff and employers. The lower figures in these
* There is a potential problem of semantics here, in that the intended rather subtle differences in 
meaning between 'systematic consultations' and the holding of 'discussions about future training 
needs' may not have been picked up by respondents answering a long questionnaire. The 
intended distinction was between the gathering of information from employers relating to 
decisions on future planning, and the involvement of employers in a dialogue about provision 
current at the time of the consultation.
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categories evident in both years seems to suggest that the development of LMI itself and 
the general approach to its collection were more important to LEAs than keeping a 
detailed track of how the information was being assembled piece by piece.
U i  Liaison with other groups
The discussion aroused by Training for Jobs accused NAFE, as an aspect of its 
supposedly insufficient responsiveness, of being out of touch with other interested 
parties, notably its employer clients. The two surveys sought evidence on the level and 
nature of LEAs1 contact with other bodies after several years of joint planning.
Table 7.1 indicated which groups were most commonly represented on LEAs' 
NAFE boards or committees, finding that representatives of individual employers and 
trade unions were included in only a minority (both 43.6 per cent) of cases, whilst . 
Chambers of Commerce (30.8 per cent) and 'other1 groups (17.9 per cent) were even 
less commonly present. Given that such committees exited in only just over half of the 
LEAs surveyed, these figures do not suggest extensive liaison in this area.
Another question in the LEA survey asked if respondents' authorities had 
'frequent discussions' with each of the five bodies listed in Table 7.9. This shows that, 
apart from the MSC (which might have been expected to be involved in frequent 
discussions in more than 67.1 per cent of cases), only Industrial Training Boards were 
involved with a significant number of LEAs (35.7 per cent), the other groups shown all 
falling below 16 per cent.
To consider how this issue was being pursued from the MSC side, respondents to 
the MSC survey were asked to state whether they had a policy of forging links 
themselves with other bodies over NAFE. Those who responded divided evenly as to 
whether they felt such a task to be their responsibility or one for the LEAs. Four 
indicated that they did pursue this objective: one was 'a firm believer in networking'®, 
another that forging such links was 'very much a policy' with hime, another indicating 
that she took 'a proactive approach^. One of the four, whilst seeing this as his role,
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Table 7.9: LEA discussions with other bodies over NAFE
Respondents indicated whether the authority/its colleges held frequent discussions with any o f the following
(1) Industrial Training Boards................................................................*........................... 25 35.7
(2) Non-Statutory Training Organisations........................................................................ 11 15.7
(3) M SC................................................................................................................................ 47 67.1
(4) private-sector training bodies..................................................................................... 7 10.0
(5) European Social Fund........................... ...................................................................... 8 11.4
sample: 70 LEAs
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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claimed it to be more so on the LMI side than in NAFEf. Four officers considered this 
an LEA job OwU). One stated that his role in this was to oversee the LEAs' efforts and 
ensure that they were forging such links0. Another, whilst believing this to be an LEA 
task did note that her position was a little different because of her personal history of 
involvement in the area; she knew people in most of these bodies for a variety of 
reasons, and so happened already to have a well-established local network.
Another stressed that it was an LEA responsibility as it was 'their Plan'd. She 
stated that it was 'not our job to organise these things', for one thing because the Area 
Office did not have the resources which would be necessary. However, she did indicate 
that the Area Office had sometimes taken the initiative in order to get things done. This 
officer did note that, along with the LEAs, the Area Office had tried Tiard and long’ to 
get consultative arrangements (an aim clearly stated in the national guidance) for NAFE 
involving a range of client and other organisations off the ground, without success. 
There had been a poor response to such overtures (little interest being expressed, for 
example, by the Local Employer Network which had been repeatedly approached) and 
the officer appeared very cynical about employer commitment to such arrangements.
1_JL Curriculum change
The criticisms levelled at NAFE in Training for Jobs suggesting that college courses 
were not relevant to the requirements of employers and that LEA provision ought to be 
more responsive and flexible implied a need for curriculum change. An ACC officer 
interviewed claimed that there had been 'little change in the basic shape of FE', some 
provision being the same as it had been twenty years before27. It was therefore 
important, in assessing the impacts of the NAFE initiative, to investigate the extent to 
which the curriculum had been altered as a consequence of the newly instituted joint 
planning arrangements.
The analysis of curriculum change was identified by an FEU officer interviewed 
as a notoriously difficult area, that any claims made could be substantiated only over a 
lengthy period28. The evidence presented here should be viewed with this consideration
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very much in mind.
To serve this purpose, LEA survey asked a question aimed to examine 
respondents’ perceptions of trends in the NAFE curriculum. Under a series of 
categories they were invited to indicate the changes experienced in their authority 
between 1984-5 and 1988-9. They were asked to do this by ticking boxes labelled 
’increase/large increase', 'decrease/large decrease', or 'no change'*. It is important to 
stress that the question investigated respondents' perceptions only, and should not be 
taken as an objective measure of change. Nonetheless, the perceptions of those 
intimately involved in the planning of NAFE courses are of considerable value in 
seeking to evaluate the impacts of the Agreement upon curriculum change.
To further the pursuit of such evaluation, an attempt was made in this case also to 
investigate the issue of causality, by explicitly asking respondents to estimate the impact 
of the NAFE Agreement, offering them a choice between 'major', 'minor', and 'no 
impact'.
Before examining the results it is useful to consider each course type specified. 
The first category, new courses, was very significant to the NAFE Initiative. If it were 
to have had a substantial impact upon the delivery of NAFE in the sense of increasing 
responsiveness, it might be expected that there would be evidence of substantial growth 
in the provision of new courses. The same would be true for the redesigning of existing 
courses, in addition to which would be an anticipated rise in the number of courses 
being discontinued.
Full-cost courses were becoming important prior to the 1984 White Paper, and are 
an example of the kind of course the MSC were exhorting LEAs to promote as an 
aspect of improved marketing in NAFE. In many cases the terms 'short' and 'full-cost 
courses' described the same entity. Again these were becoming common prior to the
* Important to note is that the data generated here are impressionistic, and that respondents 
perceptions of the trends should not be taken necessarily as an accurate picture. Nonetheless, 
given the respondents' expertise and their proximity to these changes, they do provide us with a 
version of events sufficiently reliable from which to draw conclusions about apparent patterns, 
and the impact of the NAFE initiative upon these.
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1984 NAFE initiative, and might be expected to show a similar pattern.
Certified modular courses represented component parts of overall qualifications 
which could be aggregated over a period of time suited to students/employers needs. It 
was an aspect of the flexibility much vaunted by the MSC and those who perceived the 
need for greater diversity in the nature of college courses offered.
Traditional apprenticeship courses were listed as a contrary example to the other 
types of course shown, being one which had seen considerable decline since the 1970s, 
the focus of much negative attention from both the MSC and the government, who 
viewed it as an anachronistic impediment to their current goals. Along with the 
promotion of short and full-cost courses, distance/open learning was the type of change 
towards greater responsiveness and flexibility which was being advocated in MSC and 
other circles during the 1980s. A large increase would be expected.
The results to the question are shown in Table 7.10. More revealing than the raw 
results shown in part(a) of the Table is the ranking of the categories by weighted scores 
shown in parts (b) and (c). Part (b) shows the categories in rank order by their 
weighted degree of change, and indicates as expected that distance/open learning, short 
courses and full-cost courses were the areas of greatest perceived change. New courses 
and redesigned courses also show weighted percentages of above 40 per cent, 
indicating significant changes the curriculum. Interestingly, however, there was 
considerably less evidence of discontinued courses, a category which scores only 19.4. 
Unsurprisingly, traditional apprenticeships showed a very marked decline, scoring - 
47.6. It is evident that the perceived increases occurred most visibly in areas which had 
been the focus of much attention in the 1980s, the type of provision which the 
government and MSC had been seeking to promote through such initiatives as the 1984 
White Paper and subsequent joint NAFE planning.
It is important to note that none of the categories showed a truly dramatic increase, 
the highest score being only 51.6 out of a possible 100. The message appears to be that 
such change as occurred, though in some cases significant, was relatively modest 
overall.
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Table 7.10: Curriculum change in NAFE
(a) Trends bv category
Trends, between 1984-5 and 1988-9, and the degree to which respondents felt the NAFE Agreement had been a significant factor 









Impact of NAFE Agreement 




(1) new courses................................... 10.6 68.2 18.2 3.0 0.0 66 6.5 62.9 30.6 62
(2) redesigned courses.......................... 9.0 67.2 22.4 1.5 0.0 67 6.3 47.6 46.0 63
(3) discontinued courses....................... 1.6 40.3 53.2 4.8 0.0 62 3.4 44.8 51.7 58
(4) full-cost courses............................. 15.9 65.1 14.3 4.8 0.0 63 7.9 38.1 54.0 63
(5) short courses.............................. 12.3 72.3 13.8 1.5 0.0 65 3.3 43.3 53.3 60
(6) certified modular courses................. 0.0 60.3 39.7 0.0 0.0 58 12.5 37.0 59.3 16
(7) traditional apprenticeship courses..... 0.0 3.2 14.5 66.1 16.1 62 1.8 19.3 78.9 57
(8) amount of distance/open learning.... 15.6 71.9 12.5 0.0 0.0 64 20.0 433 36.7 60
(b) Rank order o f categories fry % chame fweiehted score) (c ) Rank order ofcateeories fry impact (weighted score)
% Rank by
Score % change
(8) amount of distance/open learning.... 433 1
(1) new courses .................................... 37.9 4
(6) certified modular courses................. 31.0 6
(2) redesigned courses........................... 30.2 5
(4) full-cost courses............................. 27.0 3
(3) discontinued courses....................... 25.9 7
(5) short courses................................. 25.0 2
(7) traditional apprenticeship courses..... 11.4 8
% Rank by
Score impact
(8) amount of distance/open learning.... 51.6 1
(5) short courses................................. 47.7 7
(4) full-cost courses...................... ...... 46.0 5
(1) new courses................................... 43.2 2
(2) redesigned courses.......................... 41.8 4
(6) certified modular courses................. 30.2 3
(3) discontinued courses....................... 19.4 6
(7) traditional apprenticeship courses..... -47.6 8
Source: Compiled by die author from LEA survey data
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The figures shown in part (c) of the Table reveal perceptions of the NAFE 
Agreement's effects upon the changes identified in part (b). The first thing to note is 
that in no category was the Agreement seen as being a decisive causal factor, the 
highest weighted score being only 43.3. The second is that the rank order for impacts is 
markedly different than for the degree of chaiige in each category. Whilst the 
Agreement was seen to have had most impact on the area of greatest change - 
distance/open learning - it was seen to have had less impact other areas. That the 
Agreement should be perceived to have had little effect upon the demise of traditional 
apprenticeships is unsurprising. More striking is its perceived lack of influence over the 
growth in short and full-cost courses, both in the top three growth categories over the 
period, and discontinued courses. More significant was its perceived impacts upon new 
courses and certified modular courses (only considered the sixth most important of 
these categories of change). It is highly significant to this consideration that in 5 of the 
8 categories put to respondents here a majority of them believed the NAFE Agreement 
to have had no impact at all upon the changes which they indicated to have taken place.
The implications for assessing the impacts of the NAFE Agreement and its 
associated initiatives are not fully clear. Firstly it must be remembered that the above are 
perceptions, and therefore open to the distortions of ignorance, misjudgment and 
prejudice. Secondly it cannot be assumed that because the respondents do not generally 
perceive a great impact in these areas that the same can be expected to apply in others. 
Nonetheless, it remains significant that in one of the few cases where respondents were 
asked explicitly to make their views clear on the subject of the Agreement's causal 
impact, the result has been, on the best interpretation, a lukewarm suggestion of limited 
effects; at worst, a dismissal of the new structures being seen as an effective force for 
change.
Zi& Evaluation
The purpose of this section is to collate and present the perceptions of various 
interviewees and survey responses on the broad changes which had taken place as a 
consequence of the NAFE initiative. It then explores their views on the significance of
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the MSC as one amongst a number of possible causal factors, on the commitment of 
LEAs to the joint planning process, and on alternatives for the future direction of 
NAFE. The information presented is intended to act as a basis for evaluation of the 
overall impacts of the NAFE initiative upon the practice of NAFE planning.
7.8 (i) Changes associated with the NAFE initiative
An ACC officer interviewed addressed the question of the impacts of national policy 
initiatives, as typified by Training for Jobs and the subsequent NAFE Agreement2^ . 
Observing that 'these things change the shape of the paperwork1, he questioned 
whether they had much effect beyond this upon actual provision, over and above what 
would have happened anyway. Many different views were expressed in answer to this 
question in the course of the empirical investigation, a number of which are considered 
here.
The senior MSC NAFE officer interviewed at Moorfoot believed the NAFE 
initiative had brought genuine benefits, most notably in establishing amongst LEA 
planners an acceptance'of the need for constructing an overview of provision in order to 
plan effectively30. He accepted the need for further improvements, stating that there 
were still 'too many wheels not attached to the wagon' of good practice, but that 
progress was being made. In addition to this, a range of other beneficial developments 
were cited. The ACC officer stressed the galvanising effect of the initiative in creating 
an impetus for change, pushing LEA FE sections into action by giving the system a 
'shake-up'; it prevented NAFE from getting submerged in shorter-term issues by 
creating a 'longer-term crisis' which had to be addressed. This had in some cases 
instigated activity, in others accelerated existing practice. Three LEA officers 
interviewed also identified this factor as significant31. The ACC officer also claimed the 
NAFE Agreement to have been 'infinitely better than the alternative', i.e. the original 
Training for Jobs proposals. It had 'shifted the emphasis of planning from control to 
something a bit more forward-looking', improving the quality of judgements being 
made in NAFE.
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An LEA officer, asked to assess the benefits of the joint planning exercise said the 
answer depended 'on who is asking the question'32. If it were the MSC, the answer 
would be that the NAFE initiative had had its intended effect, that LEAs would 'never 
have got their act together had the MSC not wielded its stick’ to bring about change. 
This was because the MSC 'have institutional masters to please', for whom they had to 
produce results. In reality, joint NAFE planning was 'a paper exercise' - a 'game' 
designed 'to get the money back from the MSC'.
The above officer nonetheless listed a number of real benefits he perceived to have 
accrued from the Agreement Advantages he and other LEA officers identified included 
the raising of NAFE as a priority within their education departments, and notably 
improvements in the collection and presentation of information on NAFE courses, 
which had improved LEA understanding of what happened in colleges, helped identify 
any bad provision and assisted LEAs in responding to the Joint Efficiency Study**33. 
One officer noted that whilst her authority's NAFE priorities had not significantly 
changed as a consequence of joint planning, they were now much better articulated, 
being based on a sharp rationale rather than lecturer's whim*34.
The NAFE initiative had also created a new awareness for LEAs, providing them 
with 'new terms of reference' and new ideas on how to approach planning. One officer 
cited as an example the introduction to NAFE of the 'self-evident virtue of the MSC's 
message of resource management'. The creation of a clear-cut planning cycle was an 
advance, and had established better co-ordination and structures for improved 
responsiveness. Part of the advantage of greater coordination lay in the fact that 
colleges had 'learnt from each other'33. A respondent to the LEA survey identified a 
positive development in that 'the involvement of the MSC has been useful in ensuring 
the performance of an explicit legal duty'.
Disbenefits identified primarily stressed the administrative burden created by joint 
planning, a problem identified as highly significant in Chapter 6. One LEA officer 
complained that it had cost 'a lot of time and money' and was a very bureaucratic
* (see next section)
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exercise, another that the heavy requirement for detail was an unnecessary cost36. The 
former suggested that the Agreement had had much effect upon the management and 
administration of NAFE, little on actual provision, echoing the view expressed earlier.
The ACC officer interviewed picked up on the idea of the MSC's need to satisfy
its political masters as a weakness of the planning exercise, a weakness which meant
the whole process had become 'perverted in operation' - a foreseeable consequence.
Another agency fulfilling the same task as the MSC 'would have moved more slowly,
but might have had more universal genuine success'. The pursuit of change had been
hasty and 'based on a false analysis of the problem’ (that NAFE courses were
overpriced and uncompetitive); in consequence it was 'likely to be an arid exercise'.
The Agreement was principally flawed because its efforts were concentrated towards
improving results rather than processes. In consequence it had not escaped the old 
of
problem planning reactively, failing to emphasise the need to get the process of NAFE
A
delivery right before being able to sensibly judge results in terms of individual courses. 
The problem had been that processes were 'sadly, not measurable in MSC terms'. 
Instead of actually improving such areas as consultation with employers, LEAs' efforts 
were being concentrated but on 'satisfying the MSC officers that these things (were) 
being done’.
One of the main positive outcomes of the NAFE initiative this officer identified 
were that the 'creative tensions' set up between MSC and LEA officers had been 
fruitful and constructive, their 'love-hate relationship' being better than a consensus 
arrangement because more stimulating to both parties.
7.8 (ii) MSC impacts upon NAFE
It is clear that a series of changes affecting the planning, administration and delivery of 
NAFE occurred during the period 1984-9. Some of these, such as the writing of a 
NAFE Development Plan and monitoring an Annual Programme are directly attributable 
to the influence of the MSC, but other more general changes, in areas such efficiency, 
cost-effectiveness, the flexibility, responsiveness and relevance of provision, the
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introduction of new types of courses and the decline of old forms, have no clear causal 
links. This section considers the views of interviewees and survey respondents on the 
significance of the MSC as one amongst a number of possible factors responsible for 
such changes.
The senior NAFE officer interviewed at MSC Head Office acknowledged an 
interest in claiming credit for positive changes, but stated his belief that 'we have 
moved things along'37. The Commission's main impact had been to instigate change 
along a common front, suggesting that 'some (LEAs) would have done all this of their 
own volition and done it very well, whilst others would have done nothing'. It would 
be 'oversimplified' to suggest that all LEAs were moving in the right direction anyway, 
and the MSC had played an important role in 'speeding up the back markers’.
Of the LEA officers interviewed, one stated that the MSC had Tiad an effect, but 
then so have lots of other things'3^ . She believed its intervention to have been an agent 
of change, but not a directive one, a view shared by another officer who saw its 
contribution to have been indirect: its involvement in NAFE had caused change to 
occur, but those changes were determined by others3^ . This idea was summarised by 
an academic commentator thus:
Changes in the last ten years have generally been a case of colleges responding on their own 
initiative to changed circumstances. But the MSC has been involved in changing those 
circumstances.40
Other LEA officers claimed the MSC to have been a factor, but only a contributory 
one amongst others, against whose influence the Commission's was hard to w e ig h 4 1. 
One officer stated it had been 'part of a larger process, but the biggest factor in that 
process'42.
The MSC survey explored its interviewees’ opinions on the role of the 
Commission in effecting change in NAFE, and found that their views did not widely 
diverge. There was a widespread belief that similar changes would have taken place 
anyway, but not necessarily in the same form and almost certainly not at the same pace
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(a,b,e,f). One officer was very circumspect in making this judgement, stating that such 
change would have happened anyway only 'possibly1, and then very much more 
slowly*. Her LEA, she claimed, had previously been ’content to let colleges get on with 
it'. This meant that there would have been inter-LEA variation in developments had the 
MSC not been involved, some colleges being more 'go-ahead' than others over 
marketing and other matters. Without the NAFE Agreement, this officer claimed, some 
colleges in her Area would still have been doing the same thing as in 1984.
An officer in a northern metropolitan Area suggested that without the involvement 
of the MSC the developments in NAFE would have happened anyway, 'or they (the 
colleges) would have gone out of business^. However, the MSC had stepped up the 
pace of change by delivering a 'shock to the system'.
Another officer who indicated that change would have occurred regardless of 
MSC involvement stated that LEAs 'were working on it, but were not focused'*, 
another that they 'were moving that way, but ffagmentally'e. NAFE had 'pulled the 
thing together' for them, and concentrated their efforts towards this end. The process of 
development had been speeded up by the NAFE Agreement, which had allowed the 
release of more resources through a raising of the priority given to FE within LEAs. 
Another officer noted that prior to the Agreement authorities had few resources to 
devote to FE planning, and that the MSC had forced an increase in the allocation of 
these resources through its demands4.
None of the officers suggested that the MSC had been the principal reason for 
change, although one did claim it had been 'a substantial factor'g. One officer stressed 
that the MSC's influence had only been one of a series of factors, that it was not 
possible to claim any changes to have occurred 'as a result o f  its influence alone4.
Some changes were clearly direcdy consequent upon MSC initiatives, but these had 
only been possible because the other factors were already present
Of the other factors nominated by the 9 interviewees, demographic change was the 
most commonly cited, by 5 officers (a,b,d,g,h). One indicated that falling rolls would 
have had a big impact - given the decline in the number of 16 year olds, and with it the
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number of students on YTS placements, colleges would have had to either shed staff or 
look for new markets®. Another officer noted that this factor hit first at college level, 
whose staff had a greater awareness of its importance as it fundamentally affected their 
'bread and butter'd. This had greatly boosted college activities in marketing and 
follow-up, which had rapidly accelerated the pace of change.
Various other factors influencing changes in NAFE were mentioned. General ones 
included increased competition between colleges (linked to demographic decline)b, 
greater links between LEAs/colleges and employers^, pressures brought about through 
changes associated with YTS on those courses where it had been involved^, and the 
important directive role of senior college managements. One interviewee spoke of there 
having been 'economic, social and political' factors at workh. The effect of the Joint 
Efficiency Study (JES) which recommended improvements in colleges was seen by this 
officer as a pressure, but one whose strength was questionable; it was not a major 
motivation for LEAs, she claimed, they were 'very grudging’ about its proposals. One 
other officer cited the JES as a contributory factor in his LEA, along with financial 
pressure caused by restraints on local government spending*.
Local factors were cited in a number of cases. One officer mentioned the issue of 
providing for ethnic minorities as an impetus for change in the largest city in her LEA®. 
Two others mentioned the influx of money through Urban Development Corporations 
and the European Social Fund in Areas which had seen much industrial decline (eJO, 
and 'horrific unemployment*11. One of these had noted that his authority had been 
particularly adept at attracting money from such sources, its proactive stance clearly 
being an important factor contributing to change*5.
One officer claimed that the alliance of the two institutions, LEAs and the MSC, 
had been a force which had instigated 'tremendous change'd. Another officer, in 
commenting on the significance of the MSC's role in altering NAFE, indicated that the 
question of whether it had become involved or not was perhaps a redundant one, 
because 'if it hadn't been us it would have been the DTT'f.
The LEA survey sought to produce some more extensive data on perceptions in
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this area. It asked two questions on the subject. The first specifically asked respondents 
about the impact of the MSC, whether the evident changes in NAFE could be attributed 
to its activities, and if so whether its influence had been to initiate new developments, 
or merely to accelerate change which would have occurred anyway. The results are 
shown in Table 7.11.
The results show that a clear majority of respondents believed that the MSC had 
played an influential role in altering the administration and delivery of NAFE since 
1984. A small group only (17.4 per cent) felt such changes would not have occurred 
without the intervention of the MSC, but 71.0 per cent believed that whilst such 
changes would have occurred anyway, they would have taken longer. Only 11.6 per 
cent felt that the changes would have taken place had the MSC been involved or not 
The results indicate that respondents generally supported the view which saw the MSC 
as having had a galvanising effect upon the NAFE field; few felt its impact had made 
decisive changes which were not already in train, but even fewer felt it had not been 
influential.
The second question analysing this subject aimed to set respondents’ views about 
the impact of the MSC upon NAFE in the context of other causal influences. It 
approached this by asking them to rank a series of given factors in descending order of 
impact These categories are indicated in Figure 7.7.
The category ’overall changes in economic, industrial and employment conditions 
in the 1980s' emerged as the most significant factor in altering the delivery of NAFE 
since 1984, with a percentage point score of 23.0. The second highest score was for 
'other national influences' at 20.9 per cent, with MSC involvement close behind on
20.3 per cent. Direct budgetary constraint through RSG scored 18.7 per cent, whilst 
the remaining categories were further behind: 'changes within the authority' on 12.3 
per cent, and 'others' on 4.8 per cent.
Perhaps the most significant finding to emerge from these data is that no one factor 
or group of factors stood out above any other in terms of their perceived impact. The 
top four categories fell within 4.3 percentage points of one another, and all the
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Table 7 1 U  LEA perceptions o f  MSCLinfluence in NAFE
Please indicate which o f the following statements you would most agree with. (sample: 69 LEAs)
Changes which have occurred in NAFE since 1984 would :
(1) not have occurred without MSC involvem ent...............................................
(2) have occurred without MSC involvement but would have taken longer





Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
Figure 7.7: MSC influence in NAFE compared against other factors
Respondents ranked the following factors in terms o f their overall significance in altering the delivery o f NAFE  
provision since 1984. (The results have been weighted and averaged, the figures indicated in the graph below  
representing the percentage each factor scored.)
30
(1) MSC involvement
(2) other national influences, e.g. Audit Commission,
Joint Efficiency Study etc.
(3) direct budgetary constraint through Rate Support Grant 20
(4) changes within the authority, e.g. in its political 
complexion, in its officer personnel etc.
(5) overall changes in economic, industrial and 10 
employment conditions in the 1980s
(6) others
(sample: 69 LEAs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Source: Compiled by the author from LEA survey data.
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influences contained within these can consequently be deduced to have had a very 
significant impact.
Although MSC involvement did not score highest, to be so prominently cited 
alongside the other, grouped factors makes it stand out as having been a crucial 
determinant of change. Likewise, budgetary constraint was perceived as a strongly 
influential single factor. The role of other national influences cannot be deduced on an • 
individual basis, but collectively it is clear that these too were very important.
However, the strongest influences were nonetheless attributed by these responses 
to changes in the overall structures within which NAFE operated. The extent to which 
these in turn were affected by NAFE and the MSC is difficult to estimate, but clearly a 
very wide field of contributory causes must be considered when seeking to establish 
reasons for change in NAFE.
7.8 (iii) LEAs’ commitment to planning
It was reported in Chapter 4 that when Training for Jobs was first introduced, the 
reaction of LEAs was generally very negative. The initial adverse response of LEAs to 
the White Paper, the extended period of dispute which followed, and the evident 
reluctance with which many authorities entered into the joint planning process after the 
NAFE Agreement all suggested that LEAs' commitment to NAFE planning originally 
was not high. The subsequent NAFE Agreement and practice of joint planning might be 
expected to have seen a warming in LEA attitudes to the approach to NAFE being 
advocated by the MSC, though an MSC local officer interviewed in 1988 suggested 
that there was 'no enthusiasm for the process anywhere' within his community of five 
LEAs43. The accuracy of this view across the country had not been established, 
however, and it was consequently important to examine the extent of LEAs' 
commitment to the NAFE planning process.
This was approached in both the LEA and MSC surveys. A question in the former 
focussed on strategic objectives identified in government and MSC documents and
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Table 7.12: LEA support for stated MSC objectives in NAFE
Respondents indicated the level of support they considered the authority to lend to each of the following objectives in NAFE:
strongly no strongly
CO
supports supports view opposes opposes
# % # % # % # % # %
(1) Improving further colleges’ responsiveness to employers' needs..... 39 55.7 31 44.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 70
(2) Raising the profile of NAFE planning amongst LEA priorities..... 21 31.3 37 55.2 8 11.9 1 1.5 0 0.0 67
(3) LEAs to develop a clearly defined set o f NAFE objectives............ 30 43.5 32 46.4 7 10.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 69
(4) Emphasis on manpower planning above other NAFE objectives... 1 1.5 13 19.4 35 52.2 18 26.9 0 0.0 67
(5) Tailoring shape and content of courses to employers’/other clients'
specific requirements...................... ........................................ 14 20.3 51 73.9 3 4.3 1 1.4 0 0.0 69
(6) Emphasis amongst client needs upon those of employers............ 5 8.3 32 53.3 16 26.7 6 10.0 1 1.7 60
(7) Development of an LEA marketing strategy for NAFE............... 20 29.4 44 64.7 2 2.9 2 2.9 0 0.0 68
(8) Heavy authority involvement in the collection of labour market
information............................................................................ 12 17.9 26 38.8 17 25.4 12 17.9 0 0.0 67
(9) Improving college cost-effectiveness......................................... 27 39.1 41 59.4 1 1.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 69
(10) Increasing student-staff ratios................................................... 12 17.9 41 61.2 14 20.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 67
(11) Increasing the scope and volume of curriculum and student data
collected by LEAs.................................................................. 11 16.2 47 69.1 9 13.2 1 1.5 0 0.0 68
(12) Greater monitoring and evaluation o f NAFE by LEAs................ 15 22.1 49 72.1 4 5.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 68
(13) Development of new learning strategies e.g. open learning,
short courses............................................................................ 32 46.4 34 49.3 3 4.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 69
(14) Greater course flexibility e.g. in lengths, starting dates, hours
per week etc............................................................................. 29 42.0 33 47.8 7 10.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 69
statements, and investigated the extent to which LEAs were in agreement with these 
positions. This can be taken as one measure of the commitment of the authorities to the 
premises upon which joint MSC-LEA NAPE planning was based, and an indication of 
which aspects received LEAs' most enthusiastic support.
Respondents were asked to indicate, for a series of objectives, the strength of their 
authority's support on a range from 'strongly supports' to 'strongly opposes'. The 
results are shown in Table 7.12. To increase their value the raw data were weighted to 
produce an overall score for the aggregated level of support/opposition in each case*. 
The results are shown in Table 7.13 below:
Table 7.13: LEA support for listed NAFE objectives (weighted figures)
1) Improving further colleges' responsiveness to employers' needs..............77.9
13) Development of new learning strategies, e.g. open learning, short courses.. 71.0
9) Improving college cost-effectiveness ....................................................68.8
3) LEAs to develop a clearly defined set of NAFE objectives....................  66.7
14) Greater course flexibility, e.g.in lengths, start dates, hours/week etc.......... 65.9
7) Development of an LEA marketing strategy for NA FE...........................60.3
2) Raising the profile of NAFE planning amongst LEA priorities.................58.2
12) Greater monitoring and evaluation of NAFE by LEA s........................... 58.1
5) Tailoring shape and content of courses to clients specific requirements 56.5
11) Increasing scope/volume of curriculum & student data collected by LEA.... 50.0
10) Increasing student-staff ratios .............................................................. 48.5
8) Heavy authority involvement in the collection of L M I............................28.4
6) Emphasis amongst client needs of those of employers........................... 28.3
4) Emphasis on manpower planning above other NAFE objectives............... -2.2
* The categories were multiplied by weightings thus: strongly supports=2, supports=l, no 
view=0, opposes=-l, strongly opposes=-2. They were then calculated as a percentage of the 
maximum possible score (i.e.had all responded 'strongly supports'). Thus a 100% score would 
reflect the fullest support, -100% the fullest opposition.
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The most striking general point to emerge from these data is that the level of 
support for the objectives was generally high, with only one category attracting a 
negative score and ten out of fourteen receiving levels of support of 50 per cent or over. 
The general finding is therefore that there was a high level of commitment on the part of 
LEAs to the basic objectives upon which the NAFE initiative was founded.
To consider the individual objectives, the most popular was 'improving further 
colleges* responsiveness to employers' needs', which attracted a score of 77.9 per 
cent The approval of responsiveness is unsurprising, but significant is the implicit 
acceptance that there was room for improvement, given the objections raised against the 
assertions of Training for Jobs on this subject noted in Chapter 4. The same 
observation would apply to the strong support for improving college cost-effectiveness 
(68.8 per cent) and course flexibility (65.9 per cent score).
The high score for the development of new learning strategies (71.0 per cent)
reflects the developments noted in section 7.7, and strong support for the idea of the
In
NAFE Development Plan is evidenyhe score for LEAs to develop a clearly defined set 
of NAFE objectives' (66.7 per cent).
Several of the listed objectives fall in the range of around 48-60 per cent, which 
indicate significant but not overwhelming levels of support for marketing in NAFE, 
according NAFE a higher priority within LEAs, increased LEA monitoring and 
evaluation, tailoring courses to specific client demands, LEA collection of curriculum 
and student data and increasing student staff ratios.
Of the less popular objectives, the most outstanding here was 'emphasis on 
manpower planning above other NAFE objectives', which attracted more opposition 
than support This finding indicates to have been widespread the view picked up in 
informal interviews. LEAs did not in general support the MSC-backed view that the 
primary purpose of NAFE was to supply skilled labour to industry, the consideration 
of individuals and more specifically educational issues being secondary considerations. 
That it was these latter aspects of NAFE provision that prompted this opposition is 
underlined by the finding that the category 'emphasis amongst client needs of those of
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employers' received a score of only 28.3 per cent. The third category to fall well below 
most others was 'heavy authority involvement in the collection of LMT, at 28.4 per 
cent. The finding suggests this to have been an area for which LEAs felt they should 
not carry a heavy responsibility.
In order to further explore the issue of LEA commitment to joint NAFE planning, 
the MSC survey asked its respondents to assess the commitment of LEAs to the 
process, focussing in particular upon the extent to which they genuinely supported the 
new procedures or alternatively perceived them more as a means of securing income.' 
They were also asked, five years on from the White Paper, to indicated how the 
situation had changed since joint planning began.
One officer noted that in the early days there had been little or no enthusiasm for 
NAFE from either of her LEAs, each of whom had sent in initial Development Plans of 
eight and four double-spaced pages respectively, and made ’the usual political 
objections'*1. One of these, a single college LEA, had remained unenthusiastic 
throughout, its Development Plan still being written by a college head of department. 
The other, however, had become very committed 'once over the initial hump', a 
process aided by the retirement of some key personalities. The authority in question 
had, she claimed, taken the whole process on board and made it work for itself. The 
quality of its Development Plan had risen dramatically over the planning rounds, and it 
now had its colleges writing their own Plans in the same style. Whilst the authority 
going for what it wanted had meant the Plan did not conform to the MSC standard 
requirement, as a demonstration of the LEA's enthusiasm to make planning work it was 
a welcome development The LEA now regarded the joint structures with the MSC as 
an integral part of its planning process, rather than an additional part.
Several officers indicated that their LEAs were very enthusiastic in their 
commitment to planning. One of these noted that this would not have been the case a 
few years previously, that her LEA had 'come round' over timea. This was because it 
had taken a certain amount of time for its staff to be able to see the results of NAFE 
planning and the benefits therein.
3 2 6
An officer in a northern metropolitan Area indicated a commitment to make the 
NAFE process work had arisen in her LEAs out of a sense of 'who are they coming in 
telling us what to do ?', prompting them to see that things were done they wanted them 
to beb. Also, there was a desire 'not to appear as duffers'; the LEAs wanted to be 'on 
top of the game'.
Another officer noted a similar pattern of development, both his LEAs being now 
enthusiastic about NAFE when at first they had been resistant0. Initially they had 
regarded the production of the Development Plan and Annual Programme as 'a burden' 
and 'a chore', but now had a much greater sense of 'ownership' and involvement. One 
authority had shown enthusiasm for monitoring from a very early stage, the other had 
taken longer. The LEAs had been 'brought screaming from what they wanted to do to 
what they had to do'. It was the case that then especially, in the light of the imminent 
ERA legislation, the LEAs had come to realise the importance of monitoring and 
planning. However, the MSC was 'unlikely to get any official thanks' from them for 
this - the LEAs' executive NAFE officers were more appreciative of the benefits than 
were their political masters.
Two further officers claimed their LEAs to be very enthusiastic about the joint 
planning process. One claimed both his LEAs to be very committed to NAFE planning, 
and that both would follow the MSC's 'flavours of the month' even if they were not 
keen on themf. At the outset one of these had been Very amenable' to the process, 
whilst the other had taken 'a little persuasion at the political level' before it became 
enthusiastic. The interviewee stated that reasons for this could be attributed to the 
former having been a centralist authority already given to the issuing of directives to its 
colleges, whereas the other had previously taken 'a fairly laid-back approach'.
The other of these two officers noted that for his 'very committed' authority, 
which had previously identified that the divisions of its colleges' work into designated 
areas of expertise were beginning to slip, the NAFE Agreement had come along at the 
right time to tackle thise. It had allowed the LEA to re-impose its control over college 
activity, the MSC providing a useful 'whipping boy' on whom to deflect the blame. 
For this authority cooperation in NAFE planning was definitely not simply a matter of
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seeking the MSC's money. Other interviewees echoed some of these points: one noted 
that in her Area the MSC was similarly used by one authority to shoulder the blame for 
LEA intervention unpopular with collegesd; another that one of her LEAs had 
reorganised its colleges concurrently with NAFE planning, moving to a tertiary system 
and enabling it to break down college-based resistance to change and centralise to the 
LEA some power in FEb This had involved some ’blood-letting1, but had sped up the 
potential for change.
Another officer stated that in her Area enthusiasm for NAFE planning varied 
between its five authoritiesg. On the whole she felt they would 'vote it a good thing’, 
and that they were Very prepared1 to see it as useful. It had made the LEAs think much 
more about long term planning, and had 'prepared them for the rigours of ERA'.
One officer claimed that her metropolitan LEAs were not enthusiastic about the 
joint NAFE process, but that they had nonetheless come round to seeing the need for 
ith. They were using it for themselves, the activity having moved on from being a 
matter of MSC insistence. The process was being used as a tool in overall local 
planning, and local politicians were taking more interest in NAFE as an influence on the 
local economy.
Three officers did note continuing minor difficulties in this area, however. One, 
whose LEAs he described as enthusiastic planners, claimed there was still some 
lingering resistance to the process, and that the authorities would still go through 
'tricks' to get their moneyc. He did note, though, that learning these tricks had in itself 
been worthwhile in causing the LEAs to learn the value of monitoring, providing them 
with an opportunity to see this which might otherwise not have been forthcoming. 
Another officer stated that her two authorities, despite having taken planning on board, 
were still very reluctant to put timescales to their objectives and set target dates for their 
intended achievements^ In this sense they had 'not got it yet'.
The third of these officers indicated his LEA to be 'not particularly enthusiastic’, 
and that it carried out NAFE planning purely for financial reasons. Because of this Area 
Office staff had to 'jump through hoops' to make progress with the LEA, which
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frequently was not carried on from one year to the nexti.
Interviewees were asked to conjecture as to whether their LEAs would be likely to 
continue the planning processes currendy established under joint arrangements in the 
event of a termination of MSC involvement Most drew attention to the important fact 
that ERA would oblige LEAs to plan in any case, but a hypothetical view disregarding 
this influence was nonetheless sought.
Four officers offered a response to this question. One indicated that her authority 
would continue NAFE planning under such circumstances, that it could perceive 
benefits beyond the incentive of MSC money, that planning and marketing got results4. 
Another stated that 'if we pulled out tomorrow, they'd still do it', because by now they 
were doing it for themselves and their own purposesb.
On the other hand, one officer felt that in one of her three LEAs, if the financial 
relationship with the MSC was taken away, the planning arrangements 'would 
probably drop away'h. Against this, another officer claimed that even if the money 
relationship was removed, market factors would provide the impetus and necessity for 
the present procedures to continue, regardless of what an LEA might preferg. The 
senior NAFE officer interviewed at MSC Head Office believed two factors would keep 
NAFE planning going: upwards pressure from colleges, and the fact that LEA officers 
had now come to see the value of the process, unlike before.
Interviewees were also asked to indicate how much their LEAs had needed to 
change in order to meet the requirements of the NAFE Agreement, and to indicate the 
extent to which the MSC had introduced change or alternatively had been 'pushing at an 
open door'. Only half of the interviewees responded to the first part of this enquiry. 
One of those who did indicated that her LEAs had experienced 'much movement' since 
joint planning begand; another that both his LEAs had needed to change, each 
previously having had only one full-time officer for NAFEf; another that her LEAs 
'weren't doing much’, and had to move a long wayh. One officer stated that the LEAs 
in her Area had had 'a long way to come, and still have a long way to go^. The 
problems hindering change centred on particular individuals. Institutions had changed,
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but she believed some people still needed to significantly change their attitudes. 
Whereas she believed more typical for administrators at the top and bottom of 
organisations to be best informed about what was going on, she identified a situation in 
NAFE where it was the middle managers who were the most aware. These were the 
LEA executive and Area Office staff, who were more up to date with the requirements 
of NAFE than were councillors or college staff.
Another officer commenting on personality issues claimed that in her Area it was 
senior college staff who were out of touch with current needs, lecturing staff being 
much more in tune with these*1. Therefore, the latter were able to impress a change in 
needs (towards, for example, flexible delivery systems aimed at adult returners) upon 
senior management by means of Development Fund projects, which had acted as 
catalysts for change in what was described by the officer in question as the 'bidet 
effect', i.e. a bottom-up impetus at work.
7.8 (iv) Future options
The involvement of the MSC in NAFE was clearly unpopular in the aftermath of 
Training for Jobs, and whilst considerable evidence has been presented here to suggest 
that MSC-LEA relationships had improved dramatically since that time, it remained 
uncertain whether, given the choice, LEAs would opt to retain the participation of the 
Commission in their delivery of NAFE, i.e. whether they would prefer to continue or 
to terminate joint planning and the financial relationship. The answer to this question is 
perhaps the ultimate test of the quality of MSC-LEA relations. The discussion below 
investigates this issue, as well as attitudes regarding alternative forms of NAFE 
administration.
The senior MSC NAFE officer interviewed believed that, given the choice, some 
(but not all) LEAs would retain the involvement of the MSC, recognising the value of 
its role44. Whilst accepting the possibility that 'we're kidding ourselves', he considered 
this unlikely.
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Respondents to the MSC survey were also asked to consider this question. One 
officer in a northern metropolitan Area was quite certain that her LEAs would not opt 
for continued involvementb. As far as the LEAs were concerned the relationship existed 
purely out of financial necessity, and 'they would lose no sleep if we pulled out'. 
Although this view was pragmatic and not a grudging one towards the Area Office, it 
held true throughout both authorities. An officer from one of her authorities confirmed 
this, stating that 'LEAs could manage perfectly well without (the MSC)'45. The MSC 
officer claimed it was unlikely that any of her colleagues up and down the country 
would say otherwiseb.
However, most of the other officers in this sample did say otherwise. One in a 
midlands county authority indicated that her LEA was keen for involvement to 
continuea, and another in the south of England that both her LEAs had stated that they 
wanted the MSC to stay involvedd.
One officer in particular was very adamant that his authority desired continued 
partnership6. The MSC locally was seen very much as 'a force for the good', and both 
the LEA and its colleges wanted to see that continuing. In fact, he claimed they wanted 
to see the MSC more involved, certainly in working towards the ERA requirements. 
The early resistance the Area Office had experienced had been no more than 'skin 
deep', and in talking about the potential futures of NAFE under TECs to the LEA staflj 
with whom he had a very familiar relationship, he had found that they were very 
reluctant to have any connection severed. Furthermore, he claimed some colleges were 
keen to have MSC officers based within their institution, as an influence on and 
consultant to the lecturing staff at the lower levels. Nonetheless, the officer in question 
did stress that this attitude was characteristic of his authority, which had a particularly 
successful network of cooperative partnerships formed over a number of years, and 
that the situation he described there should not be seen as typical. Certainly, he knew 
his experience to differ from that of his colleagues in other Areas within the same MSC 
Region.
Other officers were not quite so certain about the position of their authorities on 
this question. One in a multi-authority metropolitan Area claimed it was 'difficult to
331
say'g. She believed that on the whole they found the link beneficial, in particular 
through the spin-offs from the involvement of the RFEA, whose professional expertise 
and regional perspective was of great value to the LEAs, providing something they 
would otherwise not have had available to them.
Another officer who did not state clearly whether her three LEAs would be either 
for or against continued involvement also pointed out the considerable advantages to the 
LEAs11. She believed the relationship had been mutually profitable, and that the LEAs1 
staff appreciated having somebody else in the field at the grass roots level with whom 
to work. The DES could offer only HMI, whose role was different and less flexible. 
She felt they very much appreciated the money received through the Development 
Fund, which provided them with resources which might otherwise not have been 
forthcoming: if they had to seek such funding through their council’s committees, all 
sorts of other pressures and priorities might have intervened. Furthermore, the MSC 
could make money available quickly, and on a short term basis if necessary; it was 
more flexible in this regard. The project work was very popular, particularly amongst 
colleges, who greatly prized there being a source of funding devoted entirely to NAFE. 
She claimed they would prefer to see the MSC continuing in its present role out of a 
sense of 'better the devil you know’.
One officer claimed for his Area that without the financial relationship the LEAs 
'wouldn't want to keep involved much' and that there would be 'much less contact' 
with the Area Officef. Nonetheless, he believed they would still want to receive LMI 
from the MSC. Another officer indicated that his LEA would welcome continued MSC 
involvement in some areas only of its NAFE provision, whilst resisting it in others!
A Regional officer interviewed claimed that within his Region two, possibly three 
LEAs 'would like to see the back of us’a. The other six LEAs did, he claimed, see the 
link as a partnership and would want to continue it. However, future collaboration 
depended heavily on the present staff being kept involved - in NAFE, personal 
relationships were very important.
The officer who indicated most decisively that her LEAs would not wish MSC
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involvement to continue nonetheless expressed the personal opinion that such a 
continuation was important and should be maintained1*. It needed to be kept going in 
order to best serve the needs of the client, who wanted a clear idea of what was 
available and what could be done. The MSC could help make NAFE more flexible and 
attractive to this group.
The LEA officer interviewed from the same Area, who indicated that his LEA 
would not keep the MSC involved, stated a belief that the initiative would have been 
much better had it involved the DES instead of the MSC. The DES had a better 
understanding of NAFE, its officers 'spoke the same language'46 Another LEA officer 
disagreed on this, claiming the Department 'would not have had nearly the same 
impact', in terms either of speed or extent4?. The ACC officer interviewed felt the 
alternative of a different body reporting to the DES might have been a better option, 
because it would have been biased towards provision; the MSC's concerns were more 
strongly rooted in responses to unemployment and labour market needs48. He 
suggested that NAFE would profit more from a tiered system of administration, with 
responsibilities shared between the college, LEA and national levels, providing an 
ability to negotiate with NAFE clients at every level.
Picking up on the idea of an alternative body to oversee NAFE, a respondent to the 
LEA survey stated the following view:
Ultimately, the only long-term rationale for MSC involvement would be as a national body 
criticising variations in LEA responsiveness, volume of provision and efficiency. Leaving 
aside accountability for such in the future (LEA or college governing body ?) this is a role the 
MSC have been totally unwilling to play, and, it could be argued, one that HMI Inspectorate 
should have performed anyway.
To explore the views of LEAs on this subject across England and Wales, the LEA 
survey asked its respondents to indicate whether they felt the future needs of NAFE 
would best be met with or without MSC involvement. Three options were given:
3 3 3
Table 7.16: LEA preference about the future o f  the MSC in NAFE
Notwithstanding the provisions of the current Education Reform Bill, respondents were asked to indicate
whether they felt the needs of post-16 non-advanced provision would best be met: ^ % /«—\ 50
(1) with continued MSC involvement in its presen.t form............................ 13 19.7 ►acT
(2) with continued MSC involvement in a modified form............................ 29 43.9
o\o\
I-*
(3) without continued MSC involvement.................. .................................... 24 36.4
- if so, they preferred to see NAFE planning be: ▼
(a) left to individual LEAs............................................................................ 19 79.2
(b) overseen by an alternative national body................................................... 5 20.8
Source: Compiled by die author from LEA survey data.
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continuation of the present arrangements; continued involvement on the part of the 
MSC but in a modified form; and the termination of MSC involvement Those who 
indicated the latter were invited to indicate whether they would prefer to see the MSC 
replaced by an alternative national body, or have NAFE left entirely to LEAs*. The 
results are shown in Table 7.14.
None of the three main options attracted a majority of respondents, although a clear 
majority were in favour of continued MSC involvement in some form: the first two 
categories showed an aggregate total of 63.6 per cent. Of these, however, very much
the larger group were in favour in a modification of the present arrangements (43.9 per
/
cent), with only 19.7 per cent of respondents preferring to see a maintenance of the 
status quo .
A significant minority of respondents (36.4 per cent) were keen to see MSC 
involvement terminated. Of these, a fifth expressed a preference that NAFE be overseen 
by an alternative national body, whilst four-fifths preferred to see NAFE left to 
individual LEAs. Only three respondents specified alternative national bodies they 
would wish to see involved**.
One respondent commented:
■Without continued MSC involvement’ would have been the answer had not (ERA) made a 
nonsense of LEAs duties to plan post-16 sensibly.
The principal finding from these LEA survey data is therefore that respondents 
were generally in favour of the retention of MSC involvement in some form or another - 
a far cry from their common position of refusal even to communicate with Area Offices 
when Training for Jobs was first announced.
* Recognised once again here was the imminent passing of the Education Reform Act (ERA);
respondents were asked to give a view which ignored the latter's impacts.
* * These were: 'single national body involved in all education and training so long as LEA remains
local agent'; 'DES/HMI'; 'LEAs responsible for post-16 NAFE within their area, but
coordinating, consulting, discussing on a regional basis, such as through the WJEC throughout 
Wales'.
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This thesis has taken the development and implementation of a single policy move, the 
1984 White Paper, as an illustrative example of how the policy process encompassing 
the delivery of national policy through local government agents can operate in a specific 
instance. In doing so it has considered aspects of the nature of policy networks, the 
characteristics of public bureaucracies and interactions between central and local 
government It has analysed how these can be understood by conceiving the policy- 
formulation, decision-making and implementation process to be a continuum in which 
actors at all levels contribute to policy outcomes. It has then taken as an example of this 
process the experience of Training for Jobs, analysing its conception, introduction, 
revision and implementation through the theoretical concepts outlined, and empirically 
examining its effects upon the NAFE bureaucracy and the practice of NAFE planning.
The contribution of the research is thus threefold. At the most focussed level, it has 
added a considerable weight of knowledge about the workings of the NAFE 
bureaucracy and the administrative practices through which NAFE is delivered. At a 
wider level it has illuminated key aspects of the education and training policy process in 
England and Wales, indicating pointers to the likely impacts of different strategies 
introduced within its sphere. Above this, the thesis makes a theoretical contribution by 
providing support for the notion of the policy-making continuum.
To synthesise the foregoing work, the overall conclusions derived from the 
historical, theoretical and empirical analysis of the thesis are discussed in this chapter. It 
considers a number of areas: the first is an overview of the inception, announcement 
and revision of the government's 1984 NAFE strategy as expressed in Training for 
Jobs. The next section, 8.3, goes on to consider the restructuring of the NAFE 
bureaucracy, drawing on the empirical findings of Chapter 6, whilst section 8.4 
examines impacts of the White Paper upon the practice of NAFE planning. The thesis' 
conclusions on the overall impacts of the NAFE Initiative are discussed in section 8.5, 
which is followed by a consideration of some of the theoretical implications of the 
findings, referring back to points raised in Chapter 3. The final section addresses 
directions for further research suggested by the thesis' discussions.
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8 .2  The reshaping of the 1984 NAFE strategy
The White Paper Training for Jobs made public a government strategy for NAFE which 
came unexpectedly and demonstrated a radical shift in the way policy-making in this 
area was to be made. The meaning of the White Paper has been explored in the thesis 
by recourse to three themes: the underlying forces which created the circumstances 
conducive to such a strategy; the particular motivations which drove the central 
government's actions in 1984; and the specific outcomes it sought to achieve as a 
consequence of the new legislation.
The underlying forces have been identified as:
• long-standing tensions within the state bureaucracy caused by an historical 
division of responsibilities for VET between the education policy community on 
one hand and the employment/training policy network on the other,
• economic decline and the return of mass unemployment, particularly youth 
unemployment, in the late 1970s and early 1980s;
• a centralising tendency within the public sector from the mid-1970s onwards 
which saw amongst other things the reassertion of central government authority 
over local councils, and attempts to centrally direct education more forcefully 
than had been the case throughout much of the post-war period;
• the emergence of a vocationalist philosophy in further education, emphasising 
the supply of skilled labour to industry above an earlier emphasis on personal 
development;
• the rise of a new, dynamic and flexible agency (the MSC) in the 
employment/training policy network which by 1984 had already begun to 
challenge education sector bodies for the unclaimed policy territory on their 
mutual frontier.
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Government thinking at this time is argued to have been shaped by a number of 
ideological, political and policy objectives which influenced its choice of strategy. The 
ideological considerations may be identified as:
(a) a desire to see public sector VET provision with a market-oriented, employer- 
led bias which would serve industry as a more responsive mechanism for 
skilling the labour force;
(b) a predisposition against local government, and a desire to reduce its political 
power over policy. This it held to a considerable extent in NAFE, de facto if 
not de jure, as a consequence of such factors as budgetary discretion, local 
possession of expertise, and the size and complexity of NAFE as an 
administrative activity.
Other motives were the political importance of tackling the youth unemployment 
problem exacerbated by demographic trends in the late 1970s/early 1980s, and a 
genuine belief that public sector FE colleges were not fulfilling their proper function as 
adequately as they might
The government strategy developed to meet these objectives represented an attempt 
to shift the balance in the policy-making continuum firmly towards the centre*, whilst at 
the same time devolving power to local, private hands, an aspect of its stated intention 
of 'rolling back the state'. Training for Jobs is seen primarily as an attempt to increase 
central influence over NAFE provision by restructuring the administrative bureaucracy 
through means other than direct statutory intervention. Eschewing heavyweight 
legislation that would alter LEAs' responsibilities or change their direct relationship 
with central government, it was a policy based entirely upon financial manipulation and 
the juggling of public resources. It announced quite simply that the budget of the MSC 
allocated for the purchase of college-based training was to be raised in such a way that 
it would become responsible for about a quarter of all provision in the area. The block 
grant to LEAs would be cut by the same amount. In one sweeping change the
* see Figure 3.5.
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government had reoriented the policy landscape, by simply recalculating the levels of 
responsibility for NAFE held by bodies already engaged in its provision.
Central to the initiative was a key strategic calculation. This involved setting an 
amount of resources which, in being transferred from one body to the other, would be 
sufficient to produce the desired shift in the balance of power, without being so great as 
to inspire a political controversy serious enough to jeopardise the success of the policy. 
Crucial was the lever afforded the MSC through the provision in the White Paper which 
gave it the option to spend its NAFE money outside LEA colleges should they not 
satisfy its demands.
This thesis demonstrates that in the event the strategy was largely unsuccessful. 
Local education authorities refused to cooperate, and the MSC was eventually forced to 
compromise after a long period of dispute and negotiation. The primary reasons for this 
development are here argued to be:
- a miscalculation on the part of government of the amount of resources it would 
need to remove from local authority budgets to compel their cooperation;
- the non-executant nature of the MSC - its lack of organisational resources to 
deliver its own programmes, and its consequent reliance on purchasing power 
as a means of achieving its objectives. These could only be effective if an 
alternative supplier was available: in a sector as complex, costly and 
voluminous as NAFE, this option was unrealistic;
- the solidity with which LEAs resisted the Training for Jobs policy over a 
sustained period;
- the transfer of the MSC chair to a new incumbent less staunch in his support of 
the government line.
Thus the scale of NAFE and the weight of opposition foiled the strategic aim. As a 
consequence, the MSC lost its financial lever over NAFE through an agreement to
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adopt a shareholder's role in the whole of provision rather than that of a selective 
purchaser of individual parts. Furthermore, the care with which it had had to woo 
LEAs to accept even this role created a delicacy in the relationship which made the 
exercise of the powers it did gain in NAFE a high risk option. The government 
intention that local authority control over NAFE would be substantially depleted was 
not realised.
The policy innovation was not a total failure, however, in terms of its objectives. It 
encouraged LEAs for the first time to think strategically about NAFE - traditionally a 
'Cinderella' area. Also, it thrust 16-19 and adult provision forward as a major area for 
further future reforms. It had real if limited success in establishing an MSC role on the 
supply side of NAFE where previously it had none. There was a consequent rise in the 
influence over NAFE of central politicians and of an agency with an employer-oriented, 
market-based bias. In the light of this the negotiation of the NAFE Agreement in 
preference to the White Paper must by seen as a policy modification, rather than a 
defeat. The disappointing aspect of this for government strategists was that the 
Commission was able to gain influence only as a lesser partner in the process of NAFE 
administration, rather than as a key and direct determinant of specific NAFE outputs in 
terms of courses provided. This remained a matter for LEA discretion.
The restructured NAFE policy network
Chapter 6 outlined the nature of internal and external linkages which the MSC and 
LEAs developed in response to the NAFE initiative. As well as the new posts and 
structures which became established, the chapter explored the nature of relationships 
between the various actors involved, their quality, and the problems which emerged as 
influences upon them. This analysis allows the construction of a revised portrait of the 
policy network** within which NAFE came to operate. This new network, a 
development of the frameworks outlined in Chapter 3 for both NAFE and employment
** The term ’network' is used in preference to ’community’, in recognition of the broader and less 
integrated framework of linkages within which NAFE came to operate as a consequence of the 
NAFE Initiative.
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and training, is portrayed in Figure 8.1*. The complexity of the diagram illustrates the 
extensive web of inter-linkages within which NAFE came to operate after 1985, and 
embraces all the components included in the earlier Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
The case for including all the participants in each of the formerly discrete policy 
networks is based on their undoubted significance to the development of NAFE policy 
after 1984. Whilst there were no direct NAFE links between, say, the CBI and LEAs, 
the significance of its influence over MSC policy positions is a crucial influence in the 
field, alongside numerous others.
Despite the considerable extent of the overall policy network, it must be recognised 
that the bulk of regular interaction over NAFE between the leading participants took 
place within a much more localised network of linkages. These are illustrated in Figure 
8.2, which focuses on the links between the MSC and LEAs outlined in the various 
sections of Chapter 6. Figure 8.2 serves as a short-hand summary of the overall system 
of MSC-LEA relationships which have been identified.
The principal link was that between the MSC Area Office NAFE HEO and the LEA 
equivalent in its NAFE executive section. It was between officers at this level that most 
day-to-day joint planning activity was conducted. The latter were also likely to involve 
the Area Manager, the official NAFE partner to the LEA and signatory to the 
local Contract. Links which were active only occasionally, such as those between MSC 
Head Office and individual LEAs, have not been marked on the figure, although it 
should be noted that certain contacts of this kind did occur in addition to the main ones 
shown.
Contact between MSC Area Offices and individual colleges varied considerably 
across the country, some LEAs encouraging this, others being indifferent or in some 
cases firmly opposing such contact. It has thus been portrayed in Figure 8.2 with a
* The figure shows financial and 'other' linkages, the latter being connections involving such 
activities as administration, line management, negotiation or the exchange of expertise. The 
distinction between the two broad divisions shown is most apparent in the case of MSC-college 
links, where the MSC's client relationship with individual institutions must not be confused 
with administrative or monitoring links in NAFE, the circumstances of which vary from one 
LEA to another, in some cases being quite contentious.
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question mark over the possibility of these links occurring.
The joint MSC-LEA local NAFE committees shown in the figure varied from one 
locality to another, and were likely to involve differing combinations of LEA, college, 
MSC and other participants, as oudined in Chapter 7. The involvement of Area Office 
SEOs in local joint committees is indicated to be uncertain, the nominal role of these 
officers having been found seldom to lead to much active participation in NApE 
planning. The box indicating ’national joint NAFE groups' refers to the NAFE 
Evaluation and Implementation Groups established as fora for liaison at the national 
level between the MSC and the local authority associations with whom the NAFE 
Agreement was forged. These fell with the Commission in the restructuring of 1988; 
after this date the MSC Director reported direcdy to the Secretary of State for 
Employment.
Interaction over NAFE within the commission followed the shape of its line 
management structure. This meant that there was very limited contact between one Area 
Office and another, or even between Regional Offices. Neither would Area Offices be 
in contact with the NAFE unit at the Moorfoot Head Office unless in exceptional 
circumstances. There was also very little contact between MSC NAFE operations and 
other programmes such as YTS and TVEI, even within local offices, leading to 
problems of coordination between different post-16 areas.
Contact between LEAs over NAFE was also very limited, occasional informal 
regional fora being the most common examples. There was much more coordination of 
LEAs at the national level, through the machinery of the local authority associations. 
Evidence was found of interaction of LEA NAFE sections with other departments 
within their authority, the most common links being to planning, treasurer's and 
economic development departments.
The degree to which the restructured policy network altered from the previous 
situation may be assessed by recourse to Rhodes' resource categories outlined in 
Chapter 3, used there to describe the pre-1984 resource dependencies. In terms of 
authority, the first category, the circumstances after the implementation of the NAFE
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Agreement had altered, despite there having been no reallocation of LEAs1 legal 
responsibilities. A new source had been introduced into the system, and LEAs were 
forced to follow to an extent the guidance which they received from the MSC. This 
authority hinged entirely upon the MSC's control over financial resources, the second 
of Rhodes' categories, which was the most significant change affecting the reshaping 
of the network. The consequences of this new power were a change in the distribution 
of Rhodes' third category, legitimacy, in the network, with the MSC's new role 
creating some shift in the balance between the influences of the central and local 
electoral mandate. LEAs had less discretion to exercise their own policies than before, 
but the erosion of this discretion must not be overstressed: it remained considerably 
more intact than had been envisaged in the original Training for Jobs proposals.
The fourth category, information, concerns an area which saw much change as a 
consequence of the NAFE Agreement The writing of LEA Annual Programmes and 
the gathering of significantly greater quantities of labour market information (LMI) 
indicate a much greater concentration at the LEA level of detailed knowledge about each 
authority’s NAFE provision. The effect was to increase the power of the LEA over 
colleges, giving it a greater source of authority on the basis of which to enforce its 
strategic policies. There was some equivalent increase in MSC Area Office power as a 
consequence of its having more information about NAFE, but the concentration in LEA 
hands, those with the ultimate discretion over implementation decisions, was the most 
significant development*.
The final category, organisational resources, saw no change as a result of the 
NAFE Agreement NAFE continued to be delivered through the same media, local 
authority colleges and education department administrators. The MSC remained non­
executant, and continued to rely entirely upon the purchase of delivery systems 
provided by other parties.
* This increase in LEA power was significantly counterbalanced by a devolving of discretionary 
powers to colleges under the subsequent Education Reform Act.
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1L4 The development of the MSC-LEA partnership in NAFE
Chapter 6 found much evidence to justify the portraits of the MSC and the NAFE sector 
outlined in Chapter 3. There it was suggested that the Commission's bureaucratic style 
was based on flexible and speedy adaptation to changing circumstances, fixing its 
policies and plans on very short-term horizons. The NAFE service, in contrast, was 
tied in to an education sector tradition of gradualist change, and unused to a market- 
oriented style of management
If these generalisations were valid it would be expected that they would create 
tensions between the two bodies as they became engaged in a joint planning exercise 
imposed from above. So it proved in practice, as demonstrated by the nature of the 
problem areas identified in Chapter 6. Leaving aside the inevitable problem of an 
increased administrative burden, the most significant sources of difficulty LEAs 
reported in dealing with the MSC were the unpredictability of its policy and its 
associated demands on LEAs, and the allocation of specific support funding for 
insufficient periods of time. The speed with which the MSC expected LEAs to make 
decisions also scored highly. LEAs were clearly not comfortable with the 
Commission’s year-by-year approach to decision making, seeking a stability of 
development not congruent with its constantly revised national guidance. Similarly, 
evidence was presented of a feeling in the Commission at both national and local level 
that the response of LEAs was often unnecessarily slow and insufficiently adaptive to 
changing conditions. This feeling applied more to the administrative bureaucracy than 
to colleges, who as practitioners were seen as being more closely tied to changing 
demands.
There was also clear evidence of clashes in outlook, which ranged from a lack of 
educational experience and understanding on the part of MSC staff, which sometimes 
led to unfair assumptions about past college performance, to philosophical differences 
over the objectives of NAFE. Whilst the MSC was firmly committed to the 
development of labour-power planning as a central plank of its policies, respondents to 
the LEA survey indicated that out of a whole range of NAFE objectives, an overriding 
emphasis upon such planning received the least support of all. An emphasis on the
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needs of employers, with which the MSC was also associated, was the second least 
supported of 14 objectives LEA respondents were asked to comment on.
Further evidence of tensions between the MSC and LEAs consequent upon their 
bureaucratic styles emerged in the difficulties experienced in coordinating the MSC 
planning timetable with LEA committee cycles. The difference in operation between a 
political, committee-run authority on one hand and an organisation with a rigid line- 
management structure on the other was not easily overcome, and only several years into 
the joint planning exercise was significant progress being made.
Nevertheless, despite these anticipated tensions, the MSC-LEA relationship was 
found to have developed very positively after an inauspicious beginning. The evidence 
presented in Chapter 6 indicates that the initial refusal on the part of LEAs to have any 
dealings with MSC Area Offices at all gave way after the Agreement to a tense period in 
which the two parties tentatively sought common ground upon which some form of 
cooperative procedure could be established. Once this got underway in the first year, 
there followed a fairly rapid thaw in relations as LEAs became aware that the threat to 
their position suggested by the White Paper had largely evaporated, and that a disarmed 
MSC could actually be a beneficial influence over their NAFE activity. The evidence 
presented in Chapter 6 indicates that relations between the two bodies were at no point 
very poor, outside the immediate aftermath of the White Paper. These steadily 
improved throughout the period of study, to the point where in many localities Area 
Office and LEA staff enjoyed a relationship of close colleagues which in some cases 
surpassed in quality their relations with other sections of their own institution. There 
was much evidence of high levels of confidence and mutual trust between the parties, 
examples of continuing LEA stand-offishness being relegated to a small minority.
The reasons behind this development can arguably be attributed to the tendency, 
noted in Chapter 3, of 'street-level' bureaucrats to 'routinise' policy positions into a set 
of pragmatically-arranged day-to-day activities. Thus they seek to reduce uncertainty, 
and create circumstances in which their regular work pattern is not threatened by major 
upheaval. This accounts for the unanimity of opposition at both the political and officer 
level to the Training for Jobs plan for NAFE, a consequence of its threat not just to the
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status quo, but to the likelihood of renewed stability. The White Paper's proposal to 
have funding decisions made on a course-by-course, year-by-year basis threatened an 
ongoing situation of uncertainty which the street-level bureaucrats of the education 
service could not comfortably contemplate.
It therefore follows that the NAFE Agreement led to an improvement in relations, 
with its guarantee of greater certainty in NAFE adminstration, but that the development 
of full cooperation and mutual trust was not achieved at first due the continuing 
possibility of MSC seeking to use its power of sanction to cajole LEA officers into a 
form of administrative behaviour to which they were opposed. As each planning year 
succeeded, LEA confidence mounted that the MSC would not use its powers thus, and 
a new bureaucratic equilibrium was established in which a new set of routine 
procedures replaced the old. Joint relations were thus able to improve to a position of 
considerable cooperation and mutual trust
Other reasons for the development of positive relations may be attributed to a 
compromise between the 'bureaucratic dynamic'* of both MSC and LEAs. Again partly 
a product of the translation by street-level bureaucrats of initially contradictory 
pressures into routine procedures, this saw a partial acceptance on the part of LEAs of 
the MSC's requirement for a more flexible and rapid approach to administration and 
planning, with decisions being based as far as possible on rational, measurable criteria; 
similarly, an acceptance on the part of (particularly Area Office) MSC staff that NAFE 
could not be run with the same dynamic flexibility of other MSC programmes, such as 
YTS. This was very much confirmed by the claim of one MSC officer interviewed that 
within his Area Office, the NAFE operation was perceived as slow - as not getting 
quick, clear results like the Office’s other programmes1.
The above evidence very much supports the idea that for the successful integration 
of two institutions, each with a bureaucratic dynamic potentially conflicting with the 
other, compromise involving adjustment of this dynamic must be an inherent aspect.
* see Chapter 3
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It is significant to note that the fears which were expressed at the time of the White 
Paper, that the transfer of resources from LEAs to the MSC was only the first stage in a 
plan to hand the Commission much more financial responsibility for NAFE in due 
course, proved groundless. Whilst political changes and the Commission's eventual 
loss of favour have played a part in this, the combination of LEA resistance to change 
and the MSC's concerted efforts to compromise and win acceptance in the LEA 
community have acted strongly against the likelihood that this carefully-nurtured 
situation would be threatened by renewed upheaval.
8 .5  Impacts of the Initiative upon NAFE practice
Chapter 7 identified a series of areas in which the NAFE Initiative significantly 
influenced the practice of planning and administration. The most significant was the 
introduction under the terms of the NAFE Agreement of the Development Plan and 
Annual Programme which all LEAs were required for the first time to produce.
Whilst some LEAs had conducted effective planning for some time, the new 
demands placed upon them led to a radical advance in the clarity with which LEA 
NAFE objectives were identified and articulated, and a specification in considerably 
more detail of what activities their colleges took part in each year. Whilst the quality of 
these Plans and Programmes varied widely, there is considerable evidence of a steady 
improvement across the board with each successive planning round. Particular reasons 
for this improvement included a greater acceptance on the part of LEAs of the Plan's 
role as an integral part of regular NAFE activity, and the associated spreading out and 
down of the process of Plan compilation so that the more effective 'circumference-in' 
approach to Plan construction came to be more common than the early, and sometimes 
rather cursory, top-down efforts.
A significant fact which emerged in the empirical evidence was a considerable 
variation in both the content of Development Plans and the overall approach taken to 
planning between LEAs. What is most significant about this is the evident scope for 
local discretion it indicates. The possibility that the involvement of a single, centrally-
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directed national body might impose a rigidity on planning, and thus hamper the 
development of local solutions to local problems and NAFE needs, was not borne out 
in practice. Whilst a certain uniformity was required in the broad elements of local 
implementation, the policy clearly saw a wide range of outcomes between localities.
An area where such local discretion became most manifest was the monitoring of 
NAFE by LEAs and Area Offices. A clear impact of the Agreement upon the practice of 
NAFE planning was the universal introduction of extensive LEA activity in this area. 
Whilst previously some LEAs had been involved in monitoring, many gained its 
benefits as a direct result of the Agreement’s measures. As a consequence, NAFE 
provision at the end of the period of study was based on a plan for delivery which was 
much more firmly-rooted in an LEA understanding of what was happening in its 
colleges. The evaluation by LEAs of their colleges' courses had similarly advanced 
greatly. Both activities, however, were hampered by a still primitive level of 
development of management information systems in most LEAs, a situation which 
promised to be rectified sooner rather than later.
The growth of mutual MSC-LEA trust in this area had removed the concern that 
LEAs were not being altogether candid in their statements to the Area Office about their 
NAFE provision - the fear that LEAs would deceive the MSC in order simply to 
retrieve their lost money proving groundless. Whilst better monitoring made the 
possibility anyway more remote, it ceased to be an issue through the development of a 
sense of common purpose between the two bodies as to the development of better 
NAFE provision.
Considerable benefits accrued from the implementation of centrally-funded project 
work in NAFE, despite early difficulties in devising an equable system of fund- 
allocation. The projects provided an entirely new focus in NAFE for the development 
and dissemination of examples of successful planning practice, providing a previously 
highly-localised operation with the benefit of a national perspective, in which a wider 
range of experience could be drawn upon to improve provision.
Other areas had seen less evidence of the potential NAFE benefits sought from the
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provisions of the NAFE Agreement Labour market information (LMI) in particular had 
not been developed to the extent hoped for, and the MSC had come in for a lot of LEA 
criticism for not performing well in its area of greatest responsibility in NAFE. The 
intended improvements in the responsiveness of college provision to labour market 
needs based on a thorough and up to date bank of LMI data did not materialise to the 
envisaged extent, partly as a consequence of the inherent difficulty and workload 
involved in generating such information. At the end of the period of study the collection 
and use of LMI, despite widespread evidence of improvement, remained an area yet to 
emerge as a major beneficial impact of the NAFE Initiative.
In seeking to form judgements about the effectiveness of the impacts of joint MSC- 
LEA NAFE planning upon college provision, Chapter 7 investigated curriculum change 
in the period following the Agreement’s introduction, and the assessment of LEA 
practitioners as to the role of the Agreement in influencing such change. The results of 
this enquiry demonstrated that there had not been truly dramatic changes in any 
curriculum area, and that such changes as did occur were not generally perceived to 
have been strongly influenced by the NAFE Agreement The one area of extensive 
change where joint planning was cited as a significant contributory influence was the 
increasing amount of distance/open learning offered in colleges.
2L& Evaluation of the NAFE Initiative's overall impacts
The last section of Chapter 7 explored the perceptions of a range of interested parties as 
to the overall benefits which had accrued in NAFE as a consequence of the White Paper 
and the subsequent NAFE Agreement On the basis of these comments, combined with 
evidence derived from the rest of empirical analysis presented in this thesis, it is 
possible to draw a series of general conclusions about the impact of the NAFE Initiative 
on the process of NAFE planning as a whole.
First, it has undoubtedly 'changed the shape of the paperwork^. LEAs throughout 
England and Wales were by the end of 1989 engaged in administrative procedures 
relating to NAFE planning which went far beyond anything most of them had been
3 5 4
engaged in prior to 1984. One of the most striking impacts of the new policy was the 
undoubted ’galvanising’ effect of the MSC in prompting new activity in LEAS, which 
otherwise would not have occurred at the same pace. Whilst its effect was greatest in 
the ’backwoods’ LEAs who had the least experience of a proactive NAFE planning 
stance, the speeding-up of development in this whole area was brought about in every 
LEA, to a greater or lesser extent
Another key impact was the raising of the profile of NAFE from being very low on 
the list of most LEAs' priorities to a position of considerably greater prominence. This 
was most evident in the immediate aftermath of the White Paper, but the increased level 
of activity in NAFE ensured that its administration and planning could never retreat to 
the backwater it had previously occupied in some authorities.
Improvements in the collection, assimilation and presentation of information were 
a clear product of the joint planning process. These accrued from the considerably 
enhanced role of monitoring and evaluation on the part of LEAs, and to a lesser extent 
from greater attention to the collection of labour market information. Related to the 
possession of greater information was the sharper definition specific of aims, objectives 
and targets in NAFE: LEA policy and planning was able to become increasingly 
founded on an informed rationale, rather than solely on the more subjective judgements 
of individual practitioners.
The NAFE Initiative and the resulting exhortation on the part their MSC partners 
led to a greater acceptance on the part of LEAs of the value of rational resource 
management approaches. The use of these became more widely recognised to be 
beneficial to the maximising of efficiency in NAFE, the only way to boost effectiveness 
in circumstances where resources are fixed.
There developed improved coordination between LEA colleges, which resulted 
both in a more rational and efficient division of activity between them, and a raising of 
mutual awareness through the greater spread of information about each others' NAFE 
practice. The latter was also true between LEAs as a consequence of the NAFE 
Initiative.
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An empirical finding, three years into the practice of joint planning, that a clear
to
majority of LEA respondents wished the MSCAstay involved in NAFE indicates a large 
measure of success to have emerged from the exercise. Whilst partly this could be 
explained by a desire to avoid further upheaval, clear evidence of considerable LEA 
support for most of the NAFE objectives championed by the MSC indicates a 
widespread acceptance of the value of the processes set up under the NAFE Agreement.
Negative impacts of the Initiative include the heavy administrative burden it placed 
upon already stretched LEAs. Whilst partly the inevitable consequence of any new 
initiative, this was exacerbated by MSC policy-makers with insufficient experience or 
understanding of educational matters making unreasonably burdensome requests for 
information. There was a tendency at first for the MSC to ask for everything it might 
want in order to guarantee getting what it needed. Whilst this situation had markedly 
improved by the end of the period of study, greater sensitivity in this area would have 
been an ultimately more fruitful approach.
Further negative impacts derived from the tendency of MSC planners to emphasise 
outcomes over processes. This could be traced to the Commission’s need to deliver 
measurable results to its political masters at the DE. The opportunity to establish a 
carefully-considered and effective set of processes which could have furnished NAFE 
with an effective and durable framework for future development, based on long-term 
improvements in results, was partially lost as a consequence of this factor.
Whilst the process of NAFE planning might not have developed to its full potential 
under the Agreement, it was nonetheless in this area that the NAFE Initiative had its 
greatest discemable effect. Its impacts upon the actual NAFE curriculum are at best 
unclear. The evidence presented here does not indicate significantly marked curriculum 
change, and suggests that the influence of the NAFE Agreement on such change as 
occurred was very limited. An FEU report on NAFE found 'no major change in the 
direction of the curriculum', and suggested that the changes which were in evidence 
would have occurred with or without the joint planning exercise3.
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It is not apparent, therefore, that the impact of the Agreement led to any major 
changes in provision - what it did do was to produce a form of delivery which was 
more clearly monitored, each of its components having a clearer raison d'etre, founded 
upon a sounder database of up-to-date information, against which achievements could 
be better evaluated. Whether or not actual NAFE provision prior to Training for Jobs 
was in need of major change, judgements which could clearly not be made then were 
possible now as a consequence of these developments.
In considering the impacts of the NAFE Initiative on planning and provision it is 
important to stress that it was only one amongst a series of factors contributing to 
change. Other factors, such as the role of Audit Commission, the DES/LAA Joint 
Efficiency Study, the National Council for Vocational Qualifications, and in particular 
the changing social, economic, political and demographic conditions in Britain in the 
1980s, all played their part. The influence of MSC intervention in NAFE planning 
against these other factors is difficult to weigh with any certainty.
Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that the involvement of the MSC in 
joint planning as a consequence of Training for Jobs and the subsequent NAFE 
Agreement had a very significant impact in terms of establishing planning and 
monitoring processes which would otherwise not have occurred at the same point in 
time, and which, in some LEAs, might not have occurred at all. Its effects, if any, upon 
provision, its responsiveness and relevance to the needs of employers and individuals, 
are not clear. A different type of study would be required to assess these effects.
8_l 2  Theoretical implications
Rhodes* conceptual framework dealing with policy communities and networks has 
been used in this thesis as a tool for describing and delimiting the range of 
organisations who have been involved in the policy fields at issue, both before and after 
the initiative under study. In the light of the thesis’ empirical findings we should 
consider whether the use of links founded on resource dependencies, and delimitations 
based on breaks in the structure of resource dependencies, has emerged as an effective
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tool for analysis.
The purpose behind the use of Rhodes* framework in the thesis was to describe a 
system of institutions linked in the delivery of certain policies, to distinguish different 
systems, and to understand how such systems can be changed as a consequence of 
policy innovation. To assess how well Rhodes’ framework for 'policy networks' 
provides this, it helps to return to his criteria, and reconsider them in the light of the 
new information gathered. Rhodes defined rive key dimensions along which he claims 
networks’ dependency structures to vary, as explained above in section 3.2*. In the 
case of the two networks under discussion in this thesis, did they provide a means of 
distinguishing and understanding the differences between the systems ?
To take first the constellation o f interests, the variables cited of service/economic 
function, territory, client group and common expertise undoubtedly provided such 
distinction: the systems in which LEAs and the MSC operated differed in all these 
respects. Data collected from the LEA survey (see section 7.8 (iii)) confirmed the view 
outlined in Chapter 3 that in terms of service/economic function the former were 
engaged in provision geared as much to individual needs as those of employers, 
whereas the MSC was much more oriented towards servicing the economic dynamic by 
means of national labour planning and serving the market needs of industry; the client 
group and related expertise varied for the same reasons; and, territorially, whilst the 
MSC operated at a national level through a system of tiered offices, the education 
service was much more locality-oriented. The identification of these forms of 
differences are clearly one useful means of independently establishing a basis for 
analytical comparison, since they identify real and meaningful differences between the 
policy networks in which the relevant bodies operated. The same can be argued to be 
true of Rhodes’ four other variables. In terms of membership there were clear 
differences, for example, in terms of his criteria of public-private sector balance 
between the 1984 NAFE field, which as Figure 3.1 shows was completely dominated 
by public bodies, and the employment and training network, which Figure 3.2 shows 
to have contained a mixture of public and private sector interests. The two networks
* see page 55.
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were also found to vary considerably in terms of vertical interdependence, in the public 
sector parts at least, the evidence presented on MSC internal structure in Chapter 6 
indicating its well developed national-regional-local administrative interaction system to 
contrast with LEAs’ relative local autonomy beyond their financial dependency on and 
specific legal obligations to the DES. Similar difference emerged in terms of horizontal 
interdependence and the distribution o f resources. The crucial issue here is not to 
reconsider the detail of the issues specific to the present context, but to assess the 
overall theoretical implications of these details. The criteria Rhodes uses are simple, and 
comparatively unambiguous; they appear to have utility as a method for determining 
variation. Their value for drawing up a conceptual 'map' of a policy field is 
demonstrated in the devising of Figures 3.1,3.2 and 8.1. It seems fair to argue that the 
genuine distinctions, as oudined above, which are apparent in the present context along 
the lines of his criteria make Rhodes’ approach to identifying such distinctions a valid 
means of drawing a consistent and replicable schema for the description, division and 
analysis of policy networks.
Rhodes’ distinction between policy communities on the one hand and networks on 
the other was also employed in the thesis as a means of distinguishing between the two 
principal fields covered. Policy communities are defined by Rhodes as being 
characterised by
stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical 
interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities and insulated from other 
networks and invariably from the general public ... They have a high degree of vertical 
interdependence and limited horizontal articulation. They are highly integrated.4
Policy networks are defined by Rhodes only in a negative sense - he declares simply 
that 'they are less integrated'. The key distinction can be argued to be over the degree of 
closure exhibited by the system. This latter aspect can be argued to have genuine utility, 
in that a more closed system is likely to be more susceptible to a policy intervention 
which can influence the whole; in a more open system, any attempt to influence all parts 
of it with a new policy would present considerably more difficulty. The idea is of value 
in indicating how the NAFE policy community moved from a fairly closed position in 
to a much more open system of influences in the combined network shown in Figure
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8.1; which is to say that it became a network. In this sense it can be stated that the 
scheme proved fruitful for the analysis of the thesis’ case study, as it helped to identify 
the precise manner in which the changes initiated affected the field upon which they 
were brought to bear.
One difficulty with the distinction between policy communities and networks 
(highlighted principally by the interview material used in Chapter 4) arises from the 
multidimensional nature of the 'resource dependencies' which Rhodes argues to cement 
communities and networks. The problem is that a network which may be defined in 
terms of one of the five resource categories may not exist in terms of another. Hence, in 
the present example in terms of financial resources, the NAFE sector was a highly 
vertically integrated policy community, because it relied upon a system of grant 
allocation via the DES and DoE. To take other resources, however, the empirical data 
discussed in Chapter 4 shows that, for example, authority and legitimacy were not 
highly integrated into a national-local network, rather LEAs proved themselves to have 
a considerable degree of independence in opposing the White Paper and pursuing their 
own version of a local NAFE policy, through the medium of their national associations. 
It was not that they were free of central authority, rather that the set-up was much 
looser in these senses than it was in terms of grant funding. On the other hand, the 
NAFE sector followed the definition of a community by virtue of its exhibition of a 
high degree of closure, stability of relationships and insulation from other networks and 
communities. The distinction of a community from a network therefore emerges as 
rather more complicated than Rhodes allows for, recognition of variations by resource 
type need to be taken into account in determining the nature (community or network) of 
an organisational policy system.
An additional factor highlighted frequently in the empirical findings is the 
significance of proximate day-to-day personal relationships. To the extent that 
connections between individual actors are manifestations of the association between 
their institutions, their dealings reflect the exchange of resources indicated in Rhodes’ 
work. However, the personal relationships which develop (or fail to) between those 
who operate at the interface of two bodies are of such crucial importance to the manner 
in which the institutions interact that no analysis of the patterns of relationships can be
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complete without the inclusion of this aspect Therefore, whilst a policy network drawn 
on the basis of the presence or absence of resource links is a valuable construct, the 
need to identify those areas of personal contact most significant to a policy area is clear. 
Hence the consideration of what might be termed the 'core area' of the policy network, 
as in Figure 8.2, which shows the core of the full policy network which appears in 
Figure 8.1. This is the region of the network in which the personal relationships are 
most likely to come significantly into play.
To move on to some of the implications for other theoretical areas raised in Chapter 
3, it is important to return to Salter and Tapper's notion of the 'bureaucratic dynamic', 
and the distinctions made between various organisational types*. The first of these was 
represented as a means of identifying a bureaucracy's institutional characteristics, as 
expressed by its structure, procedures, guiding principles and the style of its operating 
culture. The manner of this expression was indicated to have been categorised by 
various authors. Included were Bums and Stalker's distinction between 'mechanistic’ 
and 'organic' types, the former being more rigid, hierarchical and ordered, the latter 
less rigid and more flexible; Merton's dichotomy between rationality and rigidity in an 
organisation; and Lipsky's stress on the autonomy of individuals within an 
bureaucracy**. In section 3.5, a concluding discussion offered a contrast between the 
bureaucratic dynamics of the MSC and the main education sector institutions as an 
explanation for the advancement of the Commission in the vocational education and 
training field under the Thatcher administrations. There is no need to repeat that 
discussion here, but it may be of interest to consider the general implications of the 
empirical findings.
The argument made in Chapter 3 built on Merton’s idea that the maximisation of 
rationality in a bureaucracy's form is contingent, the utility of flexibility and rigidity 
varying from case to case, each organisation combining them in differing quantities. 
The empirical findings support this view. That is, they underline the fact that a 
bureaucracy may combine the rigidity of a strict line-management structure with the
• see section 3.3
** see pp. 73-4.
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flexibility of an organisational culture amenable to frequent and rapid change. Evidence 
for this from the thesis is in the MSC's clearly-defined structure (outlined in section 
6.2), which combined with the considerable flexibility indicated by the immediacy of its 
response to the White Paper, its 'goalpost shifting' tendencies (outlined in section 
6.4(iv)), and its rapidly developing practice on NAPE monitoring (section 7.3). The 
flexibility in part depended on the rigidity of the management structure, which made it a 
broad institutional characteristic, rather than one rooted in personal action.
A clear difference of bureaucratic type which emerged from the data concerned the 
speed and flexibility of decision-making between a business-style line management 
structures and organs of local democracy, with the attendant political and legitimising 
processes that the latter imply. This situation involves a contrast in which the former is 
able to move rapidly on the basis of swift executive decision-making, whilst the latter is 
hamstrung by procedures geared to involve a range of actors in finalising any position. 
These must ultimately involve political decision-making by elected representatives, 
which will nonetheless always be based upon earlier work by executive officers. Whilst 
the discussions in Chapter 3* about the operation of the policy-making continuum 
indicate that decision-making will occur at a range of levels in any organisation, there is 
a clear difference between an operation in which key decisions must always be referred 
to the political level, and one where the local executive manager is able to take decisions 
single-handedly. Quite apart from the executive manager's capacity to act independently 
is the freedom of this officer to act at any time. In contrast, political committees can 
meet only on certain timetabled occasions, for which decisions must generally wait.
The deliberately-cynical observation quoted earlier that 'democracy is inefficient'** is 
undoubtedly an exaggeration, but does express to a degree the manner in which the 
implementation of policy by local elected bodies appears, relative to non-political 
organisations, to be slow-paced.
Given such differences in the operation of two bodies’ bureaucratic dynamic, it can 
be generalised that problems will arise should they be required to work together, and
* section 3.6
** see page 96
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the two dynamics have an opportunity to clash. For example, an executively-managed 
body keen to move swiftly on a new initiative is likely to be frustrated in waiting for its 
elected partner to conduct the process necessary for it to take a legitimate decision, and 
this tension is likely to be replicated in any circumstance where two such bodies meet 
Evidence in support of this view emerged in the empirical work of the thesis. The 
incompatibility of the MSC planning timetable with council committee cycles and the 
speed with which the MSC expected LEAs and colleges to take decisions both scored 
prominently in the investigation of the significant NAFE problem areas discussed in 
Chapter 6. The slow pace of LEAs* response also emerged as a specified problem. 
Other problems of this kind arose through the difficulties experienced in harmonising 
budgetary cycles. A number of respondents to the MSC survey were indicated to have 
experienced difficulties in dealing with councils at the political level, in contrast with 
smooth officer-level relations. The preference of officers in a body such as MSC for 
working with executive rather than political actors, evident in some of the data 
presented in section 6.4 (ii) which contrast good officer-level relationships with 
difficulties at the political level, appears to confirm the existence of problems in this 
area.
The empirical work afforded evidence of a further problem created by a contrast in 
bureaucratic styles where two differing bodies are brought together. This is that in such 
a case, differences in the institutions’ operating characteristics will not only create 
problems in themselves: a mutual lack of understanding about what these differences 
are, or even (initially) that they exist, will considerably hamper the forging of 
cooperative and effective joint practices through compromise in the early phases of their 
partnership. Compromise can only succeed an appreciation of whether and where it 
must be made. A number of examples of this problem emerged in the empirical work. 
The lack of experience and understanding of educational matters on the part of MSC 
staff was indicated to be a serious problem by respondents to the LEA survey, as was 
the making of inaccurate assumptions by Area Office staff about past college 
performance. When it came to devising a procedure for monitoring NAFE, authority 
staff complained of the Commission raising 'hoops' for them to jump through, based 
initially on guesswork about what might be important. In addition to these were 
complaints about the administrative burden placed upon LEA staff by their MSC
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counterparts, a burden insufficiendy well understood because of an inadequate 
appreciation of: (a) the work involved in putting the required changes through the local 
authority system; and (b) the paucity of resources available at the LEA NAFE section to 
deal with it, particularly at a time of severe financial constraint from the centre. All these 
specific examples support the general point that such factors, based on contrasting 
bureaucratic characteristics, will significantly hamper inter-organisational arrangements.
These considerations lead on to an important question which emerges from the 
findings surrounding the issue of institutions which are brought together into 
partnership. It centres on the matter of likely differences between voluntary associations 
on one hand, and involuntary ones on the other. The principal cause of the differences 
between the two situations (voluntary and involuntary partnership) hinges on 
motivation. Voluntary partners are likely to enter joint arrangements with a set of needs 
which they believe can be met by the other, and will pursue as effective a partnership as 
possible either until such time as the needs are met, or until any clash of bureaucratic 
styles becomes so great as to render the whole process ultimately unrewarding, at 
which point the initial motivation would be negated and the partnership would be likely 
to end. In the involuntary partnership however, if one partner or both are reluctant 
participants, the motivation to tackle bureaucratic contrasts for the sake of effectiveness 
is subordinated to one which seeks merely to meet the minimum conditions required by 
the enforced partnership to avoid incurring sanction. Only if the reluctant partner 
experiences a change in attitude will this situation alter, as it did in the case of the LEAs 
who came to recognise the value of planning and resource management in NAFE, and 
developed something more like a genuine partnership, if still involuntary and in some 
cases still unpopular.
The other aspect of institutional characteristics mentioned above is that of the 
autonomy of individuals within the organisation. Argued to be an inherent aspect of the 
policy-making continuum in section 3.6, this emerged as an essential aspect of local- 
local relationships, as actors at these levels were found to forge arrangements suited to 
local circumstances and the positions of other local actors. The challenging by lower 
tier actors of positions handed down by superiors evident in both the MSC Area Offices 
and LEA executive sections in the empirical findings support this view. The
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implications with regard to inter-organisational relationships are considered more fully 
below, but the key point here is that in attempting to define organisational type by the 
level of autonomy of participating actors, it is essential to recognise the virtually 
universal tendency of local bureaucrats to develop an independence of stance 
realistically compatible with the demands of their daily tasks.
To move on to further implications raised by the thesis’ findings for the theoretical 
areas considered in Chapter 3, two ideas which need to be considered are: the tendency 
noted by Selznick for institutions to develop internal objectives unrelated to their 
original function; and the role of Lipsky's 'street-level' bureaucrats in structuring the 
lower-tier policy-implementation process***. These concepts are effectively related: 
Selznick's idea was noted to centre on the development of a secondary and informal 
internal structure which accompanies a bureaucracy's transition from being a more 
neutral and purely rational 'organisation' to a more responsive and adaptive human 
organism Selznick sees as an 'institution'. This structure is gradually constructed by the 
individuals employed by the organisation. It is this factor which ties the concept in with 
that of the street-level bureaucrat, whose interest it is 'routinise' the policy- 
implementation process into a set of day-to-day tasks in which a renewed equilibrium 
serves the officer's own administrative interests, principal amongst which is a 
guarantee of stability and a maintenance of the status quo. How far did the evidence of 
the empirical work presented here support that view, and what additional implications 
are thrown up by it for the analysis of informal, 'secondary' institutional interests and 
street-level bureaucratic behaviour ?
The chief evidence which relates to this matter emerging from the empirical work is 
the data gathered on the changing local relationships between MSC and LEA staff after 
1984. It suggests a pattern of development in cases where two bodies are thrown 
together in an asymmetric way, i.e. where one is reluctantly forced to accept the 
involvement of the other. Using the evidence for the development of LEA-MSC 
relations outlined in Chapter 6, and the conclusions drawn on the mater in section 8.4, 
this pattern can be summarised (using the same principle as the discussion on
* * * see  page 74.
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voluntary/involuntary partnership above) as follows. The initial state of relations is 
likely to be extremely cool, a factor principally attributable to the actors operating in the 
institution which has been the more reluctant partner. These actors will feel themselves 
to be threatened by the new situation, and their main concerns will centre upon loss of 
control over activities hitherto solely in their domain; uncertainty replacing stability; and 
the danger of further powers and responsibilities being sapped away as the arrangement 
proceeds. The internal and private, 'secondary' institutional objective, that is, the 
'maintenance and aggrandisement'5 of the organisation's existing roles, is an important 
consideration in this regard. It accounts for the intensity with which the above concerns 
are felt in such a situation, an intensity which will often be expressed as open hostility 
in the early meetings between the two sides. As time passes, two main processes may 
begin to occur, provided that no new initiative intervenes to alter the emerging 
equilibrium. First, an incrementally increasing confidence that there is not to be a 
continuing erosion of powers and responsibilities. Second, familiarisation with the 
other body and its staff. This stems from becoming acquainted with the other partner's 
working practices, and a gradually improving understanding of what the other partner 
is seeking from the joint relationship. Fears of a hidden agenda are likely to be 
ameliorated as the other partner's real objectives become separable from any 
erroneously-perceived and more sinister goals attributed to it. Judgements made about 
the other partner's affairs come to be based on a working knowledge of how it 
operates, leading to the abandonment of unfair assumptions and the development of 
more realistic expectations of what the other partner can be reasonably asked to do in a 
given time frame. Policy areas which seem uncontroversial to one partner but which are 
highly contentious for the other become mutually recognised, allowing sensitive areas 
to be treated with the required diplomacy. Recognition of how far the other partner can 
be moved in a particular direction tends to lead to the successful avoidance of violent 
conflict, and reasonable expectations only are likely to be imposed. Each partner will 
change its institutional behaviour, at least in regard to its work involving the other 
partner, both bodies compromising and altering their usual bureaucratic dynamic for the 
sake of developing cooperative mechanisms.
As a consequence of this enhanced knowledge and understanding of the other 
partner, mutual trust and confidence is likely gradually to develop. Absolutely crucial in
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this regard are the relationships which develop between the particular individuals on 
either side. The initial hostility when the partners first meet is very often founded upon 
a perception of the other body as a faceless institution which is ascribed a series of 
characteristics and motivations. When the institution instead becomes personified as a 
set of familiar faces who are seeking to do a job in the same area - people who are 
personally equally keen to avoid conflict - the response of one to the other is likely to 
become gradually transformed. This will not happen in every case, not least because 
sometimes the personalities of the individuals involved will clash. But the evidence of 
the survey data presented above suggests that in the considerable majority of cases, 
individuals originally perceived as members of the 'opposition1 instead become viewed 
as genuine partners. The two groups of staff tend to develop the relationship of • 
colleagues working towards a common end, and the institutions themselves move from 
being virtual foes to something more like allies. It is important to stress that this view is 
one developed from the experience of the thesis’ particular case study. There are 
grounds for generalisation, as the experience of over seventy local authorities is built 
into these observations. However, the possibility of a less harmonious outcome 
emerging in other policy areas must be borne in mind, and this matter will be raised as 
an area for further work in the next section.
One important consequence of personal relationships between individuals working 
in two different institutions being such a significant factor is the following: there may 
develop a 'two-tiered' relationship between the partners which reflects the proximity of 
different actors to the point of interface. In the case of NAFE planning, this meant that 
whilst officers in the LEA executive department commonly had a very good working 
relationship with their 'colleagues' in the Area Office NAFE section, it was not always 
reflected at the higher levels. The key consideration here is that interests of the 
individuals involved are determined to a significant extent by the impacts of their 
attitudes and actions upon their day-to-day routines: a senior-ranking officer voicing 
stringent opposition to the partner’s policy does not have to follow this up with regular 
contact in an atmosphere of hostility with its staff. There is an overall tendency for 
administrative actors to seek compromises in the direction which will minimise sources 
of stress in their daily tasks. This is the manifestation of and the motivation behind the 
'routinisation' of policy in action, arguably a much more important consideration for
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such actors than the policy goals themselves, which are likely to impinge upon their 
daily routines in a less disruptive manner.
There is an additional problem which arises in the ’two-tiered' relationship for the 
street level bureaucrats who seek personal working stability. It is that, where there is a 
mismatch between good officer level relations and more strained relations at the political 
or other higher level, they find themselves in a position of having to seek compromises 
not only with the other institution, but with their own internal superiors who may take a 
different view of how they should proceed than their own immediate interests would 
suggest. (Hence an MSC officer quoted in Chapter 6 cited problems of his being 
perceived to be 'batting for the LEA' by his Regional Office, with whom he had to seek 
a form of compromise solution to the differences at issue.) It must be recognised of 
course that such differences are not necessarily the product of pursuing administrative 
self-interest. In many cases the lowest tier actors will take a different view because of 
their greater understanding of the local imperatives and contingent factors which restrict 
the possibilities for action, a matter following from the growth of mutual understanding 
discussed above. The lowest tier, 'street-level' actors are likely to be most attuned to 
these factors as a consequence of their more frequent contact with the other partner. 
Both of these factors need to be taken account, therefore, in portraying the development 
'two-tiered' inter-organisational relationships.
The evidence supports the idea that the two areas under discussion - i.e. the 
tendency noted by Selznick6 for institutions to develop internal objectives unrelated to 
their original function; and the role of Lipsky's7 'street-level' bureaucrats in structuring 
the lower-tier policy-implementation process - are in one sense fundamentally linked. It 
supports the view that the development of Selznick's secondary, informal internal 
structure, argued to accompany a bureaucracy's transition from being a more neutral 
and purely rational 'organisation' to a more responsive and adaptive human organism, 
the 'institution', is a consequence of gradual construction by the individuals employed 
by the organisation. Many of the 'secondary' goals are reflection of street-level 
bureaucrats’ desire to tame uncertainty and maximise the security and predictability of 
their task. In making evident the reluctance of local officers to change their procedures 
and practices (e.g. early LEA resistance to written plans, monitoring and evaluation),
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the data supports the suggestion that a principal interest of the administrator is the 
maintenance of the status quo, or, where this proves impossible, the creation of a new 
equilibrium which can be defended. Other 'private' institutional objectives, such as the 
aggrandisement of the organisation and movement into new policy areas, are unlikely to 
be motivated (or encouraged) at the local levels, where such aims are likely to be 
perceived as disruptive. This further emphases the 'two (or more)-tiered’ quality of 
bureaucratic structures.
Whilst considering the theoretical significance of the thesis* findings vis d vis local 
institutional relationships, further conclusions may usefully be drawn by considering 
the data’s implications for the bargaining process as expressed between two 
organisations with different interests to promote. These implications involve: the nature 
of the organisations involved; and the relative effectiveness of different kinds of 
sanctions and incentives which can be employed.
In considering the type of organisation involved, the focus of the discussion of this 
here centres upon the process as expressed by a 'quasi-local' body on one hand dealing 
with a truly local body on the other (as was the case between the MSC and each LEA), 
the 'quasi-local' institution being in reality only an extension of a regional arm of a 
national body. The implications of this are that whilst a truly local body in such a 
situation will bargain and negotiate on the basis of local factors, its partner will be 
operating under pressure from above to meet requirements developed at a more 
generalised national or regional scale. It has already been noted that local sections can 
experience tensions with higher tiers over developing local policies which differ from 
the broader vision. The problem for the local office in mediating between two sources 
of pressure, one internal, one external, is that its bargaining power is undermined by a 
lack of flexibility. In an institution which allowed extensive discretion to its officers at 
each level this would not be as great a problem, but in the case of a more rigid line 
management structure, difficulties are bound to occur. The real difficulty in terms of 
negotiation is that as a process it requires sensitivity to local factors. Local staff, 
working 'at the coalface' have to deal with people upon whom the impacts of the 
demands made from above will actually fall. On the basis of the empirical evidence, it 
seems fair to suggest that only local negotiators can truly appreciate the importance of
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local factors, and need to be able to make a response on the basis of their own 
judgements based on these. For this reason it appears that when such circumstances 
arise, local officers may take it into their own hands to exercise a discretion which is 
not necessarily consistent with their official duties (as made evident by some local- 
Regional disputes within the MSC - see section 6.4(iv)). Nonetheless, difficulties do 
arise as a consequence of negotiating actors being constrained to follow national 
guidelines where local judgement might suggest another course. The lack of a clear, 
locally formulated rationale, it being handed down from an institution’s upper echelons, 
can weaken the position of the officers who have to negotiate on its behalf. And whilst 
local bodies are able to take self-contained decisions, responsible directly to no higher 
authority, local managers of national bodies are not playing with a full deck of 
negotiating cards. The implications for the bargaining process are that compromise is 
likely to be achieved most rapidly in circumstances where local actors are given 
significant powers of discretion. This will inevitably be at the cost of losing uniformity, 
a factor whose degree of conflict with national or regional priorities will vary, but the 
problem does reflect a fundamental difficulty experienced by national bodies negotiating 
with local partners.
Another factor concerning the impacts of the nature of the organisations involved 
upon bargaining concerns the geography of the local institutional framework. Where 
negotiations are between bodies situated in the same town or city, the potential for the 
development of close bargaining relationships is considerably greater than if the offices 
are physically distant, as is often the case in more rural areas. Personal, face-to-face 
contact is crucial to the development of colleague-style relationships discussed earlier.
A local office dealing with a larger number of partners will similarly be more hard- 
pressed to improve personal bargaining links than an office dealing with only one 
partner, and with a consequently greater amount of time available for face-to-face 
negotiation (see the discussion on frequency of MSC-LEA contact in section 6.4(i)). 
Other factors which come into play in dealing with a local authority include whether it 
exhibits the characteristics of an active, centralised body keen to meet new 
developments head-on, or those of a more laissez-faire variety, in which case the 
process of reaching agreement is likely to be altogether more difficult. The degree of 
autonomy of the individuals within the organisation, noted earlier to vary from one
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institution to another, will clearly have a role to play in determining the particular 
outcomes in a given situation. Furthermore, there is the extent to which a particular 
locality exhibits the characteristics of a close community, in which actors brought 
together into a new partnership are likely to have encountered their opposite numbers in 
other local settings, or whether alternatively they are likely to be dealing with complete 
strangers who move in quite different circles. The evidence from the empirical work 
presented here suggests that the former situation is much more likely to produce 
cooperation and agreement at an earlier stage in the bargaining process.
The above series of theoretical implications have considered matters arising from the 
thesis concerning institutional-level, local-local relationships. It is necessary at this 
point to move on to the more central-local aspects of the theoretical positions outlined 
earlier. To take first the subject of the dual-state thesis position outlined in section 3.4, 
an important question arises form the supposed inability of local government to resist 
the central government will in England and Wales.Saunders was quoted as stating that 
local councils
have in recent years tried yet failed to resist central government8,
and that strategies open to local government in the organisational, political, economic, 
were at best of limited effectiveness. The most local government could hope for was a 
rearguard action, delaying the inevitable. The evidence of the thesis, however, indicates 
that in the case of Training for Jobs local authorities were very much able to resist and 
alter policy as a consequence of opposition to the central government line; the ultimate 
policy implemented differed considerably from the original proposals. The implications 
for the dual state thesis appear to lie in its emphasis upon the role of the legal powers of 
the centre to alter local responsibilities. The present example is one where an alternative 
approach was employed, which sought to effect change through a strategy of financial 
transfer without altering existing local government responsibilities. The lesson is that 
through a strategy of organised political opposition based on their control of 
organisation resources, local councils are able to successfully influence policy 
outcomes in circumstances where the centre has not committed its full legal weight
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To interpret this shifting of central goals through local implementation we used in 
Chapter 3 the concept of the 'policy-making continuum'. Chapter 3 cited arguments 
against the use of a top-down model, and in particular its three major assumptions - that 
the decision making or elite group has sufficient authority to guarantee that its 
requirements are met by lower-tier actors; the ability of this elite to formulate a policy 
which is sufficiently comprehensive; and the existence of policy as a recognisable 
entity. The empirical evidence of the thesis shows the unreliability all three of these 
assumptions in the case of the NAFE Initiative.
To consider first authority, the power of the decision-making 61ite - in this case the 
central government - to compel its lower tier agents to carry out its policy decisions was 
clearly found wanting by the successful LEA opposition to the original policy, and the 
renegotiation of a considerably revised version in the NAFE Agreement This 
demonstrated beyond question the existence of other sources of power within the 
NAFE policy-making system. These lay in the local mandate held by LEAs, supported 
by the organisation of a national pressure group in the form of the local authority 
associations, which was able to invoke this local legitimacy as a means of politically 
opposing the White Paper. The power afforded by the possession of professional 
expertise, and the control of organisational resources in a large and complex field, also 
caused a diminution in the effective authority of central government to impose its 
wishes.
As for the comprehensiveness of the policy, it was stressed earlier that policies 
contain both elements which are abstract and generalised, and elements which are case- 
oriented, both being crucial aspects of the whole. Given its distribution across the 
LEAs of England and Wales, it is clear that NAFE had not one but 104 policies, one for 
each authority, the local diversity of the case-oriented aspects in each instance requiring 
considerable specification of detail. The ability to devise a policy suitable to each such 
locality required not only the expertise of a practitioner with a grounding in such grass­
roots policy requirements, but of a practitioner with such a grasp of detail in each 
specific locality. The possibility of such knowledge being directly available to central 
decision-makers is clearly unreasonable. The impossibility of a NAFE policy existing 
as a recognisable entity, such as in the form of a document, replicable across all 104
3 7 2
LEAs follows from the above. The nearest to such a document in the field of NAFE 
planning was the Guidance Handbook, which covered only the broad outlines of 
recommended local action, and was in any case more procedural than substantive in 
terms of policy.
The process of review and development which was established to formulate a 
policy which could be agreed between all partners is an interesting case example of 
policy-making, which can be articulated through the theoretical perspective outlined in 
section 3.6. In that discussion, it was argued whilst upper echelon actors make key 
decisions in the abstract about policy stances and broad implementation criteria, the 
detail of policy is worked out at lower levels in the 'policy-making continuum1. The 
upper-level 'policy-oriented' decision makers were held to 'make choices between 
policies presented to them' by lower-tier actors, who 'define their nominal masters’ 
decision space'****.
The procedure by which the NAFE Policy Group constructed the NAFE Agreement 
illustrates the policy-making continuum in operation. As the upper tier of a three-level 
structure, it made decisions on policy options presented to it by a Working Group, 
which in turn was serviced and informed by a Technical Group. As observed in 
Chapter 4, the direction of policy-making thus involved movement up, as well as 
down, the policy hierarchy, the final policy decision being taken by the group of actors 
who actually had the least involvement in developing it
The above process adds to other evidence vindicating the model of the policy­
making continuum. In the case of Training for Jobs, a clear policy was laid down by 
the central government with the intention that its measures would be implemented 
locally. In practice, they were not, because the logic of negotiation within the NAFE 
policy community forced modifications upon it. Barrett and Hill were noted earlier as 
identifying a tension between 'the normative assumptions of government' and the 
reality of the 'struggle and conflict between interests - the need to bargain and 
compromise*. They state compromise to be an inherent aspect of all policy-making,
****see section 3.6.
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because of the need to resolve different values and interests and the effects of 
underlying structural forces. This view was confirmed by Bryan Nicholson's comment 
in the introduction to the first Guidance Handbook, where he stated that the document 
offered
the best match between the interests involved although various parties have reservations about 
particular elements.9
Ham and Hill were noted as stating that policy is in a constant state of change, that 
interaction structures are complex, that the outside world must interfere, and that 
implementing actors are inherently difficult to control. The reality of the inevitability of 
compromise is forcefully demonstrated by the translation of Training for Jobs into the 
NAFE Agreement
A further theoretical position to which the empirical findings of the thesis can add 
comment, which stems from the recognition of NAFE's policy-making complexity, is 
one forwarded by Rhodes. He states that
The failure to appreciate that service delivery systems are complex, disaggregated and 
indeterminate has led to the failure of policies.10
It would appear that such failure occurred in the case of the government's 1984 NAFE 
strategy. Rhodes' comment on the experience of the Thatcher administrations' attempts 
at authoritarian treatment of sub-central government in general appears to be 
appropriate, at least in part, to the Training for Jobs experience:
The command code confronted the messy reality of the disaggregated, differentiated polity, and, 
rather than simplifying the state apparatus, the government made it more complex, confused 
and ambiguous.11
The restructured NAFE policy network indicated in Figure 8.1 supports the idea of a 
state apparatus for the delivery of NAFE which had become more complex. Whilst, as 
argued in the previous section, clear benefits quite evidently accrued from the 
introduction of the NAFE Initiative, the creation of another layer of bureaucracy did
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much to add to the administrative burden of operating the NAFE system in England and 
Wales, the scale and complexity of which did not make the prospect for successful new 
innovations in the field an attractive one for any future government Recent additions to 
this complexity in the form of the ERA legislation have not eased this situation, 
although they do indicate the tenacity of central government in seeking to pursue its 
chosen ends.
JLii Avenues for further work
The work presented in this thesis has opened up a number of fruitful avenues for 
further research. These can be usefully divided into the subheadings of: theoretical 
issues; the further restructuring of the NAFE bureaucracy; and NAFE practice.
Theoretical issues
Whilst much of the theoretical context upon which the thesis has been based is 
vindicated by the empirical evidence, there are a number of areas which suggest the 
need for further research attention.
To consider first the Rhodes framework dealing with policy communities and 
networks, it was argued in the last section that this required some alteration in terms of 
the definition of policy communities. The reason was held to be the variations possible 
in terms of resource type that could affect judgements made over whether an 
organisational system was a community or a network. Additional work might explore 
this argument further by considering other examples of organisational systems, seeking 
to identify whether the circumstances commonly arose in which a 'community' defined 
according to one resource type might appear as a 'network' in terms of another. The 
utility of the existing framework, or alternatively the importance of developing a revised 
version, could be established through such work.
To move on to matters concerning bureaucracies, the chief implications derived from
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the present work were shown in section 8.7 to surround the question of inter- 
organisational relationships between negotiating partners. In that section a series of 
generalisations were made on the basis of the research findings. Clearly, whilst these 
stand on the basis of the present Training for Jobs example, it cannot be said that they 
represent anything more than hypotheses at this stage. Each of these areas therefore 
requires further work to establish the validity of such generalisations, which may 
confirm, refute or modify the impressions derived from the thesis* empirical data.
To take first the matter of involuntary as opposed to voluntary partnerships, it was 
argued on the empirical evidence that the former exhibited a tendency for institutions 
forced into associations without consent to leave fundamental incompatibilities 
unresolved, seeking instead to meet a minimum level required to avoid sanction. This 
was held to contrast with voluntary partnerships in which conflict would alternatively 
be resolved or the partnership terminated. The presence or absence of institutional 
motivations which supported the partnership was held to be significant in this regard.
In the particular context studied it was argued that local education authorities had not in 
fact pursued the 'minimum response’, as a consequence of the revision of the original 
partnership proposal and a growing acceptance of the importance of the new 
arrangements being suggested within that revised context. Further work might 
interestingly explore a situation where enforced partnership had not involved the 
successful revision of the circumstances by the dissenting partner, and where 
opposition had continued throughout the period of partnership. Against such a case, the 
above hypothesis about the likely behaviour of such a body could be tested.
In the same context, the question arises of whether the occurrence of enforced 
partnership of this kind is a peculiarly public sector phenomenon. That is, whether the 
creation of such involuntary partnerships must be seen as restricted to circumstances 
governed by the legal decree of central government; or whether similar situations can 
arise where purely private sector institutions are involved. Further work might firstly 
explore the matter of whether private sector examples might be found, and 
subsequently conduct some form of comparative analysis as to how such bodies’ 
behaviour might compare with that of a public sector organisation in the same situation.
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A second generalisation derived from the thesis’ findings was suggested for 
patterns produced by 'asymmetric1 partnerships, i.e. those involving partners with 
differing levels of enthusiasm for the connection. The hypothesis suggested a process 
of transition from hostility to cooperation involving a number of stages and some 
underlying pre-conditions, the effects of renewed stability, familiarisation, improved 
mutual understanding and compromise, associated with the development of good 
personal relationships, tending towards a new equilibrium. The idea is based on the 
particular experience of the two bodies studied here: whether such developments are as 
likely to occur as has been suggested he® requires further work considering a range of 
other experiences in which partners exhibiting contrasting degrees of enthusiasm are 
brought into association over the development and implementation of policy. The 
degree to which ultimate cooperation is probable in such 'arranged marriages' between 
organisations would be of particular interest.
Similar attention, in the form of additional work searching for evidence of trends 
suggested here, also needs to be paid to: the matter of 'two-tiered' relationships 
developing between different levels of the partner organisations; the 'shake-up effect' 
of new initiatives which forces local bureaucrats to move to some extent in order to 
reach a compromise position which is the prerequisite of renewed equilibrium; and the 
significance of the offering or withholding of cooperation as a strategic resource 
available as a 'bargaining chip' to organisations who have power through discretion 
over this. Further light could undoubtedly be cast upon these matters by the pursuit of 
further empirical work. In addition, there are advantages to be gained in subjecting the 
present empirical material to the analysis afforded by the wider literature on bargaining 
and organisational behaviour that has not been considered in this thesis. Amongst other 
work, it may usefully be discussed in the context of such work as that of Cyert and 
March^ and Downs13.
To move on to a further area for additional work, this concerns the questions raised 
about the dual-state thesis with regard to central-local relations. In the last section it was 
noted that whilst Saunders claimed that local councils had in Britain in recent years 
'tried yet failed to resist central government'14, there was in the case of Training for 
Jobs clear evidence that local authorities had successfully opposed central government -
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not to the point of causing a complete policy climb-down, but certainly to the extent of 
significantly blunting the intended impacts of the strategy.
The question emerges as to how this was possible, given the extent of central 
government power so clearly demonstrated to exist. Reasons given in this thesis’ 
particular instance have been strategic miscalculation of an attempted financial 
manipulation; the non-executant nature of the agency through which the government 
was seeking to act; the solidity of local government opposition; and the significance of 
key individuals outside central government in allowing the policy to be revised. The 
requirement of future research is to investigate whether each or any of these factors, or 
this particular combination of factors, was effective in this instance due to unique 
circumstances, or whether there are broader theoretical implications to be drawn. Only 
by considering a range of other examples against which the circumstances of the NAFE 
Agreement may be compared could such an evaluation be attempted.
A further question arises from the complete effectiveness with which the 1988 
Education Reform Act (ERA) was able to impose similarly unpopular policies upon 
LEAs without meeting any effective opposition which was able to revise it in any way. 
The use of a large and unwieldy bill which required extensive use of parliamentary time 
to achieve this raises the question of whether significant change in the administration of 
further education can be achieved between periodic upheavals such as ERA, which by 
their very nature can only be accorded sufficient parliamentary time at extended 
intervals. The experience of Training for Jobs suggests that attempts at short-term 
strategies which circumvent major legislative change can be only partially effective; 
investigation of comparative examples would be necessary to arrive at a more definitive 
answer to this question.
Another aspect of potential work in this area which, given its more generally- 
focussed attention to nationally-driven issues, has not been conducted in this thesis is 
the relation of local geography to the factors impinging upon the need for local 
discretion in policy-making on vocational education and training. Such variables as 
local industrial and employment trends, skill shortages and demographic patterns are 
bound to influence decision-making in local further educational planning. A theoretical
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examination of the influence of such matters in NAFE would provide an interesting 
additional angle to the material presented here.
The further restructuring of the NAFE bureaucracy
Focussing first upon the area of the thesis' particular enquiry, two highly significant 
changes have come into effect which have caused further restructuring of the NAFE 
bureaucracy since the empirical work for this thesis was carried out. These are the 
dismantling of the Manpower Services Commission, and its eventual replacement by a 
system of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) overseen by the Training Agency; 
and the new arrangements for the administration of NAFE set out in ERA, which gave 
LEAs a statutory responsibility for strategic planning whilst devolving a considerable 
amount of management and budgetary responsibility to individual colleges. These 
measures together thus remove the two players in the bureaucracy created by the NAFE 
Agreement - LEAs partly, through a diminution of their managerial role, and Area 
Offices altogether. Responsibility for NAFE planning within the Training Agency has 
been taken over by its Regional Offices.
A key development in this process has been the abolition of the annual Contract 
signed between Area Offices and LEAs, a central element to the NAFE Agreement, 
made redundant by the new responsibility imposed by ERA. With it went the last 
vestige of formal MSC authority in NAFE. The effects of this extensive changes upon 
the structures through NAFE is managed requires renewed work of the kind carried 
presented here, and would particularly seek to establish:
- how the removal of a formal Training Agency role in NAFE, whilst it retains 
control over the former LEA money it still contributes to their annual NAFE 
budget, affects the security of the financial basis upon which the joint planning 
process was originally based;
- what level of contact between LEAs and Training Agency personnel remains 
given the transfer of the operation to Regional level;
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- the extent to which contact between LEAs and TECs over NAFE planning has 
emerged, if at all, under the changed circumstances;
- how the new powers of colleges to independently manage their own affairs has 
affected the LEAs ability to retain its supposedly continuing strategic role.
To consider the wider focus, an important future area of investigation involves 
attention to the wider issue of how the policy network responsible for vocational 
education and training (VET) should, ultimately, be structured. Given the evident 
difficulties which have emerged from the division at ministry level between 'education1 
and 'training', it is worth considering how the consequent tensions could be resolved. 
This would require considerable research enquiry of an intensive nature, exploring the 
feasibility of realigning long-standing responsibilities into a new structure without 
increasing the present complexity. It would rest heavily on further investigation of the 
role of bureaucratic interests in preserving existing policy networks for reasons quite 
aside from the maximisation of effectiveness in delivery.
NAFE practice
Again, to first consider further work at the most focussed level of the thesis on the 
practice of NAFE planning, a number of issues emerge. Whilst the continued 
development of all the areas considered in the course of Chapter 7 would be of future 
research interest, particular attention should be addressed to those areas which at the 
time of this study had not seen the progress for which the potential clearly existed. The 
principal area in question is the gathering of labour market information (LMI). The 
inadequacy of existing sources was a very evident difficulty hampering the 
development of NAFE planning at the time of this study, the MSC having still not 
adequately fulfilled its intended role in providing such a service. There were extensive 
suggestions made that the situation was being improved, and further research should be 
aimed at establishing whether this has in fact been the case. Particular foci of such 
enquiry would be:
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- whether the MSC's successor, the Training Agency, has succeeded in meeting 
the widely identified need for LMI to be more localised;
- whether progress has been made in terms of converting raw labour market 
information, in the form of extensive data, into labour market intelligence, which 
would be much more expressive of the requirements of NAFE that the 
information implies.
Another area for further research is the progress made by LEAs in the monitoring of 
NAFE. Whilst their performance was by no means inadequate at the time of the present 
study, it was noted that progress was still being hampered by the lack of adequate 
computerised management information systems in most LEAs. Since this situation was 
anticipated to improve considerably in the short term, an investigation of how this had 
impinged upon the effectiveness of NAFE monitoring would be of considerable 
interest.
The analysis of LEA NAFE Development Plans indicated that the quality of these 
had increased considerably during the early years of planning, with moves towards 
slimmer, more succinct documents with sharply-defined statements of aims and 
objectives. The extent of subsequent progress in this area would be of considerable 
interest Particular aspects which might be attended to are:
- whether progression from one Plan to the next has continued to show marked 
improvement, or whether there is evidence of a 'learning curve' already causing 
a slowing of development within each time period;
- whether there is any evidence of the emergence of a 'model Plan' which has 
come to be commonly replicated across England and Wales, or whether Plans 
remain diverse and highly locality-specific. This would include an investigation 
of which have proved more useful, short, concise documents or longer, more 
thorough Plans.
Another key area for further research is the investigation of curriculum change in
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NAFE. The influence or otherwise of the NAFE Agreement upon the delivery of NAFE 
courses is likely to become increasingly measurable as each year goes by, and 
curriculum trends can be more reliably identified. Research in this area represents an 
opportunity for an ongoing enquiry which may be continually updated as new 
information progressively becomes available. Particular areas of interest would be the 
addition of the new and discontinuation of the redundant, as well as courses which 
continue in a redesigned form. However, such work would need to be coupled with an 
associated enquiry into the reasons behind such changes, in order to establish the 
significance of NAFE planning as a factor of change. The use of college sampling 
would probably be the most effective approach, a strategy of enquiry quite different to 
that planned in the present thesis.
Leaving aside the finer detail of the specific components of the thesis' enquiry, it is 
important that more work be done at a wider level identifying the processes through 
which vocational education and training can be most effectively planned and 
administered. The dangers of concentrating attention upon a strategy seeking immediate 
results have been highlighted here; the need is clear to move towards a greater 
understanding of what in the longer term are the most appropriate VET delivery 
mechanisms. This requires a greater emphasis upon developing processes above the 
sometimes random pursuit of particular outcomes. Only with such understanding can 
the broad objective of making provision responsive and relevant to all VET clients 
become attainable.
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Notes to Chapter Eight
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INTERVIEW S
The following is a list o f interviewees cited in the text. In addition there were conducted a number of 
preliminary interviews which were not directly cited, but nonetheless significant in the development of 
the thesis. These were mostly at MSC Head Office at Moorfoot, but also at its TVEI unit in London. 
Interviews with Pamela Young and Michael Young at the Institute o f Education, University of London 
were also o f early importance to the work.
Apart from academics, the names of the interviewees are not revealed; this is an aspect integral to the 
research methodology as outlined in Chapter 5. The localities in which interviews were conducted are 
listed at the end.
Informal interviews were conducted with:
LMI Unit officers at MSC Head Office, Moorfoot, 17.2.87.
Leonard Cantor, Loughborough University, 8.1.88.
Officer in NAFE operations division at Moorfoot, 29.3.88.
NAFE finance officer at Moorfoot, 29.3.88.
NAFE Development Fund officer at Moorfoot, 29.3.88.
Further Education Unit officer, 20.5.88.
Association of County Councils officer, 21.3.88.
LEA NAFE officers: 9.2.88; 2.3.88; 16.3.88; 23.3.88; 6.5.88.
MSC Area Office NAFE HEOs: 5.5.88; 1.11.88; 7.11.88.
MSC Area Office NAFE EO, 5.5.88.
Senior MSC NAFE administrator at Moorfoot, 27.4.89.
MSC survey interviews
The nature of the localities in which MSC interviews were conducted is shown, along 
with the letter by means of which are referred to in the text of the thesis.
a - an office covering a single midlands county authority, the office being
located in its largest city. Here two officers were present, one from the local 
Regional Office;
b - an office covering two northern metropolitan districts;
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c - an office covering two counties in the east of England;
d - an office covering one large and one small LEA in the south of England;
e - an office covering a single county authority in the industrial north-east of
England;
f - an office covering two LEAs in south Wales;
g - an office covering five London boroughs;
h - an office covering three metropolitan districts in a north-western city; 
j  - an office covering a west Midlands shire.
Eight of the nine MSC regions in England and Wales were represented in this sample.
Interviews of one type or another were conducted in the following localities:
Cambridgeshire, Cleveland, Hampshire, Leicestershire, London (inner and outer), 
Manchester, Sheffield, South Glamorgan, Staffordshire, Suffolk.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AFE - advanced further education
ACC - Association of County Councils
AMA - Association of Metropolitan Authorities
AO - Administrative Officer
ATS - Adult Training Strategy
B/TEC - Business and Technical Education Council
CALLMI - Computer-assisted local labour market information
CBI - Confederation of British Industry
CEE - Certificate of Extended Education
CELP - College Employer Links Programme
CEO - Chief Education Officer
CGLI - City and Guilds of London Institute
CPVE - Certificate of Pre-Vocational Education
CRF - Central Reserve Fund
CTC - Central Training Council
DE - Department of Employment
DES - Department of Education and Science
DoE - Department of the Environment
DTI - Department of Trade and Industry
ED - Employment Division (of the MSC)
EO - executive officer
ERA - Education Reform Act
ESA - Employment Services Agency
ESF - European Social Fund
ESGs - Eduction Support Grants
FE - further education
FEU - Further Education Unit
FESC - Further Education Staff College
FESR - Further Education Statistical Record
FTE - full-time equivalent
GCE - General Certificate of Education
GLC - Greater London Council
GRP - grant-related poundage
HE - higher education
HEO - Higher Executive Officer
HMI - Her Majesty’s Inspectorate
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ILEA Inner London Education Authority
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITBs Industrial Training Boards
ITOs industrial training organisations
ITC Industrial Training Council
ITeCs Information Technology Centres
JES Joint Efficiency Study (by the DES and LAAs)
LAAs local authority associations
LCPs Local Collaborative Projects
LEA local education authority
LMI labour market information
MDF Mutual Development Fund
MIS management information system
MSC Manpower Services Commission
NAFE - non-advanced further education
NATFHE- National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education
NCVQ - National Council for Vocational Qualifications
NEDC - National Economic Development Council
NSTOs - non-statutory training organisations
NVQ National Vocational Qualification
OMSC - Office of the Manpower Services Commission
PER Professional and Executive Recruitment
PCFC - Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council
RAC Regional Advisory Council
RFEA - regional further education adviser
RSA Royal Society of Arts
RSG rate support grant
SEO Senior Executive Officer
SPD Special Programmes Division (of the MSC)
TO Training Division (of the MSC)
TECs Training and Enterprise Councils
TOCs Technical Occupation Categories
TOPs Training Opportunities Programme
TSA Training Services Agency
TTWA - travel to work area
TUC Trade Union Congress
TVEI Technical and Vocational Education Initiative
VET vocational education and training
WJEC - Welsh Joint Education Council
YOP Youth Opportunities Programme
YTS Youth Training Scheme
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Appendix A
Policy provisions of the NAFE Agreement.
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The section below offers a summary of the various proposals which together made up 
the provisions formulated under the NAFE Agreement This is drawn largely from the 
Guidance Handbook, and represents the nearest thing to a concrete written policy that 
emerged from Training for Jobs and its aftermath.
Summary o f the Agreement's provisions:
(i) Development Plan - to be produced by LEAs at the beginning of each academic 
year, starting in 1986-7, covering work-related NAFE provision. This was be an 
overview for a three-year period, and to be updated to cover a new three-year 
period at the start of each new academic year.
The Development Plan would be owned by the LEA, but drawn up after 
consultations with employers, trade unions, the local RAC, HMI, the careers 
service and other interested parties, and subject to approval by the MSC.
The Plan would set out the LEA's NAFE aims and objectives for the three year 
period, and set targets for their achievement. As a means of satisfying this 
requirement a list of criteria were identified, indicating that the Plan was to include:
• a list of organisations consulted for collection of labour market information 
(LMI) and for liaison with employers/employees;
• explanation and review of arrangements for consultation;
• sources of information about needs;
• review of existing provision;
• trends in enrolments and employer demand;
• extent of expected changes in demand;
• effectiveness of resource allocation;
• priorities and emphasis on certain areas;
• any rationalisation of provision;
• proposals for institutional or structural change;
• priorities for in-service training;
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• indication of how capital and revenue resources were to be allocated;
• description of the major employment issues of the area;
• assessment of the likely main structural changes in employment;
• characteristics and changing balance of the student population;
• description of all LEA and other local training facilities;
• expected changes in range and nature of provision.
The guidance recognised that many LEAs would not be able to meet all of these 
criteria in the first year, and asked that they attempt to pursue them 'as far as 
practicable1.
(ii) Annual Programme - this was to set out the detail on proposed provision of 
courses during the first year of the Plan, and how they related to the LEA's 
objectives. It was to cover the whole of its work-related provision, not a portion of 





• courses to be discontinued,
with justifications in each case. It should also provide information about course 
levels, entry requirements and staff-student ratios. Other items to be included were:
• in-service training and staff development;
• proposals for new forms of delivery, such as open and flexible learning;
• institutional changes;
• major items of capital expenditure;
• changes in marketing/resources/systems;
• improvements in information systems.
The programme was to be fully costed in the format used for FE budgets,
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identifying expenditure by each institution. This information was to be the basis of 
the transfer of funds from the MSC and of the annual contract
(iii) Contractual agreement - to be signed between the MSC Area Manager and a senior 
officer representing the LEA, this was to formalise the transfer of MSC's NAFE 
resources to the LEA. It would cover the same period as the Annual Programme, 
i.e. the first academic year of the Development Plan. It would depend on the Area 
Manager's being satisfied with the proposals contained in the Annual Programme, 
and its continuing validity throughout the year would rest on the programme being 
satisfactorily delivered.
(iv) Financial arrangements - The national MSC NAFE fund was to be devolved to its 
regional offices on the basis of the number of NAFE students in that region, as 
indicated by the FESR. This would in turn be devolved for allocation to individual 
LEAs, based again largely on the FESR, but with a 0.5 per cent margin for 
discretion on the basis of other factors taken into account by the Regional Office, 
such as identified changes in the labour market or in skill demands. The MSC 
funding given to LEAs was seen as a contribution to the whole of its provision, not 
as covering a specified portion, reflecting its 'shareholding' role identified earlier.
Transfer payments would be made monthly to LEAs, and their continuation would 
depend upon delivery of the Annual Programme. Should the Programme or a 
portion of it not be delivered, the contract provided for the abatement of MSC 
payments. This was seen very much as a last resort, LEAs and MSC Area Offices 
being asked to seek to deal with problems before this stage was reached; provision 
for re-negotiation, on the basis bf a revised programme, was made to minimise the 
possibility of abatement taking place. Area Managers could suspend payments 
whilst re-negotiation was conducted, and re-commence monthly payments at a 
different sum once a new agreement had been reached The full sanction was 
available if required nonetheless, and the abated sum would be calculated according 
to the size of the MSC's contribution to the courses not delivered.
At the end of each financial year the LEA's chief financial officer was required to
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certify that all MSC contributions had been spent on work-related NAFE and that 
no part of the costs was borne by or claimed from any other source.
No funding was to be allocated to either MSC Area Offices or LEAs for 
administering the new arrangements. Each was expected to finance the additional 
workload from its existing budget
(v) Monitoring - this was to be conducted to ensure that delivery of the Annual 
Programme was continuing as planned, and to satisfy the MSC that the LEAs 
contractual obligations were being met Key aspects for scrutiny were to be:
• the numbers of students starting and remaining on each course;
• the number of staff employed at each grade;
• total expenditure at each institution.
Emphasis was placed on local arrangements in this regard, reflecting the existence 
of peculiar local monitoring requirements, but the guidance nonetheless laid out 
certain minimum procedures. This involved a joint review in November/December 
to assess the opening of the Annual Programme, and a second joint review 
'towards the end of each programme year' to examine the extent to which courses 
followed the plans for the year.
(vi) Evaluation - to be conducted alongside monitoring, this was to assess the extent to 
which the Programme objectives and their achievement (or otherwise) helped to 
further the overall aims of making NAFE more cost-effective and responsive to 
labour market needs.
(vii) Central Reserve Fund (CRF) - this was the proportion (5 per cent) of the MSC 
NAFE budget retained centrally for disbursal to strategic initiatives of national 
benefit, and to assist individual LEAs with sudden unexpected needs. This would 
include research and development into improving responsiveness, and also the 
possibility of funding non-LEA providers where the MSC felt this necessary. This 
represents the last remnant of the White Paper's notion that the great bulk, 'though
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not necessarily all' of the MSC's NAFE resources would be spent in the public 
sector. The guidance indicates that any spending on non-LEA providers from the 
MSC mainstream NAFE fund could only occur with the agreement of the LEA.
(ym)Labour market information (LMI) - In line with the White Paper's statement that it 
would be the MSC's role to assist the flow of information about skill needs, the 
Commission was given the role of providing much of the information for the 
labour market report in Development Plan. The MSC was asked to provide:
• structure of employment by occupation and by industry;
• redundancy notifications;
• local demographic trends by age, sex and ethnic origin;
• trends in the number and composition of jobcentre and PER vacancies, 
long duration unfilled vacancies and other (mainly national) skill 
shortage indicators;
• level and composition of people seeking work through local jobcentres;
• information on MSC plans relevant to work-related NAFE in the area.
It was to be the LEA's role to coordinate this information, and to provide certain 
information of its own. This included information from local planning, economic 
development and housing departments, and the LEAs own information on 
enrolments, participation rates and student destinations.
It was recognised that in the first year of planning the quality of LMI would not be 
as high as would be expected in subsequent years the information base being as yet 
'fairly rudimentary'. Expected improvements in MSC's national and local LMI 
were to facilitate this process.
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Appendix B
The LEA questionnaire survey.
4 0 0
CONFIDENTIAL
* DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY 
~ ' J . HOUGHTON STREET 
! = ^  LONDON WC2A 2AE
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY OF LEA OFFICERS ON NAFE 
MANAGEMENT AND PROVISION IMPACTS OF THE MSC
1. A u th o rity : _____________________
2. Y our nam e and telephone n u m b er:
3. Your tide : _____________________
S ec tio n  (a) N A F E  p la n n in g  p ro c ess
1. Please in d ica te :
(1) die num ber o f  officers in  the authority education department
direcdy responsible for the preparation o f the NAFE P la n .............. ...................................................................
(2) the grade o f these officers ( e.g. 1st tier, 2nd tier e tc .) .................... ...................................................................
(3) total staff time devoted to NAFE planning centrally at the authority
(please give approxim ate answer in  staff weeks per y e a r) ............... ...................................................................
2. Does the authority budget the process o f  NAFE planning separately ?
YES I NO |
If  yes, please indicate the am ount budgeted for the 1988-9 financial y e a r .........................  ......................................
3. W ho has compiled the authority's NAFE Plan ? Please answer for both the m ost recent and for the first plan, 
tick as appropriate]: most recent
f i r s t  plan plan
(1) sing le  L EA  office r ..........................................................................................
(2) L E A  team  .............................................................................................................
(3) L E A /co llege  team  .............................................................................................
(4) college staff writing those parts o f  the plan relevant to their institution
(5) LEA  officer/team  editing submissions written by college s ta f f .............
(6) o th e r (specify ) ....................................................................................................
4. Which of the following make final decisions as to what is included in the draft NAFE
Plan submitted to  the elected members for approval ? Again indicate this for both the most nr
present and Erst year of planning [tick as appropriate]: first plan plan
(1) authority staff ....................................................
(2) college staff .......................................................
(3) a combination o f authority and college staff
(4) other (specify) ..................................................
5. Please indicate which if any of the following statements apply to your authority's NAFE planning 
process [tick as appropriate]:
(1) New staff posts have been created centrally at the authority since 1084 specifically
for work on the NAFE Plan .................................................................... ....................
- If  so, please indicate number of temporary [ ] and permanent staff [ ] .
(2) New staff posts have been created in colleges specifically for work on the NAFE Plan
(3) Staff duties at authority level have been redistributed specifically to enable one 
or more officers to concentrate more fully on the preparation of the NAFE P lan ......
(4) New commitments generated by the NAFE Agreement have been met without 
significant alteration in the education department's staffing arrangements  ..........
6. Which of the following members of the authority's colleges' staff are now, or were in 1984-5, involved in the 
compilation of the authority's NAFE Plan (please indicate whether they play an active, participatory role, or 
merely a consultative on e): 1984-5 1988-9
Participatory Consultative Participatory Consultative
(1) senior management ....................................................
(2) departmental heads ......................................... ........... .
(3) lecturing staff ................. .............................................
(4) inter-collegiate staff com m ittees............................... .
(5) other (specify) .............................................................
Please indicate if  possible the approximate average staff time devoted to NAFE planning in the authority's 
colleges, giving your ans wer in staff weeks per y ea r:
7. Please indicate for the following authority departments (a) the nature of any participatory role they may have in
the preparation of the plan, and (b) whether their relationship with the education department has strengthened since
1984 [tick as appropriate]: «  . .
Supplies Participates Relationship
Department information in planning strengthened
(1) Planning ...........................
(2) Chief executive's ...........
(3) Treasurer's ......................
(4) Economic Development
(5) Personnel .......... .............
(6) Social Services .............
(7) O ther (specify)  ..........
8. Do any other elected committees other than the education committee take on some direct responsibility
for compiling the NAFE Plan 7 -_______ _________
YES I NO I
for office use
If yes, please indicate which
9. Does the authority have a board or committee specifically responsible for the production of or for comment 
on the NAFE Plan? YES C Z  NO I-----
If yes, which if any of die following are represented on it ?
(1) elected authority members ..................................................................................................
(2) authority staff .......................................................................................................................
(3) college staff .........................................................................................................................
(4) MSC officers .......................................................................................................................
(5) Careers Service officers ..........................................*.........................................................
(6) HMI inspectors ...................................................................................................................
(7) individual employers /  employers' representatives............................................................
(8) Chamber of Commerce members .....................................................................................
(9) trade union representatives ................................................................................................
(10) other (specify) ......................................................................................................................
10. Please indicate whether the authority undertook for the purposes of its NAFE courses any of the following 
arrangements 1984-5, and whether it is doing so in 1988-9 [tick as appropriate]:
Did or does the LEA:
(1) Require its colleges to collect and and supply data on: 1984-5 1988-9
(a) first destinations of leavers ..........................................................................
(b) to ta l enro lm ents ..........................................................................................................
(c) enrolments for each course ..........................................................................
(d) completion/drop-out rates by course ....................................... ....................
(e) information about when and why students leave courses early.....................
(0 attendance figures by course ........................................................................
(g) examination results ....................................................................................... .
(h) applications received annually by course....................................................
(i) relevance of leaver's acquired skills to their first destinations...................... .
(2) Hold a comprehensive record of all NAFE courses offered in its colleges...........
(3) Place such data onto a computerised management information record................
(4) Have a planned NAFE marketing strategy  ...............................................
(5) Have a statement of proposed NAFE provision in the authority beyond the
current academic year.....................................................................................
(6) Develop information about teaching staff requirements beyond the current
academic year ..................................................................... ........
(7) Have a clearly defined set of NAFE objectives.............................
(8) Produce a documented NAFE plan ...............................................
(9) Conduct its own monitoring of NAFE provision in LEA colleges
(10) Conduct its own evaluation of NAFE provision in LEA colleges .
11. Please indicate which if any of the following changes have occurred in your authority since 1984:
(1) reorganisation of the education department..........................................................................
(2) reorganisation of the authority's colleges ............................................................................
(3) increase in the share of financial resources devoted by the LEA to post-16 activity...............
for office use
12. In which of the following ways does the authority approach TVEI and YTS courses in drawing up 
the NAFE plait Are they: TVEI YTS for office use
(1) fully integrated into the Plan with other courses
(2) included in the Plan but uhder separate headings , 
0 ) not included in the NAFE Plan .........................
13. To what extent is the authority involved in consultations with 
other LEAs over NAFE :
(1) on a regional basis .................................................................
(2) as a participant in the AMA/ACC NAFE Officers' Liaison Group..





Little No activle 
involvement involve: nent
E E  EE
14. Please indicate trends in the following for your authority, between 1984-5 and 1988-9, and the degree to 
which you feel the NAFE Agreement has been a significant factor in any change:
Impact o f NAFE Agreement 
large no large major minor no
increase increase change decrease decrease impact impact impact





(6) certified modular courses.................
(7) traditional apprenticeship courses—..
(8) amount of distance/open learning....
(10) number of TVEI 16-18 students....
(11) number of YTS students...............
15. Does the authority at present, or did it in 1984-5, promote any of the following policies for course quality 
assessment in its colleges ?
(1) Follow-up questionnaire or interview survey of any of the following to investigate 




(iii) Industrial Training Organisations .............................................
(iv) Chambers of Commerce ............................................................
(v) students' parents ..........................................................................
(vi) community groups ......................................................................
(vii) ethnic minority groups ..............................................................
(viii)others (specify) ............................................................................
(2) Regular self-evaluation by course lecturers..................................
(3) Course monitoring by committees representative of college clients
(4) Regular course monitoring by senior college staff.......................
(5) Regular course monitoring by LEA inspectors............................
16. Is the authority's current NAFE plan :
(1) treated as a discrete aspect of post-16 provision....................................
(2) integrated with other post-16 provision as part of a full FE programme
17. Does the authority /  its colleges actively seek additional NAFE funding from or 






(1) Industrial Training Boards ..................
(2) Non-Statutory Training Organisations
(3) MSC .......................................................
(4) private-sector training bodies.............
(5) European Social Fund ........................
(6) Education Support Grants ..................
(7) PICKUP ...............................................
(8) College Employer Links Programme .
(9) Responsive College Programme ........
(10) Local Collaborative Projects ...........
(11) others (specify) ................................
Section fc) Labour Market Information
18. Did the education department in 1984-5, or does it in 1988-9:
(1) Engage in a systematic consultative process with employers.........................
(2) Record the number of consultations between college/LEA staff and employers.
(3) Record the nature of consultations between college/LEA staff and employers....
(4) Assemble or employ any of the following labour market information:
(i) written description of local labour market................................................
(ii) records of labour market data sources  ..............................................
(iii) information on expected changes in local population and student numbers ,
(iv) details of anticipated future employer needs............................................
(5) Hold discussions with employers about future training needs........................
1984-5 1988-9
Please indicate any other form of labour market information collected by the authority which you consider 
important:
19. Please indicate the relative importance of the following sources of information on local NAFE requirements 
in terms of their degree of prominence with which they figure in the drawing uj) of planning priorities
Very Fairly Not very Not
important important important used
(1) MSC - provided local labour market information (LLMI)..........
(2) LLMI produced by authority-sponsored surveys........................
(3) LLMI from other sources (specify)_______________________
(4) comments volunteered by employers to colleges .
(5) information gathered from employers by college staff.
(6) informal sources, e.g. press reports........................... .
(7) judgement of college sta ff.........................................
(8) others (specify) ..........................................................
for office use




- if so, please indicate whether you feel it is:
(a) too detailed .................................................
(b) needs to be more summarised ....................
(c) not sufficiently localised ............................
(d) too localised ...............................................
(e) other inadequacy (specify) .........................
(4) improving .............................................. .............
(5) not improving ....................................................
S ection  (d l F a c to rs  o f  chan g e .
21. Please indicate which o f  the following statements you would m ost agree with. 
Changes which have occurred in  NAFE since 1984 would :
(1) not have occurred w ithout M SC in v o lv e m en t....................................................
(2) have occurred w ithout M SC involvem ent but would have taken lo n g e r .......
(3) have occurred regardless o f  M SC in v o lv e m en t  .........................................
22. Please rank the following factors in  terms o f  their overall significance in  altering the delivery o f NAFE 
provision since 1984, adding any other factors you consider to have been im p ortan t:
Rank
(1) MSC involvement ..................................................................... ................................
(2) other national influences, e.g. Audit Commission, Joint Efficiency Study etc.................
(3) direct budgetary constraint through Rate Support Grant.............................................
(4) changes within the authority, e.g. in its political complexion, in its officer personnel etc.
(5) overall changes in economic, industrial and employment conditions in the 1980s............
(6) others (specify) .........................................................................................................
Section (e l Y T S
23. Do any of the following act as a managing agent for YTS :
(1) the education department ...........................................................................................
(2) other authority departments .......................................................................................
(3) authority colleges .......................................................................................................
(4) college departments ....................................................................................................
24. Please indicate if YTS has had any of die following effects on the authority's colleges :
(1) provision of new courses .....................................................................................
(2) new staff appointments in colleges ......................................................................
(3) new cross-departmental structures within colleges................................................
(4) adverse pressure on non-YTS courses ..................................................................
(5) others (specify) ............................................................. .......................................
for office use
S ec tio n  (D R e la tio n s h ip  w ith  M SC
25. Is there an officer appointed by the authority specifically to coordinate liaison with the MSC over a  range 
o f  programmes ?
YES |  NO I i f  yes, date post estab lished ...... ....................................
26. Please indicate the frequency o f  contact between the MSC Area Office and the authority education 
department over NAFE planning [tick as appropriate]: _____
(1) day-to -day  ....................................................................................................................................................  _____
(2) m ore often than once p e r w e e k .............................................................................................   ______
(3) m ore often  than once per m onth ........................................................................................................ ...........
(4) more often than once every three m o n th s .......................................................................................  ...........
(5) less often  than once every three m onths ...........................................................................................
27. Please indicate the frequency o f  direct contact, i f  any, between the M SC and the authority's colleges
in the three areas of NAFE planning, YTS and TVEI: NAFE planning YTS TVEI
(1) day-to -day  .................................................................
(2) m ore often than once p e r w e e k ..........................
(3) more often than once per month...................
(4) m ore often than once every three m o n th s ........
(5) less often than once every three m o n th s ..........
(6) no con tact ...............................................................
(7) do n 't know  ................................................................
28. For the same three programmes, does the authority:
(a) welcom e direct college-M SC c o n ta c t .....................
(b) discourage direct college-M SC c o n ta c t.................
(c) neither encourage nor discourage c o n ta c t..............
29. Please indicate which if  any o f  the contacts identified in  the following matrix regularly occur(Le. a t least 
three times per year) between the MSC the authority's colleges [tick appropriate box /  boxes] :












30. Can the authority's relationship with the local MSC Area Office best be described as:
(1) highly co-operative and productive working relationship.....................................
(2) good working relationship ................................................................................
(3) fair working relationship ...................................................................................
(4) poor relationship ..............................................................................................
(5) very poor relationship .......................................................................................
(6) distant and irrelevant relationship ..................................................................... .
1984-5 1988-9
for office use
31. Please indicate (a) w hether the authority and the local M SC Area Office have engaged in any s ta ff exchanges 
since 1984, and (b) if  so, the num ber o f  sta ff involved :
has occurred no. staff
(1) M SC staff have been tem porarily seconded to the education d e p artm e n t.........................
(2) LEA  sta ff have been tem porarily  seconded to  the A rea O f f ic e ...........................................
32. W hat level o f  support do you consider the authority to lend to each o f  the fo llow ing M SC objectives
in N A FE  : Strongly No Strongly
supports Supports view Opposes opposes
(1) Im proving further colleges' responsiveness to  em ployers' n e e d s .....
(2) R aising the profile  o f  N A FE  planning am ongst LEA  p r io r it ie s .....
(3) LEA s to develop a clearly  defined se t o f N A FE  o b jec tiv e s ...............
(4) E m phasis on m anpow er p lanning above other N A FE  objectives ....
(5) Tailoring shape and content o f  courses to  em ployers'/other 
c lien ts ' spec ific  req u irem en ts  ..................................................................
(6) Em phasis am ongst c lien t needs upon those o f  e m p lo y e rs ................
(7) D evelopm ent o f  an L E A  m arketing strategy fo r N A F E ...................
(8) H eavy authority  involvem ent in the collection o f  labour m arket 
in fo rm a tio n  .....................................................................................................
(9) Im proving  co llege  c o s t-e ffe c tiv e n e ss ............................. .....................
(10)Increasing  stu d en t-s ta ff ra tio s ..................................................................
(11) Increasing the scope and volum e o f  curriculum  and student data
co llec ted  by  L E A s .....................................................................................  ............. ............. ............. ............  ............
(12) G reater m onitoring and evaluation o f  N A FE  by  L E A s   ......
(13)D evelopm ent o f  new learning strategies e.g. open learning, 
sh o rt c o u rse s  ..................................................................................................
(14)G reater course flexibility e.g. in lengths, starting  dates, hours
p e r w eek  e tc ....................................................................................................
33. P lease indicate the nature o f  any problem s you have experienced in dealing w ith M SC  in the follow ing a re a s :
Major Minor No
(i) M SC Policy and Structure: problems problems problems
(1) in su ffic ien t c la rity  o f  M SC  o b jec tiv es ..................................................................  ............. ............. ............
(2) unpredictability  o f  M SC  dem ands, i.e. problem s o f  'goalpost-shifting'
a t sh o rt n o tice  ..................................................................................................................  ............. ............. ............
(3) incom patibilty  o f  M SC  planning tim etable with L E A  com m ittee c y c le s   ............. ............. ............
(4) incom patib ilty  o f M SC  and LEA  budgetary  c y c l e s ...........................................  ............. ............. ............
(5) rap id  M S C  s ta ff tu rn o v er ............................................................................................. ............. ............. ............
(6) uncertainty over c riteria  for allocation o f  Central R eserve F u n d ......................  ............. ............. ............
(7) insufficient integrartion o f  C R F projects w ith rest o f  N A FE  p la n n in g   ............. ............. ............
(8) insufficient assistance w ith set-up costs o f  p lan-rela ted  a c tiv it ie s ....................  ............. ............. .............
(9) specific  funding a llocated  for insufficient periods o f  t im e ................................. .............  ............. .............
(ii) Administrative Relationship Major Minor No
problems problems problems for office use
(1) lack  o f  experience/understanding o f  educational matters by MSC s ta ff .
(2) inaccurate assumptions made by MSC about past college performance
(3) rigidity  o f  M SC adherence to details o f  annual co n trac t.......................
(4) speed with which M SC expects LEAs and colleges to take decisions ..
(5) intervention in  local m atters by M SC head o f f ic e .................................
(6) intervention in  local matters by M SC regional o f f ic e .........................
(7) unnecessarily larger burden o f  administrative w o rk ..............................
(8) duplication o f  demands already made by other bodies, e.g.DES,HML .
(9) duplication o f  demands between different branches o f  M S C ...............
(10) unnecessarily large requirem ent for in fo rm a tio n ...................................
(please state which information, i f  any, proves
particularly problematic to collect)_______________________________
34. Please give details o f any other particular aspects or problems experienced by your authority has in  dealing 
with the M SC : ______________________________________________________________________________________
35. Notwithstanding the provisions of the current Education Reform Bill, do you feel the needs of post-16 
non-advanced provision would best be met:
(1) with continued MSC involvement in its present form................ .........................
(2) with continued MSC involvement in a modified form.........................................
(3) without continued MSC involvement .................................................................
- if so, would your authority prefer to see NAFE planning to be:
(a) left to individual LEAs .................................................................................... .
(b) overseen by an alternative national body............................................................
- what form of alternative body would be more preferable ? __________________
* * * * *
Please insert any additional comments you would like to make on any of the above areas:
Thank-you for your time and co-operation ip completing this questionnaire.
Please return it, enclosing if possible copies of your NAFE Plan and Programme and any other relevant material, to : 
Peter Wicks
Department of Geography 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE.
Tel: 01 405 7686 ext 2596.
